RAF operational requirements 1923-1939. by Sinnott, Colin Sydney
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








RAF operational requirements 1923-1939.
Sinnott, Colin Sydney
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
RAF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 1923-39 
Colin Sydney Sinnoft 
King's College London 





RAF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 1923-39 
Colin Sinnott 
ABSTRACT 
operational requirements defined the aircraft performance 
characteristics which the RAF saw as needed to implement 
its doctrine of air warfare. They initiated the process 
of specification-design-development-production of service 
aircraft. This thesis examines the evolution of the RAF's 
operational requirements for its home defence air force - for bombers to mount a deterrent counter offensive and for 
fighters to provide direct defence of Britain. 
The treatment is historical. The aim is to consider the 
management processes, policies and decisions relevant to 
operational requirements in the context of their own time. 
This approach shows the Air ministry in a more favourable 
light than have studies based upon inadequate research and 
undue hindsight. 
By tracing the development of operational requirements the 
thinking behind the RAF's quest for effective fighter and 
bomber aircraft is exposed. It is shown that the 
requirements set in the mid-1930s - which led to the 
aircraft with which the RAF entered and fought the Second 
World War - owed much to ideas and concepts of air warfare 
which had first been adopted many years earlier. 
The research gives a new perspective on the origins of 
many well-known British aircraft of the Second World War. 
It is found that commonly accepted descriptions of these 
are unsound or incomplete, and an authoritative account 
taken from primary sources is given. 
It is concluded that, although the RAF's perception of the 
pattern of future air warfare proved to be wrong, its 
operational requirement policies led to aircraft which 
were at least as good as those of other countries. 
Moreover, in many respects the RAF had sought aircraft 
performance characteristics which could be exploited in 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
When the Second World War started in September 1939 the 
RAF began hostilities with aircraft types which had been 
conceived, designed and developed many years earlier. 
They resulted from the RAF's perception of the aircraft it 
would need to carry out its duty of home defence against 
air attack. To the RAF home defence did not mean just the 
interception and destruction of attacking aircraft, for it 
did not believe that such a defence could be effective. 
It believed that the most effective defence against air 
attack was an offensive against an enemy's means to wage 
war - its industry and morale - and the home defence force 
was first planned to have twice as many bombers as 
fighters. 
This thesis is concerned with the translation of that 
overall policy into operational requirements, which is how 
the RAF expressed its view of the aircraft characteristics 
it needed to carry out its duties. Through tracing the 
development of operational requirements in the 1920s and 
1930s the thinking behind the RAF's quest for effective 
fighter and bomber aircraft is exposed, and this leads to 
a new perspective on the origins of many of the aircraft 
with which the RAF entered and fought the Second world 
War. It is found that commonly accepted descriptions of 
these origins are unsound, and an authoritative account 
taken from primary sources is given. 
The treatment is historical. The aim is to consider the 
Air Ministry policies and decisions in the context of 
their own time. The purpose is not to pass judgement from 
the standpoint of knowing what strategy or tactics proved 
to be effective, and those that did not. Nor is it to 
assess aircraft designs based on knowledge of those which 
Chapter I Introduction 
later proved successful, and to blame the Air Ministry for 
not knowing what the best line of development would turn 
out to be. It will be seen that this approach puts the 
Air Ministry in a more favourable light than do studies 
based upon hindsight. 
In the Official History on Design and Development of 
Weapons, Postan et all explain how analyses and 
discussions of operational requirements were the starting 
point in the process of specification-tender-design- 
development-production through which aircraft evolved into 
operational use. They represented an assessment of future 
needs, and of the operational possibilities which might 
follow from the exploitation of new or developing 
technology. In the. words of the official History, 
In the first place the tactical and strategic ideas 
of the Services had to be focussed (sic) on problems 
of aircraft or aircraft equipment. This meant 
considering and defining to what extent the quality 
of existing types met, or failed to meet, the 
requirements of the men who flew them and what 
further improvements in quality, i. e. speed , range, 
load etc., would be necessary. In the terminology of 
the R. A. F. administration this function was described 
as 1O. R. 1 (Operational Requirements) and expressed 
the 'user' point of view in the narrower sense of the 
term. 2 
Postan's second stage was design and development, and 
indeed that is the subject of the official History. He 
says of the first stage, 
The method in which the first of those functions, 
i. e. formulation of operational requirements, was 
fulfilled need not delay us long. The fact that it 
followed directly from the strategic notions of the 
Air Staff or from the tactical experience of the 
Royal Air Force made it an integral part of the Air 
Staff duties. 3 
12 
1 Postan, M. M., Hay, D., Scott, J. D., Design and Devetopment of Weapons, 1964 
2 ibid., page 45 
3 ibid., page 46 
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It is the performance of those duties which is the subject 
of this thesis, and, as Postan noted, it was not 
restricted to the Air Staff. This is brought out in a 
review of the management process for setting operational 
requirements in the Air Ministry in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In the 1930s the vital planning task of assessing future 
operational requirements was particularly complex. There 
had been no recent combat experience from which 
operational lessons might be learnt, and until late 1934 
there was uncertainty as to the potential enemy. Most 
crucially, very rapid advances in aeronautical engineering 
were taking place. These offered new operational 
possibilities, but also new threats, with the ever-present 
risk of commitment to a level of technology which might 
have become out-dated by the (unknown) time that 
hostilities arose. It was against that background that 
decisions were made which led to the majority of the home 
defence aircraft types which the RAF operated in the early 
years of the Second World War. Some of these types, 
albeit much modified, formed the backbone of the RAF 
throughout the war. 
A study of the development of operational requirements 
highlights debates within the Air Ministry on the expected 
operational and tactical effectiveness of the aircraft 
which were sought. It will be seen that, although the Air 
Ministry was fully aware of the need to exploit the air- 
fighting potential of advances in aeronautical engineering 
and armament, this did not alter its belief in the 
effectiveness of bombers and bombing. In consequence 
there was much concern with the problem of the direct 
defence of London against hostile bombing formations. 
This problem was not thought to have been solved even by 
the heavily-armed fighters developed in the 1930s. Fears 
that single-seat fighters would be ineffective in breaking 
up formations of bombers led to much effort being put into 
the search for a superior type of fighter. 
13 
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Faced with its presumed ineffectiveness in direct defence, 
the RAF adopted the strategy of a counter-offensive to 
deter or mitigate air attacks on London. It planned to 
implement this through precision bombing in daylight. 
When Germany replaced France as the potential enemy, this 
brought a requirement for deep penetrations of hostile air 
space, and it will be shown that it was the consequent 
need for high speed and heavy armament which led to a move 
towards heavier bombers in the 1930s - not a change in 
bombing policy. Paradoxically, the heavy night bombers of 
1941-45 were a product of these day bomber requirements - 
aided by plans for overload operation using exotic schemes 
for assisted take-off. It will be seen that when these 
were not forthcoming larger airfields were built, and that 
attainable fighter performance was also dictated by 
airfield size. 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Published material of some relevance to the current 
research is of three kinds - that dealing primarily with 
British air policy and strategy, that describing the 
operations and campaigns of the RAF, and that describing 
the development and operations of particular aircraft 
types. It is convenient to discuss the literature under 
those headings. They are not mutually exclusive, for 
often works on air policy stray into descriptions of 
aircraft development, and similarly the literature on RAF 
operations and on aircraft development frequently includes 
the authors' views on political developments and supposed 
RAF policy of the day. Such cross-referencing is often 
found to be inaccurate, and can lead to interpretations of 
policy based upon a false view of RAF aircraft and 
intentions for their development. 
14 
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One reason for this is that few works on aviation history 
make reference to operational requirements, either as the 
means by which the Air Staff sought to implement its 
doctrine of air warfare or as the origin of the aircraft 
which entered service in the RAF. It is commonly assumed 
that an Air Ministry specification (which it will become 
evident has sometimes not been read) was the genesis of a 
particular type. Many writers suggest that even these 
were produced only in response to an initiative from the 
aircraft industry. The present research will show that 
this was seldom, if ever, the case. 
The weakness of picking up the history of development of 
an aircraft type at the specification stage is that it can 
miss the Air Staff's intentions, often vital to the 
understanding of the specification and of the later 
development of the aircraft concerned. A consequence of 
this omission is that there is little recognition of the 
concepts of zone and interception fighters, of the demand 
for fast bombers to limit exposure to fighter attack in 
daylight, of the trade-off of armament and fuel weight 
against performance and endurance, and of the vital 
importance of the size of airfields. These are matters 
over which the Air Ministry agonised, and had to come to 
some decision, however imperfect it can be said to have 
been in retrospect. In discussing these decisions in the' 
following chapters reference will be made where 
appropriate to such errors and misunderstandings in the 
literature. 
An incomplete description of the RAF's perception of the 
aircraft it needed is of little consequence to the vast 
majority of works on the RAF (except as a source of 
polemic bias), because they are primarily concerned with 
the development of established aircraft types and/or their 
operational history. However, a few writers have based 
their criticisms of RAF policy on the supposed decision- 
making process and decisions concerning operational 
15 
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requirements. Misunderstandings or errors here can lead 
to unsound conclusions concerning policy, management, and 
aircraft development. Literature of this kind is 
discussed in the following section. It is followed by 
comments on some common errors that are found in campaign 
and aircraft histories. 
1.2.1 Air Policv and Strateqv 
A publication which leans heavily on the consideration of 
operational requirements to argue a case for a supposed 
change in RAF policy is British Air Strategy between the 
Wars by Malcolm Smith. 4 Smith asserts that during the 
years of re-armament in the 1930s the RAF moved from a 
policy of "strategic interception" to one of out-and-out 
strategic bombing, and that this followed from a need to 
standardize equipment so as to obtain maximum production. 
He says, 
The Air Staff was then forced to examine in more 
detail than previously the operational requirements 
necessary to execute their theory of air warfare. 5 
Smith writes that in the 1930s the Government decided to 
build up the air strike force as a deterrent to Germany, 
and that technical developments in aircraft design made 
specialisation of aircraft roles increasingly essential - 
a doubtful assertion. He claims that production problems 
forced the RAF to limit the number of types of aircraft it 
could develop, although they had wanted to keep their 
options open to maintain flexibility, which their theory 
of strategic interception demanded. Smith says, 
Faced with a decision on which role they considered 
the most important, the Air Staff plumped for the 
long-range heavy bomber. In these ways, the 
admirably flexible policy of strategic interception 
was to be gradually simplified and whittled down to a 
16 
4 Smith, M., British Air Strategy between the Wars, 1984 
5 ibid., page 231 
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much more rigid and specific war aim in the years 
after Trenchard left office. 6 
Whether or not the Air Staff did consciously alter its 
bombing policy is not the subject of this thesis. But 
whether or not the formulation of the Air Staff's views of 
the operational capabilities it sought from its aircraft 
was driven by such a change is highly relevant. Smith 
discusses this question in his Chapter 8, entitled 
"Equipment and Production poliCyll. 7 Bearing in mind that 
Smith is suggesting that technical considerations had a 
major influence on Air Staff policy formulation, it is 
unfortunate that this key chapter has many technical 
inaccuracies. For example, the second page includes the 
statement that "The standard RAF aircraft of the early 
1930s was an all-wooden biplane with air-cooled engine, 
open cockpit, and fixed undercarriage. " 
In fact, as discussed in chapter 4, the Air Ministry 
adopted a metal aircraft policy in 1925, and by 1930 there 
were no wooden aircraft in front-line service. Smith 
contradicts his reference to air-cooled engines by then 
mentioning the Hawker Fury and Hart as examples of early 
1930s aircraft; both had liquid-cooled engines. He refers 
to 11R. Fedden of Rolls Royce" as contributing to the 
Supermarine S. 6, "three-times winner" of the Schneider 
Trophy contest. 8 Fedden's name was synonymous with 
Bristol engines and he never worked for Rolls-Royce; 9 the 
three successive Schneider Trophy wins were by the 
Supermarine S. 5 (Napier engine), S. 6 and S. 6B. 10 
These errors of fact by Smith do not bode well for his 
appraisal of the development of operational requirements 
for bombers and from which Smith deduces a major change in 
RAF doctrine. However, the subject of Smith's book is 
6 ibid., page 75 
7 ibid., page 229 
8 ibid., page 238 
9 Gunston, BiLt, By Jupiter: the Life of Sir Roy Fedden, 1978 
10 Barker, R., The Schneider Trophy Races, 1971 
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British Air Strategy, and changes in that can reasonably 
be expected to be reflected more in the planned numbers of 
aircraft of different types rather than in the 
characteristics of each type, not least because these 
characteristics were always changing to take advantage of 
improvements in aviation technology. on that basis the 
successive expansion plans for the RAF from 1934 to 1938 
certainly indicated a shift of intention towards heavier 
bombers, 11 but that was driven by the technical problems 
of bombing Germany rather than France. 
The current research will show that in 1937-38 the RAF did 
indeed seek a standard bomber for all roles, but not a 
role to suit a standard bomber as suggested by Smith. 
The development of the Air Staff's operational 
requirements for bombers is described and discussed later 
in this thesis. It will suffice to note here that Smith 
under-estimates the consequences for bomber design of the 
range that was required, particularly when long range was 
coupled with deep penetration of hostile air space. When 
Berlin replaced Paris as the target, bomber aircraft were 
going to get much heavier, whatever the bombing policy. 
Divine's The Broken WincT12 also uses examples of the RAF's 
aircraft development policy to make a case for a 
discussion of wider issues; in his case a general claim of 
incompetence against the Air Ministry. But, like Smith, 
his citing of technical issues is unsound and in places 
verges on the ridiculous. He makes unsubstantiated 
comparisons with other air forces and cites requirements 
which did not exist. Typical of the former is his claim 
that, 
The Air Force that Sir John Salmond inherited [he 
replaced Trenchard as CAS on 1st January 19301 was 
cocooned in the era of the fixed undercarriage 
fabric-covered biplane. 
18 
11 Smith, Expansion Schemes A-M, pages 328-335 
12 Divine, D., The Broken Wing, 1966 
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The Air Forces of other nations were already emerging 
from it. 13 
He does not indicate which other nations these were. None 
are known to the present writer, nor more pertinently to 
Richard Fairey, a leading aircraft designer of the 1920s 
and 1930s. His view that in 1931 British military 
aircraft enjoyed "technical precedence,, is quoted shortly. 
An example of Divine's disregard for facts is his 
discussion of the origin of the RAF's monoplane fighters. 
He says that, 
Early in 1930 Sir Hugh Dowding, then Air Member for 
Research and Development, decided to utilise part of 
his appropriation for the design of a fast 
experimental aircraft in the fighter range, 
and that this "requirement" indicated "an improvement in 
the position of the younger fighter school. ii% But 
Dowding was not appointed as Air Member for Supply and 
Research until 1st September 193015 (there was no post of 
AMRD until 1935), and as AOC Fighting Area, Air Defence of 
Great Britain (ADGB), before then he had no appropriation 
for experimental aircraft. Moreover, discussion of the 
operational requirements which led to specification F. 7/30 
(to which Divine is referring) was initiated in 1929 (see 
chapter 5). Divine'then criticises this specification on 
the grounds that it called for no "shape", asked for a low 
landing speed, and "only 250 m. p. h, arriving at that 
figure presumably by adding 20 m. p. h. to the previous 
requirement. 106 
Specification F. 7/30 was for a Bulldog replacement, and 
that "previous requirement" had a maximum speed of 173 
mph. 17 As discussed in chapter 5, the Air Staff actually 
13 ibid., page 179 
14 ibid., pages 179-180 
15 this and other appointments are taken from the Air Force Lists 
16 Divine, page 180 
17 PRO: AIR 2/2815, Singte Seat Fighter - Low Wing Monoplan (Bultdog Reptacement) Ty 
Requirements SDecn. F. 7/30, DCAS to CAS, 31.5.30 
19 
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sought 215 mph for F. 7/30, and the AMSR's Department, 
first under Higgins and then under Dowding, pushed this 
down to 195 mph. Divine also seems unaware that the day 
and night operational capability specified by the Air 
Staff for the standard RAF fighter had always required a 
relatively low landing speed (F. 7/30 actually included the 
highest yet allowed). 
Divine suggests that F. 7/30 indicated Air Ministry 
bureaucratic incompetence in the same way as did his 
earlier comparison between the Fairey Fawn (an over- 
specified failure) and the Fairey Fox (a private venture 
success). But this is a "broken stick" with which to 
beat the Air Ministry in the 1930s, for in February 1931 
Richard Fairey himself said of the Air Ministry's 
relations with manufacturers that, 
it may be assumed from the technical precedence which 
this country at present enjoys that for the time 
being at least our system is working quite well, and 
that the military and technical sides are cooperating 
successf ully. 18 
Divine also appears not to understand the role of the ADGB 
Command, for he says that "The air element of A. D. G. B. and 
in due course Fighter Command were through the greater 
part of the Itween war period the step-children of the 
R. A. F. 11.19 But the "air element" of the ADGB was 
primarily intended to be a bomber force, inherited by 
Bomber Command in 1936. 
other misrepresentations of Air Ministry policy - and 
staffing - in The Broken Wing will be noted in later 
chapters. 
Higham is a writer on British military history who also 
uses inaccurate technical details and unsubstantiated 
statements as evidence for his criticism of the Air 
18 Fairey, C. R., "The Future of Aeroptane Design for the Services", JRUSI, Vot 76, page 
564 
19 Divine, page 185 
20 
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Ministry's role in aircraft development. In The Military 
Intellectuals in Britain20, he writes that "official 
specifications for military aircraft in Britain have all 
too often lagged behind what designers could produce five 
years before the type was due to be operational. 112i 
Higham says that evidence for this statement was to be 
given in a later work on Production and Politics (which 
cannot be found). A gem from the Military Intellectuals 
is that the Hurricane was "Designed to a specification 
calling for two fixed guns in the fuselage". 22 In truth 
it was not designed to a specification at all, and had 
provision for four guns. 
In the same author's article on "Quantity vs Quality", the 
remark is made vis-a-vis the lack of a major enemy, that 
"One result of this in Britain was the dropping of the 
large bomber from procurement programs for the decade 
1922-32 and the concentration on some Home Defence 
designs, but more on general purpose aircraft. 1123 This 
raises the suspicion that Higham does not understand the 
RAF's interpretation of home defence, for large bombers 
were procured for the home defence air force in the period 
1922-32, and the RAF did not concentrate on general 
purpose aircraft, as is demonstrated in chapter 4. 
A more recent book by Scot Robertson24 follows Divine in 
questioning the competence of the Air Ministry. In a 
chapter on "Equipment Policy and Aircraft Development", he 
claims that, "the operational requirements of the 
peacetime RAF did not call for highly capable aircraft, 1125 
and refers to, 
the influence that the RAF's particular strategic 
theory had upon the perception of operational 
20 Higham, R., The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939,1966 
21 ibid., page 19 
22 ibid., page 27 
23 Higham, R., "Quantity vs Quality; The Impact of Changing Demand on the British 
Aircraft industry, 1900-196011, Business History Review, Vol XLII No. 4 page 443 
24 Robertson, Scot, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Docjt-r-i-n-eý _1919-1939,1995 25 ibid., page 65 
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requirements. How else can one explain the alarming 
tendency for the Air Staff to issue specifications 
for aircraft of such limited performance 
capability? 26 
He claims that because an admission of the effectiveness 
of fighters would undermine the theory of the strategic 
offensive, and with it the independence of the RAF, "they 
did not fully support research and development in fighter 
technology. 1127 It will be. r. seen that the opposite was 
the case. 
Robertson also accuses the Air Staff of technical 
incompetence - of not understanding "the complex. issue of 
aircraft development". 28 His own lack of understanding of 
such issues is encapsulated in the remark that, "The state 
of technology at the time [1928] was such that performance 
in one sphere was generally 'bought, at the expense of 
performance in another. 1129 When was this not so? It is 
precisely the compromise which has to be struck between 
many individually desirable performance aims which has 
always dominated aircraft development. 
In Robertson's concluding chapter he says that, "Another 
criticism, one that is less speculative, is the tendency 
in the RAF to issue specifications for general purpose 
machines for much of the inter-war period. iiW He says 
that "Research and Development within the RAF and the Air 
Ministry seemed to aim at the lowest standard commensurate 
with the RAF's commitments of the time - those being "Air 
Control" in the Empire. 113l The absurdity of these 
statements will be evident throughout this thesis. 
The examples taken from Smith, Divine, Higham and 
Robertson of unsubstantiated claims that the Air 
26 ibid., page 65 
27 ibid., page 67 
28 ibid., page 75 
29 ibid., page 70 
30 ibid., page 159, itaLics added 
31 ibid., page 160 
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Ministry's aspirations for aircraft performance lagged 
behind that which was possible are not uncommon in works 
on British aircraft development in the inter-war years. 
They could charitably be attributed to what Edgerton has 
described as comparison "not with that of other countries, 
but with an idealised model of technological and 
industrial development". 32 A less charitable view is that 
put by Richard Fairey when he considered the possible 
evolution of the 1929 Supermarine Schneider trophy winner 
into a fighter, and of a long-range "record breaker" into 
a bomber. He commented on his conclusions that, "These 
results may appear rather meagre and disappointing 
compared with the phantasy that can be conjured up by the 
imaginative journalist. 1133 
Divine, Higham and Robertson have used unsubstantiated 
versions of Air Ministry policy for aircraft procurement 
to support criticisms of its competence. They have little 
to say of positive value to the current research. Smith's 
account of the development of the RAF and of British air 
policy up to 1935 has been useful as background, although 
the prime source used for this purpose is Hyde's British 
Air Policy between the warS34 (recommended in RAF Records 
at the PR035). Dean's personal account in The RAF in Two 
World WarS36 covers the same ground from a different 
perspective. 
1.2.2 RAF Campaign Histories 
The literature on RAF operations in the Second World War 
is relevant to the present research in two respects. 
First, some authors include a brief history of the 
aircraft involved in the operations they describe, and it 
32 Edgerton, D., England and the AeropLane, 1991, page 19 
33 Fairey, page 576 
34 Hyde, H. Montgomery, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1976 
35 Fowler, S., Elliot, P., Nesbit, R. C., Goulter, C., RAF Records at the PRO, 1994 
36 Dean, Sir Maurice, The RAF in Two World Wars, 1979 
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is of interest to see how these compare with that found in 
the current research. Second, one purpose of the current 
research is to contrast the operations which the RAF 
encountered early in the Second World War with those that 
had been anticipated in the requirements it stipulated for 
its aircraft. For this latter purpose the literature has 
been useful, but many descriptions of aircraft development 
are inadequately researched. 
Descriptions of the development of the fighter aircraft in 
service in 1939 often begin with the supposed origin of 
the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire in 1934. 
Wood and Dempster, 37 Terraine, 38 and Richards, 39 are 
examples. In chapters 5 and 6 it will be shown that such 
descriptions are contradictory and at variance with Air 
Ministry proposals and actions at the time. 
Terraine provides an example of the errors which can arise 
from dating aircraft development from an apparently 
relevant specification. In listing the achievements of 
Sir Edward Ellington, Chief of the Air Staff from 1933-37, 
he identifies specification F. 5/34 as leading to the 
Hurricane and Spitfire, 40 which, as will be shown, was not 
so. Moreover, far from Ellington deserving credit for 
F. 5/34, he caused its postponement in favour of his own 
amazing idea for a multi-turret fighter, discussed in 
chapter 6.3. 
Terraine also joins many authors (as discussed in chapter 
6) in accusing senior officers of resisting the move 
towards increased firepower, in which the eight-gun 
fighters were an important step. Yet, as will be shown, 
this need and steps to implement it were initiated by 
senior officers (Trenchard included) as early as 1927. 
37 Wood, D. and Dempster, D., The Narrow Margin, 1961 
38 Terraine, J., The Right of the Line, 1988, 
39 Richards, D., Royal Air Force 1939-45, VoL 1,1974, 
40 Terraine, page 16 
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As regards the origin of the bombers operated in the war, 
it is often assumed in the literature that, as the RAF 
adopted a night bombing offensive, its bombers were 
planned for that purpose. That this was not so is shown 
in chapters 8 and 9. 
1.2.3 Specific Aircraft Types 
Much of the literature on individual aircraft types is 
primarily concerned with their wartime operations, and has 
nothing significant to say about the operational 
requirements the aircraft were originally designed to 
fulfil. But some writers purport to give the history of 
development of the eponymous aircraft as well as its 
operational record. A common problem is that they do not 
go beyond, and in many cases not even to, Air ministry 
specifications, despite claims to the contrary. They pick 
up the story they tell without having seen the first two 
or three chapters - but knowing the conclusion. 
Many examples of this omission are noted in later 
chapters. Perhaps its most extreme form is the recently 
published The British Aircraft Specifications File 1920- 
49, which purports to give a summary of all specifications 
in that period. Yet the authors, Meekoms and Morgan, 
claim that, "access to detailed copies of British aircraft 
specifications prior to 1936 is a rare event. iW In fact 
these documents, and many related Air Ministry papers, are 
readily available. They are the primary sources on which 
this thesis is based. 
Meekoms and Morgan say that their data is based upon the 
Putnam series of publications which cover the aircraft 
produced by individual firms. These may be accurate in 
their physical descriptions of aircraft produced, but, as 
25 
41 Meekoms, K. J. & Morgan, E. B., The British Aircraft Specifications File 1920-49,1994, 
page 7 
Chapter I Introduction 
will be shown, some are unreliable in their references to 
Air Ministry policy and to specifications. The same 
comment applies to F. K. Mason's The British Fighter42 and 
The British Bomber43.. 
There are exceptions to the above general comments on 
specialist books. Price'S44 study of the evolution of the 
Spitfire from the seminal specification F. 7/30, through 
the Supermarine Type 224 to the last Griffon engined 
Marks, deals comprehensively with the early stages of 
development. His research refutes the oft expressed view 
that the Spitfire was a private venture by Vickers 
Supermarine. Yet the biography of R. J. Mitchell, edited 
by Mitchell's son, makes the claim that development from 
the Vickers Supermarine Type 224 to the Spitfire was 
funded by the company, even though the writer was aware of 
Price's work, and corresponded with him over the question 
of the date of the first flight of the Spitfire. 45 But 
then G. Mitchell also joins many others whose research 
failed to pick up the fact that F. 7/30 was issued in 
October 1931, and not in 1930. 
A reliable publication on RAF bomber development during 
the 1930s is Goulding and Moyes' Bomber Command and its 
Aircraft 1936-40.46 Their account does not deal with some 
early stages in Air Ministry thinking, and is not 
referenced, but it is very largely confirmed by the 
primary sources on which this thesis is based. The Air 
Historical Branch Narrative on the Pre-War Evolution of 
Bomber Command47 also covers this subject. It is 
referenced to Air Ministry papers, which, although not 
directly traceable from these references, are those used 
in later chapters of this thesis. 
42 Mason, F. K., The British Fighter since 1912,1992 
43 Mason, F. K., The British Bomber since 1914,1994 
44 Price, A., The Spitfire Story, 1992, (first pubtished 1982) 
45 Mitchelt, G., R. J. Mitchett, 1986, page 132 
46 Goutding, J. and Moyes, P., Bomber Command and its Aircraft 1936-40,1975 
47 PRO: AIR 41/39, The RAF in the Bombing offensive against Germany. Vot I Pre-War 
Evotution of Bomber Command 
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It is likely that a prime source of misrepresentations of 
Air Ministry aircraft development policy - of which 
further examples are given in later chapters - is the 
official History of'the Design and Development of 
Weapons, 48 which was published before Air Ministry files 
were open to the public. It has been noted above that the 
authors of that volume took the view that the formulation 
of operational requirements, "need not delay us long". It 
may be this neglect which has led to some remarkably 
incorrect accounts of the origin of many well-known 
aircraft, both by Postan et al and other writers. In 
later chapters these are contrasted with the actual events 
of the time. 
1.2.4 Technical Background 
An important feature of the current research is to relate 
the RAF's assessment of its operational requirements to 
those which it was technically feasible to meet at the 
time, and to note the impact of advances in aviation 
technology on the RAF's perception of how air warfare 
would develop. In pursuance of these issues reference has 
been made to a number of works on aviation technology. 
For general technical background Price's Fighter 
Aircraft49 and Bomber AircraftSO give an excellent review 
of the state-of-the-art of aircraft design at the 
beginning of the War in 1939 and of developments 
thereafter. 
Modern academic textbooks on aviation science and 
engineering include advances which were not available to 
the Air Ministry and aircraft designers in the 1920s and 
1930s. To avoid a critique based upon such hindsight the 
48 Postan, Hay and Scott 49 Price, A., Fighter Aircraft, 1989 
50 Price, A., Bomber Aircraft, 1989 
27 
Chapter I Introduction 
author has sought standard works of those times. However, 
it would be unwise to assume that Air Ministry staff 
(particularly serving officers) and the aircraft 
industry's design teams were fully aware of the advances 
in theory that were then taking place, or indeed that 
these were of much direct use to practical designers. 
Von Mises' Theory of Flight5l is a much respected 
textbook. It was first published in English in 1945, but 
was derived from his earlier publications in the mid-1930s 
and his many years of lecturing on the subject. It 
contains a section on "Historical Notes" which briefly 
describes and dates the origins of the understanding of 
airflow and the development of mathematical formulations 
aimed at calculating the aerodynamic loads on an aircraft 
which were known at that time. Anderson's recent A 
History of Aerodynamics and Its Impact on Flying 
MachineS52 covers this subject in detail up to the present 
time. Although great advances were made between the wars, 
these did not this succeed in producing direct design 
tools - these had to await the use of the techniques of 
numerical analysis coupled with the power of modern 
computers. 
on the other hand aircraft performance calculations, based 
upon estimated or measured aerodynamic loads, presented a 
much simpler problem. Von Mises notes that the first 
competent applications appeared in the years immediately 
preceding the 1914-18 war. The state-of-the-art at the 
end of that war is given by Bairstow. 53 my bibliography 
includes some books on aircraft performance calculations 
published in the 1920s and 1930s, but these were attempts 
to simplify the calculations and did not add to the 
already well-established theory. They may well illustrate 
the methods used in the Air Ministry in their analysis of 
the potential performance of aircraft projects. 
51 von Mises, R., Theory of Ftight, 1959 
52 Anderson, J. D., A History of Aerodynamics and its impact on Ftying Machines, 1997 53 Bairstow, L., APPtied Aerodynamics, 1920 
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1.3 SOURCES 
Since the aim is to establish an authoritative account of 
the RAF's perception of the home defence aircraft it 
needed in the 1920s. and 1930s, it is not surprising that 
the major primary sources were found at the Public Record 
Office, Kew (PRO). It is there that many of the working 
papers of the Air Ministry are archived. In the AIR 
classes there are papers covering the exposition of the 
Air Staff's policy views on the use of air power, the 
discussions which led to the setting of operational 
requirements, and the translation of these into the 
specification of particular aircraft types. Surprisingly, 
and regrettably, the Indexes do not have an entry 
, operational Requirements', even though this jargon was in 
use in the Air Ministry in the 1920s, and in 1934 a 
section of the Air Staff was established with that title. 
This was later upgraded to a Directorate, and from 1934 
there was an Air Ministry Operational Requirements 
Committee. 
Papers on a particular aircraft's "Type Requirements" are 
relatively easy to find, and these usually include the 
relevant specification, but background information on the 
thinking which preceded the specification stage of 
development, or which did not lead to a specification, has 
required much reading of files with superficially 
unpromising titles scattered amongst many AIR classes. 
The Public Record Office guide to documents pertaining to 
the Second World War54 describes class AIR 2 as containing 
the "registered correspondence of the Air Ministry, 
covering the whole range of British air administration and 
related topics". Complementary unregistered files are in 
class AIR 20. These two classes have proved to be a 
29 
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valuable source of information for the present research. 
It is AIR 2 which contains Type Requirements files from 
the mid-1920s onwards. 
PRO class AIR 5 is not included in the guide to the Second 
World War, no doubt because it is mainly a selection of 
older papers; it is referred to briefly in RAF Records at 
the PRO. 55 Nevertheless, it has been a useful source for 
the current research, with a number of important files on 
the business of the Air Fighting and Bombing Committees. 
Class AIR 6, "Records of Meetings of the Air Board and Air 
Council,, has provided material on some aspects of the 
development of policy and of war Plans. 
Classes AIR 8 and AIR 9 are said to contain the papers of 
the Chief of the Air Staff and of the Director of Plans 
respectively. The former contains useful background 
material, and the CAS's copies of papers which may also 
appear elsewhere. For the inter-war years AIR 9 covers 
much more than is indicated by the PRO's guide ("strategic 
and operational planning records"). For much of that 
period there was no post of Director of Plans; "Plans" 
came within the Directorate of Operations and 
Intelligence, and AIR 9 contains many files on policy with 
respect to aircraft, on type requirements, and some 
Minutes of the Operational Requirements Committee. 
Other PRO AIR classes which have provided material are AIR 
10 (publications), AIR 14 (Bomber Command), AIR 16 
(Fighter Command, and some pre-1936 papers of Air Defence 
of Great Britain Command). AIR 41 contains the Air 
Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, narratives on the 
RAF in the Second World War. 
The PRO's AVIA class contains files of the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production which was set up in May 1940. Some of 
30 
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these include material dated before the formation of MAP, 
particularly the papers of Sir Wilfred Freeman. 
A number of other collections of relevant material have 
been consulted. The Air Historical Branch of the Ministry 
of Defence has copies of most aircraft specifications 
issued since 1930 - useful for filling some gaps in the 
records held by the PRO. The libraries of the Institute 
of Historical Research and of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society have collections of reference and of secondary 
material which have been valuable. The RAeS Library has 
an extensive collection of works on aircraft and aviation 
history, with books, pamphlets and manuals, its own and 
other journals, dating back to the early years of 
aviation. Of particular value has been its comprehensive 
stock of "enthusiasts" books, which although often of 
doubtful accuracy on matters of Air Ministry policy have 
provided pointers to aircraft which were built, both 
British and foreign, and to their operational history. 
Secondary sources have been used for the political and 
strategic background to this study of the development of 
the RAF's operational requirements, but as explained in 
section 1.2 above and further illustrated in later 
chapters, they are of doubtful value on that subject 
itself. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
The RAF's assessment of the aircraft characteristics it 
required was heavily influenced by the development of its 
doctrine of a. ir warfare in the early 1920s. This period 
also saw the establishment of concepts of direct defence 
against air attack which had a lasting influence on 
assessments of the tactical role and potential of 
fighters. These issues, together with other relevant 
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political, strategic and technological events of the 1920S 
and 1930s, are reviewed in chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 outlines the organisation of the Air Ministry in 
relation to responsibility for operational requirements 
and specifications. It describes the procedure for the 
initiation and evaluation of new types of aircraft, and 
the slow and uncertain evolution of an administrative 
system for managing the formulation of operational 
requirements. It explains how the somewhat double-headed 
system of the 1920s, whereby the Air Staff's views could 
be superseded by the Air Member for Supply and Research's 
control of the annual Experimental Aircraft Programme, was 
resolved in 1933-34; the first steps being the 
establishment of an operational Requirements Committee and 
an Operational Requirements section in the Air Staff. 
The core of the research is chapters 4 to 9. The 
treatment is chronological, for this brings out both the 
evolution of thinking and the correct sequence of events - 
vital to an understanding of the beginnings of each 
aircraft type. 
The development of operational requirements from 1922 to 
1930 is discussed in chapter 4. It was in this period 
that the first steps were taken to implement the RAF's 
doctrine of home defence through the specification of the 
aircraft types required. It is shown that in the late 
1920s some developments were initiated which had an 
important influence on the key decisions of the early 
1930s. 
Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 deal in depth with the development 
of operational requirements in the years 1930 to 1936. It 
was in those years that most of the aircraft with which 
the RAF fought the Second World War were initiated. It is 
shown how the Air Ministry responded both to emerging 
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technical developments and to a fundamental shift in the 
prospect of war and in the potential enemy. 
The policies and decisions which led to the Hurricane and 
Spitfire are discussed in chapter 5, where it is shown 
that there was a significant move to make maximum speed 
the prime requirement of RAF fighters. This requirement 
that was met through the Ministry's high-speed research 
aircraft programme, which was a follow up to the Schneider 
Trophy successes of 1927-31. Chapter 6 discusses fighter 
armament development, both for the eight-gun fighters and 
for the little known projects which culminated in the 
Defiant. 
Bomber development in the early to mid-1930s is discussed 
in chapters 7 and 8. France was seen as the potential 
enemy in the earlier years, and it was this which 
conditioned the operational requirements which led to the 
Battle, Wellington and Hampden. When Germany was 
recognised as a threat the range and speed sought for 
bombers increased. This process is first traced through 
the development of operational requirements for the 
Whitley and Warwick, and then, in chapter 8, to its full 
exposition in the 1936 requirements which led to the 
Stirling, Halifax, Manchester - and ultimately the 
Lancaster. 
Chapter 9 looks at the development of operational 
requirements in the years immediately preceding the 
outbreak of war. This was a time of rapid expansion of 
the RAF, and of the Air Staff's Operational Requirements 
organisation, yet little emerged that was not overtaken by 
later wartime expediency. The only new type that evolved 
in those years and which served in its intended home 
defence role was the Mosquito. 
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experience of the aircraft which had been defined in the 
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early and mid-1930s from the point of view of their role 
and achievements as compared with that envisaged earlier. 
It is well known that many expectations were proved wrong, 
and the chapter concludes with a brief consideration of 
the operational requirements that might have been 
specified had the key assumption which under underlay RAF 
strategy - the viability of self-defending formations of 
day bombers - not been made. 
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2. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 
operational requirements were formulated by the Air 
Ministry as part of its response to the duties placed upon 
it by the Government, and thus necessarily took account of 
the national and international political situation which 
faced the Government. The first part of this chapter 
outlines those events which were of some significance to 
the RAF's specification of operational requirements. They 
were the fears of French air power which arose in 1922 - 
which both preserved and re-vitalised the RAF, the opening 
of the possibility of war through the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931, the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1932- 
34, and the emergence of Germany as a threat from 1933-34. 
These events had a general, and sometimes specific, 
influence on the Air Staff's view of the operational 
capability it sought from its aircraft. Their impact is 
briefly mentioned below, and discussed in detail as 
appropriate in the following chapters. 
The converse to the influence of political affairs on the 
operational requirements of the RAF was the influence on 
politics of the military potential of developments in 
aviation. The Air Staff's advice to Government on the 
scale of unpreventable air attack on London, and on the 
catastrophic effect it would have, was a major component 
of the background to British European policy in the 1920s 
and 1930s. In the course of discussions on the 
"Continental Air Menace" in 1922, Lord Balfour commented 
that, 
Day after day, night after night, the capital of the 
Empire would be subject to an unremitting bombardment 
of a kind which no city effectively acting as the 
military, naval and administrative centre of a 
country engaged in a life and death struggle, has 
ever had to endure. 1 
1 PRO: AIR 9169, FoLio 13, Extracts from papers in which the CAS stressed priority of 
the air menace over alt other defence probtems; Note by Lord BaLfour, 29th May 1922 
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The second part of this chapter describes and discusses 
the doctrine of air warfare which was adopted to combat 
this fear, and the RAF's interpretation of that doctrine 
into a strategy for home defence against air attack. 
2.1 POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The political issue of most concern to the RAF in the 
early 1920s was the long-running battle over the existence 
of a separate air f orce. Hyde2 and Dean3 have described 
the political and military manoeuvring whereby the Army 
and Navy sought, unsuccessfully, to gain control of 
British air forces. 
The political event in the 1920s of most relevance to the 
current research was the worsening of diplomatic relations 
with France in 1922. Concern over the size of the French 
Air Force led to the decision to strengthen the RAF, for 
it had been much reduced in size after the end of the 
1914-18 war. There followed two Home Defence Expansion 
Schemes. That of 1922 for twenty-three squadrons was soon 
superseded by the better known 1923 Scheme for fifty-two 
squadrons. 4 The analysis of the role of the RAF initiated 
by these expansion schemes went far to determine the 
characteristics of the aircraft which the RAF sought for 
many years. 
The fifty-two squadron Scheme followed from the 
deliberations of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence chaired by Lord Salisbury. The Salisbury 
Committee's terms of reference were to inquire into the 
co-operation and correlation between the Army, Navy and 
Air Force, and inter alia, into "the standard to be aimed 
at for defining the strength of the Air Force for purposes 
2 Hyde, Chapter II 
3 Dean, pages 33-37 
4 PRO: AIR 5/955, Home Defence Expansion Scheme of the Royal Air Force. 1922-1923 
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of home and imperial defence. 115 The Committee issued an 
interim report in June 1923 which included the 
recommendation that, 
British air must include a Home Defence Air Force of 
sufficient strength adequately to protect us against 
air attack by the strongest air force within striking 
distance of this country. 6 
The Salisbury Committee's recommendations were endorsed by 
the Cabinet, and in June 1923 a statement was made to 
Parliament that "In the first instance the Home Defence 
Force should consist of 52 squadrons". 7 This number was 
explained in a Committee of Imperial Defence paper which 
set out the Provisional Home Defence Scheme. It stated 
that, "The object is to attain, and maintain, approximate 
numerical equality with the French Independent Striking 
Force. 118 The Air Staff was to explain that, 
At the present time France is the only power which 
maintains a powerful air force within striking 
distance of Great Britain. 
The estimated potentiality of the French air force, 
therefore, is used as a basis for calculating the air 
defence measures necessary for this country. 9 
It will be seen that this consideration shaped the Air 
Staff's views on operational requirements, and on airfield 
location, long after any thought that war with France was 
conceivable, because some basis for defence planning was 
required. The air force of the United States also had a 
problem in deciding what conflict to plan for, and also 
chose what in retrospect seems a most unlikely scenario. 
Greer says that, "The usual enemies postulated were a 
5 Hyde, page 119 
6 ibid., page 134 
7 ibid., page 136 
8 PRO: AIR 8/73, Progress of the Home Defence Expansion Scheme, Item 1, C. I. D. 120-A, 
3rd November 1923, Provisional Scheme for the Expansion of the Royal Air Force for Home 
Defence, Appendix A, section 1 
9 9/69 Folio 24, Air Staff Memorandum on Air Attack on Great Britain, Part I Scale of 
Attack, 28th May 1924, para. 1 
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coalition of European powers headed by Great Britain, 
possibly in combination with Japan. 1110 
The planned strategy for the fifty-two squadron force and 
its composition are discussed later in this chapter. It 
was specifically for home defence. The RAF had other 
duties and additional squadrons to fulfil them. The 
"First Report on War Organisation", prepared in 1934, 
listed the RAF's commitments as: 
A minor emergency overseas 
A war in the Far East 
Defence of India 
Home Defence and Locarnoll 
Only the fourth item could involve the question of home 
defence, but it was this which was the first priority12 
and predominant in the assessment of the operational 
requirements which the RAF specified for its aircraft. 
Contrary to the claims of some writers, "Air Control" 
operations in Iraq and on the North West frontier of India 
had no influence on aircraft performance requirements for 
home defence. This point is discussed in chapter 4. Such 
operations may have encouraged belief in the effectiveness 
of air power, although as will be seen, the RAF needed no 
encouragement in that direction. 
2.1.1 The Years of Expectation of Peace 
In 1923 the intention was to complete the Home Defence 
Scheme within five years, and there was no change in this 
intention when Labour replaced the conservatives in 
Government late in 1923.13 However in 1925, when the 
Conservative party had returned to power, the Government 
10 Greer, T. H., The Devetopment of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm. 1917-1941., 1955, 
page 30 11 PRO: AIR 6/22, Air Councit. Precis No. 565,22nd October 1934, para. 1 
12 ibid., para. 67 
13 Hyde, page 152 
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believed that the international situation had improved 
following the admission of Germany to the League of 
Nations, and the pending signature of the Treaty of 
Locarno. Completion of the fifty-two squadron scheme was 
deferred to 1935-36 following a Cabinet committee 
investigation chaired by Lord Birkenhead. 14 When a Labour 
Government was formed again, in 1929, completion was put 
back to 1938.15 
These postponements reflected the general policy of 
curtailment of defence expenditure, best known through the 
so-called ten-year rule. British military planning was to 
be based upon the assumption of no major war in the next 
ten years, a policy first stated in 1919, re-affirmed in 
1922, and continued until 1932.16 One consequence of 
financial restrictions was a preference to equip the RAF 
with old rather than new designs, and small rather than 
large aircraft. This was well illustrated by the Director 
of Equipment in 1925. He wrote that, 
for slightly less than the price of one of the new 
Single engine day Bombers complete with Condor 
engine, or one Fairey "Fawn" with a Lion, we can 
purchase and put into service three new D. H. 9. A's, 
and for one "Virginia" complete with 2 Lions, seven 
D. H. 9. A' S. 17 
A major impact on operational requirements was the 
decision that separate fighter squadrons for day and night 
defence could not be afforded. As a result nearly all 
fighter requirements demanded a low landing-speed for safe 
operation at night, and the carrying of equipment for 
night flying. 18 It will be shown that these requirements 
inhibited attainment of the highest contemporary 
performance for day defence. 
14 ibid., page 179 
15 ibid., page 217 
16 ibid., page 59 
17 PRO: AIR 2/302/S25726, Replacement of D. H. 9. A, DoE to AMSR, 21.7.25 
18 PRO: AIR 2/1069, Conditions Governing the Design of a Home Defence Fighter Aeroplane, 
1A, 6.3.23 
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Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s the British 
Government's policy was to seek security through 
International agreement via the League of Nations. 
Disarmament talks during this period included proposals to 
abolish or limit bombing from aircraft, and these efforts 
continued through to the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 
1932-34.19 In chapters 7 and 8 it will be shown that they 
had an important influence on the development of RAF 
bombers. 
2.1.2 War on the Horizon 
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the 
failure of the League of Nations to respond forcefully, 
re-opened the possibility of war. 20 It aroused concern 
about the security of British possessions in the Far East, 
particularly of Hong Kong and Singapore, and brought the 
end of the ten-year rule. Recognition of the need to 
rapidly reinforce the Air Force in the Far East led the 
Air Staff to introduce the concept of reinforcement range 
into its operational requirements for bombers. 
The emergence of Germany as a military threat in 1933-34 
led to a major re-alignment of Air Staff planning in many 
respects. Prior to 1934 the RAF's operational squadrons 
had been disposed to counter an air attack from France. 
In August 1934 the Air Ministry was instructed to prepare 
a plan for the Air Defence of Great Britain on the 
assumption of war with Germany, with France as an ally. 
The plan was to include the possibility that German 
aircraft would overfly Holland and Belgium, or occupy 
airfields in those countries. 21 
19 Dean, page 41 
20 Roberts, J. M., Europe 1980-1945,1989, page 506 
21 PRO: AIR 2/1386, Sub-committee of H. D. C. on Re-orientation of Home Defence Syst 
2nd August 1934 
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Germany as the potential enemy meant that attacks were now 
to be expected from the East rather from the South, with 
consequent re-orientation of the RAF's fighter defence 
system. Needless to say, a direct effect of considering 
Germany rather than France as the potential enemy was 
greatly to increase the operational range required of 
bombers, and in consequence their size. This aspect is 
discussed in chapters 8 and 9. 
2.1.3 Re-Armament 
The Government's reaction to the emergence of a German air 
force was to restate the 1923 policy of parity, but with 
respect to the German air force rather than the French. 22 
The Air Staff became concerned that the Government saw 
parity in terms of numbers of aircraft, whereas they 
believed that it should take account of the relatively 
high vulnerability of the position of London, and should 
compare opposing air forces in terms of the bomb tonnage 
deliverable per day. 23 This latter consideration was to 
dominate Air Staff bomber policy in the late 1930s. 
The much-deferred fifty-two squadron Home Defence 
Expansion Scheme of 1923 was replaced by a sixty-nine 
squadron scheme in 1934. Then, as reports indicated that 
the strength of the German air force was planned to 
increase, so was the planned size of the RAF. 
Scheme L, approved in November 1938, included a 
significant change in the ratio of bombers to fighters, 
with fifty-seven bomber squadrons and forty fighter 
squadrons. 24 This reflected the recommendations of Sir 
Thomas Inskip, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. 
In a review of the basic principles of British war policy 
against Germany he concluded that direct defence against 
22 Hyde, page 339 
23 9/8 Fotio 52, DDPLans to DCAS, 24.9.36 
24 Hyde, Appendix VII 
Chapter 2 Political and Strategic Background 42 
air attack was the better strategy for the early stages of 
such a war. The Cabinet imposed this policy on the RAF. 25 
No evidence has been found to suggest that it influenced 
the RAF's assessment of the aircraft types it needed. The 
RAF was uncertain as to whether advances in aviation 
technology favoured fighters or bombers, but nevertheless 
maintained its belief that a counter-offensive policy 
offered the best defence. 26 
In 1935 the Italian invasion of Abyssinia raised the 
prospect of war in the Mediterranean. This further 
emphasised the need to pay attention to the reinforcing 
range of RAF aircraft, but otherwise gave no experience of 
air fighting. The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, did 
include air fighting. Initially both Republicans and 
Nationalists used obsolescent aircraft with little effect, 
but later Russia, Italy and Germany supplied and operated 
some of the best contemporary aircraft. For the first 
time since the 1914-1918 war there was some evidence of 
the strategic and tactical effectiveness of high- 
performance aircraft. 27,28 This was not unnoticed by RAF 
officers, but did not lead to any change in aircraft 
development policy. 
Against the above background of political developments, 
the RAF pursued the doctrine that a counter-offensive was 
the best, indeed only, way to deter or diminish air 
attacks on London. The following section discusses that 
policy and its application in detail to the composition of 
the home defence air force and its equipment. 
25 ibid., page 412 
26 PRO: AIR 8/243, The Rote of the Air Force in Nationat Defence, November 1938 
27 Jackson, R., Fighter: The story of Air Combat, 1979, chapter 1 
28 Corum, J. S., "The Luftwaffe and the Coatition Air War in Spain 1936-193911, JSS, Vot 
18 (1995), No. 1, page 68 
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2.2. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY 
It has been seen the major task of the RAF was the defence 
of the United Kingdom against air attack. The logical 
steps which were needed to carry out this task were the 
determination of an overall doctrine, the assessment of 
the balance of the force needed to implement that doctrine 
against potential enemies, and the definition of the 
equipment required. These issues are discussed below. 
2.2.1 Doctrine 
The tenet which governed the British concept of air 
warfare was that there was no effective direct defence 
against air attack on London. From this it followed that 
the only way to deter or diminish the bombing of London 
was to plan to attack an enemy's country. It was this 
doctrine which determined both the offensive/defensive 
balance of the RAF and the performance it sought from its 
aircraft and armament. It was not disputed by Government, 
for, as illustrated by PowerS29 and Bialer30, the fear that 
devastating attacks from the air were possible and 
unstoppable had become widely accepted in the 1920s. 
Charlton's essay published in 1938 is an example of the 
popularisation of this view. 31 That this fear was the 
basis of British air policy was exemplified by Baldwin's 
much quoted statement to the House of Commons in November 
1932. He said, 
I think it is well for the man in the street to 
realise that there is no power on earth that can 
prevent him from being bombed. Whatever people may 
tell him, the bomber will always get through. The 
only defence is offence, which means you have to kill 
more women and children more quickly than the enemy 
if you want to save yourselves. 32 
29 Powers, B. D. Strategy without Sticle-Rute, 1976, Chapter 5 
30 Siater, Uri, The Shadow of the Bomber, 1980, page 47 
31 Chariton, L. E. O., The Air Defence of Great Britain, *'The New Factor in Warfare", 1938 
32 Dean, cited on page 59 
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Powers sees this as "the awesome dilemma of the English, 
given their prevailing axioms about air power". 33 
The British concept of the future development of air 
warfare was not unique. It was similar to the views 
promulgated by the Italian General Douhet, 34 who is often 
quoted as the first proponent of the offensive as the only 
effective course of action in air warfare. It was 
strongly supported in the United States. 35,36 
In August 1923 (with a supplement in March 1924) the Air 
Staff issued a memorandum on "Air Strategy in Home 
Defence. The correct objective". It stated that, "the 
main objective for an air force lies in the aircraft 
factories and productive centres of the enemy's country, 
his seat of government and his supply and transport 
system". 37 Not only did it believe that these objectives 
should take precedence over attacks on the enemy's air 
force, but that to achieve the maximum offensive power, 
it may be stated as a principle that bombing 
squadrons should be as numerous as possible and the 
fighters as few as popular opinion and the necessity 
for defending vital objectives will permit. 38 
This policy was advocated by the RAF thereafter. It 
believed that its choice of objectives would, "have the 
greatest possible effect on the true objective of all war 
- the morale of the enemy nation. liN But emphasised that 
such a strategy was applicable to "'air warfare' only; 
that is to say war between two nations who have no land 
frontiers in common", and where seaborne invasion was not 
f easible. 40 
33 Powers, page 153 
34 Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air, 1921 (English translation published 1943) 
35 Greer, page 44 
36 Freeman, R., The U. S. Strategic Bomber, 1975, pages 18 and 21 
37 PRO: AIR 8/71, ASM 11, section 4 
38 ibid., 11. A. (To be read in conjunction with A. S. M No. 11), March 1924, section 3 
39 ibid., ASM 11, section 4 
40 ibid., ASM 11. A, section 2 
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Powers suggests that the RAF's adoption of the doctrine of 
strategic bombing as the basis of home defence from air 
attack was a way of emphasising the need for a separate 
air force, but he notes that this policy was "also the one 
most in accord with the current public image of air 
power". 41 
Douhet foresaw the need to obtain command of the air space 
over an enemy's territory, envisaging that this would be 
achieved by forcing the enemy's air force to battle in 
defence of its ground installations, and of its cities. 
M. Smith summarises Douhet's "great and unique,, 
contribution as being his emphasis on the need to gain 
command of the air and then to exploit that command when 
won. Smith contrasts this with RAF policy. He claims 
that, 
In particular, the British school of air power never 
understood the classical concept of 'command of the 
air', and they came to rely instead on what was 
considered the unique power of the bomber to prepare 
the way for victory, virtually by ignoring the 
existence of the enemy air force as a strategic 
obstacle. 42 
But it was not that the RAF did not understand the concept 
of command of the air, rather that they did not regard it 
as necessary, nor attainable. 43 The Air Staff argued that 
an enemy air force did not need to be overcome before its 
homeland could be attacked, and that in any case an air 
force could not be permanently overcome by other air 
forces. In the terminology defined by Howard, 44 the Air 
Staff believed that air power could be "exercised" without 
the need for "command" of an enemy's air space. 45 
41 Powers, page 166 
42 Smith, M., page 45-46 
43 9/69, Folio 54, The Defence of England against Air Attack, lecture by DCAS to Naval 
Staff College, 10th March 1924, page 7 Air Superiority 
44 Howard, M, "The Concept of Air Power - an historical appraisal", Air Power History, 
VoL 42 (1995) NO. 4, pages 4-11 
45 8/71, ASH 1I. A, section 2 
Chapter 2 Political and Strategic Background 46 
2.2.2 Feasibility of the RAFIS Doctrine 
Between the wars the Air Staff held firm views about the 
feasibility of its counter-offensive strategy. It was 
based upon four assumptions which would need to be correct 
for the strategy to be valid. 
W that accurate bombing was possible, 
(ii) that it would be effective, 
(iii) that it could be carried out by self-defending 
formations of bombers, 
Uv) that continuous, day and night, bombing was 
essential and possible. 
The Air Staff's confidence in the accuracy and 
effectiveness of bombing and in the viability of self- 
defending bomber formations was not based upon evidence 
from the Great War. The Independent Air Force's bombing 
had then not proved to be very effective, and its losses 
were high. Morrow says that, "Battle casualties to day- 
bomber units in five months amounted to 257 aircrew, 178 
per cent of its force strength in November (1918), while 
its monthly wastage rate was just under 70 per cent". 46 
In 1923 the RAF had no evidence of accurate bombing, and 
was to base its views on the effectiveness of bombing on 
the limited experience of German air attacks on Britain 
during the 1914-18 war. 47 Expectations of accuracy were 
based upon peacetime trials, but no live trials on the 
effect of bombing against typical targets were made 
between the wars. 48 
An example of the Air Staff's views on the accuracy of 
bombing was given by the CAS, Sir John Salmond, in his 
46 Morrow, J. H. Jnr., The Great War in the Air, 1993, page 321 
47 9/69 Folio 91, Bombing Casualties Among the Civilian Population, undated and unsigned 
48 MacBean, J. A. and Hogben, A. S., Bombs Gone. the development and use of British air- 
dropped weapons from 1912 to the present day, 1990, Chapter 2 
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address to the Committee of Experts on Fighting Services 
of the 1930 Imperial Conference. In dealing at length 
with the potential of aircraft for coast defence, he cited 
recent trials in which M hits on ships were obtained 
from high-altitude bombing and 80k from low altitude. He 
also stated that torpedo trials in all the previous year's 
practices had averaged 45! k hits. 49 Indeed, such was the 
accuracy expected of bombing that the Air Staff feared 
that attacks in squadron formation could be wasteful. 
Thus when considering the best size for Sidestrand 
squadrons in 1933, Plans branch advised that, "If the 
bombing becomes so accurate that bombs are wasted owing to 
the width of the squadron formation I presume it is always 
possible to bomb by flights in line ahead and thus reduce 
the width of the pattern. vM 
An example of the assumed effectiveness of bombing arose 
in 1925, when the Air Staff's estimate of the scale of 
attack which could be mounted against London by France was 
questioned by the War Office. They replied that, "the Air 
Staff would point out that it matters little whether 100 
or 200 tons are dropped per day. The effect would still 
be overwhelming in either case. o, 51 This conclusion was 
reinforced in 1936 when an assessment of the likely scale 
of a German air attack on London, and its effects, was 
made. 52 Group Captain A. T. Harris was one of the authors. 
It was estimated that if 100 tons of bombs were dropped on 
the first day, 75 tons on the second day and 50 tons for 
each of the next four days, then the Underground and 
mainline stations would be out of action, and all gas 
supplies and 50%ý of electricity supplies would be lost. 
In this assessment it was assumed that 7516 of the raids 
49 PRO: AIR 8/115, Imperial Conference 1930, Item 12, 
50 PRO: AIR 20/84, Day Bomber Design Consideration of Aeroptanes and Equipment, Pians to 
DDOI, 11.4.33 
51 9/69 FoLio 34, Air Raid Precautions, 
_note 
by the Air Staff, 25th October 1925, para. 8 
52 PRO: AIR 41/14, The A. D. G. B. Vol. 1 The Growth of Fighter Command, Appendix 6, Air 
Attack on Great Britain, Annexure B, Summary of Estimates of Effect of Air Attack on 
London, 26th October 1936 
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were by day and 25t by night, and that poison gas would 
not be used. 
The third plank of the RAF's doctrine, belief in the 
ability of bombers to defend themselves against defending 
fighters, will be a recurring theme. It was based upon 
the view that, 
the defensive fire of the bombing formations (which 
is very effective if the drill and equipment are 
good) must be relied upon to enable them to carry out 
their task. 53 
A demonstration of the Air Staff's belief in the ability 
of bomber formations to defend themselves appeared in a 
note to the Admiralty in 1928. Advice had been sought on 
the likely outcome of an engagement between aircraft. The 
Air Staff's reply was based upon Lanchester's N2 rule for 
calculating the outcome of engagements. 54 Lanchester 
deduced that "The fighting strength of a force may be 
broadly defined as proportional to the square of its 
numex-ical strength multiplied by the fighting value of its 
individual units. 1155 The Air Staff said that experience 
and study showed that the fighting value of a good 
formation of bombers was far higher than that of the same 
number of single-seat fighters, and took the fighting 
value of a bomber as twice that of a fighter. Not 
surprisingly, bombers came out of the calculations of 
combat with fighters rather well. 
Even in 1938, when the development of eight-gun fighters 
and radar gave some hope that effective defence was 
possible, the Air Staff retained its belief in the 
accuracy, effectiveness and feasibility of bombing. When 
arguing the case for a large bomb load for its "Ideal 
Bomber", it said that, 
53 8/71 ASM ll. A, section 3 
54 PRO: AIR 8/98, Actions between Aircraft (Aprit 1928) 
55 Lanchester, F. W., Aircraft in Warfare, 1995, (first pubtished in 1916), page 55, 
itaLics in originaL 
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one sortie may attack two different objectives en 
route to its main objective, and two more on the way 
back, say five different targets in one sortie - in 
other words, one large aeroplane might be the 
equivalent either of a formation of smaller ones 
attacking the same target, or a number of single 
smaller ones attacking different targets. 56 
Given the firmly held views on the capability of the RAF's 
bombers which have been illustrated above, it is not 
surprising that it was believed that an enemy's bombers 
could not be prevented from reaching and destroying 
London. Nevertheless, it was accepted that some fighter 
squadrons were needed, even if, as Dean wrote, they were 
"mainly to propitiate weak-kneed politicians and 
civilians". 57 The Air Staff gave a more military 
justification in 1924. It accepted that without some 
fighter defence, "a well organised commercial aviation 
company might be as efficient as a highly trained bombing 
group 11 . 
58 
The general principles for defence against air attack 
described above were put into effect when fears arose 
about the size of the French air force. 
2.3 THE 1923 HOME DEFENCE SCHEME 
The strategy for defence against air attack was considered 
by a Sub-committee appointed by the "Joint War office and 
Air Ministry Committee on Air Defence of Great Britain". 
The Sub-committee was chaired by Air Commodore J. M. Steel, 
and the senior War Office member was Colonel W. H. 
Bartholomew. It is commonly referred to as the Steel- 
Bartholomew committee. It reported in February 1923 that, 
56 PRO: AIR 9/82, The Ideat Bomber, 19A, Considerations Affecting the Design of the 
Ideat. Bomber Aircraft for the Royal. Air Force, Air Staff, March 1938, section 18 (iv) 
57 Dean, page 40 
58 9/69 Item 56, Reasons for having Fighting Squadrons and Ground Defence in the Home 
Defence Scheme, Air Staff, 8.3.24, para. 4 
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The Sub-Committee recognise that offensive action by 
aircraft in the enemy's country is the best form of 
defence but that a defensive system, combined with an 
active offensive, is a necessity. 
It proposed that such fighters as were provided should be 
stationed sufficiently far inland to have time to climb to 
intercept hostile aircraft after they had been detected 
crossing the coast, and it coupled this with the need for 
a good intelligence and plotting system. 59 These views on 
the best strategy for direct defence were not new. They 
had been discussed by the A. A. Committee in 1921,60 and as 
will be seen, had their roots in the reaction to German 
air attacks on London in 1917-18. 
During July and August 1923 the Chief of the Air Staff, 
ACM Sir Hugh Trenchard, held a series of meetings with 
senior RAF officers to discuss the composition of the home 
defence air force. 61 These took place against the 
background of the recommendations of the Steel-Bartholomew 
committee62 (which had been agreed by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence), and the decision that the strength of 
the force should be fifty-two squadrons. 
The meetings considered the number of bomber and fighter 
squadrons, day and night bombing, day and night defence, 
and the location of squadrons. These discussions, and the 
ensuing decisions taken by Trenchard, 63 went far to 
determine the types of aircraft which would equip the RAF 
up to the outbreak of the Second World war, and their 
relative performance characteristics. They are discussed 
below. 
59 9/69 FoHo 51, Steet-Bartholomew Committee Report, February 1923, section 3 
60 PRO: AIR 5/564, Papers and Conferences re Air Menace, Minutes of 2nd meeting, lIth 
October 1921 
61 PRO: AIR 2/1267, The Expansion of R. A. F for Home Defence Purposes. Potic 
62 PRO: AIR 5/416, Position of the Retative Numbers of Fighters & Bombers Reguired for 
Home Defence, Minutes of 25th Juty 1923 
63 ibid., CAS to DCAS et al, 31.7.23 
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2.3.1 flasses of Bomber 
At Trenchard's meetings it was generally agreed that 
continuous, day and night, bombing was essential to 
prevent recovery from the effect of attacks. 64 The Air 
Staff had noted that the radius of action of contemporary 
night bombers was greater than that of day bombers, yet 
saw the need to achieve equal effect by day and night. 65 
The solution was seen to lie in the development of a dual- 
role bomber to equip the majority of squadrons, which, as 
Trenchard explained, could then operate by day or by night 
depending on time of year and degree of opposition. 66 He 
envisaged that there would also be a few squadrons of 
high-performance day bombers and of heavy night bombers. 
Despite these intentions, no attempt was made to develop 
ab initio a dual role bomber until 1936. Rather, as shown 
in chapters 4 and 7, the Air Ministry specified 
operational requirements for short-range day bombers and 
longer-range night bombers. 
2.3.2 No Fiqhter Escorts - but Various Bomber Escort 
Proposals 
An issue on which the CAS's meetings appeared to agree a 
clear policy line and yet immediately cast doubt upon it 
was that of the escort of bomber formations. The Air 
Staff argued that fighter escort would be ineffective, and 
that, as has been quoted, the defensive fire of a bomber 
formation could be very effective. But it added that, 
In this connection it should be remembered that the 
defensive power of a bombing formation may be very 
much increased by the addition of bombing aircraft 
carrying extra ammunition and no bombs. These 
64 ibid., Minutes of 25th July 1923 
65 ibid., 12B section 8 
66 ibid., CAS to DCAS et al, 31.7.23 
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aircraft will have a better performance and greater 
manoeuvrability than those which carry bombs. 67 
Yet surely a formation of bombers had no place for 
aircraft with a higher performance than the bomb-carrying 
aircraft, nor any use for its higher manoeuvrability. 
Paradoxically, when in 1935 a heavily-armed "escort 
bomber" was again proposed, in this instance to escort 
otherwise unarmed bombers, it was then rejected on the 
grounds that to be useful this aircraft would need a 
bottom turret and thus have a poorer performance than the 
rest of the formation. 68 
The question of escort for bombers was raised again in 
1936. The Deputy Director Operations (Wing Commander G. C. 
Pirie) saw that in the Spanish Civil War bombers were 
being escorted by fighters. Although he thought that this 
might indicate poor leadership and indifferent formation 
flying, he observed that, "Nevertheless, these operations 
provide the only examples of modern air forces in actual 
conflict with each other since 1918.11 Pirie suggested 
that an operational requirement for a long-range fighter 
should be drawn Up. 69 Air Commodore W. S. Douglas, 
Director of Staff Duties, remarked that in his view 
bombers should look after themselves, although he 
resurrected the thought that some might be more heavily 
armed at the expense of bomb load. 70 He drew attention to 
a paper on this concept by Flight Lieutenant Pharazyn. 71 
This possibility was raised again in 1938 in connection 
with the Air Staff's search for an Ideal Bomber (discussed 
in chapter 9), and in February 1939. The Director of 
Operational Requirements then asserted, in the context of 
possible escort fighter types, that "I feel sure that the 
right answer is to provide bombers with the best possible 
67 8/71, ASM ll. A section 3 
68 PRO: AIR 6/43, Expansion Progress Meetings. Memoranda June - December 1935, The 
employment of bombers without guns and fighters without bombs, Air Staff, 4th June 1935 
69 PRO: AIR 2/2613, Fighter Escorts for Bombers, DDOps to DCAS, 23.11.36 
70 ibid., DSD to DCAS, 30.11.36 
71 ibid., 2A, Fighter Escorts 
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defensive armament and carry additional ammunition when 
necessary. 1172 
All proposals to include special heavily-armed aircraft in 
a formation of bombers weakened the theory that the 
defensive effectiveness of a formation of bombers lay in 
its ability to bring a large number of guns to bear on 
attacking fighters. If only a small proportion of a 
formation could contribute to its defence throughout a 
long engagement, then much of this advantage would be 
lost. MacFarland and Newton underline this aspect in 
their comments on the conversion of some B-17F bombers to 
"flying antiaircraft batteries" in 1943. They note that 
whereas the additional firepower seemed impressive when 
compared to that of a single standard B-17, "when compared 
to a combat box of B-17s the increase in firepower was 
negligible. " This experiment also confirmed that the 
fitting of an extra turret slowed down the "battlecruiser" 
and forced the bomber formation to throttle back. 
Macfarland and Newton say the operational "results were 
not promising. 1173 Spick suggests that the production of 
this YB-40 battlecruiser, "would have gladdened the heart 
of General Douhet", but comments that they were "a dismal 
f ai lure 11 . 
74 
What was lacking in the RAF for many years was a proper 
analysis of the defence of bombers. In 1924 Wing 
Commander T. R. Cave-Browne-Cave, commander of the Marine 
and Armament Experimental Establishment, noted that, 
"There appears to be no very firmly founded doctrine as to 
the proper defence for a bombing formation from attack by 
fighters. 1175 Thirteen years later the RAF Staff College 
72 PRO: AIR 20/167, Development of Fighter Ptanes, DOR to DDOps(H), 21.2.39 
73 MacFartand, S. L., and Newton, P. N., To Command the Sk , 1991, pages 101-102 74 Spick, M., Fighter Pitot Tactics, 1983, page 94 
75 PRO: AIR 5/1132, Bombing and Bombing Tactics: Part 1, Item 1, Methods of Bombing and 
their Future Devetopment, Juty 1924, page 12 
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was told that "it is only recently that bomber tactics 
have come to be taken seriously. 1176 
It will be seen that belief in the ability of bomber 
formations to defend themselves was also to have a 
significant effect on RAF fighter development. 
In the 1923 Provisional Home Defence Expansion Scheme 
provision was made for thirty-five "Bombing Squadrons" - 
the number which Trenchard had decided upon following his 
discussions with senior officers. 77 Pending further 
investigation these were to be divided into twelve day 
bombing squadrons and twelve night bombing squadrons, with 
eleven left undecided. 78 
Most bomber squadrons were to be stationed in Oxfordshire 
and Gloucestershire, where they would be protected by the 
Aircraft Fighting zone (described below). 79 Bushby gives 
a map of the Zone and of bomber bases. 80 For many years 
the radius of action specified for most bomber types was 
no more than sufficient to reach Paris and the industrial 
regions of North East France from those bases. 81,82 
It has been noted in chapter 2 that the replacement of 
France by Germany as the potential enemy led to the need 
for much greater range for RAF bombers. It also meant 
that the best location for RAF bomber squadrons would be 
in East Anglia and Yorkshire. 
76 ibid., Item 22, Lecture by Wing Cdr. Saundby to the Staff Coliege on Bomber Tactics 
Defence and Offensive Aspect, May 1937 
77 5/416, CAS to DCAS et al, 31.7.23 
78 8/73, Section 3. Strength and Composition of the Force 
79 ibid., Section 4. Disposition of the Force 
80 Bushby, J., Air Defence of Great Britain, 1973, page 82 
81 20/84, Requirements for the New Day Bomber. Exptanation of requirements and poLicy 
by C. A. S., Note of meeting on 2nd August 1923 
82 RowLey, H. V., "The Striking Power of the RAF", JRUSI, VoL 80 (1935), page 144 
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2.3.3 Classes of FicThter 
Trenchard's meeting on the 25th July 192383 discussed at 
some length the topic of day and night fighters. The main 
issue was the feasibility of using the same squadrons for 
both purposes. It was concluded that although separate 
squadrons and types might be ideal, within a total of only 
fifty-two squadrons it would be necessary to train pilots 
for both day and night fighting. It was this conclusion 
that led to the use of the same aircraft for day and night 
operations, for otherwise only part of the limited fighter 
force would be suitable for defence against an enemy 
concentration by day or by night. 84 
The Expansion Scheme specified a total of seventeen 
"Fighting Squadrons", and under the heading "Disposition 
of the Force", set out the principles which were to govern 
their deployment in some detail. These followed from the 
system set up in 1917-18 by Major General E. B. Ashmore, 
and recommended by the Steel-Bartholomew Committee. 
In Air Defence, published in 1929, Ashmore explained that 
in 1917, 
The great principle of Air Defence was not yet 
sufficiently recognised: that although aeroplanes are 
the first means of defence, they are ineffective 
unless supported by a control system on the ground. 85 
Ashmore accepted that continuous patrols along the 
coastline were out of the question because of the expense 
in men, money and material. He concluded that defending 
fighters would have to be kept on the ground some distance 
inland. This distance would be determined by the rate-of- 
climb of the fighters, and the speed and height of the 
attacking bombers. On first warning of an attack crossing 
the coast the fighters would take-off and gain height. 
83 5/416, meeting on 25th Juty 1923 
84 2/1069, Air Exercises of 1931, Air Ministry to AOC-in-C ADGB, 30th December 1931 
85 Ashmore, E. 8., Air Defence, 1929, page 39 
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Further sighting reports of incoming enemy aircraft would 
be telephoned to a central plotting table where their 
route could be assessed, and the defending fighters would 
be directed to intercept. 86 These ideas were to form the 
basis of the air defence system used in the Battle of 
Britain. 87 
Ashmore's principles were applied in the 1923 home defence 
scheme. 88 There was first to be an anti-aircraft Gun 
Zone, and then the Fighting Squadrons were to be, 
disposed in such positions as to enable them to meet 
enemy aircraft in a prepared zone drawn round and 
parallel to the coast at a distance of approximately 
30 miles therefrom. This zone is termed the Aircraft 
Fighting Zone. 
After the Aircraft Fighting Zone, there was to be a 
second, local (London), Gun Zone. 
It was planned that fourteen of the seventeen "Fighting 
Squadrons" would be stationed in the Aircraft Fighting 
Zone, with each squadron assigned to a defensive sector 
which it would not leave. So was born the concept of the 
(Aircraft Fighting) Zone Fighter, which dominated Air 
Staff fighter requirements for many years. Zone fighters 
were to operate by day and night. 
The remaining three fighter squadrons were to be stationed 
near the South coast. It was specified that, "The duty of 
these Squadrons will be to intercept enemy aircraft on 
their inward or outward journey. They will also afford 
protection to the South-east and to the coast towns in 
that areall. 89 This plan appears to have followed from a 
proposal from Group Captain T. C. R Higgins when concern 
with the "Continental Air Menace', first arose in 1921. At 
that time six day-and-night fighter squadrons were planned 
86 ibid., page 37 
87 Probert H. and Cox S. (editors), The Battle Re-Fought, 1991 
88 8/73, section 4. (b) Fighting Squadrons 
89 ibid., 4. (b) 
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to fulfil the zone defence role of repelling attacks on 
London. But in the context of the interception of enemy 
bombers on their return journey, Higgins suggested that, 
If and when a 7th Squadron is available for the 
Defence of London DETTLING (sic)90 Aerodrome is an 
ideal locality, on which to base a Squadron devoted 
to the Role of Interception by Day. 91 
This idea of a squadron of day fighters - and later a 
specialised design for that role - was to have far- 
reaching effects on RAF fighter development in the 1930s. 
In 1923 Trenchard wanted the squadrons based on the South 
coast to be known as "Advance" squadrons, 92 but it soon 
became the practice to refer to them as "Interception" 
squadrons, and so to the concept of an "Interception 
Fighter". It will be seen that the operational 
requirements of an interception fighter were importantly 
different from those of a zone fighter. 
The problem of the defence of London and the distinction 
between zone and interception fighters is crucial to the 
understanding of RAF fighter development in the 1920s and 
1930s. Failure to appreciate this has led many writers to 
misunderstand Air Staff Policy on fighter design. It 
appears to be assumed that the terminology "interception" 
was merely a quaint form of the word interceptor. Typical 
are M. Bowyer's Aircraft of the FeW93 and Interceptor 
Fighters. 94 In describing the evolution of RAF fighters, 
Bowyer looks for a single line of development, jumping 
from zone fighter to interception fighter specifications 
and back. This can only lead to confusion, such as the 
deduction that the fast climb required of interception 
fighters was to replace standing patrols95 - which were 
90 Detting is near Maidstone, Kent 
91 5/564,5A, Defence of London against AeriaL Attack, 12.11.21 
92 5/416, meeting on 25th Juty 1923 
93 Bowyer, M. J. F., 1984 
94 Bowyer, M. J. F., 1991 
95 ibid., page 11 
Chapter 2 Political and Strategic Background 
58 
never RAF policy. More remarkably, Andrews and Morgan 
assert that it was only with the issue of the first 
specification for an interception fighter in 1927 that, 
"British defence strategists realised that the prior 
concern of a British fighter force in a future war would 
be to intercept enemy bomber attacks on Britain. vi% Mason 
finds it a paradox that the Hawker Fury (interception) 
Fighter served in only three squadrons, 97 apparently 
unaware that this was the full complement for such day 
fighters. Other examples will be noted in the discussion 
of fighter development in the mid-1930s in chapter S. 
The geography of the zone system of air defence was first 
conditioned by treating France as the potential enemy. 
The Aircraft Fighting Zone covered London from attacks 
from the South and fighter squadrons were stationed in 
Southern England. There was no need for a separate 
defence system for the Midlands and North because an 
attack from France would have to over-fly the defences of 
Southern England. 
When Germany replaced France as the potential enemy, the 
Aircraft Fighting Zone was extended to cover attacks from 
the East, not only to cover London from that direction, 
but also to give protection to the Midlands and Northern 
England. 98,99 Otherwise the basic concept of the fighter 
defence organisation was unchanged. When, in the late 
1930s, RDF (radar) was developed to give earlier warning 
of approaching aircraft, it was integrated into the 
established system of fighter control. Whereas radar made 
the reasoning which had led to an inland Aircraft Fighting 
Zone redundant, and the Outer Artillery Zone was 
abandoned, 100 the higher speed of contemporary bombers 
96 Andrews, C. F. and Morgan, E. B., Vickers Aircraft since 1908,1988, page 238 
97 Mason, The British Fighter, page 213 
98 2/1386, Memorandum by Air Staff, 30th July 1934 
99 Bushby, page 85 has a map of the Reorientation Scheme 
100 41/14, page 38 
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still gave little time for interception between first 
warning and bombs falling on London. 101 
2.4 SUMMARY 
The report of the Steel-Bartholomew committee, Trenchard's 
meetings and the Provisional Home Defence Scheme, led to a 
self-consistent set of decisions which fixed a strategy 
for home defence, the balance of offensive and defensive 
resources, and the broad types of aircraft which would be 
required. 
The overall strategy was founded on the belief that the 
bombing of London could not be prevented - it was this 
which led to the adoption of a counter offensive as a 
deterrent. In this belief the Air Staff was to be proved 
correct, as it was also correct to suppose that it could 
not be prevented from bombing an enemy's cities. The 
weakness of the RAF's strategic doctrine was its optimism 
as to the accuracy, sustainability and effect of such 
bombing. 102 Its confidence in these has been demonstrated. 
In the event, it was found that accuracy was unattainable 
in the face of a resolute defence, and that much heavier 
bombing than had been thought sufficient was needed to 
weaken an enemy's production, 103 and even this did not 
bring about a collapse of his morale. Bombing became a 
war of attrition between the bombers and the defences. 
Although it is common to deduce that the RAF's strategic 
doctrine was found to be unsound, it was the mistaken 
tactical doctrine of self-defending formations of day 
bombers, and the accuracy and effect which they could 
achieve, which undermined the strategy. The air forces of 
Germany and the United States went through the same 
101 PRO: AIR 2/2477, Problems of Air Defence, 16B, Memorandum by Air Staff for Air 
Defence Research Sub-Committee, 17th May 1935, section 4 
102 Stessor, J., The Centrat Btue, 1956, page 205 
103 Overy, R. J., The Air War 1939-1945,1980, Chapters 2 and 5 
Chapter 2 Political and Strategic Background 
60 
learning process. 104,105 The converse of the failure of 
self-defending formations of bombers was that the RAF's 
day fighter defence force was much more effective than 
anticipated. 
When it came to specifying the characteristics of the 
aircraft which would be the cutting edge of the doctrine 
expounded in 1923, for many years the Air Ministry failed 
to establish a clear procedure to determine what was 
needed. This omission is discussed in the next chapter. 
104 ibid., page 34 
105 MacFartand and Newton, chapter 3 
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MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
The first part of this chapter describes and discusses the 
procedure whereby the Air Ministry conceived and developed 
the aircraft which it believed it needed for home defence. 
The conception stage of this process - which is the 
subject of the current research - was nominally the 
responsibility of the Air Staff, but there were important 
inputs from other parts of the Air Ministry, the 
operational Commands of the RAF, and at times from the 
aircraft industry. These interactions will be noted as 
they arise in later chapters. The purpose here is to 
describe the relevant organisational structure of the Air 
Ministry, the place of operational requirements and 
specifications in the complex procedure for aircraft 
procurement, and the way in which operational requirements 
were handled within the structure of the Ministry. 
The second part of this chapter reviews developments in 
aerodynamics, structures and aero-engines during the 1920s 
and 1930s, and discusses their general impact on aircraft 
design and performance. 
3.1 THE AIR MINISTRY 
Grey's Historv of the Air Ministrvl describes the major 
organisational changes which took place in the years 
covered by this thesis, but it does not deal with detail 
below the level of Deputy Director, nor do the Air Force 
Lists for the period. There are few surviving Air 
Ministry papers which do, but one of these, Air Marshal 
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham's 1933 "Report on Certain Points 
in Air Ministry Organisation", 2 has a useful review of 
that part of the organisation of most relevance to the 
I Grey, C. G., History of the Air Ministry, 1940 
2 PRO: AIR 2/673, War Orqanfsation of the Air Ministr , 2A 
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current research. It enables the identification of 
relatively junior posts, which, as will become evident, 
had much influence on Air Ministry policy in regard to 
operational requirements. 
The departments of the Air Ministry which concern the 
current research are those of the Chief of the Air Staff 
(CAS) and of the Air Member (of the Air Council) 
responsible for research and development. 
From 1923 to early 1939 the Department of the Chief of the 
Air Staff included a Directorate of Operations and 
Intelligence, otherwise known as the Air Staff. It 
contained branches for Operations, Plans, and 
Intelligence, and from 1934 an Operational Requirements 
section. All were staffed by RAF officers, serving for 
between two and five years. The Director also held the 
post of Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and had a seat on 
the Air Council. 
Early in 1938 the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff 
was re-structured. A new post of Assistant Chief was 
created, with, inter alia, responsibility for operational 
Requirements, now a Deputy Directorate. 3 In the following 
year a Director of operational Requirements was appointed. 
Operations, Intelligence and Plans were also upgraded to 
full Directorates. 4 Soon after the outbreak of war a 
second post of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACASM) 
was created whose sole responsibility was for Operational 
Requirements and Tactics. 5 
The Department of the CAS also contained other 
Directorates. At various times Organisation, Staff 
Duties, Works and Buildings, Signals, and Medical Services 
came directly under the Chief of the Air Staff. 
3 PRO: AIR 2/2853, Re-Organisation of the Air Staff under DCAS and ACAS, approved 26th 
February 1938 
4 Air Force List, August 1939 
5 Postan, page 46 
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As regards responsibility for research and development, 
the appointment of an Air Member with that title (AMRD) 
was made in 1935. Before then research and development 
came under the Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR). 
From June 1938 a post of Director General of Research and 
Development (DGRD) was created within a new department of 
the Air Member for Development and Production (AMDP). As 
the current research impinges slightly on the period after 
a Ministry of Aircraft Production had been set up in 1940, 
it should be mentioned that the research and development 
function went into the new Ministry, and somewhat later 
the post of DGRD was upgraded to Controller of Research 
and Development (CRD). 6 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the department of the Air 
Member who carried responsibility for research and 
development contained a joint Directorate of Technical 
Development and Research, with subsidiary branches dealing 
with Aircraft, Armament, Engines, etc.. This Directorate 
was staffed by RAF officers on short-term assignments and 
by permanent civilian professionals. Postan cites the 
role of Technical Development as, 
, responsible for the design of aircraft as a whole, 
i. e. for its success in fulfilling given operational 
functions'. Its object was to bridge the gap between 
the operational requirements and the production 
orders in quantity. 7 
Of course the Directorate did not design aircraft itself, 
but it did fund, oversee, guide and judge the efforts of 
those who did. It also had a major influence on the 
initiation of new RAF aircraft. For example, it will be 
shown that this Directorate fostered the development of 
the Spitfire and Hurricane. 
6 ibid., page 46 
7 ibid., page 49; the quote is said to be from an official survey 
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The Appendix gives the holders of those posts in the Air 
Ministry which are frequently referred to in this thesis. 
In following chapters RAF officers will be referred to by 
the rank they held at the time of the event under 
discussion. 
3.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, SPECIFICATIONS AND AIRCRAFT 
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE 
Much has been written on the development of RAF aircraft 
types from specification to service, and on service 
experience, but there is little mention of the operational 
need the specifications were intended to meet. It is 
of ten suggested (af ter Beaverbrook8) that the best 
aircraft were conceived by industry, and that the Air 
ministry then wrote a specification around them. Goulding 
and Moyes have noted the tendency to claim that the Air 
Staff were short-sighted, and that the only good aircraft 
came from private ventures. They point out, however, 
that, 
In truth, the vast majority of aircraft types 
entering service were the direct result of 
specifications issued after careful deliberation and 
technical discussion. 9 
This thesis will confirm that this was indeed the case for 
the home defence aircraft with which the RAF fought the 
Second World War. 
3.2.1 Operational Requirements and Specifications 
The first step in the Air Ministry's initiation of a new 
type of aircraft would be expected to be a discussion of 
the operational requirements - often referred to as Type 
Requirements, and later as Air Staff Requirements. 
8 H. of L. Deb. VoL. 125, Cot. 804,27th January 1943 (cited in Postan, page 84) 
9 GouLding and Moyes, Bomber Comand: 1936-40, page 44 
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Ideally these would define the aircraft performance and 
armament which the Air Staff saw as needed to carry out 
its strategic policy. But the setting of operational 
requirements seldom emerged from such an a priori 
analysis, and was sometimes initiated from outside the Air 
Staff. Most new types began simply as replacements of 
aircraft which were in service. The driving force was the 
need to take advantage of developments in aviation 
technology to obtain a higher performance. Nevertheless, 
it will be seen that, however consideration of a new type 
was begun, it could lead to debates which illuminate the 
RAF's perception of the future of air warfare, and of the 
aircraft characteristics which were thought to be 
desirable. 
When, one way or another, agreement was reached on the 
operational requirements for a particular purpose, these 
would be the basis for a specification. A specification 
was a formal contract document - an invitation to tender - 
and as such was expressed in engineering and contractual 
terms. It included the operational requirements, although 
not explicitly before 1934. 
Before proceeding further in the description of Air 
Ministry aircraft procurement procedure it will be helpful 
to describe the numbering system used for specifications, 
because specification numbers were used widely in the Air 
Ministry - and are hereafter - to refer to aircraft 
projects. 
A typical specification number would be in the form 
F. 20/27. The first character denoted the class of 
aircraft. From the late 1920s this was 'IP, for fighters 
and "B" for bombers. The number before the slash denoted 
the order in which a number had been assigned to projects 
for which contracts were expected to be issued in the 
(financial) year denoted by the number after the slash. 
Thus F. 20/27 was a fighter project which was the 20th of 
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all those new aircraft which had been considered for 
ordering in 1927-28. B. 9/32 was a bomber project which 
was ninth in the 1932-33 programme. 
For a number of years in the 1930s it was intended to use 
IILII for light bombers, IIPII for medium bombers and "B" for 
heavy bombers, so that in the 1936 programme B. 12/36 was a 
heavy bomber and P. 13/36 a medium bomber. This sub- 
division of bombers was inconsistently applied and it was 
discarded early in 1937.10 
The specification number was often assigned at early stage 
in the consideration of a new aircraft, and would then be 
attached to its operational requirements - before the 
specification itself had been drawn up. It will be seen 
that sometimes issue of a specification did not follow an 
operational requirement. On other occasions, if a project 
had slipped into a later financial year, the designation 
of a specification might be changed from that first 
assigned to the operational requirement. For example 
B. 1/39 was the delayed B. 19/38. 
The Air Ministry was usually seeking performance at the 
upper limit of the technically possible, so that 
operational requirements would be expressed in order of 
priority and in relative terms - the highest possible 
speed, highest possible rate-of-climb, high 
manoeuvrability, etc.. Such characteristics were often 
competing aims in design optimisation, so in addition 
maxima or minima were given where appropriate. These 
limits were derived from project studies carried out by 
the Research and Development (Aircraft) branch of the Air 
Ministry, under the leadership of Captain R. N. Liptrot, a 
qualified aeronautical engineer. 11 They provided a set of 
10 PRO: AIR 20/78, Nomenctature and Revised System of Designation of Types of Aircraft, 
DCAS to CAS, 12.1.37 
11 For exampte, in PRO: AIR 2/729,9A, 10.5.34, Liptrot describes performance 
catcutations for a series of hypotheticat aircraft which had been taid out to meet an 
Air Staff requirement. 
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realistically attainable performance aims based upon the 
current state of technological development. When coupled 
with the required normal fuel and military (mainly crew, 
armament and bombs) loads, they set the performance to be 
met in acceptance trials of prototypes designed to the 
specification. 
In October 1933, as part of an attempt to shorten 
development times, it was proposed that Air Staff 
Requirements (i. e., operational requirements) should be 
circulated to firms immediately after they had been 
agreed. (As Appendix "B" of the forthcoming 
specification). At the same time firms would be told of 
the expected date of issue of the specification, and who 
would be asked to tender. 12 This procedure was adopted 
towards the end of 1934.13 It was an improvement on 
previous practice for, as the Director of Technical 
Development noted, operational requirements had previously 
been scattered throughout a specification, with no clear 
picture of the overall intention. 14 The performance data 
now given in Air Staff Requirements replaced these 
dispersed references. 
In the 1920s and early 1930s it was not unusual for 
operational requirements and specifications to be 
developed together. A specification drawn up by the 
technical branches of the Air Ministry would be modified 
by the Air Staff to meet their wishes. Later, when a 
formal procedure for developing operational requirements 
had been established, there continued to be an interplay 
between the Air Staff's wishes and their technical 
feasibility. 
12 6/22, Air Council Precis, ACM 572 Acceleration of Design and Development, 11th 
October 1933, para. 7(a) 
13 from specification files held by the Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, 
P. 4/34 appears to be first for which this procedure was foLtowed. 
14 PRO: AIR 2/1668, Experimental Aircraft New Procedure for Ordering, DTD to AMSR, 
15.1.35, para. 2 
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An important output of the current research is to trace in 
detail the route whereby important operational 
requirements were developed, so as to understand the Air 
Staff's intentions, and to establish the correct timetable 
of events. This will be seen to give a new perspective on 
the origins of many of the aircraft with which the RAF 
fought the Second World War. 
3.2.2 Post-Specification Procedure 
Although this thesis is not greatly concerned with 
aircraft development beyond the consolidation of 
operational requirements, it will be helpful to outline 
the steps in aircraft development which followed the issue 
of a specification. 
The Air ministry's practice was to invite a number of 
aircraft manufacturing firms to tender design proposals to 
a specification for a new type of aircraft. Following 
analysis and comparison of these designs by the technical 
Branches of the Air Ministry, assisted by the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment, a number of firms (usually two or 
three) would be contracted to build prototypes. These 
were then subjected to extensive testing, together with 
any which had been built to the specification as a private 
venture. One or more of those tested might be chosen for 
limited production - perhaps to a modified specification - 
for development trials in squadron service. Finally a 
decision would be made as to which model(s) should be 
ordered for full production. 15 As in other businesses, a 
new specification would usually be issued for the 
production model. 
Thus an operational requirement could lead to a number of 
specifications. For example, specification B. 9/32 for a 
15 PRO: AIR 20/68, Aircraft Devetopment Programme. Notes on Conferences (from 1925), 
page 134, A Tabte of the Stages of Design and Devetopment of Aircraft, c. 1926 
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twin-engined day bomber was issued in 1932. It was 
followed by three production specifications, all issued in 
January 1937. These were 29/36 (Wellington), 30/36 
(Hampden) and 44/36 (Hereford). As compared with B. 9/32 
these included an increase in bomb load, and, for the 
Wellington, in armament. 16 (Note that the letter denoting 
the class of the aircraft was often dropped from 
production specifications. ) The situation could also 
arise that a new project was not given a designation until 
a contract was awarded - the Hawker Demon and Hurricane 
are such examples. In the latter case there was a 
specification number but no corresponding specification 
document. 
Clearly, unless one identifies the first thoughts on a new 
project, there is scope for misinterpretation and the 
assignment of credit where it does not belong. This is 
well illustrated in chapter 5 where a variety of versions 
of the origin of the Spitfire and Hurricane is discussed. 
In the mid-1930s attempts were made to shorten the time 
taken to develop a new aircraft. After discussions within 
the Ministry and with industry, 17 the procedure outlined 
above was retained, but with a fixed timetable for each 
stage of design and development, 18 and omission of the 
twelve-month squadron development period. 19 it was hoped 
that these changes in procedure would cut the development 
time by half. 20 They were adopted by the Air Council in 
May 1935,21 but Dowding was to comment three months later 
that, "All this is pow held up by the production of Lord 
Weirs [sic] alternative scheme. v122 
16 These examples are taken from specification files held by the Air Historical Branch, 
Ministry of Defence. 
17 2/1668,8A, Minutes of a Meeting held ... on 10th December, 1934, to discuss a new 
system of ordering Experimental Aircraft 
18 Wd., 11A, New types of Service Aircraft - Acceleration of Design and Development, 
para. 5 
19 ibid., 11A, para. 8 
20 ibid., 11A, para. 6 
21 ibid., 14A extract from Air Council Minutes of 155th Meeting , 7th May 1935 22 ibid., note by AMRD, 19.8.35 
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Lord Weir, in his capacity as adviser to the Air Council, 
had proposed a more radical change in procurement 
procedure, which he wrote was "almost the most important 
matter of policy on which I have been consulted". Weir 
claimed that the state-of-the-art of aircraft design was 
such that, "the actual performance and qualities of design 
can be accurately predicted from the design. iiB His 
contention was firmly contradicted by both the aircraft 
industry24 and the Air Ministry - the Secretary quoted a 
recent opinion of the United States Federal Aviation 
Commission that, "We cannot accept it as desirable that 
the prize for a design competition should be awarded to 
that Competitor who is able to support the tallest 
Claims. 1125 
In fact dispensing with the prototype stage of aircraft 
development had already been considered by the Air 
Ministry as part of its review of the timetable of 
aircraft development. It was then noted that such a 
scheme was "said to have been adopted by the Italians", 
but the Ministry's unanimous view was that it would lose 
the advantages of competition, and lead to a loss of time 
and money if a chosen design was unsuccessful. 26 An 
example of the dangers of by-passing prototype testing is 
given by Vann's history of the Me 210 project. 27 (The 
author recalls a remark by Sir Sidney Camm in 1960 that 
the only way to know whether a new design was successful 
was to get a prototype in the air as soon as possible. ) 
In his biography of Lord Weir, Reader notes that Weir's 
proposals were never adopted as Air Ministry practice. 28 
23 6/43, Expansion Progress Meetings, EPM 21(35), Acceleration of Design and Development 
of Service Aircraft. (Note by Lord Weir), 21st July 1935, page 1, 
24 ibid., EPM 45(35), T. O. M. Sopwith to The Rt. Hon. Sir Phillip CuncLiffe-Lister, 29th 
October 1935 
25 ibid., EPM 53(35), para. 2 
26 2/1668,11A, para. 4 
27 Vann, F., Witty Messerschmitt, 1993, Chapter 10 "The Me 210 disaster" 
28 Reader, W. J., Architect of Air Power: Life of Viscount Weir, 1968, page 218 
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Nevertheless, to shorten the time from inception to 
production the Ministry did order some new types 'straight 
from the drawing board'. This procedure, and other 
attempts to shorten the timescale of development are 
described by Postan. He comments that despite these 
efforts, "the problem remained largely unresolved. 1129 
3.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATING NEW AIRCRAFT 
This thesis is closely concerned with the ideas that led 
to the development of new RAF aircraft, and the management 
process through which these evolved is of some importance. 
There were two distinct phases - from the early 1920s to 
1934, and from that year to the outbreak of war. 
3.3.1 1923-1934 
The Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry has 
described operational requirements as having been dealt 
with in a piecemeal fashion before 1934.30 This will be 
shown to be fair comment, for although a clear procedure 
was defined, it was not always followed in practice. Some 
examples will be given to illustrate the misunderstandings 
which could result. 
The procedure that was meant to be followed for initiating 
new aircraft types was set out in an "Office Memo" dated 
June 1923. For military aircraft a "Type Requirements" 
file was to be opened by the DCAS and was to state the 
type contemplated. After the new type had been accepted 
into the experimental aircraft programme, the file was to 
be passed to the technical branches of the AMSR's 
department for a specification to be prepared. The 
specification was then to be referred back to the DCAS for 
29 Postan, pages 142-147 
30 41/39, page 54 
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his final approval. 31 This Office Memo is one of the few 
records which indicate the Air Ministry's intention that 
new types should originate with the Air Staff, and the 
intended distinction between type (or operational) 
requirements and specifications. It did not specify where 
responsibility for operational requirements lay within the 
Air Staff, but a clue is to be found in Richards' 
biography of Portal. 32 
Richards notes that Portal was appointed to the Flying 
operations (Home) section of the Air Staff in April 1923. 
He cites a 1964 paper in which Portal wrote that his "job 
was 'Home Operations', but there were only a few squadrons 
in the country and I turned myself into a kind of 
rudimentary Operational Requirements branch". 33 This 
casual approach to the assumption of responsibility for 
operational requirements was confirmed by Brooke-Popham in 
1933. He noted that the F01 (Flying operations 1) section 
had originally been formed to consider home defence, but 
that shortly afterwards it began to deal with operational 
requirements in aircraft and armament. This had become 
the bulk of the work of two of the three officers in the 
section. Only the third now dealt with the strategy of 
home defence. Brooke-Popham proposed that there should be 
a new section of the Air Staff specifically for 
operational Requirements, and that this should come 
directly under the DCAS. It was to deal with all types of 
aircraft, equipment and armament, other than that for the 
Fleet Air Arm, and "would form the channel of 
communication on such matters between the Air staff, both 
Operations and Training, and the Technical Research 
Departments. it34 The new section was created in April 
1934.35 
31 PRO: AIR 20/82, Aircraft Type Requirements Procedure, Office Memo dated 8th June 1923 
32 Richards, D., Portat of Hungerfor , 1977, page 82 33 PortaL, C., The Air Force Department Society Journal, May 1964 
34 2/673,2A, pages 14 & 15 
35 ibid., 44A, Organisation of the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff and the 
Department of the Air Member for PersonneL 
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As has been noted earlier, proposals for new aircraft also 
emanated from the Research and Development Department. 
Some of these were research projects brought forward to 
explore their potential for military (or civil) use, but 
others were replacements for existing Service types. 
Whatever the source of a proposal for a new aircraft, they 
were all regarded as experimental, and were brought 
together in annual Experimental Aircraft Programmes. 
These programmes were drawn up by the AMSR's department 
and discussed with the Air Staff, but the AMSR could, and 
did, proceed with projects which were not approved by 
them. It is not surprising that the Air Staff complained 
that the AMSR had aircraft built for which the Air Staff 
had no use. Conversely, the technical branches were 
annoyed that the Air Staff criticised their proposals 
instead of producing operational requirements. This lack 
of direction in the formulation of operational 
requirements, and the ambiguity of the role of the AMSR's 
Department, are well illustrated below by examples taken 
from 1927. 
The development of an interception fighter is described in 
detail in chapter 4.4.2. It began early in March 1927 
when the Chief of the Air Staff (Trenchard) saw the draft 
of a zone fighter specification, No. 27/26. He told the 
AMSR, Air Vice Marshal Sir John Higgins, that there were 
already four such types being built, and stressed that he 
wanted an "Interceptor". Trenchard suggested that a 
specification for one should replace specification 
27/26.36 Faced with this proposition, Higgins asked his 
Director of Technical Development (Air Commodore J. L. 
Forbes), "Have we at any time been given the general 
requirements of the Air Staff for the 'Interception' 
type? ". 37 They had not, 38 and Higgins minuted Forbes, 
36 PRO: AIR 2/767, Singte-Seat Fighter Landptane Spec 27126, CAS to AMSR, 4.3.27 
37 ibid, AMSR to DTD, 7.3.1927 
38 PRO: AIR 2/794, Interception Fighters for Home Defence: Type Requirementi, DTD to 
DCAS, May 1927 
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I don't know how the practice originated of sending 
detailed specifications to the Air Staff for their 
approval. It appears to me to be wrong. It is for 
Air Staff to tell us general lines on which they want 
a machine produced and what they want to put in it 
and for us to translate it into technical details. 39 
Whilst financial restrictions had not permitted the 
development of two classes of single-seat fighter, it was 
surely the Air Staff's duty to have considered the 
operational requirements of the interception class, if 
only to establish whether the requirements were 
importantly different from those of a zone fighter. 
A different perspective on the complaint of Higgins quoted 
above is given by the development of a multi-gun fighter, 
which is discussed in chapter 4.4.1. In this case the 
technical department initiated the project and ignored the 
Air Staff's comments. 
At a meeting in October 1926 to consider the Experimental 
Aircraft Programme for 1927, the AMSR's department put 
forward a proposal for a single-seat six-gun fighter. The 
Air Staff believed that such an aircraft would be useless 
because of its low performance, but it was claimed that 
the performance would be better than that of day bombers, 
and that the aim was to assess by full-scale tests the 
actual loss of performance caused by fitting six guns. 
The AMSR (Higgins) supported the project - he said that he 
was influenced by similar developments in other countries. 
The item was finally agreed. 40 
The following March - the month of Higgins, complaint 
quoted above - the DTD (Forbes) wrote to the DCAS to 
confirm that the 1927-28 Estimates provided for the 
development of an experimental multi-gun single-seat 
39 2/767, AMSR to DTD, 11.3.27 
40 20/68, pages 128-132, Conference to decide New Programme for Experimentat Aircraft 
for 1927,7th October 1926, Item 6 
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fighter. 41 He mentioned that as the gun load was higher 
than usual they proposed to have no radio and a relatively 
low fuel load. The DCAS replied that to be "of some 
value" the aircraft must have either the performance of an 
interception fighter with the proposed reduced military 
load, or match existing zone fighters with full military 
load; in both cases the Air Staff would accept a reduced 
fuel load. 42 It will be shown in chapter 5 that 
acceptance of a reduced fuel load to achieve a multi-gun 
fighter was a vital contribution to the development of the 
Hurricane and Spitfire in 1935, but in 1927 there was no 
prospect of the proposed six-gun fighter meeting either of 
the DCAS's alternatives. Nevertheless, the AMSR's 
department issued a specification and ordered a prototype 
from Gloster. 
This episode clearly rankled with the Air Staff. Five 
years later, the then F01 (Wing Commander A. C. Maund) saw 
that the Air Estimates included E30,000 for High Speed 
Research Aircraft. He advised the DCAS that although this 
item was not requested by the Air Staff, there was "no 
objection to A. M. S. R. developing this type if he has the 
money, there is no need to press for its being replaced on 
high priority. " Maund added, 
I suggest, however, that in order that the misfortune 
which occurred with the Gloster multi-gun machine 
should not be repeated, you ask A. M. S. R. if he has 
any other Service use in view for these machines and, 
if so, that we should be given a chance to comment on 
the specification for the reason stated above. 43 
In chapters 5 and 6 it will be seen that the Gloster 
Multi-Gun Fighter actually did serve a valuable purpose. 
Moreover, the then AMSR (Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding) did 
not consult the Air Staff before he ordered two 
41 PRO: AIR 2/778, MuLti-Gun Fighter Specification 10/27: Type Requirements, DTD to 
DCAS, 3.3.27 
42 ibid., DCAS to DTD, 24.3.27 
43 20/68,, page 76, F01 to DCAS, 29.9.32 
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experimental high-speed aircraft in 1934. They became the 
Hurricane and Spitfire. 
The handling of the issues described above illustrates the 
uncoordinated way by which the Air Ministry dealt with the 
analysis of its operational requirements. Yet this was an 
essential step in getting the means to implement its 
strategy. In later chapters it is shown how the failure 
to translate the strategy of the Home Defence Scheme into 
a coherent set of operational requirements led to the 
equipment of bomber squadrons with aircraft which could 
not fully implement the fundamental strategy of continuous 
day and night bombing. It also led to day-and-night 
fighters which were inadequate in either role. 
These problems arose from two sources. First was the 
failure of the Air Staff to analyse the operational 
characteristics of the aircraft required to implement the 
home defence strategy. Second was the replacement of this 
omission by the initiation of technically interesting 
projects by the technical branches of the Air Ministry. 
There were occasional inputs from the operational 
Commands, but these were seldom taken seriously. Overall, 
whilst the RAF's fighters and light bombers were kept at 
the forefront of aviation development, its equipment was 
not closely related to the implementation of its strategic 
policy. 
3.3.2 A New Procedure 
In 1933 the unsatisfactory nature of the process by which 
the Air Ministry was initiating new aircraft was 
recognised and moves were made to rationalise the system. 
These included the actions noted earlier - the 
establishment of an Operational Requirements section in 
the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, and 
arrangements to give designers early sight of Air Staff 
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Requirements. In addition steps were taken to co-ordinate 
strategic, technical and operational inputs through the 
establishment of what became known as the operational 
Requirements Committee, and to eliminate divided 
responsibility. These are discussed below. 
Air Vice Marshal E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt was appointed DCAS on 
1st February 1933. It will be evident from later chapters 
that he made a number of important contributions to 
rationalising Air Ministry policy in regard to types of 
aircraft. One of his first actions was to tackle the 
problem of formulating operational requirements. In April 
1933 Ludlow-Hewitt wrote to the CAS (Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond) on this topic. He said that F01 had 
formulated Air Staff operational requirements for 
replacement or new aircraft, and that these had then been 
submitted to the CAS for approval prior to the AMSR 
proceeding to meet the requirements. Ludlow-Hewitt's 
objection to this procedure was that although F01 might 
have consulted individual officers in the departments of 
the Air Ministry, he had not obtained official 
departmental views. The DCAS thought that "it was quite 
unsound that F. O. 1. should be the sole adviser to the 
C. A. S. on this important question". It will be clear from 
the examples given above that Ludlow-Hewitt described the 
process of formulating operational requirements as it was 
meant to have been over the previous ten years, but not as 
it always had been. 
The DCAS proposed a new procedure which would formally 
involve both the departments of the Air ministry and the 
operational Commands of the RAF. The key features were: - 
(a) The A. 0s. C. of overseas Commands should be asked 
to submit annually their views as to the 
operational requirements for replacement or new 
types for their Commands. 
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(b) A Committee should be set up to advise the 
C. A. S. as to the operational requirements that 
should be called for in the proposed new or 
replacement types of aircraft. 
(c) The Committee should consist of: - 
D. C. A. S. Chairman. 
Representative(s) of A. M. S. R. 
D. O. S. D. [Director of Organisation and 
Staff Duties] 
D. D. O. I. 
Representative of Plans. 
A representative of the A. O. C. of an 
appropriate Command at home, if applicable. 
The Committee should sit as and when required 
and the Chairman should co-opt additional 
members if he considers such action desirable. 
Ludlow-Hewitt proposed that the committee's 
recommendations should go to CAS, and that if he approved 
them, the AMSR's Department would draw up a specification 
in consultation with F01 (or F02 for flying boats). If 
the DCAS accepted that the specification covered the Air 
Staff requirement, it would be issued to industry. 44 This 
scheme was adopted, although not wholly with immediate 
effect. 
Meetings of the kind proposed by Ludlow-Hewitt were first 
held in 1934, although the title "Operational Requirements 
Committee" did not come into full use until 1935. The 
committee continued to be chaired by the DCAS after the 
Operational Requirements branch was put under the new post 
of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in 1938.45 
Following the first 'Operational Requirements Committee' 
meetings in March 1934, at which new light and heavy 
bombers were considered, Ludlow-Hewitt explained to the 
CAS that, 
44 20/82, DCAS to CAS, ApriL 1933 
45 2/2853, Re-Organisation of the Air staff under DCAs and ACAS, approved 26.2.38 
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In making out these specifications I have endeavoured 
to give, for the information of the designer, a 
general statement in the first paragraph of the 
primary characteristics of the required type. The 
object of this paragraph is to give the designer 
definite guidance as to these primary 
characteristics, to which other items in the 
specification must if necessary be subordinated. 
A. M. S. R. will then be in a better position to ask for 
the assistance and suggestions of the firms in 
working out the means by which the primary 
requirements can best be met. 46 
This procedure was followed thereafter. 
Divided responsibility for the initiation of new service 
aircraft was dealt with in October 1934. The Minutes of a 
meeting on the next year's Experimental Aircraft Programme 
record that, 
A. M. S. R. stated that before considering the items on 
the proposed programme he wished to comment on the 
method of approach to the problem which had hitherto 
been followed. It had been the practice for D. T. D. 
to prepare a draft programme for discussion, but he 
considered that it should be initiated by the Air 
Staff. D. C. A. S. agreed that in future the Air Staff 
should be responsible for initiating the programme 
of proposed new types of service aircraft, D. T. D. 
adding to this any projected items for Research or 
Experimental purposeS. 47 
It is indicative of the importance attached to control of 
the Experimental Aircraft Programme that the decision to 
make it the responsibility of the Air Staff immediately 
led them to take positive steps in regard to the 
assessment of the aircraft types needed by the RAF - more 
so than had either Ludlow-Hewitt's new procedure, or the 
creation of an Operational Requirements section. The day 
after the AMSR's statement the DCAS (Ludlow-Hewitt) 
instructed Plans branch that, "In connection with the 
formulation of specifications for Service aircraft 
46 PRO: 2/729, Heavy Bomber Specification B3/34. Type Requirements, DCAS to CAS, 13.3.34 
47 PRO: AIR 2/716, Experimentat Aircraft Proqramme for 1935: Air Staff requirements and 
order of priorit , 6B, Minutes of 16th October 1934 
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required in the future, I want you to prepare a review of 
the nature of operations required of the various air units 
stationed East of the U. K., both actual and proposed". 48 
This request was similar to the first stage of Ludlow- 
Hewitt's new procedure, although, as became evident, the 
"nature of operations" was not the same thing as 
operational requirements. 
Plans branch produced a Table which set out the duties and 
roles of each overseas Command, and the number of 
squadrons of different types which was needed, but with 
only peripheral reference to the operational 
characteristics required of each type. 49 It concluded 
that only a torpedo-bomber and a General Purpose aircraft 
were different from those required for home defence. 
It is interesting that the General Purpose type was not 
specified for Air Control duties, as some believe (chapter 
4), but was defined as being able to engage a cruiser, 
with a bomb load of 500 lbs, and with adequate offensive 
and defensive armament. 50 
The Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence (Wing 
Commander R. H. Peck) then sought to widen the review of 
the aircraft types required to include the whole of the 
RAF. He pointed out to the DCAS that, 
As you know, we have not had a careful appreciation 
of this kind before although it is really an 
essential first stage towards a stabilised equipment 
policy to provide a regular inflow of new designs. 
Moreover, without it it is exceedingly difficult to 
decide what operational requirements to lay down for 
each class of aircraft so that the number of classes 
can be reduced as low as possible without sacrificing 
essential characteristics in any one class. 51 
48 PRO: AIR 2/2715, CLasses of Aircraft Required by the Royal Air Force, DCAS to PLans, 
17.10.34 
49 ibid., 2A 
50 ibid., Cochrane [Pians] to DCAS, 9.11.34 
51 ibid., DDOI to DCAS, 15.11.34 
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In fact Wing Commander W. L. Welsh (F01) had prepared a 
general review of home and overseas type requirements for 
a lecture to the RAF Staff College in 1928, but this does 
not appear to have been seen as an executive document. It 
is fully discussed in chapter 4. 
Peck's proposal to extend the 1934 review was not accepted 
by Ludlow-Hewitt. In regard to the home defence classes - 
which he listed as heavy, medium and light bombers, two- 
seater, single seater (general) and single-seater 
(special) fighters - he said that, "These classes 
constitute the backbone of the Air Force and cannot be 
amalgamated or combined to get the very best results out 
of each class. v62 
Undeterred, Peck sought - without success - to persuade 
the Operational Requirements section to undertake a review 
of all future requirements, and their possible 
amalgamation. He suggested that they should include a 
comparison with foreign aircraft, particularly to see if 
parity in numbers would give parity in bombing capacity. 53 
Ludlow-Hewitt's replacement as DCAS in January 1935 by AVM 
C. L. Courtney brought a change of heart, for Courtney 
instructed Peck to produce a note on all the classes of 
aircraft required by the RAF, and on the rate of 
replacement. Peck's review of May 1935 concluded that 
there was little prospect of reducing the number of 
classes below those already seen as required for home 
defence and overseas. Indeed, he pointed out there were 
some omissions, such as high altitude bombers and 
f ighters. 54,55 
52 ibid., DCAS to DDOI, 27.11.34 
53 ibid., DDOI to OR, 11.12.34 
54 ibid., 6A, DDOI to DCAS, 13.5.35 
55 ibid., 68, The Classes of Aircraft required for the Royal Air Force and the policy on 
which obsolescent aircraft should be replaced 
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Otherwise, Peck's review was notable for some conclusions 
which were to be rapidly overtaken, as will be shown in 
chapters 7 and 8. He thought that there was no merit in 
increasing the bomb load of heavy bombers, and that 
despite its low "output efficiency" the light bomber class 
should be kept. Peck did, however, correctly foresee the 
merging of the zone and interception classes of fighter. 
Another input to the management of operational 
requirements followed from the establishment in 1934 of 
Bombing and Air Fighting Committees. They included in 
their terms of reference the consideration of aircraft 
design in relation to bombing and fighting performance. 56 
The Air Fighting Committee was to have some influence on 
armament issues (chapters 6 and 8), and Bombing Committee 
played an important part in discussions of an Ideal Bomber 
in 1938 (chapter 9). 
3.3.3 Summarv 
During Ludlow-Hewitt's spell as DCAS the Air Ministry's 
management procedure for considering operational 
requirements was greatly improved. It will be seen that 
the Operational Requirements Committee provided a valuable 
forum for the bringing together of views of the Air Staff, 
the Research and Development department and the 
operational Commands of the RAF. Meetings were held to 
discuss the requirements for most of the post-1933 
aircraft which are discussed later in this thesis. 
During the Second World War, the Directorate of 
Operational Requirements was largely devoted to keeping 
the aircraft conceived before the war battleworthy. 57 But 
as the end of the war approached the Director proposed an 
extension of Ludlow-Hewitt's scheme by setting up a sub- 
56 PRO: AIR 5/1143, Bombing Air Fightinq Committees. Interim Reports, paras. 2 and 48 
57 PRO: AIR 20/2240, Operationat Requirements, DOR to ACASUR), 19.3.1945 
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committee to look at future requirements as a whole. It 
was decided that this should include representatives of 
aircraft designers as well as of the Air Ministry and the 
Commands. 58 
3.4 TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
It is inevitable that the subject of this thesis raises 
technical issues concerning aircraft design and operation. 
This section summarises developments in aviation 
technology during the 1920s and 1930s, and discusses their 
general impact on aircraft design and performance. Some 
particular aspects which were important to the RAF's 
assessment of feasible operational requirements are noted. 
The section concludes with some cautionary words on 
aircraft performance comparisons. 
3.4.1 Aerodvnamics 
Aerodynamics is the branch of science concerned with the 
flow of air. An understanding of the physics of air flow 
when treated as a non-viscous incompressible fluid had 
been developed before the first flight of a heavier-than- 
air machine, and the principles of its mathematical 
treatment were well established by the end of the Great 
War. This academic work was of little direct value in the 
design of practical aircraft. It was known that viscous 
effects were important in determining aerodynamic forces, 
but their inclusion in calculations of the aerodynamic 
loads on complex shapes had to await the advent of 
sufficiently large computers in the 1980s. 
The progress that was made between the wars in the 
understanding of air flow and in the interpretation of 
wind tunnel tests was certainly beneficial. It led to an 
58 ibid., ACASUR) to DOR, 15.5.45 
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appreciation of the need for clean (streamlined) design 
and to comparative data on the performance of wing 
sections and of engine installations - all essential if 
advantage was to be taken of increased engine power. In 
the early 1930s devices such as slots and flaps came into 
general use to increase the lift which could be obtained 
from a wing at low speeds. 
3.4.2 Aircraft Structures 
During the 1914-18 war the load-bearing structure of most 
aircraft had been made of wood. This practice continued 
after the war, but there were difficulties in obtaining 
suitable wood and problems of storage, particularly in the 
tropics. Moreover metal structures were more suitable for 
mass production. 59 The Air Ministry took the lead in 
persuading the British aircraft industry to design metal 
aircraft. In 1925 it decided to equip the RAF with only 
all-metal aircraft60 (something of a misnomer because 
wooden secondary structures and fabric covering of metal 
load-bearing structures continued in use for many years). 
The adoption of this policy, coupled with the statement 
that the RAF would buy no wooden aircraft after 1st April 
1928, and would run down its employment of woodworking 
trades, was a bold move. Its success was exemplified by 
comments from the Director of Contracts of the Air 
Ministry in February 1929. He wrote that, 
In the last three years a silent revolution in 
construction has been proceeding with remarkable 
speed and smoothness. Considering the difficulties, 
technical and financial, which confronted the 
Ministry in 1925, and the gloomy forebodings then 
expressed, it is a matter of surprise that so 
momentous a change has been carried through with so 
little friction. 
59 6/22, Air CounciL Precis No. 539, Chariton Report, 2nd December 1926 
60 PRO: AIR 2/1208, Equipment of RAF with AU Metal Machines - Potic , Extract from Air 
CounciL Minutes , 3rd December 1926 
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He noted that, "I understand from A. M. S. R. that in another 
12 months there will be hardly any wooden machines in 
service, except for training. 1161 Nevertheless, as noted 
in chapter 1, the myth that in the early 1930s the RAP was 
equipped with all-wooden aircraft has persisted. 
The next step in the development of aircraft structures 
was a move to stressed-skin construction. Fabric covering 
was replaced by a metal skin which contributed to the 
load-carrying strength of the aircraft's structure. By 
the mid-1930s this had become general practice for new 
first-line military aircraft, with Vickers' "geodetic" 
construction an exception. 
3.4.3 Aero-Encfines 
Improvements in aircraft performance came in the first 
place from increases in the power, power/weight ratio and 
fuel economy of aircraft engines. It was these which made 
higher speeds and longer ranges possible, and thus made 
improvements in aerodynamic design both desirable and 
exploitable. 
The Air Ministry did not issue operational requirements 
for aircraft engines. 62 It did, as will be seen, support 
engine manufacturers to ensure that a British engine 
development and manufacturing capability was maintained. 
Gunston's Piston Aero EnqineS63 gives an excellent review 
of aero engine development between the wars, explaining 
both the problems of obtaining increases in power and how 
these were tackled, including the widespread introduction 
of supercharging to maintain engine power to high 
altitudes. These developments led to the power available 
61 ibid., 24A, Note by Director of contracts, 21.2.29 
62 PRO: AIR 20/92, Operational Requirements for Aero-Engines, Extract from 2nd Meeting 
of DGRDJACAS Monthly Liaison Meetings, 16th February 1939, Conclusion 10 
63 Gunston, Bill, Piston Aero Engines, 1993, Chapter 6 
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to aircraft designers increasing from about 200 hp in 1920 
to well over 1,000 hp in 1940. This increase in power was 
accompanied by marked improvements in engine and cooling 
system installation for low drag. 
In the 1930s metal propellers began to replace the wooden 
propellers which had been in use, and the introduction of 
variable-pitch propellers made possible the optimum use of 
high power engines at both low and high aircraft speeds. 
3.4.4 Aircraft DgsicT 
This section briefly discusses the influence on aircraft 
design of the technical developments described above. It 
must be remembered that aircraft design is a compromise 
between conflicting operational requirements, such as a 
high maximum speed and low landing speed, and between 
conflicting technical requirements, such as a strong wing 
but of low structure weight, or a well-cooled yet 
streamlined engine installation. 
By the end of the 1914-18 war aircraft had been developed 
into acceptably reliable vehicles, certainly for military 
purposes. In the course of this development aircraft 
designers had explored a number of basic configurations. 
It had been found that the biplane configuration gave a 
good compromise between structure weight and aerodynamic 
performance at the speeds then possible with the engine 
power, and materials, that were available. For military 
purposes the biplane configuration could give the good 
manoeuvrability and high rate-of-climb that were sought 
for fighters. For bombers, load-carrying could be 
achieved by a large wing area, so retaining a low wing- 
loading. The latter was an important consideration at a 
time when take-off and landing on relatively unprepared 
surfaces was the norm, and when night landing aids were 
rudimentary. Design digressions into monoplanes and 
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triplanes had been tried, not without some success, but by 
the end of the war biplanes dominated contemporary 
designs. 
In the ten years following the Great War there was little 
change in the choice of configuration of aircraft designed 
for military applications. All the home defence aircraft 
which entered RAF service in those years were biplanes. 
Such modest improvements in the performance of RAF 
aircraft as did arise came largely from increased engine 
power and improved engine installation. 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s improvements in 
materials and design began to be exploited in racing 
aircraft. The Schneider Trophy races are the best known 
of these, and illustrate the application of emerging 
possibilities for improving the high-speed performance of 
aircraft. The Trophy was donated in 1913 to encourage the 
development of hydro-planes. In the later years of the 
competition this brought the advantage of no limitation on 
airfield size. Thus the ever-present design compromise 
between the need to take-off and land safely in a 
restricted area, and the achievement of high flight 
speeds, could be loaded in favour of the latter. 
In the years immediately following the Great War increases 
in winning speeds were obtained from improvements 
in the 
streamlining of biplanes, for there was little change 
in 
available engine power between 1920 and 1925.64 By 1925, 
the American Curtiss R3C-2 realised all the potential for 
clean design of a biplane configuration. The Italian 
winner of 1926, as well as Reginald Mitchell's abortive 
Supermarine S. 4 of the previous year, and his S. 5 (the 
1927 winner), took the next step in drag reduction with 
monoplane configurations, albeit wire-braced except for 
the S. 4.65 
64 Buchanan, J. S.. OThe Schneider Cup Race, 1925.0 "A . Vot 
30 (1926). page 434 
65 Barker. R.. The Schneider Troohy Pacts. 1971 
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This demonstration of the value of aerodynamically clean 
design was not overlooked by the designers of military and 
civil aircraft, but it was not directly applicable to non- 
racing aircraft. The Supermarine Schneider Trophy winners 
of 1927-1931 obtained their high power from engines of 
very short life; they also carried very little equipment, 
had almost no view for the pilot, and very high landing 
speeds. When in 1931 the aircraft designer Richard Fairey 
analysed the changes that would be needed to produce a 
practical fighter, he concluded that it would be little 
better than those in service with the RAF if the 
comparison was made at the same engine power. 66 
ýn parallel with the development of racing seaplanes in 
Italy and Great Britain in the late 1920s, American 
military and civil aircraft designers began to put 
together the technical opportunities that were emerging. 
They recognised that increases in engine power provided 
the potential for higher speeds, but that the strut- and 
wire-bracing of wings, which gave strength with lightness, 
produced drag which inhibited attainment of the potential 
benefits of increased power. A number of designers took 
advantage of the development of corrosion resistant 
aluminium. alloys, and a better understanding of structural 
and aerodynamic design, to develop cantilever (i. e. 
unbraced by external struts and wires) monoplanes. 
April 1931 saw the first flight of the Boeing B-9, a 
monoplane twin-engined bomber, which had the additional 
innovation of a retractable undercarriage. This aircraft 
did not go into large scale production. 67 it was soon 
followed by the similar Martin B-10 bomber, which was 
ordered in quantity for the United States Army Air Corps 
in 1933.68 Soon after 1930 cantilever monoplanes entered 
66 Fairey, page 574 
67 Swanborough, G. & Bowers, P. M., United States Mititary Aircraft since 1909,1989, 
page 101 
68 ibid., page 433 
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airline service in the United States, the Boeing 247 in 
1933 and the Douglas DC2 in 1934.69 Air Vice Marshal A. M. 
Longmore observed that these, "Big, Heavy [sic] passenger 
carrying monoplanes in America have a speed which is 
little less than our fighters at the present day". 70 
The Air Ministry had purchased the 1922 Schneider Trophy 
winner (Supermarine Sea Lion II) and supported the British 
entries of 1925 - they were designed for high speed 
research and development and lent to the manufacturers for 
racing. 71 The RAF staffed and managed the British 
Schneider Cup team in 1927,1929 and 1931 and, as will be 
seen, continued to fund high-speed aircraft research after 
1931. The Air Ministry was not unaware of aviation 
developments in America. It considered buying a Martin B- 
10 bomber, 72 and, after a visit to the USA by the Director 
of Technical Development in 1934, generated an 
"Americanised" version of heavy bomber Specification 
B. 3/34 (see chapter 7). Gunston refers to pressure from 
the Air Ministry on Bristols to buy a Northrop 2-L 
aircraft as a test bed for the Bristol Hercules engine, 
but also because of the Ministry's interest in the quality 
and finish of the Northrop's stressed skin construction. 73 
The feasibility of higher maximum speeds led to a conflict 
with landing-speed requirements. A relatively small wing 
area (or more correctly, high wing-loading) was sufficient 
and desirable at high speeds, but would inevitably lead to 
a high landing speed, especially at a time before high- 
lift devices such as slots and flaps were in general use. 
This was a particular problem for RAF fighter development 
because of the requirement that the standard fighter 
should have a day and night operational capability. 
69 Linden, F. Robert van der, The Boeing 247: the First Modern Afrtiner, 1991 
70 PRO: AIR 16/305, Study of Air Fighting Tactics at Northolt, 99A, Enctosure B, 
Longmore to C-in-C Intand Area, Ist May 1934 
71 Buchanan 
72 PRO: AIR 2/729 Heavy Somber SDecification B3/34. Type Requirements, CAS to Secretary, 
7.6.34 
73 Gunston, By Jupiter, page 74 
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Safe night flying required a low landing speed. This was 
not a problem when fighters had a low wing-loading so as 
to give a high rate-of-climb, and when maximum speeds were 
around 150 mph. 74 But when it became possible to attain 
much higher speeds, the design conflict with a low landing 
speed became a significant issue. For a similar reason, 
when the speed and military and fuel load sought for 
bombers were much increased in the mid-1930s, the 
consequent increase in wing-loading made take-off a 
critical design factor. It is shown in chapter 8 that 
this led to a planned reliance on catapult take-off, 
although in practice it meant the acceptance of longer and 
longer take-off distances. In 1940 this problem was eased 
by the decision to build concrete runways to replace the 
grass airfields commonly in use up to then. 
The trend to streamlined aircraft led to another 
complication. They had a flat gliding angle such that 
when landing the gliding distance from a height of fifty 
feet could be twice that of the ground run. 75 This led to 
the practice of specifying landing distances rather than 
landing speed. 
3.4.5 Comparisons of Performance, 
It is the nature of the subject of this thesis that many 
references are to aircraft performance data - speed, 
range, bomb load etc.. It was in those terms that the Air 
Ministry expressed and discussed its operational 
requirements. Occasionally reference is made to data from 
other sources, or to the performance actually achieved by 
aircraft designed to meet Ministry requirements. All such 
data, from whatever source, must be viewed with caution 
and comparisons drawn with great care. 
74 PRO: AIR 20/167, Devetopment of Fighter Planes. Jan. 1925 - Oct 1940, F01 to DDOI, 
2.7.27 
75 20/82, FOI to DCAS, September 1933 
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A common source of misunderstanding is to overlook the 
fact that aircraft performance characteristics are inter- 
related, so that it is meaningless to quote maximum speed, 
maximum range and maximum bomb load as if they could be 
obtained simultaneously. This is a common practice of 
writers who criticise the actions of the Air Ministry 
between the wars. For example, Robertson claims that 
"Specification B. 9/32 required a minimum bomb load of 1000 
lbs. and a range of 1500 miles. 1176 It will be shown in 
chapter 7 that the specification actually called for a 
normal bomb load of 1,000 lbs with a range of 720 miles. 
A reinforcing range of 1,500 miles, with no bomb load, was 
later added to the specification. M. Smith confuses the 
range and bomb load requirements of the heavy bomber 
(B. 12/36) specified in 1936.77 He mistakes the 
operational range of 2,000 miles required for war with 
Germany with the overseas reinforcing range (3,000 miles), 
and overlooks that these, and the maximum "warload", were 
associated with different take-off assumptions. In 
particular the maximum bomb load was dependent on catapult 
take-off, which - contrary to Smith's assumption - was not 
expected to be available overseas. These aspects are 
discussed in chapters 8 and 9. 
To a lesser degree the RAF made errors of this kind with 
respect to its own aircraft. For example, when it was 
found that the production model of the Bulldog fighter did 
not achieve the same maximum speed as had the prototype, 
it was discovered that acceptance trials had been made 
without the full military load. 78 A similar error was 
made with the Hart bomber. 79 
76 Robertson, S., page 62 
77 Smith, M., page 237 
78 PRO: AIR 2/346, Type Requirements of Buttdog 11 Singte Seater Fighter Aircraft, RDA3 
to ADRDA, 13.7.32 
79 PRO: AIR 2/818, High Performance Day Somber Spec 12/26. Hawker "Hart" and "Hind". 
Type requirements. Spec 7/34, CAS to AMSR, 12.12.30 
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Even if trials had been properly conducted, there was 
likely to be a difference between the performance of a 
well-maintained prototype and that of aircraft in squadron 
service. In 1939 Dowding wrote that he had, "recently 
been carrying out some experiments, designed to determine 
the actual speeds of Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in 
Squadrons, as distinct from the speeds which are 
attributed to them by the Air Ministry. " He said that his 
experiments showed that the speed of the Hurricane was 
seriously over estimated and that the Spitfire was even 
more disappointing. 80 
Attempts to trace trends over time in the performance 
required and achieved by RAF aircraft also face the 
fundamental problem that definitions were changed. Key 
events were the redefinition in 1932 of bomber cruising 
speed and range, and of fighter endurance, and further 
changes in the definition of fighter fuel requirements in 
1935, and of bomber performance in 1936 and in 1938. 
Before 1932, except for night bombers, it had been common 
to define maximum speed, range and endurance at full 
throttle. Estimates of maximum speed continued to be 
based upon full throttle for both fighters and bombers, 81,82 
but in 1932 a new scheme was introduced for specifying the 
endurance of fighters, and the range and complementary 
cruising speed of bombers. These were to be based upon 
the lower power-setting of maximum permissible engine 
revolutions (rpm) for continuous running. 83,84 
In 1935 there was a complete reappraisal of endurance and 
other fuel requirements for fighters which had important 
80 PRO: AIR 2/2822, Type Requirements for Specn F 36/34. (Hawker), 38A, AOC-in-C Fighter 
Command to Air Ministry, 25th Juty 1939 
81 PRO: AIR 2/2744, Mutti-engined Day Bomber: Type Requirements - Spec. B. 9/32, CAS to 
AMSR, 7.9.32 
82 PRO: AIR 2/2821, Whirtwind Sinqte Engined. Singte Seater Day and Night Fighter. Specn 
F/37/35 Type requirements, 2A 
83 PRO: AIR 2/2815, Singte Seater - Low wing Monoptane (Bulldog Replacement) Type 
Requirements Specn. F. 7/30, FOI to DTD, 7.10.32 
84 2/2744, DTD to DCAS and AMSR, 22.8.32 
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policy implications. This is fully discussed in chapter 
5. 
In chapter 8 it will be seen that in 1936 the power 
setting for bomber cruising performance calculations was 
reduced to two-thirds of that for maximum power. The Air 
Staff also reduced the fuel allowance for take-off and 
emergencies from M hour to U hour. Then in 1937 the use 
of two-thirds maximum power for cruising performance 
assessment was replaced by the adoption of "maximum 
economic cruising power". 85 This was the highest power 
which could be used with a weak fuel/air mixture. For 
supercharged engines on 87 octane petrol it was said to 
give approximately 8796 of the top speed of an aircraft at 
15,000 feet. 86 
In 1938 the Air Staff reviewed the provision that was made 
for reserves in the calculation of the effective 
operational range of bombers, and found that Bomber 
Command used a different approach from that used by the 
Air Staff . 87 The then Deputy Director of Operational 
Requirements (Group Captain R. H. M. S. Saundby) proposed a 
new scheme to be used for all purposes. 88 In this, before 
the still air range at maximum economic cruising power was 
calculated, fuel was to be set aside for 50 minutes at 
that power. This was to allow for taxying and take-off, 
climb at full throttle, and M hours flying to allow for 
navigational errors and other emergencies. Any additional 
allowances for operational reasons were to be decided by 
the officer planning each mission. 89 These rules were 
approved by the CAS, 90 and incorporated into Air Staf f 
85 PRO: AIR 2/2833, Tornado and TvDhoon. Singte Seater Fighter - Specification F18/37 - 
Type Requirements, RDA3 (Liptrot) to DDOR, 26.7.37 
86 PRO: AIR 8/231, Aircraft Performance Figures 1937-45, AMRD to PS to CAS, 4.2.38 
87 PRO: AIR 2/3318, Effective Operationat Ranges of Aircraft, DDOps to DDOR, 14.6.38 
88 ibid., DDOR to ACAS, 9.7.38 
89 ibid., Appendix 10A, Ranges of Aircraft 
90 ibid., CAS to ACAS, 12.7.1381 
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operational requirements for new aircraft, albeit in a 
slightly different form. 91 
This comprehensive scheme did not last long. In March 
1939 the Director of Operations explained to the DCAS that 
effective operational range and corresponding bomb lift 
was calculated by taking a typical operation, and assuming 
the highest cruising speed over a defended area, 
economical cruise over the sea, and a period of maximum 
power if engaged. 92 
The important point about the series of changes in the 
definition of speed and range described above is that they 
were applied retrospectively to existing types. In 
consequence, other than for maximum speed, it is seldom 
possible to directly compare the performance data 
specified in an operational requirement with that 
calculated for the resultant aircraft during its 
development and when it had entered service. Furthermore, 
apart from changes in definition, during the course of the 
design and development of an aircraft other factors arose. 
In general improvements in engines led to the potential 
for a higher performance than that first sought, but this 
could be more than offset by weight increases and other 
departures from the design as first envisaged. In 
addition, as will be seen in chapters 8 and 9, the 
acceptance in the late 1930s of increased take-off and 
landing distances had a very marked influence on 
attainable performance. 
The cumulative effect of many of these factors is 
illustrated by the history of the Vickers Wellington. It 
is shown in chapter 7 that the operational requirement 
which led to this aircraft was conceived in 1931, and 
included a planned range of 600 miles at full throttle 
(190 mph) with a bomb load of 1,000 lbs. The change in 
91 PRO: AIR 2/2958, Bomber Landptane to Sr>ec. No. BI/39. Type Reguirements., OR1 to 
RDA3,22.7.38 
92 8/231, DOps to DCAS, 23.3.39 
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the definition of range in 1932 led to the specification 
being issued with a range of 720 miles at maximum 
continuous rpm (170 mph). Development was much delayed, 
and design changes were made before the prototype first 
flew in 1936. In August 1937 a comparison was made of the 
expected performance under normal take-off conditions of 
the medium and heavy bombers then under development, and 
the Wellington was now credited with a range of 1,550 
miles at 214 mph with a bomb load of 2,000 lbs. 93 Early 
in 1939 it was credited a range of 1,425 miles with a bomb 
load of 4,500 lb - but these figures assumed a very long 
take-off and not normal conditions. 94 It had been found 
that the geodetic structure of the Wellington was over 
strength, and it was therefore best judged on overload 
perf ormance. 95 
Performance estimates for the aircraft designed to the 
1936 heavy bomber specification B. 12/36 illustrate the 
expectations which could be raised during design - 
expectations which, as shown in chapter 9, could then be 
translated into unattainable performance demands for the 
next generation of aircraft. The Air Staff Requirement 
issued in July 1936 called for a topzpeed of 275 mph at 
15,000 feet, but in 1937 there were estimates of nearly 
330 mph for both the Short and Supermarine designs to 
B. 12/36.96 Thereafter estimates for the Short Stirling 
decreased, 97,98 and acceptance trials early in 1941 found 
the top speed at 15,000 feet to be only 218 mph99 - less 
than the original call for a cruising speed of 230 mph. 
93 9/82,12A, 26.8.37 
94 PRO AIR 2/1964, Wettington Vickers Bomber to Speciffcation 8.9/32. Type Requirements, 
7A of 55A, note by OR2,15.2.39 
95 8/231, AMRD to AMSO, 18.12.36 
96 PRO: AIR 2/2082, Consideration of Design of Experimental Heavy Bomber inctuded as a 
Devetopment Type in the 1937 Estimates. Specn. 825/3 , 5A, RDA3 to DTD, 12.11.37 97 8/231, CAS to AMDP, 20.3.39 
98 ibfd., Tabte dated 2.5.39 
99 PRO: AIR 2/2899, Short Bro's. - Stirting Landptane B12/36. Type Requirements and 
Summary of Triats, 53A 
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An additional problem arises in making international 
comparisons, for there were different conventions for 
describing engine characteristics. For instance, in 1938 
the Chief of the Air Staff queried data which showed that 
the cruising speed of RAF fighters was a much lower 
percentage of maximum speed than those of other 
countries. 100 It was explained to him that the apparent 
inconsistency arose because other countries used a 
different system of engine rating. 101 
The discussion above illustrates how difficult it is to 
make valid comparisons of aircraft performance, yet the 
problems outlined above appear to have gone unnoticed in 
the literature, where it is common to quote what can best 
be described as a random collection of data obtained from 
specifications, design estimates, prototype trials and 
performance in service, with no indication of date or of 
other relevant factors. An example is a Table compiled by 
Robertson which he says "illustrates the trend in Air 
Staff specifications". 102 It gives data for bombers from 
1920 to 1940. Most of it is unrecognisable when compared 
with that given in the actual specifications - which can 
readily be found in the primary sources. 
In the current research the intention is to explore the 
performance that the Air Staff were seeking, and why. It 
will therefore be concerned primarily with estimates made 
at the inception stage of new aircraft, and hence with the 
definitions ruling at that time. Attention will be drawn 
to instances where a change in the definition of 
performance was relevant to the consideration of an 
operational requirement. 
100 8/231 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 31st January 1938 
101 ibid., AMRD to PS to CAS, 4th February 1938 
102 Robertson, S., pages 65-66, itatics added 
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4. DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS: 1923 to 1930 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 have discussed how a number of political, 
strategic and technical issues had an important bearing on 
the characteristics of the aircraft with which the RAF 
sought to carry out its home defence responsibilities. 
This chapter deals with the way in which the RAF's 
thinking on operational requirements in the 1920s 
developed against that background. 
The aircraft which actually came into service with the RAF 
during the 1920s were in response to requirements which 
sought no more than a gradual improvement over the types 
with which it had finished the war in 1918. Some remained 
in service for many years. For example, the Vickers 
Virginia night bomber served, albeit much modified, from 
1924 until 1937,1 and versions of the Armstrong Siddeley 
Siskin III fighter equipped first-line fighter squadrons 
from 1924 to 1932.2 Nevertheless, behind this 
traditionalist appearance there was much discussion on the 
best type of bomber, on defence against a formation of 
bombers, and above all on defence against air attacks on 
London. None of the more extreme ideas which were Put 
forward led to aircraft which entered service, but towards 
the end of the decade the Air Ministry initiated major 
advances in the RAF's fighter aircraft and their armament 
which prepared the ground for the great advances made in 
the 1930s. 
Paradoxically, a Service devoted to the principle of 
offensive bombing operations put more effort into the 
development of fighter aircraft than it put into the 
1 Thetford, 0., Aircraft of the Royal Air Forie, 1988, page 539 
2 ibid., pages 22 and 24 
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development of bombers. This policy is noted in the Air 
Historical Branch narrative on the evolution of Bomber 
Command, where it is said that, "the Air Ministry devoted 
most of the scanty sums available for scientific and 
technical research to experiments designed to improve the 
defensive rather than the offensive power of the A. D. G. B, 
forces". 3 
The AHB narrative says that although concentration on 
defence as a long-term policy (which, it says, in the 
event proved correct) may appear a "curious policy to 
pursue at a time when the doctrine of the offensive was 
still the accepted gospel", it was justified by the ten- 
years rule. This is a surprising deduction, for in most 
businesses the expectation of no major change in the 
market for ten years ahead would be seen as a reason for 
embarking upon long-term research relevant to making the 
core business more competitive. The RAF undoubtedly saw 
its core business as bombers and bombing. Moreover# 
despite the effort that was put into fighter development, 
the RAF did not believe that it had succeeded in producing 
an adequate defensive system, either during the reign of 
the ten-year rule or afterwards. 
Robertson and Mason put forward the opposite conclusion to 
that of the Air Historical Branch. Robertson asserts that 
the Air Staff neglected fighter technology, and that only 
in the mid- to late-1930s were they "forced to consider 
fighters in a meaningful way". 4 Mason, in discussing 
Trenchard's influence on RAF equipment, claims that he 
aimed to, 
keep the bomber at the forefront of technology by 
means of a constant stream of prototypes. Moreover, 
the research necessary to ensure this advance would 
become the responsibility of the privately-owned 
industry. Thus the bomber made slow technological 
progress within the funds available, although, by 
implication, the interceptor fighter - the logical 
3 41/39, page 35 
4 Robertson, S., pages 67-68 
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instrument with which to gain major advances ... was 
permitted to stagnate. 5 
This is a confused argument, which at best implies 
comparison with some technological ideal of the kind noted 
in section 1.2.1 above. Mason contradicts his claim that 
interceptor fighters were permitted to stagnate under 
Trenchard in his The British Fighter, where he writes 
favourably of the Hawker Fury fighter6 - which, as will be 
shown, was developed at Trenchard's instigation. 
When this issue of whether or not the RAF put more effort 
into the development of fighters or bombers is viewed in 
terms of the operational requirements which the Air Staff 
sought, rather than in terms of the aircraft which 
industry produced, it will be seen that there was some 
complacency regarding bombers, which contrasted with a 
more thoughtful and innovative analysis of the role of 
fighters. 
This chapter first discusses the general development of 
operational requirements for fighters and bombers in the 
1920s, and then describes the evolution of some types of 
aircraft which were important as stepping stones to the 
operational requirements of the 1930s. This is followed 
by an analysis of the testing of some aspects of the 
operational effectiveness of the aircraft developed in the 
1920s in the RAF's Air Exercises of 1927-1932. Finally 
there is a review of the position reached by the end of 
the 1920s. 
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1920S 
In chapter 3 it has been seen that responsibility for the 
formulation of the RAF's operational requirements was 
fragmented in the 1920s, and indeed remained so up to 
5 Mason, The British Bomber, 1994, page 117 
6 Mason, The British Fighter, 1992, page 213 
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1934. This may be why the author has found no record of 
an analysis of the RAF's operational requirements as a 
whole which can be dated earlier than 1928. On Ist March 
of that year Wing Commander W. L. Welsh lectured to the RAF 
Staff College on "Air Staff Requirements in Aircraft". 7 
Welsh was then head of Flying Operations 1 which, as 
explained in chapter 3, was the section of the Air Staff 
which had become responsible for formulating operational 
requirements. His review brought together the whole range 
of the RAF's operational responsibilities. The two copies 
of the lecture which are held in the Public Record Office 
are unsigned and undated, and the present author is 
grateful to Mr. Peter Elliot of the RAF Museum for 
identifying the lecturer and occasion. Welsh's review is 
taken here as the framework for a general discussion of 
the development of operational requirements in the 1920s, 
with reference to earlier studies as appropriate, and 
particularly to the thought-provoking views of Air 
Commodore J. A. Chamier. 
Chamier was Director of Technical Development at the Air 
Ministry prior to his retirement from the RAF in December 
1928, when he became Secretary-General of the Air League. 
In November 1928 he sought permission to publish a paper 
on "Air Bombardment". Chamier wrote, 
The object of this note is to examine the present 
problem of air bombardment, the tactics of day and 
night bombing aircraft and the methods which may be 
adopted by the defence. 8 
His views on operational requirements differed from those 
of the Air Staff, and although publication of his paper 
was refused, Chamier's ideas were taken seriously. His 
paper was copied by the DCAS to a number of senior 
officers with the comment that it "has at least the merit 
of venturing off the beaten track", and a request for "how 
7 9/37, Folio 10, Air Staff Requirements in Aircraft, 
8 5/1132, File 18,1A, Chamier to Air Ministry, 5th November 1928: Air Bombardment, page 
I 
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your views on the broader aspects of the problem compare 
with those of the writer of the essay. 119 Chamierl s views 
and those of his critics are noted below as appropriate 
and contrasted with the Air Staff's assessment of 
operational requirements. 
Welsh's lecture on "The Air Staff's Requirements in 
Aircraft" first considered the RAF's duties throughout the 
British Empire, the need for economy, and the ever 
changing state of aircraft development. It then turned to 
the issue of priorities, stating that, 
The Home Defence problem .... is the most difficult 
to meet, and at the same time the most vital. If the 
needs of Home Defence can be met, it is probable that 
the machines in it can be adapted to meet the other 
and less difficult demands from overseas. It would 
be illogical to start the other way round and to 
build machines eminently suited for the different 
overseas commands, which would at best be indifferent 
Home Defence machines, if only for the reason that 
while we were adequately protecting our outposts, the 
heart of the Empire for its safety would depend on 
makeshif ts. 10 
This comment contradicts the assertion by M. Smith that 
the RAF under Trenchard (CAS 1919-29), "was organised and 
equipped primarily to deal with the typical peacetime 
problems of the British Empire". 11 As Ferris observed, 
"Contrary to Smith's account, in 1922-25 the RAF sought 
above all else to create strategic bombing forces.,, 12 
Clearly, as regards equipment, the aircraft needed for 
home defence were seen as the first priority. Indeed, 
following agreement to the Home Defence Expansion Scheme 
in 1923, Trenchard held a meeting on policy at which, "He 
reminded those present that our difficulties in regard to 
the day bomber were the natural consequences of the policy 
9 ibid., DCAS to AVMs Scariett, Steel, Brooke-Popham, Dowding, Air Commodores T. C. R. 
Higgins and Ludtow-Hewitt, 12.3.29 
10 9/37, Folio 10, page 3 
11 Smith, M., page 13 
12 Ferris, J., "The Theory of a 'French Air Menace', Anglo-French Relations and British 
Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921-2511, JSS, Vol 10 (1987), No. 1, page 63 
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of the last three years. " He said that the ten-year rule 
had then led to the production of a "'general utility' 
machine for use in Iraq and elsewhere. " Trenchard now 
specified the day bomber which he saw as needed to attack 
Paris, and, accepting that this would take time to 
develop, said that meanwhile "preference in equipment 
would now be given to fighter and night bomber units". 13 
Yet Smith suggests that, 
The work of the RAF in the 1920s required equipment 
which would be no use at all in a European emergency. 
In hot and undeveloped countries, where there was no 
aerial opposition, lift, flight stability, low 
landing speed, ease of repair and fuel economy were 
the factors which governed the design of aircraft. 14 
Smith does not indicate which of these factors might have 
been dispensed with for aircraft designed for a European 
war. Certainly none is dependent on the absence of aerial 
opposition. All aircraft require lift and flight 
stability, the night operation of home defence aircraft 
required a low landing speed, and ease of manufacture, 
repair and maintenance were sought for all RAF aircraft. 
It therefore should come as no surprise that the aircraft 
developed for European operations were suitable for the 
RAF's overseas Commands. Omissi refers to the claims of 
other writers that policing operations influenced RAF 
aircraft requirements and strategy, 15 but concludes that 
the use of obselete aircraft in thjS. - role did not retard 
the development of new types for home defence. 16 Indeed, 
most of the aircraft used for air control in Iraq and 
elsewhere in the 1920s were the Bristol F2B and DH9A of 
1914-18 war vintage. 17 
Nevertheless, the view has persisted that Air control 
considerations dominated RAF aircraft development between 
13 20/84, Requirements for the New Day Bomber. Explanation of requirements and policy by 
C. A. S., 2.8.23 
14 Smith ibid, page 32 
15 Omissi, D. E., Air power and cotoniat controL, 1990, page 134 
16 ibid., page 210 
17 Bowyer, C., RAF Operations 1918-1938,1988 
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the wars. In the 1997 Brabazon lecture the Chief of the 
Air Staff said that as a result of such "low intensity" 
operations there was "no great incentive to push airframe, 
engine and weapon technology", and that "between 1939 and 
1942, we paid a heavy price, almost a fatal one, for that 
preoccupation with low intensity, low technology 
operations". 18 IEý will be shown that in fact the needs of 
Air Control operations played no part in the operational 
requirements which led to the home defence aircraft used 
by the RAF in those years. 
In 1928 Welsh listed sixteen classes of aircraft required 
by the RAF. 19 None was specifically for Air Control 
duties. The sixteen classes were: - 
(a) Land Single Seater fighter. 
(b) Land Single Seater fighter (interception). 
(c) Ship Single Seater fighter. 
(d) Multi-Seater fighter (C. O. W. gun experimental 
tactically). 
(e) High performance day bomber. 
(f) Medium performance day bomber. 
(g) Night bomber. 
(h) Giant night bomber. 
(j) Land Torpedo Bomber. 
(k) Ship's Torpedo Bomber. 
(1) Fleet Spotter Reconnaissance. 
(m) Coastal Reconnaissance. 
(n) Army Co-operation. 
(0) General Purpose Bomber Reconnaissance for 
overseas. 
(p) Submarine Co-operation. 
(q) Training. 
The classes relevant to the home defence force were the 
fighters (a), (b) and (d), and the bombers (e) to (h). 
Welsh said that there was a consensus of opinion that two 
other fighter types might be added, a two-seat fighter and 
a night fighter. 
18 Johns, ACM Sir Richard, "Air Power", JRAeS, Vot 25, January 1998 
19 9/37, FoLio 10, page 3 
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4.2.1 Fighter Recfuirements 
The requirement for two Land Single Seater Fighters can be 
traced back to the basic principles of the 1923 Home 
Defence Scheme, which have been explained in chapter 
2.3.3, and are re-capitulated below. 
Fighters of class (a) were stationed in the Aircraft 
Fighting zone. They were to take-off at the first sign of 
an attack and climb to pre-determined patrol lines, from 
which they would be directed by radio to intercept 
incoming enemy aircraft. This was the main system for the 
defence of London. Interception fighters (class(b)) would 
operate by day only. They were not required to carry 
radio equipment and had less endurance than zone fighters. 
Clearly, a zone fighter could serve as an interception 
fighter, but not vice versa, and it was some years before 
a pure interception fighter operational requirement and 
specification were issued. This is discussed in section 
4.3.2 below. Meanwhile, interception fighter squadrons 
were equipped with zone fighters. 20 
4.2.1.1 Zone Fighters 
The question of the best type of aircraft to fulfil the 
home defence zone fighter role concerned the RAF 
throughout the years between the wars. There were seen to 
be two major issues, one a genuine consequence of 
geography, and the other flowing from the RAF's confidence 
in the fighting strength of its own, and therefore an 
enemy's, formations of bombers. 
The geographical problem resolved into a question of 
response time. Warning of an attack could not be obtained 
before hostile aircraft were seen, or maybe heard, 
approaching the English coast, and this would leave little 
20 2/794, DCAS to CAS, 27th May 1927 
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time for interception before they reached London. For 
example, if the enemy was flying at 10,000 feet at 100 mph 
they would reach London in about 30 minutes after first 
being detected. In that time defending aircraft would 
have to be manned, have their engines started and warmed 
up, take-off, climb to the height of the raiders, 
intercept and destroy them. The Staff Exercises of 1931 
included exactly this type of calculation to decide where 
to base the fighter defence of Newcastle against attack 
from "enemy" forces based in East Anglia. 21 
Clearly as the speed and altitude attainable by bombers 
increased, so the prospect of solving the problem of 
defending London. against air attack became remote. This 
was summed up in the 1928 review by the comment, 
As is well known, the main problem of the defence of 
London is time; and experience in the Air Defence 
Command has shown that no Fighter so far produced, 
good as it may be, is good enough. 22 
It was the problem of response time which led the RAF to 
seek single-seat fighters with a high rate-of-climb. 
Indeed, some saw such aircraft as unique to the defence of 
London. In replying to comments from the Commandant of 
the Imperial Defence College on what he described as the 
RAF's doctrine of "Air offensive at All Costs", Sir John 
Salmond (CAS from ist January 1930) explained that, 
we shall very likely always have to have S. S. F. 's 
[single-seat fighters] for our one specialised 
problem, the defence of London, where the time factor 
is everything. This I believe is the only sole 
reason for their existence; The French - no one else, 
in fact, except possibly some day Germany with the 
Ruhr - have not the same problem [SiC]23 
Even so there were strong doubts as to whether single-seat 
fighters would be effective even if they did succeed in 
21 PRO: AIR 9/64, Fotio No. 2, Air Ministry Staff Exercises No. 2 (1931), 22.5.31 
22 9/37, FoLio 10, page 7 
23 9/8, FoLio 34, JLS[atmond], 24th March 1930 
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intercepting hostile bombers. There was little experience 
from the 1914-18 war of combats between formations of 
heavy bombers and defending fighters, but quasi- 
theoretical analyses of the problem led to a long-running 
search for an alternative type of home defence zone 
fighter. 
4.2.2.2 Multi-Seat and Heavy-Gun Fighters 
The concept of a multi-seat heavy-gun fighter, the fourth 
fighter type in Welsh's list, was first put forward by Air 
Commodore T. C. R. Higgins when he was Director of Training 
and Staff Duties in 1923.24 Higgins examined the problem 
of defence against formations of bombers based upon an 
analysis of the Gotha bomber raid on London on 7th July 
1917.25 In fact this raid was not intercepted, but 
Higgins assessed the likely results if it had been 
intercepted by a squadron of single-seat fighters. He 
concluded that they would have been ineffective because of 
the ability of a formation of bombers to concentrate its 
fire on a series of fighter attacks. This advantage was 
thought to be enhanced because of the belief that a "free" 
gun mounted in a bomber was inherently more accurate than 
the fixed guns of a fighter. 
Higgins stated that "All experience proved that the 
ability to fight offensive actions in Squadron formation 
was vital to the defence. u26 -a view which influenced 
consideration of fighter design and tactics for many 
years. He deduced that what was needed was a type of 
fighter which could manoeuvre in formation alongside a 
formation of bombers and engage them broadside - somewhat 
on the lines of a traditional naval battle. 27 Higgins 
proposed a twin-engined fighter armed with heavy guns. 
24 2/1069,1A, 6th March 1923 
25 ibid., DTSD to AOC Intand Area, 6th March 1923 
26 ibid., page 3, para 10 
27 ibid., page 4, para 17 
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Higgins' paper was widely circulated for comment in the 
RAF. His conclusions were supported by a separate study 
made by a committee on behalf of the Air Member for Supply 
and Research, 28 but many others criticised them. Foremost 
amongst these were the staff of the RAF Staff College, who 
argued that German single-seat fighters had been effective 
against deep penetration raids by the Independent Air 
Force in 1918,29 a view which is supported by the official 
History of those raids. 30 Another critic was the chairman 
of the AMSR's committee. He put in a minority report in 
which he argued that if a large fighter could not be 
guaranteed to have a gun of greater range than the enemy 
it would be useless. 31 
Despite these doubts, Trenchard supported32 the building 
of two prototype twin-engined heavy-gun fighters to 
specification 4/24 - the Westland Westbury and the Bristol 
Bagshot. The intention was to experiment with the 
Coventry Ordnance Works (C. O. W. ) 1% pounder (37mm) gun and 
the tactics of its use. Both aircraft were unsatisfactory 
as fighters, but the Westbury was used for many years as a 
test bed for the C. O. W. gun. 33 A second C. O. W. gun 
fighter specification (F. 29/27) was issued in 1928.34 
Prototypes to this single-seat fighter specification were 
built by Westlands and Vickers. 
Postan's reference to these episodes is an illustration of 
the danger of not looking for the origin of new 
developments, and hence attributing them to industry. He 
says that, 
28 9/37 FoLio 11, Design of Home Defence Fighting Aeropiane, undated and unsigned, 
c. 1923 
29 2/1069, Commandant, RAF Staff Cottege, to Air Ministry, 6th April. 1923 
30 Jones, H. A., The War in the Air Vol V1,1937, pages 118-174 31 9/37 Fotfo 11, Minority Report 
32 2/1069, CAS to AMSR, 10.4.24 
33 Mason, T., British Ftiqht Testing, 1993, page 114 34 PRO: AIR 2/347, Type Requirements for C. O. W. Gun Fighter Spec. F. 29/2 , dated lst March 1927, but from accompanying minutes 1928 is obviousty correct. 
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As an experiment, Westlands had actually installed a 
37 mm. gun in a fighter as early as 1927, and 
Bristol's also claim to have been interested in the 
installation of large guns. But at the time neither 
the guns nor their installation were such as to 
justify a change in the Air Force tactics or in Air 
Ministry specifications. 35 
In "Air Bombardment" Chamier concluded that single-seat 
heavy-gun fighters were the correct counter to both low- 
flying fast day bombers and to formations of high-flying 
heavy day bombers. His argument was that a heavy gun 
would be needed for long-range firing in a stern chase 
against fast bombers, and to stay out of range of the 
machine guns of a heavy bomber formation. In their 
comments on Chamier's paper, Air Commodores E. R. Ludlow- 
Hewitt36 and T. C. R. HigginS37 (as expected) favoured some 
sort of heavy gun fighter, but in addition to rather than 
instead of existing types. Both Higgins and AVM Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham agreed with Chamier that 
manoeuvrability was not an essential requirement for a 
home defence fighter. Brooke-Popham wrote, 
I do not consider that it is essential for a home 
defence fighter to have the same degree of 
manoeuvrability as was found necessary in France in 
the last war because the home defence fighter will 
normally be operating only against enemy bomberS38 
The remaining two types of fighter considered in the 1928 
review of requirements were a two-seat fighter and a night 
fighter. The concept of a two-seat fighter was dismissed 
on the grounds that the proposed attack tactics were 
unfeasible and that a "back gun" (a traditional feature of 
a two-seat fighter) was essentially a defensive weapon 
which should not be needed in a fighter. Welsh firmly 
stated that therefore a two-seat fighter was not being 
developed, with the comment that, "it has not yet been 
possible to produce even a Single-Seater Fighter with 
35 Postan, page 108, itatics added 
36 5/1132, Ludtow-Hewitt to DCAS, March 1929 
37 ibid., Higgins to DCAS, 3.4.29 
38 ibid., Note on Air Bombardment, Brooke-Popham, 6th May 1929, para. 6 
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sufficient performance. v139 It will be seen in section 
4.3.3 below that in less than two years the RAF decided to 
experiment with a two-seat fighter in the mistaken belief 
that this would be faster than a single-seat fighter. 
4.2.2.3 Night Fighters 
That there was a prima facie case for a specialist night 
fighter was accepted by the Air Staff in 1928, for it was 
known that the clear view forward and upward that was 
essential for night fighting could not be obtained from a 
tractor-engined biplane. 40 This was also evident to 
operational pilots. 
In 1924 the fighter squadron pilots of No. 6 Group had 
advocated the development of a pusher-engined single- 
seater (with the pilot seated ahead of the wings and 
engine) so as to get a good view for night fighting. 41 In 
1926 the ADGB Command put forward a similar proposal. 42 
It noted that even though the Woodcock (a contemporary 
zone fighter) was a good night flyer, it was a bad night 
fighter because of an indifferent view. The Air Staff's 
response on both occasions was that the loss of 
performance associated with a pusher configuration would 
be too great and would detract from the fighter's use by 
day. They claimed that most of the advantages of a pusher 
could be obtained from small twin-engined aircraft, and 
that a prototype of this kind was being developed; trials 
would show if this approach was the answer. 43 The 
aircraft referred to in 1926 was the Boulton & Paul 
39 9/37 Folio 10, page 4 
40 ibid., page 5 
41 PRO: AIR 2/269, Use of Pusher Type Fighter Aircraft for Home Defence Work, Commander 
No. 6 Group to Headquarters Inland Area, 2nd September 1924 
42 ibid, AOC-in-C ADGB to Air Ministry, 9th July 1926 
43 ibid, DDOI to AOC Inland Area, 26th November 1924 and DDOI to AOC-in-C ADGB, 4th 
August 1926 
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Bittern, whose trials were not satisfactory and which was 
not developed further. 44 
In the absence of a specialist night fighter, zone 
fighters were required to operate by night, despite doubts 
about their effectiveness, and in some cases their 
safety. 45,46 They were required to have a low landing 
speed (52 mph as compared with 65 mph for a day only 
interception f ighter) 47# 48 and to carry night flying 
equipment and radio - in the late-1920s these accounted 
for nearly 20% of the military load of a fighter. 49 A 
fighter designed without these restrictions could be 
expected to have a considerably higher performance than a 
comparable zone fighter. 
Thus the policy of requiring a day and night operational 
capability for the RAF's standard fighter led to aircraft 
which were recognised as inadequate night fighters and 
were less than the best possible day fighters. In chapter 
5 it is shown how the issues of view and landing speed 
dominated discussion of the operational requirements for 
the next generation-of zone fighters, and confirmed 
Welsh's comment that "the best Fighter is like the carrot 
dangled in front of the donkey's nose - it is never 
reached. v150 
4.2.2 Bomber Recruirements 
Four types of bomber were listed in the Air Staff review 
of 1928: high-performance day, medium-performance day, 
night and Giant. Development of a Giant bomber was said 
44 ibid, AMSR to CAS, 7.5.28 
45 5/564, First Meeting of A. A. Defence Committee, November 1921, Group Captain Higgins 
remarks 
46 2/2815, DTD to DCAS, 13.8.30, and DCAS to CAS, 10.11.30 
47 2/346, Specification-No. 9/26 
48 2/794, Specification No. 20/27 
49 PRO: AIR 2/1238, Consideration of a Two Seater Fiahter, Liptrot to AD/RDA, 8.5.30 
50 9/37 Fotfo 10, page 7 
Chapter 4 Operational Requirements: 1923 To 1930 ill 
to be "dormant". 51 It appears to have last been 
considered in 1922 in the context of a joint bomber/civil 
transport. 52 In the late 1920s there was some initiative 
from industry which is described later in this chapter. 
4.2.2.1 Day Bombers 
In 1928 day bombers were divided into two classes, high 
performance and medium performance. This distinction was 
brought about by the advent of the Fairey Fox in 1925,53 
with its much higher performance than the day bombers then 
in service. High-performance bombers were seen as relying 
primarily on evasion for defence, being difficult to 
intercept because of their speed. It was said that they 
were cheap, but had a light bomb load, short range, and 
could operate only by day. 54 
Chamier's view of high performance day bombers was more 
positive than the Air Staff's. He believed that unless a 
satisfactory heavy day bomber could be developed, they 
were the only bombers left "to continue the struggle 
against the re-armed defence and theirs is no easy role. 
What is their logical development? " His answer was that 
as their defence lay in speed and not in gunpower, the gun 
and gunner should be sacrificed for greater speed. He 
foresaw a fast single-seater with a bomb load no greater 
than the gun and ammunition load of a fighter, and 
therefore with a comparable performance. He claimed that, 
Against these changeling bombers the [heavy] gun 
carrying defender becomes useless; in his turn he 
must revert to a normal fighter getting his superior 
performance by his lessened endurance. 55 
51 ibid., page 13 
52 5/955, Director of Research's Programme 1923-24: Conference on 6th October 1922 
53 20/84, Summary of Tenders to Specification 12/26,28.2.27 
54 9/37 Folio 10, page 12 
55 5/1132, Air Bombardment, page 12 
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It will be recalled that Chamier had proposed "heavy-gun" 
fighters to combat two-seat day bombers, but he expected 
that his proposed single-seat day bombers would outpace 
such fighters. He had thus raised the issue of a "speed 
bomber" as it came to be known, and, unwittingly, the use 
of fighter-bombers as arose in the Second World War. 
In their comments on Chamier's paper Ludlow-Hewitt and 
Higgins made what were to become the standard policy 
objections to proposals for an unarmed bomber which relied 
solely upon speed for its safety. Ludlow-Hewitt's 
criticism was based upon the morale of pilots, who if 
caught would be "dead meat". 56 Higgins argued that the 
production of a fast light bomber could not be kept 
secret, and that faster fighters would be produced. 57 
Strangely, there is no record that when in 1923 Trenchard 
asserted that high altitude would confer immunity on day 
bombers, 58 this was countered by the similar suggestion 
that high altitude fighters would be produced. 
Class (f), the medium performance (not medium bomb load) 
day bomber was represented in 1928 by the single-engined 
Hawker Horsley and the twin-engined Boulton & Paul 
Sidestrand; both had been specified before the emergence 
of two classes of day bomber. The Sidestrand was 
initially developed to assess the merits of a twin-engined 
day bomber, which, whilst having a lower performance than 
a single-engined type, would be able to carry more guns 
for defence. 59 Its bomb load of 550 lbs and radius of 
action of 275 miles were little greater than those of the 
single-engined, high performance, Fox, (460 lbs and 210 
miles respectively). welsh suggested much the same bomb 
load and range requirements for the replacement of both 
types. 60 
56 ibid., Commandant RAF Staff Cottege to DCAS, March 1929 
57 ibid., Higgins to DCAS, 3.3.29 
58 20/84, ExpLanation of requirements and poticy, 2.8.23 
59 9/69 FoLio 41, A. D. G. B. Exercises - Juty 1927 
60 9/37 Fotfo 10, Appendix 
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Chamier reasoned that the medium-performance class of day 
bomber would have to carry heavy guns for defence against 
his proposed heavy-gun fighter, and stressed that, in 
consequence, gun installations would become a high 
percentage of the available military load. Chamier saw 
this as the "germ of our future policy", 61 for it would 
lead to a large aircraft if the three aims of adequate 
range, bomb load and defensive capability were to be 
achieved. Chamier's summation of the future of this class 
was that "We must ekpect it to become a great machine". 62 
These were prescient remarks indeed, as will be shown in 
chapters 8 and 9. 
4.2.2.2 Night Bombers 
Provision for night bombers (class (g)) followed from the 
1923 decision that continuous attacks were necessary to 
obtain the maximum benefit from an air offensive. The 
1928 review re-iterated that policy and discussed the 
requirements of night bombers at some length, taking 
account of the inter-play between bomb load, range, speed, 
and the hours of darkness at different times of the year. 
This latter consideration was important because a slow 
night bomber could not complete a long-range mission in 
darkness in a European summer. welsh concluded that, 
our night bombers, unless they possess very great 
speed will either be unable to operate at their full 
radius right throughout the year, or will have to be 
capable of operating by day as well as by night. The 
latter alternative is the solution if mobility and 
continuity in attack are to be maintained. 
Welsh foresaw that, "as anti-aircraft defence methods both 
air and ground, improve, such as the facility with which 
fighters can find bombers, so will the performance of the 
61 5/1132, Air Bombardment, page 12 
62 ibid., page 16 
Chapter 4 Operational Requirements: 1923 To 1930 114 
night bombers have to improve". He deduced that there 
would be a tendency for the characteristics of the night 
bomber and the medium-performance day bomber classes to 
merge. 63 
Robertson" makes sweeping deductions f rom these 
discursive remarks by Wing Commander Welsh; (he is unaware 
that "Air Staff Requirements in Aircraft" was a lecture to 
the RAF Staff College). He believes that the prospect of 
a bomber capable of day and night operation meshed well 
with a supposed Air Staff "preference for general purpose 
aircraft", and that, 
had the Air Staff continued with the requirement for 
a night bomber, which relied upon speed alone to make its raid during the hours of darkness, then perhaps 
the industry would have made the breakthrough in 
design and development that was necessary. 
He cites the Mosquito - designed eleven years later - as 
an example. 65 
In fact, within a few years the Air Staff issued 
requirements which called for bombers with a speed higher 
than the 173 mph that Welsh had specified as needed to 
complete a long-range mission in darkness. 66 
Earlier in this chapter Welsh's emphasis that home defence 
considerations must dominate RAF aircraft requirements is 
quoted. Nevertheless, in his discussion of Welsh's paper, 
Robertson pursues the familiar line that the lack of an 
immediate threat to the United Kingdom meant that "duties 
throughout the Empire took precedence". He says that 
should a "more far-flung" threat than that from France 
arise, "the Air Staff assumed that continuous development 
in aircraft would allow them to reconfigure the air force 
to meet such a threat. " Yet in Welsh's paper this 
63 9/37 Folio 10, page 11 
64 Robertson, S., pages 69-75 
65 ibid., page 75, Note 19 
66 9/37 FoLio 10, page 11 
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assumption is clearly contradicted, for after noting that 
existing RAF night bombers could attack Paris in darkness 
throughout the year, Welsh wrote, 
This it may be argued should be sufficient as the 
raison dletre of the home defence force is to defend 
this country against France. But to accept it would 
be to immobilise the air force and render it 
ineffective should the political situation point to 
operations which call for a greater radius of action. 
With this consideration in mind he took the problem of 
making the return journey to Berlin from Metz or to 
Samarkand from Kabul (both requiring a design range of 
about 950 miles) as'the determining factor in night bomber 
requirements. 67 
It is from his interpretation of Welsh's lecture that 
Robertson concluded (quoted in chapter 1.2.1) that the Air 
Staff did not understand the complex issues of aircraft 
development. He added that, "Moreover, it carried with it 
the unintended consequence of actually restricting the 
pace of aviation development. v168 
It will be seen from later chapters that these are totally 
unjustified conclusions, in line with Robertson's own 
misunderstandings of the complexities of aircraft design, 
as noted in chapters 1.2.1 and 3.4.5. 
4.2.2.3 Feasibility of a Continuous Day/Night Offensive 
The problem which faced the Air Staff between the wars was 
that in the absence of combat experience it was not known 
whether bombers should depend upon evasion (by speed or 
darkness) or on self-defence to carry out their missions. 
It was believed that night bombers would be intercepted 
and attacked by defending fighters in much the same way as 
67 ibid., pages 10 and 11 
68 Robertson, S., page 75 
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would day bombers. This, after all, was why the RAF's 
zone fighters were required to have a day and night 
operational capability. Chamier went so far as to suggest 
that night bombing might become too hazardous. 69 Overall, 
there was thought to be no particular merit in night 
bombing - which would be relatively inaccurate - apart 
from the desirability of having the means to mount a 
continuous offensive. 
Faced with these uncertainties, it has been shown in 
chapter 2 that the policy adopted in 1923 was to aim to 
equip the majority of bomber squadrons with a dual-role 
bomber - which could then operate by day or by night 
depending on time of year and degree of opposition. The 
Provisional Scheme's plan for twelve each of day squadrons 
and night squadrons, with eleven undecided, was intended 
as a temporary position until a dual-role bomber was 
developed. Indeed, at the policy meeting in August 1923 
discussed above, Trenchard re-iterated that ultimately, 
"we did propose to have a combined day and night bomber 
for the majority of squadrons". 70 
However, for many years a dual-role bomber was regarded as 
technically unattainable. Thus when in May 1924 Plans 
Branch of the Air Staff considered the equipment of the 
undecided eleven bomber squadrons, it suggested day 
bombers - partly because it was easier to train pilots for 
that role. Plans' most telling argument was that day 
bombers were cheaper, and easier to maintain, than night 
bombers because, "they had only one engineii. 71 
Later in 1924 Air Commodore J. M. Steel, then DCAS, took a 
less committed line. In writing to Trenchard on the issue 
of the proportion of day and night bombers he said that, 
69 5/1132, Air Bombardment, page 6 
70 20/84, Expianation of requirements and poticy, 2.8.23 
71 9/8 FoLio 31, The Type of the Remaining 11 Home Defence Bombing Squadrons, Ptans, 
16.4.24 
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Unfortunately there are several factors bearing on 
the question which we cannot foresee, such as the 
nature of armament which will be carried in future 
aircraft, to what extent defensive arrangements by 
day and night will develop, and whether the war will 
take place in the summer or winter. 
He accepted that whilst operationally it was desirable to 
have the majority of squadrons able to operate by day and 
by night, there were training and technical difficulties 
to be overcome. Therefore for the time being it was Air 
Staff policy to have a few purely day squadrons, a few 
purely night squadrons, and the majority indeterminate. 
Steel said that, 
The apparent vacillation will enable a definite 
decision to be made when more information is 
available as to the "dual-role" bomber which is so 
eminently desirable, and the necessary degree of 
performance and bomb-load for night-bombers will also 
be easier to decide. 72 
Such indecision on the composition of the planned thirty- 
five squadron bomber force has to be viewed against the 
background of the number of bomber squadrons in home 
defence service in the 1920s; nine Regular and five 
Reserve/Auxilary in 1925, ten Regular and eight 
Reserve/Auxilary in 1930.73 There were indeed a few 
purely day squadrons and a few purely night squadrons - 
and no others. The target of thirty-five bomber squadrons 
set in 1923 was not achieved before it was overtaken by 
re-armament in the mid-1930s. Thus "vacillation" could 
continue for many years. 
Less excusable was the incompatibility that arose between 
the importance attached to continuous, day and night, 
attacks and the radius of action specified for different 
classes of bomber. This appears to have gone unnoticed, 
both at the time and in modern accounts. 
72 9/69 FoHo 57, Proportion of Night and Day Bombers, DCAS to CAS, 23.6.24, pares. I 
and 4 
73 Moyes, P. J. R., Bomber Squadrons of the RAF and their Aircraft, 1964, pages 298 and 
299 
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Welsh's analysis of night bomber requirements in terms of 
speed versus armament was governed by the requirement to 
mount continuous attacks on distant objectives. Yet he 
noted without comment that current, and expected future, 
day bombers had a radius of action which was much lower 
than that which he saw as necessary for night bombers. 
This was certainly Air Staff practice at the time, and 
indeed remained so up to the time that the day/night 
distinction in bomber requirements ceased, as will be seen 
later in this chapter and in chapter 7. 
This contradiction cannot be explained by a policy of 
waiting for the development of the desired dual-role 
bomber, for which no operational requirement was written. 
If in the absence of that type it was thought appropriate 
to specify a range for night bombers of 950 miles, why was 
a day bomber of that range not also specified? Economy is 
not an adequate explanation, because there were funds to 
develop several generations of long-range night bombers 
(Virginia, Hyderabad, Hinaidi, Heyford). It appears that, 
despite what was said about the relative vulnerability of 
night and day bombers, the Air Staff had little confidence 
in their key doctrine that bombers could defend themselves 
during deep penetration raids in daylight. 
In chapter 2.3.2 it has been shown that from the first 
adoption of this doctrine there were doubts. Another 
example arose when Chamier suggested that heavy-gun 
fighters could be an effective counter to day bombers. 
Ludlow-Hewitt's somewhat lame response was that Chamier 
had overlooked that bombers could penetrate some forty 
miles into hostile air space before being intercepted. He 
added that if they were successfully attacked, then a two- 
seat fighter escort would have to be provided. 74 None of 
the required range existed or was contemplated at that 
time, or indeed in the future, although Ludlow-Hewitt 
74 5/1132, Commandant RAF Staff Cottege to DCAS, March 1929 
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mentioned the possible use of the Hart bomber in this 
role. 
Doubts about the viability of long-range day bomber 
operations were certainly justified by the experience of 
the 1914-18 War. Germany developed large multi-engined 
bombers so as to get the range to bomb London, and 
initially made daylight raids with these aircraft. Morris 
says that the later change to night bombing was attributed 
by German writers to improved defences. 75 When the Royal 
Flying Corps obtained multi-engined bombers in 1917 (again 
to get range) they used these at night. 76 
A bomber designed for long range was likely to be able to 
carry a relatively large bomb load. It was also likely to 
be relatively slow, and vulnerable to fighters in daytime. 
There thus developed the tradition that heavy bombers were 
night bombers, or vice versa, and it was only these which 
had a long range. Welsh took this attitude further in his 
outline requirements for a Giant night bomber. He coupled 
a bomb load of 4,000 lbs with a radius of action of 500 
miles77 - twice that of contemporary day bombers. 
4.3 NEW FIGHTER CONCEPTS 
By the end of the 1920s fighters from the 1914-18 War had 
disappeared from home defence fighter squadrons, having 
been replaced by Siskin IIIAs and Gamecocks. These types, 
and their planned replacement, the Bulldog, were nominally 
zone fighters for day and night operation. Like their 
predecessors, they were armed with two Vickers 0-303in 
machine guns, but had a higher performance than the types 
which they replaced. In 1927 the Air Ministry issued two 
specifications which broke new ground. These were F. 10/27 
75 Morris, page 233 
76 Jones, H. A., The War in the Air Vol V1,1937 Operations of the independent Force, 
pages 118-174 
77 9/37 Folio 10, Appendix 
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for a multi-gun fighter and F. 20/27 for an interception 
fighter. In 1929-30 the Air Staff re-opened consideration 
of a two-seat fighter. These three important developments 
are described below. 
4.3.1 The Multi-Gun Ficrhte_ 
The multi-gun fighter was the creation of the Directorate 
of Technical Development. It was argued that as bomber 
speeds increased, attacking fighters would have only a 
short time for aimed fire, and thus needed a high volume 
of fire to be effective. To meet this need, specification 
F. 10/27 called for the installation of six machine guns. 78 
In chapter 3.3.1 it is noted that the Air Staff opposed 
this project because they believed that its performance 
would be poor. The need for greater firepower was not 
questioned, but if a fighter could not get into position 
to use its guns it would be useless. The C. O. W gun 
fighter projects had the same problem. 
Two prototype aircraft were built to specification 
F. 10/27, one by Glosters79 and one by Saunders Roe (with 
four guns)80. These aircraft were used in firing trials 
during 1930-32 which provided evidence of the need for 
increased firepower if a fighter was to be effective in 
fleeting encounters. 81 
4.3.2 The Interception Fighter 
Specification F. 20/27 was the first for an interception 
fighter, and was unusual in that the opening paragraphs on 
"General Requirements" defined the task of the aircraft, 
78 2/778, MuLti-Gun Single Seater Fighter Specification No. F. 10/27 
79 PRO: AIR 2/848, Gloster MuLti-Gun Fighter Specn 10/27 - Type Requirementl 
80 PRO: AIR 2/817, Saunders 4 Gun Single Seater Fighter - Specri. 10/27. Type 
Requirements 
81 PRO: AIR 2/625, Gun Armament in Aircraft (Policy), Trials Report, 27th November 1931 
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with industry invited to offer ideas for meeting that 
task. The main requirement was for "The capability of 
overtaking in the shortest possible time an enemy aircraft 
who is passing overhead at 20,000 ft. at a speed of 150 
m. p. h. ". An ability to climb to 20,000 feet in 12 minutes 
and a top speed of 190 mph at that altitude were 
suggested, but these aims were not to override the main 
requirement. 82 
It has been noted in chapter 3.3.1 that operational 
requirements for the interception fighter role had not 
been drawn up before 1927. Thus when Trenchard called for 
a specification, the DCAS (Air Commodore C. L. N. Newall) 
first reviewed the role of the class in the Home Defence 
Scheme, for the practice of equipping the interception 
squadrons with zone fighters had raised doubts about the 
interception fighter's correct function. 
Newall began by noting that night bombers could be 
expected to fly low and slowly, and that zone fighters 
should be able to intercept them. He concluded that an 
interception fighter would be required only to operate 
against high-performance day bombers, and thus could be 
free of night flying limitations. Newall proposed that 
such fighters should be stationed on the South coast, and 
take-off only after warning of an attack was obtained from 
sound mirrors. They would then pursue hostile bombers on 
their way to bomb London. As there would be little time 
for interception, the fighters would need the highest 
performance and a high volume of fire, but little 
endurance and no radio. 83 
Sound mirrors were at best expected to detect aircraft at 
a range of 25 miles, and in practice achieved considerably 
82 PRO: AIR 2/833, "Fury" S. S. Interception Figh er. Spec No. 20/27,1A, Specification 
issued 17th August 1927 
83 PRO: AIR 20/168, Interception Fighters: Type Requirements and Triat-s, DCAS to CAS, 
27.5.27. (drafted by Welsh, 20/168, F01 to DDOI, April 1927) 
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less, 84 so a nigh impossible system of interception was 
envisaged. This was found to be the case in the Air 
Exercises of later years. 
Newall's proposals, which included an armament of four 
machine guns, were approved by Trenchard. 85 But after an 
administrative mix-up only two guns were called for when 
specification F. 20/27 was issued in August 1927, although 
with the facility to change from 0.303in to 0.5in. 86 The 
inclusion of this facility is inexplicable, for a key 
requirement was a high volume of fire, i. e., "the greatest 
number of rounds in the shortest possible time", which was 
best obtained by a large number of small guns each with a 
high rate-of-fire. To this end a gun of even smaller bore 
than 0.303in was contemplated. 87 
The issue of armament for the interception fighter was re- 
opened in the following September. Welsh wrote to the 
DCAS to say he had seen a mock-up of the Bullpup, a 
private venture fighter design by Bristol, which had four 
0.303in machine guns. Welsh said that the designer did 
not think that four guns would have affected the 
performance, except for the extra weight. Bristol were 
modifying the machine to meet specification F. 20/27 with 
two guns, but Welsh suggested that the Air Ministry should 
call for two extra guns. Then if it was found on test 
that the performance was affected they could be removed. 88 
Newall agreed, and in October 1927 he passed the papers on 
the Bullpup to the Director of Technical Development for 
his views. 89 Six months later the DTD minuted his reply 
to Newall, saying, "I think it is dead: it reached me on 
12.4.28.1190 
84 PRO: AIR 20/155, The Use of Sound Mirrors by RAF Personnel. during the ADGB Exercises 
1933 
85 2/794, CAS to AMSR, 31.5.27 
86 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 2.8.27 
87 9137 Folio 10, page 9; see also PRO: AIR 41/82, Armament Vot. II, page 14 
88 2/794, F01 to DCAS, 29.9.27 
89 ibid., DCAS to DTD, 3.10.27 
90 ibid., DTD to DCAS, 12.4.28 
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Trenchard was incensed when he saw this minute. He wrote 
to the AMSR (the DTD's senior officer), to say that a 
request for remarks on the Bullpup had got an 
unintelligible reply five months later. He also pointed 
out that the contemporary C. O. W. gun fighter specification 
(F. 29/27, chapter 4.2.2.2) asked for the same performance 
as the interception fighter with a gun load much heavier 
than that of the four 0.303in machine guns which the Air 
Staff had first proposed for the latter. Trenchard said 
that he had agreed to four guns for the interception 
fighter, subject to there being no significant loss of 
performance. It now appeared to him from the Bullpup 
story and from the C. O. W. gun fighter specification that a 
significant loss in performance was not expected, yet when 
issued the interception fighter specification called for 
only two guns. 91 
In reply to Trenchard's admonition, the AMSR explained 
that neither he nor his DTD had seen the proposal to alter 
specification F. 20/27 back to four guns until it was too 
late to change it. It transpired that the Air Staff had 
borrowed the file containing the reference to the Bullpup 
and kept it for some months, during which time the DTD had 
issued the specification. In regard to comparison with 
the C. O. W. gun fighter, he explained that this 
specification was not the same as for F. 20/27, and that 
allowance had been made for the higher military load of 
the former. 92 The DCAS (Newall) had taken up this 
apparent anomaly with the Director of Technical 
Development a few weeks earlier. 93 
Trenchard accepted these explanations (it seems it was he 
who had kept the file! ), and agreed that as the 
specification had gone out to tender, and contractors were 
working on their designs, it would be wrong to change 
91 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 1.5.28 
92 ibid., AMSR to CAS, 4.5.28 
93 2/347, DCAS to DTD, 3.4.28 
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it. 94 This comment underlines the difference between an 
operational requirement and a specification. 
The significance of this episode, coupled with the 
experiment with a six-gun fighter, is that as early as 
1927 the three senior officers with the greatest influence 
on RAF aircraft procurement, Trenchard (CAS), Newall 
(DCAS) and Sir John Higgins (AMSR), were strongly in 
favour of increasing the fire power of RAF single-seat 
fighters. This was to culminate in the eight-gun fighters 
of 1934-35, of which more in chapters 5 and 6. 
Another point of interest, in the context of the comments 
made in chapter 1.2 regarding the apparent failure of many 
writers on the development of RAF aircraft to seek out the 
relevant specifications, let alone the background to 
them, 95 is Trenchard's mistaken comparison of the C. O. W 
gun fighter (F. 29/27) and interception fighter (F. 20/27) 
specifications. Whilst it was true that the main "General 
Requirements" of the specifications were the same, many 
pages later in the documents the "Contract Performance" 
requirements differed considerably. 96,97 
There were a number of tenders to specification F. 20/27, 
including two monoplanes and the two multi-gun fighter 
(F. 10/27) prototypes, both reduced to two guns. 98 The 
competition was followed by a production order for the 
Hawker Hornet, 99 later renamed Fury. 
At the same time that specifications for the multi-gun and 
interception fighters were being developed, the Air 
Ministry was evaluating the tenders to specification 9/26. 
94 2/794, CAS to AMSR, 9.5.28 
95 for exampte, Mason's The British Fighter gives a misteading description of the origin 
and requirements of F. 20/27 in his section on the Bristot Buttpup, page 202. 
96 2/347, Contract Performance section of Specification F. 29/27, Ist March 192[83 
97 2/833, Contract Performance section of Specification F. 20/27,17th August 1927 
98 9/37 FoLio 18, Types of Aircraft at Present in the Service and Types under 
Construction, February 1930 
99 2/794, CAS decision, 16.5.30 
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This was for a standard day and night (zone) fighter, and 
the competition was won by the Bristol Bulldog. 100 It was 
intended to replace the Siskin IIIA (developed from a 1922 
design), and gave an increase in maximum speed from 144 
mph to 173 mph. 101 The next advance in zone fighter 
development came with the initiation of a replacement for 
the Bulldog, which led to the well-known and much 
misrepresented specification F. 7/30. This is discussed in 
chapter S. 
4.3.3 The Two-Seat Fighter 
In the 1914-18 War the two-seat Bristol Fighter, with one 
fixed forward-firing machine gun and one rear gun, was 
found to be an effective and successful fighting aircraft. 
Morrow describes it as "indisputably the best two-seat 
fighter reconnaissance craft". 102 It continued in service 
for many years after the war in the RAF's home and 
overseas commands, primarily on Army Co-operation 
duties. 103 
The success of the Bristol Fighter may have been due more 
to its success as an aircraft, an achievement in its own 
right in those days, than to the merits of a two-seater. 
It suffered severe losses until fought as a single-seat 
fighter with the additional advantage of rear defence. 104 
Nevertheless, experience with this aircraft seems to have 
led many in the RAF to believe that there were advantages 
in two-seat fighters -a report on fighter and bomber 
squadron affiliation exercises in 1929 said that "The two- 
seater Fighter finds more supporters each year". 105 
100 Thetford, page 133 
101 2/2815, DCAS to CAS, 31.5.30 
102 Morrow, J. H. Jnr., The Great War in the Air, 1993, page 243 
103 Thetford, page 131 
104 Jones, H. A., The War in the Air Vot 111,1931, page 336 
105 2/1238, IA, Extract from 1929 AfflHation of Fighter and Somber Squadrons, 20th 
December 1929 
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But the issue under discussion in the 1920s concerned 
fighters to attack formations of bombers, for which the 
fighter vex-sus fighter combat experience of the 1914-18 
War was not directly relevant. 106 As explained earlier in 
this chapter, Welsh's view in 1928 was that there was no 
case for continuing the development of the two-seat 
fighter class. A change of opinion was triggered by a 
comment in the report on the 1929 affiliation exercises 
mentioned above. This was that, "It is possible that 
every designer of a fast Day Bomber could provide its own 
antidote by an adaptation of his two seater Day Bomber to 
a two seater Fighter. " 
At the instigation of welsh (FOl), 107 the Deputy Director 
of operations and Intelligence, Group Captain C. L. 
Courtney, took up the "own antidote" suggestion and 
proposed the conversion of two or three Hart day bombers 
to two-seat fighters. 108 This experiment was agreed by the 
CAS (Sir John Salmond) in February 1930, although in his 
view a two-seater would always have an inferior climb and 
thus be late in intercepting attacking bombers. 109 
Specification F. 15/30 covering conversion of the Hart 
bomber into a two-seater fighter was issued in October 
193 0.110 
The above description of the resurrection of the two-seat 
fighter concept by the RAF in 1929 and early 1930 provides 
a further example of the importance of seeking the 
earliest thoughts on the development of aircraft 
for the 
RAF. It contrasts with Mason's claim that "When Camm. put 
forward a design proposal to adapt the Hart itself as a 
two-seat day-and-night fighter in mid-1930 ... retaining 
106 PRO: 16/305, Study of Air Fighting Tactics at Northott, C-in-C ADGB to Air Ministry, 
23rd April 1928 
107 2/1238, F01 to DDOI/DCAS, 7.2.30 
108 ibid., DDOI to DCAS, 10.2.30 
109 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 25.2.30 
110 PRO: AIR 2/849, "Demon" Two seater Fiqhter SDecn F. 15/30 Type Requirements 
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the Hart's performance, it was quickly realised that all 
manner of side benefits, ... would accrue". 111 
Within the Air Ministry there was some discussion as to 
whether a requirement for day and night operation of the 
converted Harts would lead to an unacceptable loss of 
performance (the Hart was a day bomber). Calculations 
were made to investigate this issue, and these started 
from the premise that the Siskin IIIA day and night 
fighter appeared to be satisfactory in service with a 
landing speed of 62 mph, although 55 mph had been required 
in the past. 112 Theperformance of the Hart Fighter 
Variant when equipped for night flying was deemed 
acceptable with a landing speed of 62 mph, and it was 
agreed to proceed with experiments into day and night 
operations. 113 It will be seen in the following chapter 
that the acceptance of a landing speed of 62 mph for night 
operations was then introduced into the parallel Air Staff 
versus technical branches debate over zone fighter 
specification F. 7/30, with important consequences for that 
project. 
The Hart Fighter Variant experiment was initiated because 
the RAF's high-performance day bombers were faster than 
its zone fighters. Welsh saw the reason for this as being 
the insistence on the highest rate-of-climb for zone 
fighters. He believed that it was this which led to an 
inadequate speed margin over day bombers. 114 The Research 
and Development (Aircraft) branch claimed that this was 
not necessarily the case, 115 (in fact it is in general true 
that maximisation of rate-of-climb and of top speed are 
conflicting design aims). Both Welsh and RD(A) missed the 
point that day bombers were being compared with fighters 
which were condemned to an inadequate day performance 
111 Mason, The British Fiqhter, page 234 
112 2/1238, Liptrot to AD/RDA, 8.5.30 
113 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 7.7.30 
114 ibid., F01 to DDOUDCAS, 7.2.30 
115 ibid., AD/RDA to DTD, 19.3.30 
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because they were required to have a night flying 
capability. In effect the Air Staff were calling for 
night fighters to combat day bombers. It will be seen in 
section 4.5 that the senior officers of the ADGB Command 
hammered home this point after the 1931 Air Exercises had 
exposed the inadequate performance of zone fighters. 
By 1933 a full squadron of Demons (as the Hart Fighter 
Variant was named) was available for fighter and bomber 
affiliation exercises. It had been thought that by taking 
position in front of and below a formation of bombers the 
two-seat fighters' rear gunners could then fire from a 
blind spot of the bombers' defence. But the ADGB reported 
that "a very important fact had been disclosed. This is 
that the position in front and below the bombers is 
difficult to maintain if the bombers practice evasion. ivlM 
Indeed, Brooke-Popham later commented that such tactics 
implied "that the enemy will be good enough to continue 
flying in a straight line". 117 
The lack of coordination in the formulation of operational 
requirements was even more evident from the ADGB Command's 
apparent ignorance that two-seat fighters had been re- 
introduced primarily to combat fast single-engined 
bombers. The Command claimed that attack from twin- 
engined bombers was that most to be expected, and that 
their front guns would provide a good defence against the 
tactics planned for the Demon. It concluded that a 
fighter with a front turret would be more useful. No 
doubt the Command was aware that such types were under 
consideration, and actively supported by the Chief of the 
Air Staff. These developments are discussed in chapter 6. 
116 ibid., Extract from ADGB Report on AffiHation exercises 1933. 
117 16/305,78A, Notes on Design and Tactics of A. D. G. B. Fighters, 23rd ApriL 1934, 
para. 16 
Chapter 4 Operational Requirements: 1923 To 1930 129 
4.4 BOMBER SPECIFICATIONS 
The RAF ended the 1914-18 War with single-engined bombers 
such as the Airco DH9 and DH9A, which were mostly used by 
day, and a twin-engined heavy bomber (Handley Page 0/400), 
which was used by night. Development of these two classes 
continued through the 1920s. 
4.4.1 Dav Bombers 
In section 4.2.1.1 it is explained how the day bomber 
class came to be split into high and medium performance 
classes. No replacement was sought for the twin-engined 
Sidestrand in the 1920s, but the development of a new 
high-performance day bomber was to have far-reaching 
consequences. Not only on bomber development, but also 
for fighters - its part in the re-introduction of two-seat 
fighters has been discussed above. 
In April 1926 Trenchard sought to replace the Fairey Fox 
by an aircraft with a British engine. He wrote that, 
I consider that the specification should state that 
we merely want the same range and bomb load as the 
"Fox" and that it should not land any faster. All the 
other advantages derived from the engine will then go 
towards the performance of the machine. This is of 
the first importance. We can make bigger type 
machines afterwards. 118 
This instruction followed a note from the DCAS in which he 
put the case for having "one or two bombing squadrons in 
the H. D. force with exceptionally high performance", for 
which range, load and landing speed should to some extent 
be sacrificed. He suggested that, inter alia, "It is of 
considerable political value to possess the fastest 
118 PRO: AIR 2/757, HiAh Performance Day Bomber with Falcon X Engine Fox Replacement 
Type Requirements Spec. 12/26,43A, CAS to AMSR, 7.4.26 
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bombing machine in the world in a squadron or 
squadrons. 11119 
The result of Trenchard's instruction was the Hawker Hart 
and Hind series, powered by the Rolls Royce Kestrel. 
These types came into service from 1930 onwards and 
equipped many more than one or two squadrons. What had 
begun as a special type of limited value formed a major 
part of the day bomber force, and for a time was seen as 
the main threat from potential enemies. 
4.4.2 Niqht Bombers 
operational requirements for night bombers in the 1920s 
sought modest increases in speed and ceiling but little 
change in bomb load, range or armament. Specification 
B. 19/27 (issued August 1927) led to the last biplane heavy 
bomber to enter RAF service. 120 It called for, 
View and steadiness for precision bombing at night 
Capacity for self-defence 
Easy maintenance. 
The requirements included a still air range at 115 mph of 
920 miles, maximum speed not less than 120 mph, 1,546 lbs 
of bombs and three Lewis guns plus ammunition. 121 
Prototypes from Vickers, Handley Page and Fairey all 
crashed, which delayed Service evaluation, but eventually 
the biplane Handley Page Heyford was ordered. One 
squadron was equipped with the Fairey Hendon monoplane as 
an interim measure in 1936,122 but by then B. 19/27 had been 
overtaken by a new night bomber specification, B-3/34 (the 
Whitley), which is discussed in chapter 7. 
119 20/84, DCAS to CAS, 10.3.26 
120 Thetford, page 308 
121 PRO: AIR 2/821, Vickers Twin Engined Bomber. Spec 19/27 Type Requirement, 
specification issued 17th August 1927 
122 Thetford, page 271 
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An indication of the state of aircraft development in 1927 
is provided by the AMSR's alternative to B. 19/27. This 
aimed to obtain reliability by specifying three engines. 123 
In an age when many twin-engined aircraft could not 
maintain height on one engine, a twin was inherently less 
reliable than a single-engined aircraft, being more likely 
to experience engine failure. Trenchard objected to this 
proposal because of the loss of ceiling which would 
result, 124 but a prototype was ordered. It did not 
complete its trials. 125 
4.4.3 Giant Bombers 
No specification for a Giant Bomber was issued in the 
1920s, but some proposals emerged from the aircraft 
industry. These were in response to an Air Ministry 
specification for a. large troop transport, and a private 
venture "Battleplane" project from Vickers. 
Specification C. 16/28 was primarily for a transport as 
required by the Air Staff, 126 but Wing Commander A. C. Maund 
(who replaced Welsh as F01 in September 1930) reported 
that, "The designers have, however, foreseen that the 
performance will be comparable with the night bomber class 
and have included the requirement for bombing without 
interfering with the other functions. " Maund added that 
the Air Staff also thought that transports might serve as 
reserve night bombers. 127 
The two prototypes built to specification C. 16/28 were 
heavy biplanes with a very large wing span - 115 feet for 
123 PRO: AIR 2/803, De Haviltand "Canberra, ' Three En-qined Night Bomber Spec No. 22/27 
Type Requirements, AMSR to CAS, 2.12.27 
124 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 9.12.27 
125 Mason, The British Bomber, page 225 
126 PRO: AIR 20/96, Bomber Transport Aircraft, CAS to AMSR, June 1928 
127 9/37, FoLio 18 
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the Handley Page. 128 When Maund saw one of them he 
reported that it would give problems with hangars, 
transport of spares and handling on the ground. He 
commented that, "As these machines are required 
exclusively for use abroad where facilities are limited, 
these difficulties become accentuated., 1129 Both prototypes 
were abandoned. This experience was to lead the Air Staff 
to limit the span of future bombers. 
An off-shoot of transport specification C. 16/28 was a 
Vickers design for a "Battleplane". This project had an 
estimated military load (crew, bombs, armament) of 8,900 
lbs, a top speed of 170 mph, and a range of 1,850 miles at 
91 mph. Several possible uses were suggested by the 
company; as a "Battle Cruiser" to gain "temporary air 
superiority over a distant bombing objective", for long- 
range reconnaissance against opposition, and as a self- 
defending day bomber. As a night bomber it was claimed 
that the Battleplane would have a speed approximating to 
that of a night flying "scout", with the comment that 
scouts were unlikely to get faster because of their need 
for a low landing speed. Service as a troop carrier and 
transport was also suggested. 130 
The proposed aircraft was a large biplane with four 
engines in two tandem pairs, similar to the Handley Page 
V/1500 of 1918 in layout, armament, range and bomb load, 
but faster and with a higher ceiling. 
The DCAS (Burnett) saw this proposition as an interesting 
night bomber but too slow for a day bomber. But after 
seeing a mock-up Maund was enthusiastic. He saw the 
Vickers machine as equivalent to six Harts, and with 
sufficient gun power to make fighter attack difficult. He 
128 PRO: AIR 2/688, Interim Night Bomber (Requirements), HandLey Page to LudLow-Hewitt, 
7th November 1933, TabLe 28 
129 20/96, F01 to AMSR, October 1931 
130 PRO: AIR 2/856, Vickers Four-engined Bomber (PV) Type Requirements, brochure dated 
January 1930 
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concluded that if the aircraft was successful there would 
be no need to divide home defence into day bombers and 
night bombers. Maund also agreed with Vickers that their 
Battleplane could be used as a heavy fighter. He 
suggested that "A squadron of such machines could 
interpose itself between enemy bombing formations and 
their objectiveii131 -a reversion to the multi-seat fighter 
ideas of T. C. R. Higgins many years earlier. It will be 
seen in chapter 6 that at the time, early 1931, Maund was 
looking for a new type of fighter. 
It is not known whether Vickers or Maund knew of Douhet's 
ideas, but the Vickers aircraft closely matched his 
specification for an all-purpose "battleplane". 132 
Vickers built and flew their Battleplane, but the 
technology on which it was based was out-of-date and they 
made a large financial JOSS. 133 Three months after the 
Vickers aircraft made its first flight in January 1931, 
the monoplane Boeing B-9 bomber first flew, 134 followed 
shortly by the similar Martin B-10.135 In the next year 
Vickers themselves were designing a twin-engined bomber to 
specification B. 9/32 (the Wellington, discussed in chapter 
7) which bore little resemblance to the aircraft of the 
1914-18 War. 
Reference has been made to unsubstantiated claims in the 
literature that Air Staff bomber requirements impeded 
technical development by industry. But if the 
unconstrained efforts of industry could do no better in 
1930 than to update the Handley Page V/1500, then the Air 
Ministry's record looks positively innovative. Similarly, 
Vickers, opinion that scouts were unlikely to get faster 
131 ibid., Fol to DCAS, 12.2.31 
132 Douhet, pages 99-101 
133 2/716, AMSR to DCAS, 22.8.34 
134 Swanborough and Bowers, page 101 
135 ibid, page 443 
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contrasts with the developments pursued by the Air 
Ministry which are discussed in the next chapter. 
4.5 AIR EXERCISES: TESTING THE AIRCRAFT OF THE 1920s 
To a certain degree the aircraft conceived in the 1920s 
were tested in Air Exercises, which the RAF first 
undertook on a large scale in 1927.136 Other air forces 
did not undertake major exercises until 1931 when Italy, 
France and the United States held large scale air 
manoeuvres, although only those in France had objectives 
similar to those of the RAF. 137 The RAF's exercises in 
1927, and those that followed in 1928,1931 and 1932, 
employed many of the aircraft whose origin is described in 
this chapter. London was the target except in 1932.138 
M. Smith and S. Robertson139 maintain that these exercises 
were designed to test the basic theory of the counter 
offensive, and Smith remarkably suggests that they were 
biased in favour of the attack. 140 This was not so. The 
exercises were aimed primarily at testing the operational 
efficiency of units, and the detection, tracking and 
interception of raids. 141 The objectives set in 1927 
specifically state that the purpose was not to 
investigate, "the relative effectiveness of offence and 
defence in air operations". 142 
The exercises were artificial in many respects. Bombers 
were required to radio their position and height, and this 
undermined an assessment of the interception system. The 
important finding of the effectiveness of the fast day 
136 9/69 FoHo 41, ADGB Exercises - Juty 1927 
137 Turner, G. C., "Air Exercises 1931, British and Foreign", JRUSI, Vot 76 (1931), page 
731 
138 Robertson, F. A. cle V., "Air Exercises, 193211, JRUSI Vot 77 (1932), page 808 
139 Robertson S., page 97 
140 Smith M., page 72 
141 Robertson, F., pages 809-810 
142 9/69, FoLio 41, para. l(iv) 
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bomber (Fox) squadron in 1927 was said to be partly due to 
false reports of their height or to no reports at all. 
Similarly, the failure to intercept three out of twenty- 
five night raids was partly attributed to the bombers' 
failure to report their position. 143 In 1932, when 
searchlights were not used, the bombers were given set 
courses and were to use their navigation lights. (The 
report on the 1935 exercises said that this had been the 
practice in all years. 144) The exercises were not wholly 
loaded against the attackers, for when the bombers 
"arrived over the target, the fighters were not allowed to 
worry them as they aimed their bombs. t045 
Given these conditions it is not surprising that what 
would later be thought of as a high level of success in 
interceptions was achieved, even at night. 146 Even so the 
Air Ministry was far from satisfied. In the December 
following the 1931 exercises the Air Council called for a 
thorough investigation into, 
(a) The location and function of advance squadrons. 
(b) Improvement of the system of warning and 
interception. 
(c) Static defences. 
(d) Improved aircraft types, and tactics. 
(e) The distribution of guns and searchlights. 147 
Item (a) arose from the employment in 1931 of purpose- 
designed interception fighters for the first time, 
following the equipment of No. 43 Squadron with Hawker 
Furies (see section 4.3.2 above). The ADGB Command had 
reported that, "The most unsatisfactory feature of the 
exercises was the failure of interceptor [sic] squadrons 
to engage the bombers". In consequence it was proposed by 
AVM F. W. Bowhill, AOC Fighting Area (the fighter squadrons 
143 ibid. FoLio 41, 
144 PRO: AIR 20/184, Air Defence of Great Britain - Command Exercises. 1935. Report, 
sections 31,109 and 117 
145 Robertson, F., page 810 
146 PRO: AIR 9/46, Air Gunnery and Fighting in the Air 1924-39, Item 4, Interception in 
Home Defence exercises, 1931-1933 
147 2/1069,40A, Air Exercises of 1931, Air Ministry to AOC-in-C, 30th December 1931 
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of the ADGB), and agreed by the Air Ministry, that for the 
1932 exercises the interception squadrons should be re- 
positioned further inland and fitted with radio. 148 They 
were moved to the Aircraft Fighting Zone (not the "anti- 
aircraft zone" as stated by Bowyer149), for use as day zone 
fighters, in which role they were more successful. 150 
Item (d) of the Air Council's investigation arose from 
reports of the inadequate speed of zone fighters when 
faced with fast day bombers, and brought to the forefront 
the fundamental issue of the viability of one fighter type 
for day and night operation. Both the AOC-in-C of the 
ADGB (Ellington) and the AOC Fighting Area (Bowhill) 
suggested that the need for a faster day fighter meant 
that the policy of seeking fighters with a day and night 
fighting capability should be reconsidered. They also 
commented on the poor view from the single-seat fighters 
used in the exercises - Siskins, Bulldogs and Furies. 
151 
In reply, the Air Ministry argued that it was likely that 
an enemy would seek a decision in the first few days of a 
war. Therefore a rigid distinction between day and night 
fighters would place the RAF at a serious disadvantage if 
it could only use SP% of its defence against an enemy 
concentration by day or by night. They accepted that some 
distinction might be inevitable, but hoped that it would 
be possible to restrict this sufficiently to enable 
concentration of both types by day in an emergency. 152 As 
regards the view from fighters, the Ministry said that 
efforts were being made to produce an improvement-153 This 
will have been a reference to the importance attached to 
"fighting view" in the then recently issued specification 
F. 7/30 for a Bulldog replacement. In the following 
chapters it will be seen how the lessons learnt from the 
148 ibid., 39A, ADGB Report, section 8, and Air Ministry to AOC-in-C 
149 Bowyer, Interceptor Fighters, page 20 
150 9/69, Folio 77, Comments of F01 on Air Exercises, 1932 
151 2/1069,398, ADGB Report, section 9 and section on Fighter Design and Tactics 
152 ibid., Air Ministry to AOC-in-C 
153 ibid, 39D, Extract from ADGB Report and letter to AOCinC ADGB from the Air Ministry 
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Air exercises influenced the next stages of development of 
fighter requirements. 
The Air Council's investigation in 1931 was into aspects 
of the ground and air defensive system - but there was 
also some concern with the poor performance of bomber 
formations in finding and hitting their objectives. 154 
This does not appear to have weakened confidence in the 
counter-offensive strategy. 
4.6 THE 1920s IN RETROSPECT 
In reviewing the development of the RAF's fighters and 
bombers in the 1920s, one is struck by the failure to 
compare the armament of one with the other. When T. C. R. 
Higgins in 1923 and Chamier in 1928 attempted a reasoned 
analysis of the problem of attacking hostile bomber 
formations, both concluded that a "big gun" fighter was 
the answer. Following Higgins' paper there was 
considerable investment in prototype aircraft to 
experiment with the large C. O. W. gun, but this was not 
matched by a re-appraisal of bomber requirements should 
the heavy gun fighter prove to be successful. Similarly, 
when steps which were taken in 1927 towards the doubling, 
even tripling, of the number of machine guns carried by a 
fighter, it was not deduced that the RAF's bombers would 
need to be more heavily armed. Chamier seems to have been 
alone in developing a theory of fighter defence and then 
deducing from it the response in bomber design which would 
be needed. 
Whilst a major source of the grave doubts which existed 
about the feasibility of defending London against air 
attack was the apparent hopelessness of obtaining adequate 
warning, there was, and would continue to be, concern 
about the ability to mount successful attacks on hostile 
154 ibid, 39E, Air Ministry reply to section 22 of ADGB Report 
Chapter 4 Operational Requirements: 1923 To 1930 138 
bomber formations if interception was achieved. This 
concern was not based upon evidence from the 1914-18 War 
nor from trials or exercises. It followed from the creed 
of bomber invulnerability which led to an air defence 
policy based upon a counter-offensive. 
The real problem was surely not whether all attacks could 
be prevented from reaching London, but whether sufficient 
losses could be inflicted on an attacking air force, 
before and after bombing, to diminish or deter further 
attacks before unacceptable damage was caused. Yet the 
studies made in 1924,1925 and 1927 of the potential scale 
of a French air attack on London appear to have taken 
little account of attrition of the attacking air force by 
the defence. The scale of attack estimates took the form 
of a bomb tonnage to be expected for the first and second 
twenty-four hours and a constant rate thereafter. 155,156,157 
It was said that reduction in this long-term rate was 
entirely dependent upon the scale of the RAF's counter- 
bombing offensive, which would take a month to have an 
effect. Certainly the RAF's fighter strength was weak in 
1924, but less so in 1927, and strong enough in 1931 to 
have been adjudged to account for 75! k of the attacking 
force in the three days of that year's exercises. 158 Yet 
the advice that a constant daily scale of attack was to be 
expected was continued in 1934, when Germany was 
recognised as the potential enemy. 159 In the 1936 
assessment of potential German attacks on London referred 
to in chapter 2, it was repeated that the counter 
offensive was the one active means of reducing the scale 
of attack. 
155 9/69 Folio 24, Air Staff Notes on Enemy Air Attacks on Defended zones in Great 
Britain, 28.5.24 
156 9/69 Folio 37, Scale of French Air Attack against Great Britain, 20th November 1925 
157 9/69 Folio 42, letter to Wing Commander Sir Norman Leslie, CID, 17th October 1927 
158 Turner 
159 9/69 Folio 94, Estimated Scale of Possible Air Attack on London, prepared for 56th 
Meeting of ARP Committee, 1934 
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To summarize this chapter, although the 1920s were a 
period of financial stringency and the RAF grew little in 
size after the first impetus provided by the fifty-two 
squadron Home Defence Scheme, it did improve considerably 
the quality of its aircraft. Fighter development kept in 
advance of any elsewhere in the world, as did the new 
class of high-performance day bombers. But the Air Staff 
failed to see that its strategy of continuous, day and 
night, bombing was not matched by the aircraft it sought - 
a major omission in the analysis of operational 
requirements. It appears to have been seduced by the 
"high performance" day bomber, not only as a useful (and 
cheap) weapon in itself, but also as the likely form of 
attack on London, against which there was thought to be 
little defence. The RAF gave much credence to the untried 
doctrine of self-defending bomber formations, and thus 
undervalued its own progress in fighter development; so 
much so that consideration was given to an aircraft 
designed to ram a bomber, with the pilot escaping by 
parachute. 160 
160 20/68, Conference to decide New Programme for Experimentat Aircraft for 1927,7th 
October 1926 
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5. THE QUEST FOR SPEED: from Bulldog to Spitfire 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The period 1930-1936 was one of great advances in aircraft 
design set against a background of dramatic changes in the 
international situationand the prospect of war. It began 
with France as the theoretical enemy and Paris as the 
planning target and ended with Germany as a real threat 
and Berlin as the target. These events had little impact 
on the assessment of desirable characteristics of fighters 
- apart from a continuation of the search for improved 
performance and fire power. Attacks on London were 
expected to be made by unescorted formations of bombers, 
particularly in view its distance from German airfields. 
To combat them the standard requirement continued to be 
for single-seat fighters with a day and night operational 
capability, but doubts about their effectiveness 
persisted. 
These doubts arose from the belief that to obtain 
sufficient concentration of fire in an attack on a bomber 
formation, fighters must themselves attack in formation. 
But it was thought that, "A pilot cannot aim a gun and at 
the same time accurately maintain his position in 
formation". 1 In consequence much effort was put into the 
search for a fighter type and/or tactics which would allow 
the firepower of a formation to be concentrated. Little 
attention has been paid to these developments. They are 
discussed in the next chapter as part of an overall review 
of the search for increased firepower. This chapter 
describes the evolution of the Air Staff's performance 
requirements for single-seat fighters in the years 1930 to 
1935. It shows how maximum speed came to dominate 
1 PRO: AIR 2/1323, Novel Experfmentat Fighters, AOC-in-C ADGB to secretary, Air 
Ministry, "Design of Horne Defence Fighter", 24th January 1933, section 4 
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operational requirements at the expense of rate-of-climb, 
manoeuvrability, and particularly of endurance. 
It will be seen that the Air Ministry responded to 
advances in engine and aircraft design in the setting of 
its operational requirements. Through these, and by 
encouraging and funding the aircraft manufacturing 
industry, the maximum speed expected rose from 180 mph in 
1930 to 330 mph in 1935. The starting point of this 
spectacular advance was the drafting of specification 
F. 7/30 for a day and night zone fighter to replace the 
Bulldog. This has been said to be "the most important 
fighter requirement ever". 2 It was indeed a landmark in 
the Air Staff's influence on fighter development, but it 
will be shown that the conventional wisdom regarding 
F. 7/30 is based upon retrospective and often false 
interpretations. 
The chapter continues with the plans to replace the Fury 
interception fighter, and the consequent decision to 
develop a fast day fighter despite the failure of the 
interception concept. This led to the first eight-gun 
fighter requirement, F. 5/34. It was followed in 1935 by 
an Air Staff Requirement for an eight-gun day and night 
zone fighter, F. 10/35, also with maximum speed as the 
prime requirement. 
Designs to specification F. 5/34 were not ordered into 
production, and Air Staff Requirement F. 10/35 was not 
followed by the issue of a specification. It was met 
through the development of designs funded as part of the 
Air Ministry's experimental high-speed aircraft research 
programme. The way in which these events led to the 
Hurricane and Spitfire has been much misrepresented. 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 trace the Air Ministry's intentions 
and decisions with careful attention to the sequence of 
events. 
Bowyer, Interceptor Fighters, page 13 
Chapter -5 The Quest for Speed 142 
5.2 BULLDOG REPLACEMENT: F. 7/30 
In his catalogue of British fighters, Mason correctly 
refers to F. 7/30 as an attempt to break the shackles of 
the biplane formula, 3 but claims that the requirement 
sought 250 mph at 15,000ft. 4 In his earlier survey of 
British fighters, Lewis also gave 250 mph, but said that 
"Both Vickers and Supermarine, with their F. 7/30 tenders, 
broke away from the biplane in spite of the diehard 
official preference for it. ot5 
The literature abounds with similar misrepresentations of 
F. 7/30. In describing Supermarine's contender in the 
F. 7/30 competition, Andrews and Morgan6 correctly quote 
the maximum speed and the need for "an excellent all-round 
view", but wrongly state that the specification sought 
exceptional manoeuvrability and a steep climb for night 
interception. BarneS7 and Jackson8 say that F. 7/30 called 
for a higher endurance/range than any contemporary 
fighter. Jackson and James9 say a speed of 250 mph was 
sought, as do StewartIO and Brew1l. The British Aircraft 
Specifications File 1920-49 ignores the actual 
specification entirely - it gives maximum speed 250 mph, 
landing speed 50 mph, range superior to any existing 
fighter, and a steep climb for night interception. 12 
In fact specification F. 7/30 as issued in October 1931 
called for a maximum speed of not less than 195 mph, and 
at no time in its evolution was a speed higher than 215 
mph considered. Landing speed was to be not higher than 
60 mph, and the specified endurance was the same as that 
3 Mason, British Fighter, page 249 
4 Mason ibid., page 240 
5 Lewis, P., The Britisý Fighter Since since 1912,4th edition 1979, page 226 
6 Andrews, C. F. and Morgan, E. B., Supermarine Aircraft since 1914,1981, page 204 
7 Barnes C. H., Bristol Aircraft since 1910,1964,3rd edition 1988, page 243 
8 Jackson, A. J., Btackburn Aircraft since 1909,1968, page 309 
9 James, D. N., Gloster Aircraft since 191 , 1987, page 
171 
10 Stewart, A., Hurricane, 1982, page 14 
11 Brew, A., Boutton & Paut Aircraft since 1915,1993, page 321 
12 Meekoms & Morgan, page 147 
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sought by the RAF for earlier fighters of the same type 
(later increased only following the redefinition of 
endurance noted in chapter 3.4.5). A high rate-of-climb 
for day interception was a standard requirement for a zone 
fighter, and manoeuvrability was put fourth in order of 
priority as opposed to first for the Bulldog - which 
F. 7/30 was to replace. (The RAF's waning concern with the 
manoeuvrability of fighters is noted in chapter 4.2.2.2. ) 
Nevertheless, it was indeed the Air Staff's intention to 
encourage the development of a new configuration for 
single-seat fighters, and in this they succeeded. 
Specification F. 7/30 began life in October 1929 as part of 
the planning of new aircraft to be started in 1930-31. 
The key element in the Air Staff's thinking was to improve 
"fighting view", and Wing Commander Welsh (FO1) proposed a 
fighter with a pusher vieW13 (i. e., avoiding the 
obstruction to view from the cockpit of the upper wing of 
a tractor biplane). In February 1930 it was agreed that 
to meet this view requirement, "a new specification is to 
be prepared for a single engine low wing monoplane with 
Halford engine. Zone fighter". 14 A draft specification 
(F. 7/30) for this "Bulldog replacement" was produced by 
the Director of Technical Development (Air Commodore J. V. 
Holt) and sent to the DCAS (Newall) on 28th April 1930.15 
It initiated an eighteen-month debate which ranged over 
the performance, armament, configuration and engine 
requirements of RAF fighters. 
In forwarding the draft specification to the CAS (Sir John 
Salmond), Newall explained that he had agreed with the DTD 
that "we would try to improve the view for fighting by 
definitely specifying a low winged monoplane". 16 This 
13 20/68, Aircraft Development Programme: Notes on Conferences (from 1925), page 116, 
Wing Commander [Welsh, 1`013 to DCAS, Remarks on Experimental Aircraft Programme for next 
year, 11.10.29 
14 ibid., page 70, Minutes of meeting ..... to discuss new experimental 
types for year 
1930/31 
15 2/2815, DTD to DCAS, 28.4.30; the draft specification is IA, undated 
16 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 31.5.30 
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firm intention was to be weakened - not by "diehard senior 
officers" - but by the Deputy Director of Technical 
Development, Group Captain N. J. Gill. Although he saw no 
objection to stating that a low wing monoplane was 
acceptable, he feared that to definitely specify one might 
lead to an abortive tender competition in view of the 
failure of previous* attempts. 17 This advice was 
questioned by Maund in February 1931,18 but was 
reaffirmed. 19 In fact, as will be seen, a strong 
indication that a low wing monoplane was preferred was to 
be given in the specification when issued. 
In his minute to the CAS, Newall also stressed the need 
for increased firepower - which he said they had been 
seeking for a long time. As regards performance, he 
expressed great dissatisfaction with the proposed maximum 
speed. Newall sought a speed of 215 mph as a reasonable 
increase over that of the Bulldog which the F. 7/30 project 
was to replace, and this was agreed by the CAS. 20 
However, performance assessments showed that no higher 
than 180 mph was compatible with a landing speed of 55 mph 
- seen as the maximum for operations at night - unless 
flaps and slots were used. 21 The Air Ministry did not 
exclude designers from using such devices, but it 
believed, correctly, that in 1930 they were not ready to 
do so. This question of an acceptable compromise between 
maximum speed and landing speed was to delay issue of 
F. 7/30 for many months 
Newall offered a landing speed of 62 mph (found to be 
acceptable with the Siskin, chapter 4.3.2), and the 
performance estimates were revised to give a maximum speed 
of 190 mph, 22 but this was unacceptable to Newall - he set 
17 ibid., DDTD to DCAS, 16.7.30 
18 ibid., F01 to DDTD, 11.2.31 
19 ibid., DDTD to Fol, 14.3.31 
20 ibid., CAS to DCAS and AMSR, 21.6.30 
21 ibid., RDA3 to DTD, 12.8.30 
22 ibid., DDTD to DCAS, 29.8.1930 
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200 mph as the minimum which would make the project 
worthwhile. 23 
The impasse began to be broken on loth September 1930, 
after Sir John Higgins had been replaced as Air Member for 
Supply and Research by Air Vice Marshal H. C. C. Dowding. 
Dowding told his staff that "I should like to go a little 
slow in the issue of the specification for a new Bulldog 
replacement if there is no strong objection.,, 24 
The DTD (Holt) was clearly taken aback by this proposal to 
delay F. 7/30. Money had been set aside in the Estimates 
for a new single-seat day and night fighter, and Holt 
feared that if it was not spent, then in the financial 
climate of 1930 it would disappear. He was also concerned 
with the availability of work for aircraft firms, design 
offices - some were getting short of work for the coming 
winter. These considerations illustrate the way in which 
financial stringency, and the RAF's perceived need to keep 
a national aircraft design and manufacturing capability in 
being, could influence views on acceptable performance 
characteristics. Holt advised Dowding that despite the 
Air Staff's concerns he was confident that the current 
proposal would produce a machine which would be superior 
to the Bulldog, and suitable for night flying. He added 
that the two-seater (the Hart Fighter Variant) had not 
flown at night and doubted that it would be suitable for 
night work. 25 
A year had elapsed since the first proposal for a Bulldog 
replacement, and the matter was reviewed at a meeting on 
the Experimental Aircraft Programme for 1931-32, held in 
October 1930.26 Following this meeting Newall wrote to 
the CAS to review the whole position as regards the new 
23 ibid., DCAS to DTD, 3.9.30 
24 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 10.9.30 
25 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 19.9.30 
26 20/68, page 67, F01 to DCAS, 7.10.30 
Chapter 5 The Quest for Speed 146 
fighter. 27 He dismissed the RAF's current zone fighters, 
Siskin IIIs and Bulldogs, because they were unable to 
overtake contemporary day bombers and had inadequate 
firepower and view. He reported that the meeting had 
agreed to the Air Staff's current requirement for a 
maximum speed of 200 mph and a landing speed of 60 mph, 
but that Dowding would not guarantee that the maximum 
speed would be achieved. 
Newall then put his opinion to the CAS. He referred to 
pending trials of the two-seat fighter, to technical 
research on ancillary equipment which offered drag and 
weight savings, and to uncertainty in the use of the 
Bulldog at night. He proposed that unless the minimum 
performance requirements which had arisen from the meeting 
could be guaranteed, the F. 7/30 project should be 
postponed and that research aimed at meeting the 
requirements should be pursued urgently. He concluded by 
referring to reports he had seen in the U. S. Air Services 
Magazine of two types of aircraft with retractable 
undercarriages, NACA cowlingS28 and metal airscrews. 
These would most likely have been the Boeing and Martin 
bombers mentioned in chapter 3.4.4. 
Dowding independently raised other technical developments 
which he thought might justify a change of policy or delay 
for the Bulldog replacement. He drew attention to trials 
data for the Gloster multi-gun fighter (see chapter 4.3.1) 
with the comment "They are remarkable", and to reports 
from Bristols that they expected over 200 mph from a new 
f ighter. 29,30 
The status of draft specification F. 7/30 was then settled 
for the time being by Salmond. He told Dowding and Newall 
27 2/2815, DCAS to CAS, 10.11.30 
28 developed from the British-invented Townend Ring -a cowling for air-cooled radial 
engines to improve cooling and reduce drag 
29 2/2815, AMSR to DCAS, 12.11.30 
30 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 15.11.30 
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that it should be postponed for six months, and demanded 
vigorous action on the research issues that had been 
raised. As regards the references to the Gloster and 
Bristol fighters, he emphasised that the Bulldog 
replacement must be designed and equipped for night flying 
and have the necessary endurance as well as performance, 31 
but he asked for reasons why the Gloster multi-gun fighter 
had not been accepted. Wing Commander Maund (F01) 
explained that it had never been an Air Staff requirement, 
but had been concocted in 1927 by the AMSR (then Sir John 
Higgins) as an interception fighter, i. e., without the 
endurance and night flying capability of a zone fighter. 32 
Ironically, the Gloster (SS19) Multi-Gun led via the 
Gauntlet to the Gladiator, 33 the aircraft which received 
the production contract envisaged as following from 
specification F. 7/30. 
The research which Salmond demanded was into improvements 
to the equipment carried by RAF aircraft with a view to 
achieving savings in drag and weight. 34 Maund had raised 
this issue in comments on the Experimental Aircraft 
Programme for 1931-32, where he noted that there had 
little progress since the 1914-18 war in the equipment 
carried in RAF aircraft. He said that the benefits of 
streamlined aircraft design were lost, because, 
When a Service aircraft takes the air with its full 
equipment on board, it looks like a neglected bramble 
hedge owing to the vast number of excrescences in the 
form of Service equipment. 35 
The decision to postpone F. 7/30 and to concentrate on 
equipment research was communicated within the technical 
branches of the Air Ministry, and it was indicated that 
31 ibid., CAS to AMSR through DCAS, 21.11.30 
32 2/778, F01 to CAS, 27.2.31 
33 Thetford, pages 284-286 
34 PRO: AIR 2/615, Poticy Re Internatty St wed Engine Driven Aircraft Etectricat and 
Wiretess Generators to Reptace Air Driven Generators, CAS to AMSR, 12.12-30 
35 20/68, page 104, New Aircraft Programme 1931-32, Note by F01,6.10.30 
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the improvements sought would be forthcoming. 36 There is 
no reference to the suggestion made by Quill and Cox that 
the delay in the issue of F. 7/30 was "almost certainly 
that the technical branches of the Air Ministry estimated 
that an engine of around 700 hp would be needed to meet 
the specification, and that in 1930 no suitable service 
engine of this power existed. 1137 The question of engines 
for F. 7/30 is discussed later in this section. 
5.2.1 "Tvpes of Aeroplanell 
The six-months postponement ordered by Salmond ended in 
May 1931 and he duly asked Dowding if it was now possible 
to meet the "reduced" operational requirement. Salmond 
placed rate-of-climb as the first priority, a top speed of 
200 mph second, good fighting view such as that given by a 
low-wing monoplane or pusher third, and manoeuvrability 
f ourth. 38 
Dowding sought the advice of his Director of Technical 
Development (now Group Captain H. M. Cave-Browne-Cave), and 
was told that equipment development was proceeding 
satisfactorily, but that the best performance which could 
be offered was 195 mph (probably 190 mph in service), 
coupled with a landing speed of 60mph. In June 1931 a 
revised draft specification on these lines was sent to Air 
Commodore C. S. Burnett, 39 who had replaced Newall as 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. 
Wing Commander Maund then drafted an important statement 
of the Air Staff's position and proposals to meet it. 
40 
With minor exceptions these were to be agreed by the DCAS 
and CAS. They were very different from those that have 
36 2/2815, DTD to AMSR, 15.12.31 
37 Quill, J. with Cox, S., Birth of a Legend: The SpitfiLe, 1986, page 52 
38 212815, CAS to AMSR, 18.5.31 
39 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 22.6.31 
40 ibid., F01 to CAS through DCAS, 29.6.31 
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been attributed to the Air Ministry by writers on the 
development of RAP aircraft in the 1930s. For example, in 
his The British Fiqhte Mason asserts in respect of F. 7/30 
that, 
No preference regarding the aircraft's configuration 
was expressed, so that manufacturers could submit 
either biplane or monoplane designs. 
By means of the latter omission, the Air Ministry 
intended to encourage industry to bear the burden of 
research into radical expedients, so long as the 
basic requirements were met. 41 
In the same author's Hawker Aircraft42 he refers to "a 
deeply entrenched prejudice among some of the senior RAF 
staffs against the monoplane", and asserts that the Air 
ministry was not inclined to encourage monoplane designs. 
He repeats that the stimulus to overcome this prejudice 
could only come from industry itself. Lewis's reference 
to "diehard official preference" for the biplane 
configuration has already been quoted. Divine says of the 
development of F. 7/30 that, 
It epitomised once again the weakness of the 
administrative machine of the Air Ministry: its 
timidity in progress, the poverty of its imagination, 
the stultification of its bureaucracy. 43 
Maund's proposed policy was far from timid or lacking in 
imagination. He began by noting that the revised 
specification met the operational requirements except for 
ammunition supply and top speed. He explained that the 
deficiency in ammunition supply was relevant only to 
tractor biplanes, "which we want to see superseded"! 
Regarding the deficiency in top speed, he said that this 
was only 5 mph and argued that as there was to be a 
competition it could safely be assumed that if a firm 
could exceed 195 mph it would do so. 
41 Mason, British Fighter, page 240 
42 Mason, F. K., Hawker Aircraft since 1920,1991, page 35 
43 Divine, page 181 
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Maund next referred to a recent investigation into 
collisions (chapter 6.3.1), and referred to his paper, "A 
good fighting view", (it will be remembered that "fighting 
view" was the prime requirement which launched F. 7/30). 
In this paper Maund concluded that the best view would be 
from a pusher, particularly if tailless and with the wings 
swept back, next best would be a low wing monoplane, with 
a tractor biplane as the worst. 44 
Under the heading "Types of Aeroplane", Maund continued 
his policy proposals by suggesting how the Air Ministry 
might get the aircraft manufacturing industry to develop 
new types of aircraft. He wrote, 
Past experience shows that, unless special action is 
taken, we shall inevitably be left to choose between 
certain tractor biplanes. This is because post war 
progress has become concentrated on "cleaning-up" the 
stereotyped form of aircraft, and firms have 
accumulated a great deal of knowledge of this type. 
They can forecast closely what they can do, and there 
is a minimum of unknowns to be faced. They regard 
tractor biplanes as bread and butter entries'; novel 
types as 'highly speculative,. The inherent 
shortcomings of the normal tractor biplane are 
becoming increasingly evident, particularly with 
fighters, and so real progress in the future will 
depend more and more on novel types; but there can be 
no chance of developing these unless experience is 
gained in adapting novel ideas to Service 
specifications, even if the Service cannot adopt 
first practical efforts in new directions. 
Taking this analysis further, Maund put forward a list of 
firms that might be asked to submit tenders based upon the 
novel types of aircraft which they had been investigating. 
Should such types prove unsuccessful, he argued that as 
there had always been many private venture entries to 
official fighter specifications, there would be plenty of 
tractor biplanes to choose from. 
Burnett (now Air Vice Marshal) agreed with Maund's 
analysis and proposals, with the caveat that he thought 
44 2/2815,35A 
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that better results from novel designs would be obtained 
if the firms chosen to develop them were not also 
permitted to submit private ventures. 45 
Sir John Salmond firmly supported Maund's proposed policy. 
In a minute to Dowding in July 1931,46 he f irst dealt with 
the ammunition issue by noting that it only applied to 
biplanes - "which I am anxious to see superseded". He 
observed that, "Cantilever monoplanes or pushers should 
find no difficulty in accommodating the required number of 
rounds". Then, taking note of Maund's paper on fighting 
view, he said the draft specification did not meet modern 
fighter requirements and wrote an amendment to the 
relevant section of the specification. The amendment 
defined what was meant by a "pusher view". 47 Otherwise 
Salmond approved the issue of specification F. 7/30. 
The Chief of the Air Staff then stressed the importance of 
encouraging novel types so as to get away from tractor 
biplanes. He agreed with Maund's assessment, commenting 
that "firms were reluctant to risk their money on highly 
speculative ventures of novel design". He told Dowding 
that, 
If we are to get serious attempts at novel types to 
meet this specification, we shall have to provide the 
incentive. 
Will you, therefore, ask firms who have been 
experimenting seriously with novel types to make 
special entries such as: - 
Tail-less type by Westlands. 
Monoplanes by Fairey, Gloster etc., 
Pushers by Vickers, 
in addition to the auto-gyro, and assure these firms 
that this will not preclude them from entering 
'private ventures' to normal design. You may have 
other novel types in view. 
45 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 7.7.31 
46 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 13.7.31 
47 ibid., 358 
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In order to provide the necessary incentive I should like the designs, which you accept and pay for, 
concentrated among novel types as far as you consider 
them to be promising. 
It is difficult to read into these instructions a lack of 
imagination, a preference for biplanes, or an 
unwillingness to fund radical designs. 
5.2.2 Encrine Policv 
Dowding informed Burnett that the specification had been 
amended according to the CAS's wishes, and then said, 
"There is one further point, however, which is of great 
importance. I refer to the question of air-cooled versus 
water cooled engines. ve48 It is surprising that this 
matter had not been discussed earlier, particularly as the 
technical branches' performance estimates must have been 
based on an assumed engine power, if not on a specific 
engine type. 
The literature on this topic is adamant that the Air 
Ministry was wholly committed to the Rolls-Royce Goshawk 
(or Kestrel IV) evaporatively-cooled engine, then under 
development. Mason says that, "Implicit in the wording of 
the specification was the Air Ministry's preference for 
the Rolls-Royce Goshawk evaporatively-cooled in-line 
engine.,, 49 James says that the "specification also laid 
great stress on the use of the Rolls-Royce Goshawk". 50 
Jackson5l asserts that use of the evaporatively cooled 
Rolls-Royce Goshawk (or Kestrel IV) was specified, and 
Barnes that the "Air Staff indicated a preference for the 
evaporative-cooled Roll Royce Kestrel IVio. 52 As will be 
shown, preference for the Goshawk in fact came from 
48 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 5.9.31 
49 Mason, British Fighter, pages 240 
50 James, page 205 
51 Jackson, Btackburn, page 309 
52 Barnes, Bristot, page 243 
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industry. There was-no mention of the Goshawk in 
specification F. 7/30. 
Dowding was Air Member for Supply as well as for Research, 
and he reviewed the current state of the British aero- 
engine industry as well as the merits of air or liquid 
cooling. He was concerned that the air-cooled engines 
under development at Napier and Bristol were in trouble, 
whereas Rolls-Royce liquid-cooled engine development was 
proceeding well. This, he said, "has introduced a marked 
tendency for aircraft firms to choose water or steam 
cooled engines in preference to air-cooled types". He 
noted that in consequence Napier were without orders for 
the next year and that Bristol were complaining of 
difficulties, as were Armstrong Siddeley. Dowding said 
that these firms were working on new air-cooled engines 
which, "if they prove to be successful, will be more 
valuable to us than steam or water cooled engines, owing 
to the absence of any vulnerable radiator surface". But 
if, he explained, the specification was to say that air- 
cooled engines were "greferred", then tenders which met 
the Air Ministry's preference would be at a disadvantage 
compared with those which ignored it, and installed 
liquid-cooled engines. Even so, such was Dowding's 
concern that air-cooled engine firms could go out of 
business, which he saw as a calamity if the need arose to 
expand production in the event of war, that he wrote, 
"From the supply point of view, my recommendation is that 
we should state unequivocally that an air-cooled engine is 
required, except in the case of 'pusher, designs". 
Burnett put these views to Salmond, with the comment that 
survival of the manufacturers of air-cooled engines could 
be achieved by considering what other aircraft types might 
be specified to have them, but that, 
Unfortunately, the Zone Single-Seater Fighter is the 
one class in which, for operational reasons, we can 
least contemplate any sacrifice in attainable 
performance. Throughout the history of this class, 
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there has never been produced a type which has given 
us adequate performance to meet the fastest 
contemporary Day Bombers. 
Thus for F. 7/30 he suggested that contractors should be 
left to choose either type of engine. 53 Salmond agreed 
with this policy. He said that, "For fighters we must 
take the engines whether water, steam or air cooled which 
give the best performance. 1154 
Following this ruling and the CAS's earlier general 
approval, on the 30th September 1931 Dowding instructed 
his Department to amend and issue specification F. 7/30.55 
As issued the first paragraph included the statement that, 
"A satisfactory fighting view is essential and designers 
should consider the advantages offered in this respect by 
low wing monoplane or pusher", 56 and later that "Any 
approved British engine may be used". 57 
5.2.3 The Outcome 
The responses from aircraft manufacturing firms to the 
F. 7/30 specification are interesting as a commentary on 
the two years of discussion of the requirements. All the 
fears which had been expressed within the Ministry came to 
pass to some degree. Westlands, who had been given an 
order for a Pterodactyl, gave higher priority to their 
private venture biplane entry. 58 most of the invited 
tenders chose a Rolls-Royce liquid-cooled engine, for as 
Dowding anticipated, "The development of this engine gives 
designers using it a marked advantage in performance over 
the air cooled engine types". The Ministry accepted that 
53 2/2815, DCAS to CAS, September 1931 
54 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 29.9.31 
55 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 30.9.31 
56 ibid., 44A, Specification No. F. 7/30. Single Seater Day and Night fighter, Ist 
October 1931, section 1. General Requirements 
57 ibid., 44A, section 2(a) 
58 PRO: AIR 20/169, Single Seater Fighters: Remarks on specifications, RDA1 to AD/RDA, 
13.11.32 
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it would have to rely on private ventures for air-cooled 
types. 59 
When forwarding these results to the DCAS, Maund noted 
"This specification brought out more originality and 
serious attempts to meet the operational requirement than 
any preceding specification. v16O Furthermore, Maund's hope 
that the encouragement of novel designs to meet RAF 
specifications - even if at first unsuccessful - would 
lead to improved fighters, was justified. For in section 
5.4.3 it will be shown how the Supermarine low-wing 
monoplane response to F. 7/30 led to the Spitfire. 
It is relevant to this later development that in his 
review of tenders, Cave told Dowding that the designs to 
F. 7/30 would probably be improved with an inverted engine 
which Rolls-Royce were developing. 61 In June 1932 Dowding 
informed Burnett that, "The design of the inverted Kestrel 
(to be called Merlin) is in hand and we shall place an 
order for 2 probably this year. l162 - which suggests that 
the Ministry planned some funding for the early 
development of the Merlin. (The intention to develop an 
inverted engine was not proceeded with. ) 
At the beginning of this section it is noted that many 
writers wrongly claim that the Air Ministry was seeking a 
speed of 250 mph when formulating F. 7/30. It is always 
difficult to prove a negative, even though in the original 
sources on which this thesis is based no figure higher 
than 215 mph is mentioned, but a comment by Burnett on the 
performance estimates of the tenders to F. 7/30 may be 
thought conclusive. §3 He pointed out that the Supermarine 
proposal did not meet the landing speed requirement, and 
that this might lead to it being unfit to fly at night, 
59 2/2815, DTD to AMSR, 30.5.32 
60 20/169, F01 to DCAS, 1.6.32 
61 2/2815, DTD to AMSR, 30.5.32 
62 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 12.6.32 
63 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 2.6.32 
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which he said was "an essential operational requirement". 
Burnett suggested that it would be wise to require an 
increase in wing area and accept some consequent loss in 
the estimated top speed of 244 mph, which he said it 
seemed could be afforded (and was done64). Burnett was 
unlikely to have taken this view if there had been earlier 
thoughts of seeking a maximum speed of 250 mph. 
Burnett also mentioned that all the biplane entries had a 
configuration which gave a greatly improved view - which 
indicates that designers took heed of the carefully worded 
requirement for "a clear view upward and forward for 
formation work and manoeuvring". 65 Yet those writers who 
have noticed the emphasis on view claim it was for night 
f lying. 66,67,68 
5.3 PRIORITY FOR SPEED 
The previous section of this chapter has shown that in 
1930-31 the Air Ministry sought to get industry to break 
away from biplane designs, but doubted that it could at 
the same time get a significant increase in fighter 
performance. In the next few years the pace of 
development of aeronautical engineering was such that much 
higher speeds became possible. The RAF feared that when 
these developments were applied to bombers the defence of 
London would become even more difficult. They therefore 
moved towards making maximum speed the prime operational 
requirement, first for day fighters, and then for the 
standard day and night zone fighter class. The best 
estimate of 195 mph for F. 7/30 in 1931 was raised to 315 
mph for its replacement four years later. 
64 PRO: AIR 2/2741, Intercepter (sic) Fighter: Type Requirements & Specn. F. 5/34,5A, 
27.2.33 
65 2/2815,44A, Section 7(b) 
66 Jackson, Blackburn, page 309 
67 James, page 204 
68 Mason, British Fighter, page 243 
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Hand-in-hand with the increase in engine power that 
contributed to this advance went an increase in engine 
weight, and thus in total aircraft weight. one 
consequence was that a military (pay)load which was the 
same percentage of all-up-weight as in earlier years could 
now include much heavier armament -a development long 
sought by the Air Ministry. These benefits were not 
obtained without some loss, most particularly in 
endurance, but also in manoeuvrability. 
Two fighter requirements led this process. The interplay 
between these and the Ministry's high-speed aircraft 
development programme, an interplay which resulted in the 
Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire, has led to much 
confusion in the literature. This confusion stems partly 
from a failure to grasp the RAF's fundamental distinction 
between the zone (day and night) and the interception (day 
only) classes of fighter, and partly from a failure to 
clarify the sequence of events. 
Before discussion of these matters it will be helpful to 
summarise the four designations which arise frequently in 
the literature and in this chapter. 
F. 5Z34 was for a day fighter, known as the Fury 
replacement. 
operational requirements were agreed in August 1934 
and a specification was issued in November 1934. 
Prototypes were ordered from Bristol and Gloster. 
F. 36/34 was a number assigned to a Hawker 
experimental fighter design. 
The decision to order this aircraft was made in 
September 1934. There was no specification. 
F. 37/34 was for a Supermarine experimental fighter 
design, first known as the modified' F. 7/30. 
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The decision to order this aircraft was also made in 
September 1934. A brief specification was issued in 
January 1935 - this was based upon specification 
F. 7/30. 
F. 10/35 was for a day and night fighter. 
operational requirements were agreed in March 1935 
and circulated to industry in April 1935. No 
specification was issued. 
After requirement F. 10/35 had been issued it was decided 
that the two experimental fighter designs, F. 36/34 and 
F. 37/34, could be developed to meet it, and these became 
the Hurricane and Spitfire respectively. It was also 
decided that the prototypes then being built to F. 5/34 
should also be modified to meet F. 10/35, but there was no 
production order for these designs. 
It is noted in chapter 1 that the Official History on 
Design and Development of Weapons was published before the 
relevant Air Ministry files were generally available. It 
must take some of the blame for leading later writers to 
confuse both the importance at the time of the different 
classes of fighter, and the sequence of events - not least 
because the Appendix written in 1945 by Air Marshal Sir 
Ralph Sorley, who was a major participant in the events 
discussed in this chapter, is incomplete and misleading - 
as is his article published in "The Times" in 1957; this 
is discussed in chapter 6. In terms of timing, Sorley's 
memory of these events is outdone by the comments of 
another Air Staff officer of the 1930s, Sir John Slessor. 
He wrote that, "it was not until 1932 that the Hurricane 
and Spitfire specifications were put out, and those of the 
Wellington and Hampden not till the following year. 1169 In 
fact it was the latter which appeared in 1932, with the 
requirement which led to Hurricane and Spitfire appearing 
in 1935. 
69 SLessor, J., The Centrat Blue, 1956, page 203 
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The Official History makes no mention of the background 
from the 1920s of two distinct lines of fighter 
development, zone and interception. It claims that the 
Hurricane and Spitfire can both be traced back to zone 
specification F. 7/30 - and that Hawker were asked to 
tender to that specification, 70 which they were not. 71 
Hawker did submit a private venture biplane to F. 7/30, but 
as will be shown in section 5.4, the Hurricane evolved 
from the company's interest in a notional Fury 
(interception) fighter replacement in parallel with their 
funded work on the High-Speed Fury research aircraft. 
Postan says that, "In the summer of 1935 Mr. Camm's 
aircraft was sufficiently advanced, and sufficiently 
promising, to be considered for the Specification F. 10/35 
as an up-to-date replacement of the Fury. 1172 But as noted 
above, it was F. 5/34 which was the Fury day fighter 
replacement. 
Wood and Dempster's description of the development of the 
Hurricane and Spitfire in their much acclaimed work on the 
Battle of Britain, The Narrow Margin, 73 confuses the 
classes of fighter in the opposite sense to Postan. They 
maintain that the four-gun modified' Supermarine F. 7/30 
"met Air ministry specification F. 5/3411. Wood and 
Dempster similarly confuse the development of the Hawker 
Hurricane. They claim that specification F. 36/34 was 
"written around" a Hawker design with eight machine 
guns. 74 Apart from the fact that no specification was 
written, the Hawker design to which only the number 
F. 36/34 was assigned had provision for four machine guns. 
Terraine says that the work of Camm, (Hawker) and Mitchell 
(Supermarine), the Merlin engine and the Browning machine 
70 Postan, page 88 
71 2/2741,43A, Invitation to tender, sent to Gioster, Bristol and Westland, 2nd January 
1935 
72 Postan, page 89 
73 Wood, D., and Dempster, D., The Narrow Margin, 1961, Appendix 1 
74 Wood and Dempster, ibid 
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gun, "bore fruit in Specification F. 5/34 (later revised to 
F. 36/34 and F. 37/34)11.75 It will be shown that no such 
revision was contemplated or relevant. 
Andrews and Morgan claim that in May 1935 "representatives 
of the Air Ministry operations branch" pressed Supermarine 
to fit eight guns to their F. 37/34 as this armament had 
already been specified for F. 5/34- They wrote that "This 
requirement was readily accepted by Mitchell on 29 April 
1935, under enabling specification 10/3511.76 It will be 
shown that (at the time) Sorley clearly believed that 
consideration of eight guns for Supermarine's experimental 
aircraft F. 37/34 followed Mitchell's receipt of Air Staff 
Requirement F. 10/35. In no sense was this an "enabling" 
document for a design already in progress. 
King, in referring to F. 5/34, goes so far as to say that, 
"upon Mitchell's proposals, emphasising climb and 
manoeuvrability, the specification calling for eight guns 
was formally written. 1177 Conversely, Mason claims that 
F. 5/34 "was drawn up to cover the Hawker design proposal", 
and that "on 4th September [19341 the full Specification, 
F. 36/34, was issued. to Hawkers. 1178 Bishop also gets the 
events of 1934-35 in the wrong order. He says that F. 5/34 
was issued early in 1935, and that Camm "was already 
confident of bettering it. The Air Ministry issued a 
revised Specification F36/34 in terms of what Hawkers were 
already doing. 1179 In fact the decision to order the 
Hawker design was made in September 1934, and it bears 
repeating that there was no specification F. 36/34 
documentation. Bishop joins many others in claiming that 
the Hurricane, and the Spitfire, were private ventures, 
overlooking that the Air Ministry had decided to 
fund both 
prototypes as experimental high-speed aircraft 
before 
75 Terraine, page 18 
76 Andrews and Morgan, Supermarine, page 213 
77 King, H. F., Armament of British Aircraft 1909-1939,1971, page 261 
78 Mason, Hawker, page 37-38, itaLics added 
79 Bishop, E., Hurricane, 1986, page 8 
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either specification F. 5/34 or requirement F. 10/35 were 
issued. Wykeham, who says that he had full access to Air 
Historical Branch papers, asserts that the F. 5/34 
specification, which he says was issued in January 1935, 
"fitted well with Hawker and Supermarine projects". He 
makes no mention of F. 10/35.80 
Let us return to the reality of Air Ministry thinking and 
actions during what*turned out to be the critical years of 
1932-35. 
5.3.1 Fury Replacement: F. 5/34 
The estimated top speed of the Supermarine tender to the 
day and night fighter specification F. 7/30 was much higher 
than that of the Fury day fighter then in service. 81 It 
was likely that an even better performance could be 
obtained if the night flying and other zone fighter 
requirements were dropped. In October 1932 Maund (FO1) 




Maund estimated that without the requirement for night 
flying, and with endurance reduced to that of the Fury, a 
four-gun monoplane of design contemporary with the 
Supermarine F-7/30 would have a higher rate of climb and a 
maximum speed of 250 mph. (It may be this study which has 
led writers to believe that the Air Staff hoped for 250 
mph from the original F. 7/30 specification. ) 
Maund reminded Burnett that the DTD had recently said 
"definitely that it would always be possible to produce a 
specialised day bomber with a performance (meaning speed) 
equal to that of the best contemporary day and night zone 
fighter", and that a fighter with no margin of speed over 
80 Wykeham, P., Fighter Command, 1960, page 63 
81 20/168, F01 to DCAS, December 1932 
82 20/167, F01 to DCAS, *7.10.32 
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bombers was useless. He emphasised this point by noting 
that the maximum speed called for in the zone fighter 
specification F. 7/30 issued in October 1931 was the same 
as that sought for the Hart day bomber replacement then 
under discussion in 1932 (chapter 7.2.2), whereas the ADGB 
Command had asked for a 50t speed margin. 83 
Maund was aware of the RAF's concern about the number of 
types in service (it had recently been criticised on this 
point by the Committee on National Expenditure84), but 
argued that the RAF "would be put in an impossible 
situation vis-a-vis the country in war if we were able to 
build machines fast enough to tackle day bombers and did 
not do so on the ground that by this omission we reduced 
the number of types. " 
In December 1932 the DCAS (Burnett) put proposals for a 
new day fighter to Sir John Salmond (CAS). He said that 
there was financial provision for a Fury replacement in 
1933, and that, "It is suggested that the operational 
requirements should be based on substantially the same 
principles as those on which the successful Fury was 
evolved". Burnett took Maund's maximum speed estimate of 
250 mph, but increased the armament to six machine guns, 
and, as with F. 7/30' , sought fields of view similar to 
those from a single-engined pusher. As this was to be a 
day fighter, he proposed a landing speed of 68 mph. 85 
Burnett had asked the AMSR's Department to provide an 
estimate of the best performance possible which met his 
requirements, and Maund explained that the Air Staff were 
simply seeking a view on the technical feasibility of a 
draft operational requirement. He asked if improvements 
in aerodynamic efficiency and engines might allow a 
maximum speed of more than 250 mph to be stipulated. 86 
83 2/1323,15A, AOC-in-C ADGB to Secretary, Air Ministry, 6th June 1932 
84 PRO: AIR 9/8, Fotio 41, Committee on Nationat Expenditure 1931 
85 2/2741, DCAS to CAS, 19.12.32 
86 ibid., F01 to DTD, minute 3 [December 19323 
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This was surely a much better way of developing a feasible 
operational requirement than that which had been followed 
with F. 7/30 and earlier, where the initiative had often 
been taken by the technical branches and then criticised 
by the Air Staff. As discussed in chapter 3.3.2, when 
Ludlow-Hewitt replaced Burnett as DCAS he formalised 
consultation at an early stage by setting up meetings of 
all those concerned with new operational requirements. 
Both Maund and Burnett had put rate of climb as the first 
priority for the new fighter, but had also specified that 
it was to be based upon the same principles as the Fury. 
This contradiction was exposed when the DTD (Cave) asked 
if the climb required was to be at best climbing speed and 
not, as with the Fury, that to give the quickest 
interception of an enemy at a specified height and 
speed. 87 His staff were told that the climb requirement 
was for the best to 20,000 ft. 88 This apparently innocent 
detailed technical question and its answer exposed a lack 
of continuity of thought by the Air Staff, and brought 
home that it was implying a significant change of policy. 
Maund and Burnett had overlooked that the Fury had been 
designed to meet the concept of an "Advance" or 
"Interception" fighter. This concept had been found to be 
unworkable in the Air Exercises of 1931. In consequence, 
as noted in chapter 4.5, the Fury squadrons were moved 
from their advanced bases back to the Aircraft Fighting 
Zone - to serve as day zone fighters. Zone fighters 
needed a high rate-oi-climb to attain their patrol height 
quickly, a requirement which would lead to a different 
design optimisation from that to meet the interception 
concept, where speed and distance covered in a pursuit 
climb were important. This issue had arisen when the 
requirements for an interception fighter were first 
87 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 23.12.32 
88 ibid., 5A, 27.2.33 
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considered in 1927.89 Plans to simply replace the Fury 
after its operational role had been discredited required 
some explanation - even though as the fastest fighter then 
in RAF service the Fury was seen as a successful aircraft. 
These matters were taken up by Wing Commander A. T. 
Williams in April 1933, after he had replaced Maund as 
head of Flying Operations 1. Williams was aware that the 
Fury had been introduced to test the Advanced scheme and 
had failed, and he questioned the need for a replacement 
of that type in addition to zone and two-seat fighters. 
He suggested that a new day fighter was worthwhile only if 
it had a rate-of-climb sufficiently higher than that of a 
day and night fighter. From a comparison of four, six and 
eight-gun Fury replacements with the Supermarine F. 7/30, 
it was evident that this was not so. Williams concluded 
that the higher speed expected of a Fury replacement did 
not counterbalance having a third type of fighter, with 
low endurance, high landing speed, and restricted to day 
flying. As an alternative, he suggested fitting more guns 
in place of the night flying equipment of a zone fighter 
as a way of getting a day fighter without introducing a 
third type. 90- 
This suggestion missed the point made earlier that it was 
the relatively poor top speed of aircraft designed for 
night landings that was the problem in combating fast 
bombers. After criticism of his proposal from the DDOI 
(Peirse)91 and from the DCAS (now Air Vice Marshal E. R. 
Ludlow-Hewitt) 92 Williams came round to accept that a 
compromise day and night fighter "would be valueless for 
day fighting without the essential margin of performance 
and fire power". He also took up a point made by Peirse, 
(and earlier by Maund) that, 
89 20/168, F01 to DCAS, 13.5.27 
90 ibid., F01 to DCAS, 4.4.33 
91 ibid., DDOI to DCAS, 29.5.33 
92 ibid., DCAS to F01,2.6. [333 
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It seems certain that political considerations will 
always force us (at any rate in war) to maintain in 
our defence a certain number of Fighter aircraft 
giving the highest possible margin of superiority 
over contemporary foreign Bomber aircraft. 93 
Ludlow-Hewitt then sought to persuade the CAS (now Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Edward Ellington) that the RAF should 
adopt "the policy of equipping a few squadrons with a 
fighter developed to produce as high a fighting 
performance as possible at the sacrifice of other 
characteristics such as endurance and landing speed. " He 
admitted that the AOC-in-C of the ADGB (Air Marshal Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham) was opposed to keeping three types 
of fighter in service, and that he wished development to 
be concentrated on the day and night fighter. But Ludlow- 
Hewitt told Ellington that, 
Nevertheless, we should probably make quicker 
progress in producing the best possible type of 
fighter if we continue practical research in the 
direction of combining maximum performance with an 
adequate measure of safety in landing and the other 
characteristics necessary to render the aircraft 
efficient as a fighter. 
He pointed out that maximum performance would only be of 
use if the landing speed was reasonable, and view, 
endurance and other factors were acceptable, and that the 
more these characteristics were developed the more the 
aircraft would resemble a "day and night 11 fighter. 94 It 
will be shown later that this was good reasoning in the 
then climate of rapid improvements in aviation technology. 
Ellington's response in July 1933 was not encouraging. He 
said that, 
If we had unlimited capacity for developing 
experimental machines and also unlimited money, there 
would be no doubt that we should go ahead with a 
maximum performance multi-gun single seater fighter. 
93 2/2741,10A, Pro and Cons - for the retention of Specialist Day Fighter, June/July 
1933 
94 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 11.7.33 
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But he pointed out that there were already a number of 
fighters under consideration, and that it was beyond the 
capacity of Dowding's technical staff to deal with them. 
He asked what priority was proposed by the Air Staff. 95 
Ellington was sceptical of the value of single-seat 
fighters because they were not able to fight in formation, 
a key feature of RAF fighter tactics. Moreover one of the 
fighters under consideration was Ellington's own project 
for a fighter specifically designed to fight in formation, 
as was the concurrent "Novel fighter". These are 
described in chapter 6. 
Ludlow-Hewitt consulted Dowding about workload and 
priorities, 96 and after some discussion it was decided 
that Ellington's project and the Novel Fighter should go 
ahead in 1933, and that the Fury replacement should be 
delayed until the next year. 97,98,99 Its provisional 1933 
designation F. 16/33 was replaced by the better known 
F. 5/34,100 and the funds in the 1933 Estimates earmarked 
for a single-seat fighter were diverted to Ellington's 
proj ect. 101 
In the spring of 1934 the Fury replacement project was 
resurrected and estimates of its performance were updated 
by Captain Liptrot to take account of contemporary 
engines. 102 These were the Fairey Prince, and later the 
Royce PV 12 (Merlin), 103 both liquid-cooled in-line 
engines. (Sorley was later to write that a "radial, air- 
cooled fighter" was- envisaged for F. 5/34,104 but this is to 
95 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 13.7.33 
96 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 16.8.33 
97 ibid., DTD to DCAS, 22.8.33 
98 ibid., DCAS to DTD, 23.8.33 
99 ibid., DTD to DCAS, 28.8.33 
100 20/68, page 124, Specifications for new type Service LandpLanes (ExcLuding DTD 
types) 1928- 
101 2/681,16A, Tender Designs to Specification No. F-22/33, DTD to AMSR, 31.7.34 
102 2/2741, F01 to RDA3,27.3.34, and 22A, RDA3 to OR, 23.5.34 
103 ibid., 27A 
104 Postan, page 539 
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confuse what happened with what was expected. ) The 
performance estimates were based upon an endurance of 1.67 
hours, equivalent to the 1ý( hours specified for the Fury 
after account was taken of the change of definition of 
fighter endurance introduced in 1932.105 
Liptrot compared four, six and eight gun options with 
maximum speed as the first priority, and a four gun 
example with best climb to 20,000 feet as first priority. 
The recently formed Operational Requirements section then 
drew up draft "Air Staff Requirements for Fury Replacement 
Aircraft". 106 These were sent to Ludlow-Hewitt by Squadron 
Leader Sorley, de facto head of the section following the 
death of Wing Commander Williams in June 1934. 
Sorley drew attention to Liptrot's figures which indicated 
a very small difference in maximum speed between the four, 
six and eight gun options, and a significant drop in speed 
if design was optimised for climb. His recommendation on 
choice of armament is discussed in chapter 6- of greater 
significance was his advice that optimisation for speed 
rather than for climb should be adopted. 107 This 
represented a major departure from the long-standing 
policy that rate-of-climb was the prime requirement of a 
home defence single-seat fighter. Sorley also suggested 
that the loss of manoeuvrability which would accompany 
optimisation for speed was acceptable, because the 
principle of short decisive attacks from astern did not 
require high manoeuvrability. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, a step in this direction had been taken in 
F. 7/30, and it had been foreseen in the late 1920s 
(chapter 4.2.2.2). 
More urgency was injected into these developments by 
reports from abroad. The DTD (Cave) told the Operational 
Requirements section that, 
105 20/168, F01 to DCAS, December 1932 
106 2/2741,23A 
107 ibid., OR to DCAS, 5.7.34 
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We receive from A[irl. I[intelligencel. reports of 
high speeds claimed for fighters built abroad. As 
our new Fighter Specifications F. 7/30, F. 5/33 and 
F. 22/33 all sacrifice performance for other 
operational requirements, the situation may arise 
shortly that our fastest fighter is very much slower 
than some foreign fighters. 
He asked for higher priority for the F. 5/34 
specification. 108 Cave would have been well aware that 
F. 7/30 sacrificed performance for a night flying 
capability, and that the tenders for the two multi-seat 
turret fighters then under development, F. 5/33 (Novel) and 
F. 22/33 (CAS), were indicating a relatively low 
performance. 
A meeting of the kind later known as the operational 
Requirements Committee was held on 9th August 1934 to 
discuss the draft requirements for the day fighter 
F. 5/34.109 This meeting agreed to sacrifice not only rate 
of climb and manoeuvrability for speed, but also 
endurance. Sorley had proposed an endurance of 1.75 hours 
(at maximum continuous rpm), "() slightly more than that of 
the Fury. The committee reduced this to 114 hours on the 
understanding that this would give a maximum speed of 277 
mph, 111 and patrol at 150 mph for 3W hours. 112 
When specification F. 5/34 for a day fighter was issued in 
November 1934, it called for eight Browning machine guns 
and a maximum speed at 15,000 ft of not less than 275 
mph. 113 Prototypes were ordered from Bristol in March 1935 
and from Gloster in May 1935.114 
108 ibid., 22A, DTD to OR, 17.7.34 
109 ibid., (60A], Extract from Minutes of Conference on Air Staff Requirements for Fury 
Replacement, 9th August 1934 
110 ibid., OR to DCAS, 5.7.34 
111 ibid., 27A 
112 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 5.9.34 
113 ibid., 40A, Specification No. F. 5/34. SingLe-Seat Fighter, issued 16th November 1934 
114 6/22, ACM 572, Progress on Experimental Aircraft, 30.4.35 
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5.3.2 The Specification that Never Was: F. 10/35 
In the autumn of 1934, although trials of the F. 7/30 
prototypes had yet to take place, the DDOI (Group Captain 
A. T. Harris) told the CAS that shortcomings in their 
design were already apparent. He said that they lacked 
retractable undercarriages, flaps and enclosed cockpits. 
He suggested that under the political conditions then 
existing the production of a new type in the zone fighter 
class at comparatively short intervals was justified. 115 
The political conditions were of course the emergence of 
the threat of German air power. Harris, proposal was 
agreed by Ellington, 116 and the Experimental Aircraft 
Programme for 1935 included a new day and night fighter to 
replace F. 7/30.117 
The requirements for this project, numbered F. 10/35, were 
considered by the 'Operational Requirements Committee' on 
29th March 1935.118 This meeting continued the policies 
which had been adopted for the day fighter F. 5/34. It 
decided that speed and fire power were more important than 
rate-of-climb and manoeuvrability. Significantly, 
although F. 10/35 was required to operate at night, landing 
speed was not discussed at all -a far cry from the 
troubles in defining specification F-7/30. But by 1935 
the use of flaps to give an acceptable landing speed 
without unduly compromising maximum speed had become 
common practice. 
An armament of six, preferably eight, fixed 0.303in 
machine guns was agreed after some consideration of guns 
of greater calibre, and of traversing guns. These matters 
are discussed in chapter 6. 
115 2/716, DDOI (for DCAS) to CAS, 12.10. [343, page 3, para. (b) 
116 ibid., IA, [15.10.341, Note to DCAS 
117 ibid., 6B, Minutes of Conference on Experimentat Aircraft Programme, 16th October 
1934 
118 PRO: AIR 2/2821, Whirtwind Singte Enqined. SinqLe Seater Day and Night Fighter. 
Specn F/37135 Type Requirements, 3A 
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The most important decision concerned endurance. A Table 
had been circulated which showed the estimated 
relationship between maximum speed and endurance. 119 Air 
Vice Marshal C. L. Courtney (DCAS from 26th January 1935) 
proposed that endurance should first be decided, as the 
Table showed that this would determine maximum speed. 
Wing Commander H. A. Whistler then gave the views of the 
Fighting Area of the ADGB Command. He asked for fuel for 
% hour at Ground Level (or at 15,000 ft, whichever gave 
the greater) at maximum continuous power to cover climb 
and fuel reserve, plus one hour at economic speed at 
15,000 ft for patrol, plus 1X hour at full power for 
pursuit and attack. This was agreed. 
The concept of determining fuel capacity by reference to a 
hypothetical operational sortie was new. It was certainly 
an improvement over the previous practice of simply 
specifying a number of hours at maximum power. Whistler's 
detailed prescription was equivalent in fuel capacity to 
an endurance of one-hour at maximum continuous power (plus 
U hour reserve), and from the Table this was compatible 
with a top speed of 315 mph. (The Minutes of the meeting 
record 310 mph, but this was corrected by Courtney when 
reporting to Ellington. 120) 
Air Staff Requirement F. 10/35 was circulated to industry121 
and drafting of the specification was put in hand. 122 It 
was to be overtaken by the events described in the next 
section, and the specification was amended to incorporate 
cannon armament as discussed in chapter 6. 
Cannon armament would be heavier than the machine guns 
called for in F. 10/35. Even so, when putting a cannon 
fighter proposal to Ellington, Courtney noted that the new 
aerodromes being built for home defence had a clear run of 
119 9/37, Folio 32, OxIand (OR) to DCAS, 23.3.35 
120 2/2821, DCAS to CAS, 6.4.35 
121 ibid., 13A and 13B, 25th April 1935 
122 ibid., DTD to RDA3,26.4.35 
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1,100 yards, and that this would permit an increase in 
wing loading and make a speed of 330 mph possible. 123 
So in the space of four years the planned maximum speed of 
RAF fighters had risen from 195 mph in the final form of 
F. 7/30 to 330 mph. An important contribution to this 
great advance was the Air Ministry's high-speed aircraft 
research programme. 
5.4 HIGH-SPEED AIRCRAFT RESEARCH 
In parallel with the Air Staff's consideration of the 
operational requirements for a high performance day 
fighter (F. 5/34) and for a new day and night fighter 
(F. 10/35), the Directorate of Technical Development was 
pursuing a high-speed aircraft research programme. This 
was later described by Dowding (when Air Member for 
Research and Development in September 1935) as a follow-up 
to the RAF's support of the Schneider Trophy racing 
seaplanes. He wrote, 
[1.1 Since the time when we won Schneider Trophy 
outright we have ceased to seek after extreme speeds 
involving very high landing speeds and vast landing 
areas, but it has been policy to have one or two 
machines under construction which will be 
considerably ahead of latest service types in 
performance. 
2. Such machines were the High Speed Fury, High 
Speed Hawker and Supermarine Monoplane. 3.24 
This section first describes the progress of the AMSR's 
Department's research programme through its dealings with 
Hawker and Supermarine in 1934. It is then shown how the 
outcome came to fulfil the single-seat fighter 
requirements which had been under discussion from 1932 to 
1935. As has been shown, this is a contentious issue, 
with many contradictory claims in the literature. 
123 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 11.11.35 
124 6/43, EPM 29/35, Note by AMRD, item (b), 21.9.35 
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5.4.1 Hawker 
From 1932 the Air Ministry had funded the development by 
Hawker of the experimental High-Speed Fury. This was a 
Fury biplane fighter fitted with a special Rolls-Royce 
Kestrel engine, and later with new wings and the Rolls- 
Royce Goshawk engine-125 In the course of this work there 
had been discussions with the company on the Ministry's 
high-speed aircraft development aspirations. Stewart 
claims that in August 1933 Hawker's Chief Designer (Sidney 
Camm) and the DDTD (Buchanan) had agreed that a Hawker 
Fury Monoplane design "was accepted in principle". 126 
Maybe so, but when early in 1934 the company sent 
proposals for a monoplane fighter to Buchanan he minuted 
the DTD that, 
The attached proposal has been received from Messrs. 
Hawkers and arises out of discussions we have had 
with Mr. Camm on high speed development. 
The proposal is a method of overcoming the limitation 
of the existing high speed Fury due to its biplane 
construction. 
The proposal is for a new type of interceptor fighter 
not for a true high speed monoplane. Messrs. Hawkers 
will not separate high speed development from 
military utility and the work on the Fury has 
suffered from this cause. 
In any case it is clear that ultra high speed 
development must be associated with a monoplane and 
the Supermarine F. 7/30 if successful may offer an 
opportunity to proceed with the work. 127 
In passing these views to the AMSR (Dowding), the DTD 
(Cave), although less critical of Hawker's pursuit of 
military utility, proposed deferring action on their 
proposal until the current re-build of the High-Speed Fury 
125 PRO: AIR 2/652, Special Engine Devetopment for High-Speed Aircraft: Policy, 1932- 
1933 
126 Stewart, page 14 
127 PRO: AIR 2/605, Proposat for a High-Speed Monoptane by Hawker Aircraft Ltd., DDTD to 
DTD, 19.2.34 
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was completed. 128 Dowding agreed with this approach, with 
the comment that, 
It is of course possible that the D[ay] & N[ight] 
Fighter Replacement may be so good that the Air Staff 
may agree to waive the requirement of a special 
Interceptor class with all its attendant 
disadvantages. 
He saw Hawker's point regarding military utility, but felt 
that "this rather handicaps us in carrying out an advanced 
research programme in land speed. l, 129 
The I'D & NII fighter referred to by Dowding-was the 
Supermarine contender for specification F. 7/30, and 
presumably by "land speed" he meant in contrast to the 
seaplanes of the Schneider Trophy races. 
When the time came to re-consider Hawker's proposal in May 
1934, Dowding agreed to a further three months 
postponement in the expectation that the performance of 
the High-Speed Fury and of the Supermarine F. 7/30 would 
soon be known. 130 However, trials of both were delayed by 
trouble with their Goshawk engine. 131,132 
It is shown below that in concurrent discussions with 
Supermarine over their F. 7/30 project, the Director of 
Technical Development (Cave) had come to the very 
important opinion that Hawker's, as well as Supermarine's, 
current ideas should be dealt with as part of the high- 
speed research programme. Thus when on 4th September 1934 
Hawker (perhaps having been told of Cave's views) 
submitted a new proposal for a four-gun monoplane fighter, 
and re-opened the question of an order, this was quickly 
dealt with. 
128 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 22.2.34 
129 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 25.2.34 
130 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 13.5.34 
131 ibid., RDA3 to AD/RDA, 27.7.34 
132 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 24.8.34 
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Hawker's Chief Designer explained that the company's 
earlier proposal had been designed to meet the 
specification of the Fury and to compare a biplane and 
monoplane at full scale. He said that Drawing Office work 
had continued, but with the Goshawk engine replaced by the 
Rolls-Royce PV 12, and that there had been close 
cooperation with the Royal Aircraft Establishment on wing 
design. 133 Camm said that a top speed "approaching 300 
mph" was possible, but the Directorate thought this 
optimistic and estimated 285 mph, with an endurance of 1.5 
hours at normal rpm. 134 
In forwarding Hawker's proposal to Cave, Buchanan noted 
that in discussions on the specification for a Fury 
replacement the fitting of eight guns was proposed, but 
that, 
In view of the importance of high speed development, 
I recommend the ordering of this aeroplane as part of 
this work, apart from the question of the Fury 
replacement. 135 
Cave drew this minute and Hawker's proposal to the 
attention of Dowding, and endorsed Buchanan's 
recommendation to buy the aircraft as part of "our High 
Speed development work". 136 Dowding agreed immediately. 137 
The Ministry's Contract Department were told on 20th 
September 1934 that, "It is proposed to place an order for 
this aeroplane. Could you ascertain the price. 11138 The 
aeroplane was ordered at a contract price of E8,000139 and 
given the number F. 36/34; no specification document was 
issued. 140,141 
133 ibid., Camm to Buchanan with Hawker Drawing E. 57540,4th September 1934 
134 ibid., RDA3 to Dr. Coates/DDTD, 8.9.34 
135 ibid., DDTD to DTD, 10.9.34 
136 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 13.9.34 
137 ibid., AMSR "Agree", 14.9.34 
138 ibid., DDTD to AD of C. A., 20.9.34 
139 ibid., file note unsigned and undated 
140 Air Ministry file on Specification No. 36/34 held by the Air Historical Branch, 
Ministry of Defence 
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These facts, which demonstrate an awareness of need and 
speed of decision-making by Dowding's department, contrast 
with M. Bowyer's claim that, "Following lengthy, complex 
discussions of fighter policy the Air Ministry on 21.2.35 
ordered a Hawker prototype to Specification F. 36/34.9042 
It is true that contractual matters were not settled for 
some months, a common state of affairs then143 and now, but 
Dowding's decision was made in September 1934, ten days 
after receipt of Camm's letter. No issues of fighter 
policy arose. 
5.4.2 Supermarine 
In section 5.2 it is noted that Supermarine were awarded a 
contract for a prototype to specification F. 7/30. This 
aircraft was given the company Type No. 224. Completion 
was much delayed, partly by difficulties with the 
evaporative cooling of the RR Goshawk engine -a problem 
which bedevilled some other contenders for F. 7/30. 
Meanwhile the company discussed with the Air Ministry 
modifications to their Type 224 which were expected to 
improve its performance. In July 1934 they referred to 
these discussions and proposed that the modifications 
should be incorporated into their entry for the F. 7/30 
competition. The company quoted a price for the 
modifications and sought approval to proceed with them. 144 
The Ministry checked Supermarine's performance estimates 
and agreed that the modifications should give a speed at 
15,000 ft of 265 mph as compared with an estimate for the 
141 PRO: AIR 2/2822, Type Requirements for Specn F. 36/34. (Hawkerl, this Me has onLy 
"Specification 15/36 Hawker "Hurricane". DeveLopment - Production,,, issued 20th JuLy 
1936 
142 Bowyer, Aircraft for the Few, page 41 
143 2/1668, DTD to AMSR, 15.1.35, para. 10 
144 PRO: AIR 2/2850, Singte Seater Day and Niqht Fighter to Spec. No. F7/30 - Kestrel IV 
Engine Pretiminary Consideration of Design: Supermarine Aviation Works, Supermarine to 
Secretary, Air ministry, 27th Juty 1934 
Chapter 5 The Quest for Speed 176 
unmodified F. 7/30 aircraft of 235 mph. The proposed 
changes involved a reduced wing area, a conventional low 
wing, trailing-edge flaps, retractable undercarriage, 
retractable tail-wheel, closed cockpit and a smaller 
tailplane. 145 These "modifications" transformed the 
Supermarine Type 224, with its odd-looking cranked wing, 
fixed spatted undercarriage and open cockpit to the more 
elegant Type 300.146 Supermarine's quote of E7,000 for the 
modifications was to a design whose first cost had been 
E8,500 . 147 
The Directorate of Technical Development's very reasonable 
reaction to this proposition was that to place a contract 
for such major modifications to Supermarine's F. 7/30 
contender would be unfair to other companies with entries 
to the competition. 148 The Director (Cave) then proposed 
to Dowding a way of overcoming this serious contractual 
obstacle. He suggested that the Supermarine proposal, and 
the "Interceptor Fighter" design from Hawker, should "be 
considered quite apart from the present F. 7/30 competition 
as they would be too late for consideration with that 
type., ' Then, after mentioning again that discussions on 
the next single-engined fighter indicated that eight guns 
would be required, he wrote, 
I think it would be a wise precaution to order one of 
these modified F. 7/30s from Supermarine if they will 
quote a reasonable price and delivery date. It will 
be a suitable type on which to overcome many of the 
problems we shall have later with the 8 gun 
interceptor e. g. the combination of steam cooling, 
retractable undercarriage and guns in the wings. It 
will also be a most interesting experiment with wing 
flaps on a high performance monoplane. 149 
Dowding immediately agreed to this proposal, although he 
commented that, "There is no reason why they [Supermarinel 
145 ibid., RDA3 to DDTD, 9.9.1934 
146 Price, The Spitfire Stor , page 16 147 2/2850,1A, Requisition for Purchase, undated 
148 ibid., AD/RDA to DDTD, 14.8.34 
149 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 23.8.34 
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should not have included retractable undercarriage & flaps 
in their original design. (You may remember that I asked 
you about this at the timePi. 150 It has been explained in 
section 5.2 that Supermarine's initial tender to F. 7/30 
had not met the landing speed requirement and that an 
increase in wing area was necessary. Flaps would have 
been a way of meeting the requirement without an increase 
in wing area and consequent reduction in top speed. 
"Variable camber or equivalent devices" were permitted in 
specification F. 7/30.151 
At Cave's request, 152 on 4th September 1934 the Director of 
Contracts asked Supermarine to quote the cost and delivery 
of a new aeroplane, ''Igenerally on the lines of your 
proposals on Drawing 30,000, Sheet 2.11, i. e., the 
'modified' F. 7/30. He said that the new aircraft was not 
to be regarded as a replacement for the company's Type 
224, which was to be completed for the F. 7/30 trials. 153 
This letter was sent just over one month after 
Supermarine's request for funding of the modifications. 
Considering the rapidity of this response it is surprising 
that Price says that, "The Air Ministry was lukewarm 
towards the new proposal". 154 He says that after a board 
meeting on 6th November 1934, Vickers (Aviation) decided 
to fund Mitchell's design work. Scott agrees, and quotes 
Sir Robert McLean of Vickers as writing that he and Roll- 
Royce decided that they would finance the building of a 
"real killer fighter", and that he told the Air Ministry 
that "in no circumstances would any technical member of 
the Air Ministry be consulted or allowed to interfere with 
the designers". 155 The Director of Contracts' letter must 
have been a great comfort when these bold decisions were 
made! Moreover, a manuscript minute by Dowding dated two 
150 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 24.8.34 
151 2/2815 ibid., 44A, Section 4 
152 2/2850, DTD to DOC, 27.8.34 
153 ibid., 50A, Director of Contracts to Supermarine, 4th September 1934 
154 Price, The Spitfire Stor , page 16 155 Scott, J. D., Vickers. A Histor , 1962, page 202 
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days after the Vickers board meeting speaks for itself. 
Dowding wrote, 
Spoken to Sir R. McLean. 
Do not press the Dagger engine on this new F. 7/30 
project. 
Let them use Goshawk or P. V. 12. 
Give them the I. T. P. as soon as possible. 156 
The Intention to Proceed was issued on 1st December 
1934.157 A few days later it was agreed between the 
Directorate of Technical development and Supermarine that 
the Goshawk engine (on which the modified F. 7/30 was 
based) should be replaced by the Rolls-Royce P. V XII 
(Merlin). 158 Price explains how the consequent change in 
planform led to the familiar outline of the Spitfire. 159 A 
brief specification (F. 37/34) for an "Experimental High 
Speed Single Seater Fighter" was issued. It retained most 
of the requirements of the F. 7/30 day and night zone 
fighter, but permitted all four guns to be outboard of the 
propeller disc. 160 
Thus the AMSR's high-speed aircraft research programme led 
to orders being placed for two experimental aircraft, 
F. 36/34 (Hawker) and F. 37/34 (Supermarine). The Air Staff 
had not been directly involved. Indeed, Sorley wrote that 
he did not know of the existence of the projects until 
after orders had beeri placed. 161 
5.4.3 From Hiqh-ST)eed Research to the SDitfire and 
Hurricane 
Supermarine were one of the firms which received Air Staff 
Requirement F. 10/35 for a new day and night fighter. 
156 2/2850,53a, Dowding to DDTD, 8.11.34 
157 ! bid., DoC to Supermarine, lst December 1934 
158 ibid., Supermarine's Draft Notes on Conference at the Air Ministry on 5th December 
1934. Improved D. N. Fighter. Type 300 
159 Price, Spitfire, page 17 
160 2/2850, Specification F. 37/34_Experimentat High Speed Singte Seater Fighter, issued 
3rd January 1935 
161 Haining, P., The Spitfire Log, 1985, page 25 
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Sorley of the Operational Requirements branch visited the 
company in late April 1935, and he told Courtney (DCAS) 
that, 
Mitchell received the Air Staff Requirements for the 
10/35 while I was there and is naturally desirous of 
bringing the aircraft now building [the F. 37/34 
version of F. 7/301 into line with this specification. 
He says he can include 4 additional guns without 
trouble or delay. 
Sorley noted that Hawker had a similar aircraft under 
construction (the F. 36/34), and suggested "that we should 
likewise relate the requirements of this one to the 
10/35. t062 
Sorley's memory seems to have failed him when he wrote 
about these events ten or more years after they occurred. 
In the two cited post-war publications he makes no mention 
of F. 10/35 - he relates everything to F. 5/34. 
That it was F. 10/35 which was at issue in the spring of 
1935 is confirmed by a minute to the Air Staff from Air 
Commodore R. H. Verney (who replaced Cave as DTD from 17th 
September 1935). Under the heading "Single Seater Day and 
Night Fighter Specification F. 10/3511. Verney wrote, 
In view of the probable decision (not yet notified to 
me) that F. 36/34 Hawker, and F. 37/34 Supermarine 
Fighters are to ' 
be converted to this Specification, 
by ordering new wings for the Hawker, and altering 
the Supermarine which is still in the design stage, 
it is a matter for careful consideration whether the 
issue of this Specification should still be made? 
Verney's concern was that Air Staff Requirement F. 10/35 
had already been circulated to industry, and a follow-up 
specification was expected. He suggested that the options 
were: 
(a) To let F. 10/35 continue. 
(b) To withdraw it for a time 
162 PRO: AIR 2/2824, "Spitfire" (Supermarine) Singte seater Day and Night Fighter - Type 
Requirements for Specn 37/34 and Triats, OR to DCAS, 1.5.35 
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(c) To recast it making demands for an even more 
advanced design. 
Verney favoured the last option. 163 His view of a more 
advanced design is discussed in chapter 6. 
On seeing Verney's minute, Dowding wrote to Courtney, "I 
agree that the fact that you have roped in, my 2 
experimental fighter prototypes rather alters the 
situation". 164 He advised holding up the F. 10/35 
specification, as did Wing Commander R. F. Ox1and, head of 
the operational Requirements section since October 1934. 
An operational Requirements branch note (drafted by 
Sorley165) confirmed that the Hawker and the Supermarine 
designs were being modified to meet F. 10/35 "in all 
essentials" . 
166 
Thus Ludlow-Hewitt's hope that practical research into a 
pure high-performance fighter would lead to an 
operationally acceptable day and night fighter was 
realised. Paradoxically, rather than the high-performance 
day fighter being developed to meet the requirements of a 
day and night fighter, it was the drastic reduction in the 
endurance required of the new day and night fighter which 
made this possible. 
5.5 SUMMARY: The Zone And Interception Classes Merge 
Since 1923 the RAF had pursued the concept of two classes 
of single-seat fighter. The standard zone class was 
required to operate by day or night, and to have an 
endurance which permitted patrol until the route and 
height of an attack were fully identified. The 
interception class was at first to be optimised for a 
pursuit climb from airfields on the coast. When the 
163 2/2821, DTD to OR and DCAS, 21.5.35 
164 ibid., Dowding to DCAS, 23.5.35 
165 20/167, Note by S/L (OR), 28.5.35; 
166 2/2821,18A, OR to DCAS, 28.5.35 
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pursuit climb role had been found unfeasible the class was 
retained as a high performance, low endurance, day only 
zone fighter. The characteristics of the two classes 
began to merge as the introduction of flaps broke the link 
between maximum speed and landing speed, and night flying 
and radio equipment reduced in weight. But the most 
important factor was the reduction in the endurance 
specified for day and night zone fighters. 
In going from F. 7/30 to its replacement F. 10/35, the Air 
Staff had accepted the advice of the Fighting Area and 
reduced the required endurance (at maximum normal rpm) 
f rom 2% hours167 to one hour, and reserves f rom % to 1,4 
hour. This startling change underlay Sorley's proposal 
that the Supermarine F. 37/34 experimental fighter could 
meet F. 10/35. He noted that the latter required only two- 
thirds of the fuel load of the former as a result of a 
halving of the required endurance and reserves. This 
saving in fuel weight would more than offset that of four 
additional guns. 168 It also explains how Hawker's 
experimental fighter, which Camm had based upon the Fury 
low endurance concept, could be deemed to meet the zone 
fighter requirement F. 10/35. 
The merging of the two classes was completed when the 
Bristol and Gloster prototypes to the Fury replacement 
specification F. 5/34 were brought into line with F. 10/35. 
The first step concerned endurance. That specified for 
the zone fighter F. 10/35 was actually less than that of 
F. 5/34 - one hour as compared with 12X hours. The Air 
Staff proposed to reduce F. 5/34 to one hour, 169 and this 
was agreed by the Fighting Area and put into effect. 
170,171 
167 2/2815,61B, 17th October 1932 
168 2/2824, OR to DCAS, 1.5.35 
169 2/2741,44A, OR to DCAS, 1.4.35 
170 ibid., OR to RDA3,29.4.35 
171 ibid., 53A, Corrigendum No. I to Specification F. 5/34,10th May 1935 
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The restriction to day flying was then removed from 
F. 5/34. Oxland and Sorley erroneously believed that when 
F. 5/34 was under discussion, doubts that an eight-gun 
fighter could be produced successfully led to "the result 
that the requirements were restricted to day flying 
only". 172 This was not so - the limitation to day flying 
came from the concept of a Fury replacement as described 
in section 5.3. After consulting the builders of the 
prototypes, specification F. 5/34 was brought fully into 
line with F. 10/35 by a corrigendum, which simply said, "For 
'day fighter' read 'day and night fighter-1.173 
The marked reduction in endurance has gone largely 
unnoticed by writers on the development of RAF fighters in 
the 1930s. M. Bowyer suggests that most of Fighter 
Command's aircraft had "a duration of about I hr 20 min 
(power unspecified], judged sufficient for the task if 
radar early warning was effectively employed". 174 But the 
critical decision on endurance for F. 10/35 was made before 
there could be confidence in the development of an early 
warning system. 
Some of those present at the meeting in March 1935 which 
considered F. 10/35 may have known of the nascent RDF 
system - it has been said that there was a faint 
possibility of radiolocation in 1933-175 Certainly there 
were contemporary thoughts that early warning of air 
attacks coming from the East might be obtained by 
stationing ships or. aircraft off -shore, 176,177 and there 
were fears that an enemy could get warning of an RAF 
bombing attack when it was 50 miles from his territory-178 
Even so, it is most unlikely that the Air Staff would have 
172 2/2821,18A, OR to DCAS, 28.5.35 
173 2/2741, Corrigendum No. 2 to Specification F. 5/34,15th August 1935 
174 Bowyer, Aircraft for the Few, page 11 
175 41/39, page 36 
176 2/1386,39A, 6.11.34 
177 212715,7E, The Rote of the Generat Purpose Reconnaissance Aircraft, 23.7.35 
178 ibid., 7A, The InfLuence of Tactics upon design of Bombers for the Air Defence of 
Great Britain, JuLy/August 1935 
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committed itself to'a major change in its operational 
requirements for zone fighters on the basis of such hopes. 
A more likely explanation is that fears of attack by fast 
bombers led it to put maximum speed above all other 
aspects of fighter performance. This was one of the 
lessons learnt from the analysis of the Air Exercises of 
1931, as noted in chapter 4.5. 
No doubt the Air Staff took comfort from the knowledge 
that an endurance of one hour at maximum rpm for F. 10/35 
corresponded to three hours at 150 mph. 179 Against 
unescorted bombers, patrol at that speed might be 
acceptable, although even then a patrol would have to 
terminate when there was just sufficient fuel remaining 
for combat, lest the aircraft became engaged in combat 
after that time. For example, F. 10/35 would have fuel 
remaining for only 20 mins at normal maximum rpm after two 
hours patrol at economic speed. 180 If hostile fighters 
were escorting the bombers, then patrol would need to be 
at a much higher speed than 150 mph, with a corresponding 
loss of endurance. Points such as these are illustrated 
by Price in Fighter Aircraft, where he gives an example of 
the calculation of endurance and range for a specific 
operational sortie. 181 
179 2/2821,2A 
180 PRO: AIR 2/1599, "Defiant" Single Engine Two Seater Day and Night Fiqhter - 
Specification F9/35 - Type Reguirements, 2B, RDA3 to OR, 27.3.35 
181 Price, Fighter Aircraft, pages 35-36 
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6. THE QUEST FOR FIGHTER FIREPOWER 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The RAF believed that a formation of bombers was capable 
of putting up a very strong defence, and that attacks by 
individual fighters would not be successful. It therefore 
viewed the armament of fighters in the context of the 
firepower which could be brought to bear simultaneously by 
a formation. In theory this could give an effective 
concentration of fire, but it was thought that in practice 
a fighter pilot could not both maintain close formation 
and aim his guns. There were seen to be two possible 
solutions to this dilemma. one was to match the defences 
of a bomber formation by increasing the number or calibre 
of guns carried by individual single-seat fighters. This 
would either obviate the need for formation attacks or 
give effective long-range unaimed fire from a formation. 
The other approach was to accept that formation keeping 
and aimed fire were incompatible, and therefore to 
separate the functions of pilot and gunner. 
Between 1930 and 1935 both of these approaches to the 
achievement of effective fighter firepower were 
energetically pursued. In chapter 5 it has been noted 
that the pursuit of speed for single-seat fixed-gun 
fighters was coupled with increased armament. It is 
little known that these fighters were thought unlikely to 
be successful against formations of bombers, and that for 
a time priority was given to the development of multi- 
seat turret fighters (chapter 5.3.1). It was believed 
that in this way a squadron's firepower could be brought 
to bear simultaneously on a formation of bombers. 
The general issue of fighter firepower was analysed by the 
DCAS (Ludlow-Hewitt) early in 1933.1 He was writing after 
1 2/1323, DCAS to AMSR, 15.3.33 
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reviewing the results of the "Novel Fighter" competition 
which is described later in this chapter. Ideas similar 
to those of Ludlow-Hewitt were later put forward by Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham. 2 
Ludlow-Hewitt postulated that the destruction of bombing 
formations might be achieved by, 
"All Sporadic 'close-in' attack. 
"B" Sustained 'lie-off' attack. 
He commented that whereas tactic "All could be delivered by 
fast single-seaters, these could not give concentrated 
fire, and had difficulty in making repeated attacks 
against fast bombers . These problems disappeared with 
the long-range tactic "B", but this lacked the element of 
moral shock, which Ludlow-Hewitt saw as the case for 
retaining "A". 
After noting the desirability of increasing the rate of 
fire of all guns, however mounted, he saw four possible 
lines of fighter development. These were, 
"W" The two-seater with improved stern armament. 
IIXII A single-seater with extra heavy fore armament 
for the 'lie-off' astern, (the Thomson type 
[see section 6.21). 
"Y" A two-seater with swivelling guns forward 
(possibly with turret) developed for the no 
allowance position astern and below, (probably 
on the lines suggested by the A. O. C. -in-C. [see 
section 6.31 ). 
IIZII The high performance single-seater fighter for 
fire shock action. 
He considered that All these types must have the highest 
possible speed and climb, but that X and Y need not have 
great manoeuvrability. 
2 16/305,78A, Notes on Design and Tactics of A. D. G. B. Fighters, 23rd April 1934 
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Ludlow-Hewitt proposed that the order of Priority for 
research and experiment should be Z, W, X, Y. He thought 
that the two single-seat types, X and Z, might be 
combined, for he expected the development of larger and 
heavier single-seater fighters to allow more guns without 
loss of Performance. In chapter 5.5 it has been shown 
that this was found to be so with F. 5/34 and F. 10/35. 
The AMSR (Dowding) largely accepted Ludlow-Hewitt's views, 
with the caveat that he did not agree that a multi-gun 
fighter would be restricted to unaimed fire in lie-off 
attacks. He believed that there should be room for each 
pilot to take aim. 3 Dowding told Ludlow-Hewitt that, "I 
think the multi-gun fighter is a force very much to be 
reckoned with", and that, "Even if we decide not to adopt 
it ourselves, we must consider the possibility of its 
adoption by other nations". 4 
Wing Commander Williams (F01) was consulted, and he 
suggested that a false impression of the difficulty of 
repetitive attacks by single-seater fighters had arisen 
from exercises which had pitted Bulldog fighters of 1928 
design against fast Hart bombers of 1930 design. Whereas 
in a home defence war against France the RAP would employ 
Furies of 205 mph, Bulldogs of 165 mph and Demons of 185 
mph against French bombers of 122 mph with one fixed and 
two moveable guns. He expected that British and French 
re-equipment plans would maintain this favourable 
position. Nevertheless, Williams emphasised that the 
problem in defending London was not simply that of the 
destruction of bomber formations but also of catching them 
in time. He envisaged that against high-speed bombers 
interception could be made only by single-seaters of the 
highest possible performance, and consequently Of short 
endurance. Williams was sceptical over the use of two- 
seater fighters with no speed margin over fast day bombers 
3 2/1323, AMSR to DCAS, 20.3.33 
4 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 17.2.33 
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of the same date, and of long-range attacks. However, he 
admitted that should such attacks be needed to break up 
bomber formations, single-seat fighters with four, six or 
eight guns could lie astern of a bomber formation and fire 
at long range. 5 
On the other hand, the DDOI (Peirse) was sceptical of the 
role of single-seat fighters, however heavy their 
armament. He took it as generally agreed that single-seat 
fighters attacking in formation could not keep formation 
and aim at the same time, and that when attacking 
individually they could not break up bomber formations. 
Peirse concluded that the single-seater, however many guns 
it carried, was "the least useful type of fighter. " Even 
with ten guns it would be up against many more from a 
bomber formation. Nevertheless, like Dowding, Peirse 
feared that such fighters would be a serious menace to RAF 
bombers. These might be faced with deep penetration 
raids, and relays of enemy fighters could attack them at 
long range - Peirse said they had done so with success 
against Independent Air Force raids in 1917-18. For the 
RAF he favoured a multi-seater fighter with moveable front 
and rear guns - if the required performance was 
achievable. 6 
In an attached paper on "Fighter Types and Tactics", the 
effectiveness of a fighter's two Vickers guns against a 
bomber's single Lewis was cited, and it was deduced that 
"the use of eight g-uns savours of the sledge hammer being 
used to crack a nut". This contradicted Peirse's own 
argument that even ten guns would not be enough against 
the combined firepower of a formation of bombers. More 
significant is that, at a time when the Air Staff were 
actively discussing six or eight guns for RAF fighters, 
they were still thinking in terms of single-gun stations 
for bombers. This was further illustrated when Ludlow- 
5 20/167. FOI to DCAS, march 1933 
6 20/168, DDOI to DCAS. 28.7.33 
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Hewitt sought to justify the development of a multi-gun 
fighter to the CAS in September 1933. He argued that, 
the number of single seater fighters which can attack 
a large bombing formation simultaneously would 
probably not exceed one third of the number of 
bombers, hence the need for the single seater fighter 
to develop at least four times the fire power of one 
bomber from the rear gun. 7 
It will be seen in chapter 7 that this was indeed the 
armament specified for the RAF's own new bombers at the 
time. 
The preceding paragraphs have outlined the policy options 
and differences of opinion on how fighters could achieve 
effective firepower. The following sections describe how 
these led to the specification of single-seat fighters 
armed with eight machine guns or four 20mm cannon, and to 
a variety of multi-seat turret fighters. 
6.2 SINGLE-SEAT FIGHTER ARMAMENT 
6.2.1 The Route to Eight-Machine Guns 
The history of the armament of the RAFs single-seat 
fighters in the late 1920s and 1930s has been obscured by 
the success of the eight-gun Hurricane and Spitfire and 
the supposed role of Ralph Sorley. For example, Dean says 
that, 
The fact that these fighters each carried eight 
Browning machine guns mounted in the wings and not as 
was customary a smaller number mounted in the 
fuselage was due to the genius of Air commodore Ralph 
Sorley, who pressed this highly novel idea on the 
designers and on the Air Ministry with most fortunate 
consequences. $ 
2/2741, OCAS to CAS. 5.9.33, 
Dean, page 63 
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Hyde and Divine go further. Hyde claims that the need for 
eight guns was derived from "Tests which Sorley 
conducted", 9 and Divine that the Air Ministry, 
had also appointed Squadron Leader Sorley as early as 
1930 [sic] to the operational Requirements Department 
(which did not exist] of the Air Staff to explore his 
theories of aerial gunnery. Against considerable 
internal indifference and some active opposition 
Sorley developed a theory that air fighting required 
the maximum concentration of hits within a period of 
two seconds, .... The story of how Sorley stole an 
obsolete aircraft to prove his point at Shoeburyness 
is part of legend. 10 
Quill also refers the success of the Shoeburyness tests, 
and says, "So eight guns became the policy for RAF 
fighters and Sorley had it written into what was to become 
the F. 10/35 specification. 1111 
Bishop refers to "a persistent one-man campaign" by 
Sorley. 12 Chaz Bowyer refers to the foresight of Sorley 
early in 1933. He says that Sorley "calculated that eight 
machine guns would be essential in fighters if a truly 
lethal was to be made on an enemy bomber in the two 
seconds' engagement envisaged". 13 
In his Appendix (dated May 1945) to the Design and 
Development of Weapons Air Marshal Sir Ralph Sorley 
described the "Factors Involved in the Conception of the 
8-Gun Fighter". 14 He then made no claims of personal 
involvement. However, in an article in The Times. in 
1957,15 (copied in The ST)itf ire Loq16) Sorley said that, 
As the individual who was (I think without 
controversy) responsible for the original eight gun 
fighter concept, I should like to put on record the 
9 Hyde, page 342 
10 Divine,, page 182 
11 QuiLL, page 62 
12 Bishop, E., Hurricane, 1986, page 8 
13 Bowyer, C., Spitfire, 1980, page 10 
14 Postan, Appendix VI (page 537) 
15 Sorley, R., "Eight Guns for a Fighter", The Times, 14th September 1957, page 7 
16 Haining, P., The Spitfire Log, 1985, pages 21-26 
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sequence of events, so that in times to come there 
will be no ambiguity ... 
This is a remarkable claim, and far from removing 
ambiguity, Sorley sowed the seeds of confusion. 
The issue of fighter armament is one of perceived need 
versus feasibility. From 1926 onwards the need for 
greatly increased firepower was recognised. By 1934 it 
had become feasible. to meet that need whilst retaining the 
essential performance characteristics of a fighter. The 
sequence of events which led to this result is summarised 
below. 
In chapter 4 it has been shown that in 1926 the then AMSR 
(Sir John Higgins) set in train the development of a six- 
gun (four wing-mounted) fighter (F. 10/27). He foresaw 
then that as bomber speeds increased, attacking fighters 
would have only a short time for aimed fire, and thus 
would need a high volume of fire to be effective. (The 
then Flight Lieutenant Sorley started his first spell at 
the Air Ministry in the Supply and Research Department 
some months after the initiation of this multi-gun fighter 
project). 
In 1927 Newall (then DCAS) called for four guns for the 
new interception fighter project (F. 20/27). Trenchard 
agreed, and was very annoyed when an administrative mix-up 
led to only two guns being specified (chapter 4.3.2). In 
1930 four guns for the Bulldog replacement were accepted 
without question, two of which could be wing mounted. 
17 
Newall at that time emphasised the need for a new type of 
gun which would be suitable for wing mounting. 18 
In 1931 the Air Staff concurred in the use of the Gloster 
Multi-Gun (designed to F. 10/27) for firing trials, 19 and 
17 2/2815,44A, Specification No. F. 7/30, section 6(a) (i) and (ii) 
18 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 31.5.33 
19 20/169, DCAS to AMSR, 2.2.31 
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these decisively demonstrated the value of many guns. An 
Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment report 
concluded that the six-gun aircraft was equivalent to two 
general purpose fighters. 20 Later in 1931, at Dowding's 
behest, 21 air firing trials confirmed the ideas behind the 
inception of the multi-gun fighter. They demonstrated 
that, 
the multi-gun type of fixed gun single-seater fighter 
is more likely than is the two-gun single-seater 
fighter, to produce the density of fire necessary to 
ensure a hit on a vital part of a target aircraft, 
in a time which approaches the actual average time 
during which aerial targets present themselves in air 
f ighting. 22 
Given the above background it is not surprising that many 
entries to the Novel Fighter competition held in November 
1932 (section 6.3) were found to advocate "increased gun 
power with fixed guns firing forward", and that the 
judging Committee eliminated all but one of these as not 
being novel! Nevertheless, the Committee reported that, 
they wish to place on record the large body of 
opinion this competition discloses in favour of 
development in this direction. The only limitation 
appears to be the number of guns and rounds of 
ammunition which machines can carry. 23 
The fixed-gun fighter entry from Wing Commander A. A. B. 
Thomson of the Armaments Branch was short-listed, "because 
it indicated a new conception of this principle". 24 
Thomson emphasised the need to destroy an enemy in one 
attack. To achieve this he proposed an eight-gun single- 
seat fighter (a twin-engined pusher biplane with four guns 
mounted in the fuselage and four in the wings). Each gun 
20 2/848,24A, A& AEE Report, GLoster F. 10/27. Vickers and Lewis Gun InstatLations, 
Juty 1931, page 20 
21 2/625, AMSR to DTD and AD/RDArm, 29.8.31 
22 ibid., 16A, A& AEE Report, Long-range StatisticaL Air Firing TriaLs to examine the 
Fire Effect of MuLti-gun Aircraft, 27th November 1931 
23 2/1323,45A, Report of Committee set up to examine proposaLs for a NoveL Type 
Fighter, 10th January 1933, section 3 
24 ibid., 45A, section 3 
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was to be capable of 1,000 rounds per minute. Thomson 
supported his case by reference to recent firing trials, 
and claimed that one fighter with many guns would be as 
effective as a formation with fewer. He stressed the 
importance of speed and of a steady gun platform. 25 
Thomson's entry was not taken further because in the then 
state of aircraft development it was limited to 200 rounds 
per gun, 26 and to achieve even that he proposed to limit 
the weight of pilots to eight stone27 -a suggestion which 
Williams thought to be "fantasticlio28 Perhaps so, but in 
similar discussions, in the United States Army Air Corps 
the thought of restricting the size of pilots was also 
considered. 29 
In forwarding his department's entries in November 1932, 
Dowding wrote that, "I cordially endorse the contention 
(in Thomson's entry] .... that complete destruction of 
enemy aircraft in one attack must be aimed at. " He said 
that, 
The failure of single seater fighters during the 
war to develop decisive fire from the rear 
against bomber formations has in my opinion led 
umpires in peacetime manoeuvres to impose unduly 
drastic casualties on fighters attacking in 
these circumstances. The result has been that 
we have been driven to explore other lines of 
attack and the two-seater fighter has been 
developed ... 
Dowding added that the great advantage of the multi-gun 
fighter was that it would not be at a disadvantage in 
combat with other fighters, and enclosed a graph to 
demonstrate the hitting power of six Darne30 guns. 31 
25 ibid., Part IV, Thomson's entry, 19.11.32 
26 ibid., Appendix 45A, section 6. (a) 
27 ibid., Part IV, Thomson's entry 
28 20/167, F01 to DCAS, 18.18.33 
29 Greer, page 86 
30 a French machine gun then being evatuated by the RAF (WaRace, G. F., The Guns of the 
Royat Air Force 1939-45,1972, page 56) 
31 2/1323, Part IV, AMSR to SD2,25.11.32 
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At the same time, in late 1932, as discussed in chapter 
5.3.1, the DCAS (Burnett) advocated six guns for the Fury 
replacement, and in March 1933 Williams considered an 
eight-gun fighter in response to Ludlow-Hewitt's appraisal 
of fighter development policy. 
Sorley did not join the Air Staff until 17th January 1933. 
It is easily established from the Air Force Lists that in 
1930 he was a student at the RAF Staff College, and in 
1931 and 1932 he was Commanding Officer of No. 8 (Bomber) 
Squadron which was stationed at Khormaksar, Aden Command. 
That in 1934 and 1935 Sorley made important contributions 
to the evolution of the Hurricane and Spitfire has been 
shown in chapter 5, but claims that his advocacy of 
multiple wing-mounted guns for fighters was novel in 1934 
are unfounded, as is his description of the events which 
led to the eight-gun fighters. 
It was in the summer of 1934 that a decision had to be 
taken on the armament to be specified for the delayed Fury 
replacement (F. 5/34) - other aspects of that project have 
been discussed in the previous chapter. The then Squadron 
Leader Sorley put to the DCAS a somewhat half-hearted 
recommendation for eight guns. He wrote, 
I do not think anything less than six guns should be 
considered. We shall always be able to reduce the 
number of guns-carried in war if it is found 
necessary to increase performance, or if good results 
are being obtained with a fewer number of guns than 
8, but if we call for less we cannot increase them at 
Will. 32 
There is conflicting evidence as to when the actual 
decision to call for eight guns was made. Keith, who was 
Assistant Director (Armament Research and Development) in 
1934, says that Captain F. W. Hill, the civilian gunnery 
expert on his staff, had analysed the results of careful 
32 2/2741, OR to DCAS, 5.7.34 
Chapter 6 The Quest for Fighter Firepower 194 
firing tests carried out early in 1933. Predictions were 
made of the density of hits that would be required to do 
lethal damage to an aircraft, and it was concluded that 
contemporary tactics and armament could not be effective. 
Keith says that he persuaded Tedder, then Director of 
Training, to hold an informal conference to consider 
gunnery problems on 19th July 1934. This was two weeks 
after Sorley's minute which is quoted above. 
Keith says the meeting, which was attended by Sorley, was 
shown graphs of Hill's analysis of the firing trials, and 
that far-reaching "decisions" were taken. It was 
concluded that eight guns firing at 1,000 rounds per 
minute were required. Keith says that he had to carry 
this argument to high quarters before authority was 
given. 33 No doubt he did, for an informal meeting chaired 
by the Director of Training could surely not have decided 
such an issue, and there was indeed opposition from a high 
place to the proposal to call for eight guns. 
On 27th July 1934, Ludlow-Hewitt sent the draft F. 5/34 
requirements to the AOC-in-C ADGB, and asked for his 
views. 34 Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham's lengthy 
reply included the phrase, "I think 8 guns is going a bit 
too far", and this is quoted by WykehaM35, Bishop, 36 
C. Bowyer37 and Wood and Dempster as an example of the 
opposition to eight guns. Wood and Dempster say that the 
proposal created a "furore amongst older officers 
like Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham". 38 But it seems 
that claims of opposition to eight guns from many senior 
officers are supported by many references to a remark 
from 
one officer. 
33 Keith C. H., I Hold My Aim. 1946, pages 78-79 
34 2/2741,24A, DCAS to AOC-in-C, 27th July 1934 
35 Wykeham, page 62 
36 Bishop, page 8 
37 Bowyer, C., Spitfire, 1980, page 10 
38 Wood and Dempster, page 87 
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Brooke-Popham's remark was in the context that eight guns 
would give a lot of head resistance, and that "most people 
in the Fighting Area wanted guns in the cockpit", which 
would not be possible with eight guns. otherwise his 
comments on the draft requirements were forward looking. 
He referred to talks with an American designer in which 
300-350 mph was mentioned, and suggested that the maximum 
speed in the draft requirements should be increased from 
265 to 280 mph. He said that the 1934 Air Exercises had 
shown that climb was not so important, and supported the 
compromise in favour of speed. 39 
Brooke-Popham's objections to eight guns were read to a 
meeting of the 'Operational Requirements Committee'40 held 
on 9th August 1934 to discuss the Air Staff's draft 
requirements for F. 5/34. The meeting was told that his 
concern about the head resistance of eight guns had been 
dealt with. 
It is evident that Brooke-Popham and his staff had 
commented on the proposal to have eight guns from the 
point of view of their experience of biplanes and of 
Vickers and Lewis machine guns. It would have been 
difficult to mount these guns and their ammunition on the 
thin wings of a biplane without a significant drag 
penalty, and very difficult to mount eight of them in a 
fuselage so that pilots had access to the unreliable 
Vickers gun in order to clear blockages. But, as 
discussed in chapter 5, for some years the Air ministry 
had envisaged that future fighters would have a cantilever 
monoplane wing, and this would be thick enough to house 
eight guns of a new and reliable type, and their 
ammunition. 
The Minutes of the meeting on F. 5/34 record that it was, 
"unanimous that the slight sacrifice [from six guns] of 
39 2/2741,25A, AOC-in-C to DCAS, Ist August 1934 
40 ! bid., 26A, OR to AMSR, DTD, DSD, DoO, DDOI, Plans and RDA4,3.8.34, inviting them to 
the meeting 
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one mile per hour was more than counterbalanced by the 
great advantage of additional guns", and 
IT WAS AGREED that 8 guns should be aimed at on 
grounds of shorter time to obtain the required 
density and the improvement in range which was 
obtainable with more guns. 41 
When he reported this conclusion to the CAS, Ludlow-Hewitt 
attached the graphs (Hill's) provided by the AMSR's 
Department on which it was based. 42 These showed, for six 
and eight guns, each capable of 1,200 rounds per minute, 
the length of burst required to obtain a vital hit plotted 
against range. 43 They confirmed Thomson's conclusions of 
November 1932. Yet Sorley claimed that it was he who had 
come to the conclusion that eight guns were needed, "After 
much arithmetic and burning of midnight oilit. 44 
Sorley's version of these events is different in other 
respects. He wrote that after much discussion with his 
friends in 1933, he was satisfied that his concept was 
right, but that as it, 
would produce a totally different fighter from 
anything the fighter pilots were accustomed to. I was 
cautious, therefore, where I discussed these ideas in 
the early stages, for fear of arousing reaction too 
soon; and to obtain confirmation I arranged with 
Major Thompson . ..... . that we would obtain an 
obsolete aircraft, set it up on a range, mount eight 
guns at 400 yards, fire bursts of two seconds with 
solid and explosive ammunition, and assess what 
happened. This we did on the ranges at Shoebury, and 
to my joy the effect was all that I had imagined. 
Sorley continued that, "With that bit of evidence 
behind 
me, I think the specification F5/34 came out 
into the 
open, and many meetings were held where, finally, 
unorthodoxy carried the day.,, 45 
41 ibid., [60A], Extract from Minutes, 9th August 1934 
42 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 5.9.34 
43 ibid., 24B 
44 Haining, page 22 
45 ibid., page 24 
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This impressive story of original theory - secret 
experiment - doubters routed, is marred by the fact that 
by 1957 Sorley's memory of the actual sequence of events 
seems to have gone sadly awry. It was many months after 
the decision to call for eight guns for F. 5/34, and after 
general circulation of that specification, that firing 
trials with eight machine guns were carried out at 
Shoeburyness - and not in secret. 
Air Ministry files of the time show that in December 1934, 
in a paper for the Air Fighting Committee, "Practical 
trials of firing explosive bullets from 4 or 8 machine 
guns were proposed by O. R. io. 46 This paper is written in 
the first person - presumably by Sorley, for it refers to 
a visit by the writer to France to see a 20mm gun. Sorley 
says that he visited France for this purpose, "Before 
deciding to specify eight . 303 machine guns". 
47 
A later paper in the same style reported to the committee 
that successful trials with eight guns firing solid and 
explosive rounds had taken place at Shoeburyness on 19th 
June 1935,48 i. e., ten months after the unanimous 
agreement of the Operational Requirements Committee to 
eight guns for F. 5/34, seven months after issue of the 
specification, and some months after prototypes had been 
ordered. Indeed, the trials took place after the issue of 
requirement F. 10/35 in April 1935 (which also called for 
eight guns), and after Sorley himself had suggested the 
conversion of the Hawker and Supermarine experimental 
fighters to F. 10/35. 
It happened, as explained in chapter 5.4.3, that issue of 
specification F. 10/35 was overtaken by agreement to 
Sorley's proposal, and this led to consideration of a 
46 PRO: AIR 5/1137, Papers for Air Fighting Committee, A. F. C. /6, Brief Review by O. R. of 
the use for air fighting of a Gun of targer Catibre than Machine Guns, 14.12.34, para. 13 
47 maining, page 24 
48 5/1137, A. F. C. /15, "Further Review by O. R on the question of Guns ..... 11,26.7.35 
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recast of F. 10/35. Sorley's novel contribution to fighter 
armament was to come with this project. 
6.2.2 The Cannon Fighter 
When doubt was cast on the issue of specification F. 10/35, 
the first thoughts of both the Air Staff (Oxland/Sorley) 
and the DTD (Verney) regarding its recast were to attempt 
to employ the large C. O. W. gun in a "No Allowance 
Fighter" . 
49,50 
No allowance shooting had for many years been seen as a 
means of making long range attacks on bombers. It was 
based upon the principle that, 
It is possible to find an angle of fire so that the 
effect of an aircraft's forward speed exactly 
counterbalances the effect of gravity, allowing the 
bullet to travel along a trajectory which is almost a 
straight line, 'for a surprisingly great range. 51 
Thus if a fighter flew below and behind a bomber, and at 
the same course and speed, and with its guns at the 
appropriate upward angle, the gunner would need to make no 
allowance for gravity, aerodynamics or relative speed. 52 
The CAS (Ellington) saw the proposed no allowance C. O. W. 
gun fighter alternatives to F. 10/35 when he approved 
withdrawal of the specification in June 1935. His comment 
on them had far-reaching effects. Ellington minuted that, 
We should however, be clear as to our attitude to 
smaller calibre guns than the C. O. W. If other powers 
are ignoring the St. Petersburg Convention(? ) [sic] 
49 2/2821,18A, OR to DCAS, 28.5.35 
50 ibid., DTD to OR and DCAS (through AMSR), "Singte Seater Day and Night Fighter 
specification F. 10/3511,21st May 1935 
51 Keith, page 53 
52 PRO: 10/1430, Manuat of Air Tactics, 1937, chapter VII, para. 19, No-ALLowance 
Shooting 
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in respect of the weight of explosive projectiles, 
are we to do the same? 53 
The Convention agreement was that explosives would not be 
used in projectiles which weighed less than 400 grams, 54 
and therefore did not apply to the 1% pounder (700 grams) 
C. O. W. gun. The significance of the 400 gram limit had 
been noted in an Operational Requirements note of December 
1934, but this nevertheless proposed firing trials with 
explosive ammunition in 0.303in machine guns. 55 
The Air Ministry was aware of developments in Switzerland 
and France of 20mm and 23mm cannon which fired an 
explosive shell of much less than 400 grams. The French 
Hispano gun was designed specifically for mounting on an 
aircraft engine. In I Hold My Aim Keith has described his 
investigation and assessment of these developments. 56 
Ellington's apparent willingness to ignore the St. 
Petersburg Convention appears to have prompted 
consideration of such weapons by the RAF, for when Sorley 
proposed a new version of F. 10/35 he dropped the earlier 
proposals to use the C. O. W. gun. He referred to an 
operational Requirements' review of fighter armament 
(presumably A. F. C. /15, referenced above), which "advocated 
that we should develop a multi-cannon armament". 
Sorley suggested that the quickest way to do this would be 
to convert the unissued F. 10/35 specification by 
substituting four cannon for eight machine guns in its 
"Armament" paragraphs. He thought that, 
In general design the aircraft need not differ 
essentially from those building to 5/34,36/34 and 
37/34 and perhaps D. T. D. may think the easiest and 
quickest way to fulfil the requirements would be to 
have additional wings built for one or other of these 
types. 57 
53 2/2821 CAS to DCAS, 4.6.35 
54 WaLLace, pages 31-32 
55 5/1137, A. F. C. /6, paras. 2 and 13 
56 Keith, Chapter 8 
57 2/2821,268, Specification F. 10/35 (suspended), 23rd August [19351 
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The DCAS (Courtney) sought Ellington's approval for such a 
recast of F. 10/35. He foresaw that mounting heavy guns in 
wings would be a problem, but said that one cannon mounted 
on the engine, 
is only a first and somewhat inadequate step towards 
heavier armament and offers such a meagre density of 
fire that its adoption would not provide an adequate 
armament. 
He added, "If we tackle this new problem quickly and 
successfully we should have a fighter superior to anything 
we know of elsewhere". 58 
Ellington agreed to this proposal, 59 and an Air Staf f 
Requirement was sent to aircraft firms on 1st February 
1936 as Appendix "B" of the (future) specification F. 37/35 
(amended from 10/35). It was entitled "Amended 
Requirements for Single Engine, Single-Seater Day and 
Night Fighter", 60 and called for a fighter with sufficient 
(at least four) 20mm guns to give a decisive result, and 
at longer ranges, than would machine guns. There is no 
evidence that this project had been considered by the 
Operational Requirements Committee. 
When the specification itself was issued on 15th February 
1936 the single engine requirement was dropped. 61 The 
design ordered for development was the twin-engined 
Westland Whirlwind, with the four cannon mounted in the 
fuselage - so by-passing the expected problems of wing 
mounting. The Whirlwind was delayed in development, and 
in 1939 Sorley's idea of installing cannon in the wings of 
the Hurricane and Spitfire was acted upon. 62 In this way 
58 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 11.11.35 
59 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 13.11.35 
60 ibid., 438 
61 ibid., 568, Specification F. 37/35. Singte-seat day and night fighter, issued 15th 
February 1936 
62 Postan, pages 108-109 
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the products of the high-speed research programme also 
filled the role of the cannon fighter. 
The development of the machine guns and 20mm cannon which 
were a vital ingredient of the eight-gun and cannon 
fighters is described by Wallace63, by Keith64, and in the 
Air Historical Branch Narrative on Armament, Vol. II: 
Guns, Gunsights. Ammunition and Pvrotechnics. 65 
6.3 FORMATION FIREPOWER 
In the Introduction to this chapter reference is made to 
doubts about the effectiveness of fixed-gun fighters - 
even with eight or ten guns - against formations of 
bombers. The words of Air Chief Marshal Sir Geoffrey 
Salmond, when AOC-in-C of the Air Defence of Great Britain 
in 1933, show how widespread these doubts were. In 
referring to the Novel Fighter competition to be described 
below, he wrote, 
It will be recognised that in practically all the 
proposals put forward by the various officers under 
my Command there is a note of pessimism as to the 
ability of present day fighters to compete 
successfully with hostile bombing formations. This 
is a clear warning that there is something wrong in 
our policy. 
I would suggest that the fixed gun single seater 
fighter, which is the cause of this pessimism, was 
designed in the first instance rather for the needs 
of air fighting in France in 1916-18 than for the 
purpose of home defence fighting. 
Salmond deduced that to break up enemy bomber formations 
in the short time available, "the design of the home 
defence fighter and the tactics employed should be such as 
to produce the maximum fire effect in the minimum time". 
Since the need for concentration required that fighters 
63 WaLtace 
64 Keith, chapters 7 and 8 
65 PRO: AIR 41/82 
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attacked in formation, Salmon saw this as ruling out any 
form of fixed gun, because, as quoted in chapter 5.1, "A 
pilot cannot aim a gun and at the same time accurately 
maintain his position in formation". 66 
This section examines the attempts to find a type of 
fighter which, by attacking in formation, could bring a 
great concentration of fire to bear on an enemy bomber 
formation. This little known aspect of RAF fighter policy 
is traced through the Bright Ideas, or Novel, Fighter 
competition, Air Chief Marshal Ellington's 11CAS11 fighter 
project, the development of the Boulton Paul Defiant, and 
plans to fit movable guns in the wings of the Hurricane 
and Spitfire. 
6.3.1 BricTht Ideas and the Novel Fiqhter 
In October 1930 Wing Commander Maund, newly appointed as 
head of Flying Operations 1 on the Air Staff, re-opened 
the search for a fighter type which would be effective 
when fighting in formation. He suggested that the "period 
of grace" which had been imposed on discussions of the 
Bulldog replacement. (F. 7/30) in November 1930 (chapter 
5.2) should be used to review fighter development. He 
argued that although the single-seat multi-gun approach 
was the best available, it was not satisfactory. To 
search for something better, Maund suggested that the 
problem of driving away bomber formations should be put to 
the aircraft industry and made the subject of an 
experimental tender. 67 A year later Maund re-activated 
this idea. He sent the DCAS (Burnett) a scheme for what 
he called a "'Bright Ideal Fighter". Maund put forward a 
procedure for a tender competition to meet a set of "ideal 
66 2/1323,46A, AOC-in-C ADGB to Air Ministry, Design of Home Defence Fighter, 24th 
January 1933, sections I and 4 
67 20/167, Problems of Fighters for Home Defence, undated and unsigned; attributed to 
F01 and dated November 1.930 from a reference to a minute in AIR 2/2815 of that month 
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operational requirements". 68 The final form of these is 
quoted later - it differed little from Maund's first 
ideas. 
Maund emphasised the need for fighters to attack in 
formation, but stressed the danger of collision when 
formation attacks were attempted by single-seat fighters. 
He drew attention to the views of the AOC-in-C of the ADGB 
following a recent Court of Inquiry into such an 
accident. 69 
Air Marshal Sir Edward Ellington had noted that whereas in 
fighter/bomber affiliation exercises, and in the study and 
practice of fighter tactics, only the formation leader 
took aim, the Inquiry arose from an experimental fighter 
attack in which each pilot aimed at his opposite number. 
This required the pilots to take their eyes off their 
formation leader, and this was seen to lead to a grave 
risk of collision - given the "field of vision afforded by 
the Bulldog". (The concern with fighting view as been 
discussed in respect of the F. 7/30 requirements). 
Ellington had consulted his twelve fighter squadron 
commanders, and reported that five felt that the risk of 
collision should be taken in war, but only three thought 
it acceptable in peacetime training. Ellington concluded 
that the risk was not acceptable, and that, 
we must modify the type of aircraft with which we 
equip our fighter squadrons and endeavour to design 
one which will enable the front gun to be worked by a 
gunner who is not the pilot. 70 
As described later in this chapter, he was to pursue this 
idea after he had been appointed Chief of the Air Staff. 
In December 1931 Burnett (DCAS) put Maund's 'Bright Ideal 
Fighter scheme to Dowding (AMSR), with the comment that, 
68 20/68, page 89, Appendix A, "Bright Ideal' Fighter Aircraft, attached to FOI to DCAS, 
1.10.31, 
69 2/1323,2A, note by Maund, undated 
70 ibid., 1A, AOC-in-C to Secretary, Air Ministry, 24th September 1931, para. 8 
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I feel that while we should continue the present 
efforts to find a solution by means of increased fire 
power from single-seaters and by still further 
tactical experiments, we might also try to attack the 
problem another way, namely, by thinking out other 
possible forms of fighter not subject to the well 
known limitations of single-seaters. 
He suggested getting "the trade" to help with new ideas, 
as proposed by Maund. 71 
Dowding objected to putting such a question to industry. 
He thought it would. be more useful to seek the opinions of 
the Fighting Area of the ADGB and of the Director of 
Training. 72 
Burnett took up this suggestion and sent Maund's paper to 
the Director of Training (Air Commodore W. G. S. Mitchell)73 
and the AOC-in-C (Ellington) . 
74 He said that his aim was 
"to see if the technical development of the last ten years 
has enabled other forms of fighters to be evolved which 
will meet our requirements more effectively than the 
present types. " 
Mitchell agreed that pilots could not get concentration of 
fire and fly their aircraft (in formation) at the same 
time, and concluded that the solution lay with either a 
multi-gun fighter or a two or three seat fighter. 75 
Ellington welcomed "the broad scale on which the proposed 
operational requirements governing the design of fighter 
aircraft have been drawn up. " He considered that it would 
give designers a "really free hand and produce a fighter 
best suited to our needs". 76 
71 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 2.12.31 
72 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 8.12.31 
73 ibid., DCAS to DoT, 28.12.31 
74 ibid., IOA, DDOI to AOC-in-C, 24th March 1924 
75 ibid., DoT to DCAS, 13.2.32 
76 ibid., 11A, AOC-in-C ADGR to Air Ministry, 22rd AprfL 1932 
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With this support, in April 1932 Burnett obtained the 
Chief of the Air Staff's agreement to proceeding with 
Maund's scheme, 77,78 but Dowding repeated his objection to 
inviting industry to participate. 79 He insisted that it 
was "highly improbable that aircraft designers will be 
able to hit on any tactical method which evades the united 
intelligence of the Service". 80 Dowding's view prevailed, 
and he and Burnett agreed to hold a "preliminary 
unofficial competition" restricted to the Service. 81 
The competition was launched by the Directorate of Staff 
Duties through the issue of a Memorandum calling for 
"Suggestions for an-Improved Form of Fighter Aircraft", 
with entries required by 21st November 1932.82 The 
Memorandum gave the operational requirements which "those 
making suggestions should attempt to meet as far as they 
can. " These were, 
W Fighters should be able, when in squadron 
formation or tactically deployed, to open 
simultaneous fire on hostile formations and to 
sustain the attack until a decision is reached. 
(ii) The armament layout should enable fighters to 
employ tactics which will deflect enemy formations 
from their course and away from their objectives 
during the action stage. 
(iii) The design of aircraft and armament layout 
should permit action to be joined from as many 
directions as possible with a minimum of preliminary 
manoeuvre and loss of time. 
Uv) Fighters should be able successfully to engage 
fighters as well as bombers. 
(v) An adequate margin of performance over 
contemporary bombers is needed both as regards speed 
and manoeuvrability together with the highest 
possible rate of climb. 
77 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 29.4.32 
78 ibid., CAS [to DCASI, 2.5.32 
79 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 28.6.32 
80 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 22.7.32 
81 ibid., DCAS to AMSR 30.8.32 
82 ibid., 278 
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(vi) Ability-to operate by night as well as by day 
and to carry the required equipment of a zone 
fighter. 
(vii) Special attention to be given to the freedom 
of arcs of fire from obstructions such as tail 
planes, etc. if movable guns are employed. 
(viii) Machine Guns in movable mountings should be 
capable of being operated under all conditions. 
The requirements to fight in formation and from many 
directions implied a multi-seat aircraft, yet all the 
attributes of a zone single-seater fighter were also 
required. Bright ideas were certainly needed! 
A large number of entries were received, and a Committee 
was set up to judge them. Maund was appointed chairman 
and the other members were Wing Commander A. T. Williams 
(who was scheduled to replace Maund as head of Flying 
Operations 1), Squadron Leader R. B. Mansell and Captain 
R. N. Liptrot from the Research and Development (Aircraft) 
Branch, and Major H-S-V. Thompson of the Armaments Branch. 
The committee met on 10th January 1933 and immediately 
eliminated many entries because they were vague or 
impractical, or duplicated ideas which were included in 
current developments. 83 It has been noted earlier that 
Thomson's eight-gun fighter proposal was short-listed, but 
rejected after further consideration. 
Four entries remained, and these fell into two classes: - 
(a) Those with a turret mounted to cover the upper 
hemisphere, or rather most of it, and 
(b) An aircraft with special turret in the nose to 
enable it to fire not only in the front 
hemisphere but through a considerable proportion 
of the remaining area. 84 
83 ibid., 45A, Report of a Committee set up to examine proposals for a Novel Type 
Fighter, para. 3 
84 ibid., 45A, para. 7 
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The committee considered that the most important zone of 
attack was the forward hemisphere and therefore decided to 
eliminate the two entries in class (a). Its reasons were 
that in one case the upper turret could not reinforce the 
front guns, and in the other this would be possible only 
by sacrificing the pilot's view aft. Even so it 
recommended the latter proposal should a Demon replacement 
be decided upon in the future. (Brew asserts that the 
front-turret type (b) was a Demon replacement, 85 but this 
was clearly not so. ) 
Ironically, the two types rejected from the final short 
list, fighters with eight fixed guns or with a midships 
turret, actually became the equipment of Fighter Command 
when it entered the war in 1939. 
Two entries remained, Maund's and that from the 
Directorate of Technical Development. Both had proposed a 
two-seater aircraft with a specially designed front turret 
to give a wide field of fire, and with two wing-mounted 
fixed guns. To accommodate the front turret Maund 
sketched a tailless monoplane single-engined pusher 
aircraft, and the DTD1s staff proposed a monoplane twin- 
engined pusher of otherwise conventional layout. 86 Both 
hoped to get two or more machine guns in the turret. The 
committee considered that the front turret configuration 
gave , almost complete freedom in the choice of tactics for 
the attack". It could not decide which was the best of 
the two proposals. The tailless design appeared to offer 
a wider zone of fire and no loss of performance compared 
with a single-seat fighter, but the twin-engined pusher 
could be developed along proven aerodynamic lines. 87 The 
committee recommended, 
(a) That the trade be asked to produce experimental 
two-seater fighters with front gun turrets. 
85 Brew, page 236 
86 2/1323,428, Most Promising Proposais in the Competition 
87 ibid., 45A, paras. 9-11 
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(b) That they be shewn the outlines of both D. T. D. Is 
and F. O. 1's proposals to give them an idea on 
general lines only of what is in mind. 
A final comment concerned those entries which proposed 
guns which, "could be moved up to the 450 no allowance 
position". It was thought that this would be particularly 
useful at night, and should be looked into. 88 Although 
outside the scope of the current research, it may be noted 
that the Luftwaffe employed a similar method to attack RAF 
night bombers during the Second World War, although not 
employing no allowance principles. 89 
As the competition was concluding early in 1933, Maund 
left the Air Staff to take command of the Aircraft and 
Armament Experimental Establishment following his 
promotion to Group Captain. His successor as F01 
(Williams) reviewed the history of the Bright Ideas scheme 
and expressed disappointment with the results of the 
competition and regret that the views of the aircraft 
industry had not been obtained. He pointed out that the 
fighters recommended by the committee did not meet the 
requirement to be "able successfully to engage fighters as 
well as bombers, in as much as they are somewhat 
restricted in rear defence". 90 Sir Geoffrey Salmond had 
taken a different view of this aspect in his comments on 
the entries from the ADGB quoted at the beginning of this 
section. In supporting the concept of a fighter with a 
front turret he said that, 
Defence, however, should not be allowed to play too 
important a role in the design of home defence 
fighters, since enemy fighters are not likely to 
operate frequently or in force over our defended 
zones. In addition defence against enemy fighters is 
provided by the interceptor' class of fighter. 91 
88 ibid., 45A, paras. 12 and 13 
89 Hinchliffe, P., The Other Battte: Luftwaffe NiQht Aces versus Somber Comand, 1996, 
pages 137-138 
90 20/167, F01 to DCAS through AMSR, 13.2.33, 
91 2/1323,46A, section 6 
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(As discussed in chapter 4.3.2, this was not part of the 
role initially planned for the interception class. ) 
Dowding, who as the Air Member for Supply and Research, 
would have to implement the Committee's recommendations, 
accepted them with some reluctance. 92 He drew attention 
to his comment on the front turret entry from his 
department - that it would be at the mercy of single-seat 
fighters. Dowding had then said that, "I do not consider 
it necessary at the present moment to adopt any new 
design. I think we have in the multi-gun fighter a weapon 
to our hand which will prove adequate to our requirements 
if properly employed. 1193 The multi-gun fighter did indeed 
prove adequate in 1940 when Dowding employed it. 
Specification F. 5/33 for a fighter with a front turret was 
drawn up, and outlines of the Maund and DTD proposals were 
included. 94 Before it was i: )ut out to tender, there arose 
a proposal for an eyen more extreme type of fighter 
design. 
6.3.2 Ellington's Ficrhter 
Sir Edward Ellington was appointed Chief of the Air Staff 
in May 1933. Soon after his appointment he read the 
minute (discussed in section 6.1) in which the DCAS 
(Ludlow-Hewitt) set out priorities for future research and 
experiment into types of fighter. Ellington saw that the 
two-seat fighter with a front turret was put last in 
priority for future research (funds for the Novel Fighter 
had already been set aside95), and in particular behind 
research into increased fire power for single-seat 
fighters. This was-contrary to the emphasis Ellington had 
placed on the need to separate pilot and gunner when he 
92 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 17.2.33 
93 ibid., Part IV, AMSR to SD2,25.11.32 
94 ibid., 54A, DTD to DDTD, AD/RDA, RDA3,5.4.33 
95 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 15.3.33, para. 12 
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was AOC-in-C ADGB in 1931. He asked for more urgency on 
this idea, and wrote, 
What I think is wanted is an aeroplane which can be 
fought against an attack from both the front and from 
behind, in formation; and for this a two-pilot 
aircraft is required, so that one pilot can maintain 
the place of his aircraft in the formation while the 
other fights the front or rear gun or guns as the 
case may be. 96 
It might be thought that Ellington's proposal fell into 
the class of those defined as "so vague and unpractical 
[sic] as not to warrant serious consideration" by the 
Novel Fighter competition judging committee, 97 (although 
Maund himself had at one time suggested a fighter with 
guns at "both ends of the fuselage,, 98). But Ellington was 
head of the RAF and, as discussed in chapter 5.3.1, his 
proposal was given overriding priority. 
Ellington was persuaded that to switch control of an 
aircraft between two pilots in the course of an action 
might be impractical. Alternatives were proposed of 
either a three-seat aircraft with one pilot and two 
gunners, 99 or a two-seater with one pilot and a gunner to 
move between fore and aft turrets as the course of an 
engagement dictated. 100 At one time attempts were made to 
treat the 11CAS11 type as being primarily for overseas or 
escort use, with the Bright Idea or "Novel" type for home 
defence. In rejecting this Ellington stressed that the 
prime requirement was for a fighter which could be fought 
in formation, and that the rear turret was not for rear 
defence - it was to attack an enemy from the front and 
flank. He did concede that, "I do not expect that the 
first attempt will produce a very successful machine". 101 
96 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 9.5.33, 
97 ibid., 45A, para. 4 
98 20/68, pages 75-76, F01 to DCAS, 29.9.32 
99 20/167,, F01 to DCAS, 11.5.33 
100 ibid., F01 to DCAS, July 1933 
101 2/681, CAS to DCAS, 14.9.33 
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An Air Staff Requirement (F. 22/33) for an experimental 
fighter with movable front and rear single Lewis guns 
which need not be fireable simultaneously was written to 
cover Ellington's project. 102 In approving this he said 
that he wanted designers to be given a free hand. He did 
not object to a three seater as a third choice after the 
two pilot or gunner-moving to-and-fro options. 103 
There was little enthusiasm in responding to specification 
F. 22/33, or to the Novel Fighter specification, F. 5/33.104 
Designers believed that the front turret and two engines, 
common to both projects (Maund's pterodactyl scheme was 
not taken up), would give such high drag as to make a 
useful performance impossible to achieve. 105 Indeed, the 
CAS type had evolved into a three-seater with two gunners, 
which the designer - Fairey - suggested might also serve 
as a bomber. 106 Ellington himself observed that this was 
unlikely to give more information than "an adaptation of 
the twin-engine day bomber, B. 9/32 similar to that which 
made a Demon out of a Hart. eO07 This comment invites the 
spectre of the Battle of Britain fought by Fighter Command 
equipped with a fighter variant of the Wellington bomber. 
Prototypes for both types of multi-seat fighter were 
ordered, but as designs progressed it became clear that 
their performance would be inadequate. in June 1935 the 
DCAS (Courtney) sought Ellington's permission to cancel 
F. 22/33. He suggested that the new turret-fighter project 
F. 9/35 (see below) would do the job intended by 
Ellington's project. 108 Ellington agreed to the 
cancellation, remarking that he had wanted an aircraft 
which "could be flown in formation and could be fought in 
102 ibid., 5A 
103 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 3.10.33 
104 Specification heLd by Air HistoricaL Branch, Ministry of Defence, issued 22nd 
December 1933 
105 20/167, F01 to DCAS, 16.3.34 
106 2/681,16A, Tender Designs to Specification No. F. 22/33, DTD to AMSR, 31.7.34 
107 ibid., 178, CAS to DCAS, 29.8.34 
108 ibid., 19A, CanceLLation of F. 22/33, DCAS to CAS, 6.6.35 
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formation both to the front and to the rear. I did not 
want a 3-seater, but a two-pilot aircraft". 109 
6.3.3 Genesis of the Defiant 
The project F. 9/35 referred to by Courtney was the type 
"W" specified in Ludlow-Hewitt's review of fighter 
requirements -a two-seater with improved stern armament. 
In October 1934 the DDOI (Harris) concluded that the twin- 
engined Novel and CAS fighters were unlikely to go to 
production because of their low performance. He proposed 
that a new two-seater fighter, with a single-engine, 
should be included in the 1935 Experimental Aircraft 
Programme. 110 This was agreed. 111 
M. Bowyer maintains that Boulton & Paul, "floated the idea 
of a turret fighter to replace the biplane Hawker Demon", 
after they had bought a French designed turret in 1934. 
He says that this aroused Air Ministry interest to produce 
F. 9/35.112 But Brew says that the rights to the French 
SAMM turret were bought on 23rd November 1935113 - over a 
year after Harris proposed development of a single-engine 
two-seat fighter. There is no mention of Boulton Paull14 
in the Air Ministry's discussion of the requirements of 
F. 9/35 in 1935. 
A draft "Air Staff Requirement for a Single Engine Two- 
seater Day and Night Fighter"115 was discussed by the 
Operational Requirements Committee on 3rd April 1935. The 
conclusions of this meeting and their aftermath underline 
the quandary resulting from the desire for a multi-seat 
109 ibid., 19A, CAS to DCAS, 7.6.35 
110 2/716, DDOI (for DCAS) to CAS, 12.10.041, page 3 para. (c) 
Ill ibid., 6B, Minutes of Conference held on 16th October 1934 on Experimental Aircraft 
Programme; 
112 Bowyer, Aircraft for the Few, page 14 
113 Brew, page 236 
114 the company's name was changed from Boutton & Paul on 30th June 
1934; Brew, page 62 
115 PRO: AIR 2/1599, "Defiant" SingLe Engine Two Seater Day and Night Fighter W 
Specification F9/35 - Type Requirements, Last paper in the file, unnumbered and undated 
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fighter coupled with the failure to agree viable tactics 
for its use. 
The Air Staff Requirement called for a fighter which, 
can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at 
least four machine guns over the upper 
hemisphere ....... ; thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below and in front, 
or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same 
time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be 
trained on to the target simultaneously while in 
formation. 
No fixed forward guns were specified, on the grounds that 
it was "Undesirable to split the armament". 116 This echoed 
a remark of the Director of Training when he had been 
asked for his views on the ideal operational requirements 
of Maund's Bright Idea Fighter in 1932. He observed that, 
"The drawback of the present two-seater fighter (Hart) is 
that the pilot has a front gun, and in a frontal attack on 
a bombing formation the same difficulties arise as with a 
S. S. F. with fixed guns. oP117 (By "Hart" Mitchell meant the 
Hart Fighter Variant later named Demon. ) 
How having some fixed front guns could be seen as a 
drawback is difficult to understand - unless one accepts 
Spick's view that it, "removed temptation from the pilot 
who might otherwise have tried to start his own private 
war. 11118 Even the exotic projects for front turret 
fighters which followed from the Novel Fighter competition 
had some fixed forward armament. 119 Indeed, as has been 
noted, the two short-listed entries with midships turrets 
were discarded because their turrets could not reinforce 
their front guns. Furthermore, when in 1933 Peirse had 
argued the case for a two-seat fighter, he had envisaged 
the ideal fighter as having a four-gun turret behind the 
pilot plus two fixed guns for the pilot. Then in dogfight 
116 ibid., section 3. Armament (a) guns 
117 2/1323, DoT to DCAS, 13.2.32 
118 Spick, M., Fighter Pitot Tactics, 1983, page 50 
119 2/1323,54A, DTD to DDTD, 5.4.33 
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the turret could be fixed to give six guns straight 
ahead. 120 Despite these earlier views, when F. 9/35 was 
discussed by the Operational Requirements Committee the 
Minutes record no discussion of the absence of front guns 
or of the proposed tactics. 121 But Keith, who attended in 
his capacity as Head of the Armaments branch, wrote of 
these matters that, "some hard things had been said by 
several successful single-seater fighters [pilots] of the 
last war.,, 122 
Although the F. 9/35'project was initiated because it was 
thought that a single-engined aircraft would have a better 
performance than was expected of the two twin-engined 
fighters under development, the committee decided to allow 
two engines. Inevitably this led to a proposal from the 
department of the Air Member for Research and Development 
(AMRD) that the Armstrong Whitworth twin-engined Novel 
Fighter design to F. 5/33 should be changed to meet the 
requirements of F. 9/35 - it was hoped to save the money 
which had been spent on F. 5/33.123 The company believed 
that they could meet the performance requirements of 
F. 9/35 and asked if a front turret was acceptable. 124 
This query led to a discussion of turret position and 
tactics which made a nonsense of the previous three years 
effort on the promotion of multi-seat fighters. Courtney 
(DCAS) claimed that the RAF did not need the downward 
firing capability of the front turret, but did want the 
beam fire and rear defence given by a midships turret. 125 
This was tantamount to saying that the considerable 
investment in the Novel and CAS types, and the priority 
given to them, were unsoundly based. In both these 
projects the importance of fire in the forward hemisphere 
120 20/168, Fighter Types and Tactics, 28th JuLy 1933 
121 2/1599, Minutes of Conference to consider "Operationat Requirements of a new type 
Two-Seater Day and Night Fighter (Specification F/9/35), 3rd ApriL 1935 
122 Keith, page 109 
123 2/1599,27A, DCAS to CAS, 14.11.35 
124 ibid., Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft to Air Ministry, 15th October 1935 
125 ibid., 27A, DCAS to CAS, 14.11.35 
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had been stressed. Ellington, who had strongly pressed 
for a fighter with front and rear turrets, argued that if 
fighters had to dive on bombers they would need downward 
fire, 126 but Courtney told him that attack from above 
needed elevated, not downward, fire. 127 Ellington gave up 
on being reminded that the other F. 9/35 designs were 
single-engined aircraft, and "consequently" agreed to a 
midships turret. 128 The logic of this discussion is 
difficult to understand because the specification 
permitted one or two engines. 
Air Staff Requirement F. 9/35 was approved by Ellington129 
and circulated to industry in April 1935, with the full 
specification following a month later. 130 The Boulton Paul 
Defiant was ordered in 1938.131 
6.3.4 Moveable Guns for Single-Seat Fighters 
It is mentioned in chapter 5.3.2 that when the 
requirements for the new day and night fighter F. 10/35 
were discussed the question of traversing guns arose. 
This was another aspect of the RAF's search for a means of 
obtaining concentration of fire from fighters attacking in 
formation. It appears to have been first proposed in 1932 
by Group Captain L. A. Pattison in his entry to the Novel 
Fighter competition', where he suggested that, "the pilot 
of a single-seater should be enabled to adjust the angle 
of his guns whilst in flight". 132 Squadron Leader G. A. 
Pidcock put forward a similar idea in his entry. 133 
126 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 15.11.35 
127 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 19.11.35 
128 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 20.11.35 
129 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 8.4.35 
130 ibid., Air Staff Requirement (4A) circuLated 18th AprfL 1935 and Specification 
for 
"Two-seater Day and Night Fighter", issued 20th May 1935 
131 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 22.1.38 
132 2/1323, Part 11, IA 
133 ibid., Part 111,2A 
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In 1934 AVM P. H. Playfair suggested "remote controlled 
moveable guns in single seaters", 134 and this possibility 
was included by Brooke-Popham in his "Notes on Design and 
Tactics of A. D. G. B. Fighters". 135 The Air Fighting 
Committee then proposed trials to investigate such 
"offset" guns to see if the flank fighters in a formation 
could attack without risk of collision. 136 The pilots will 
still have to take aim, and at the next meeting of the 
committee it was thought that the attacking formation 
should be limited to three aircraft. 137 
Then in January 1935, Verney (DTD) minuted Dowding (AMSR) 
that, 
Wing Commander Keith has brought forward a new scheme 
for formation fighting which necessitates traversing 
the wing mounted guns through an arc of about 500.1 
have shewn the scheme tentatively to the D. C. A. S. who 
is very interested, as it is evident that it offers a 
means of greatly increased rate of fire and 
concentration without the necessity for mounting as 
many as 8 guns, which may present difficulties. 
Verney suggested that some experiments should be made on 
this scheme. 138 He was told to show it to the CAS, 139 Who 
pressed for it to be investigated. 140,141 
Keith's idea (which he does not mention in I Hold My Aim) 
was an elaboration on the use of offset guns. It was to 
enable the guns of a formation of fighters to be aimed 
continuously at a target during an approach on the "curve 
of pursuit". Keith went further in proposing that all the 
fighters in a formation attack should aim at one member of 
an enemy formation to increase the likelihood of a lethal 
134 16/305,74A, Ptayfair to HQ ADG8,14th April, 1934, para. 4 
135 ibid., 78A, 23rd Aprit 1934 
136 PRO: AIR 5/1126, Minutes of Air Fiqhtinq Committee Meetinqs 1-21, Second Meeting, 
12th November 1934, Item 11 
137 ibid., Third Meeting, Ist March 1935, section 2 
138 PRO: AIR 2/1575, Traversing Gun Mounting for Winq Guns in Fighters, DTD to AMSR, 
7.1.35 
139 ibid., DCAS to DTD, 11.1.35 
140 2/2821, CAS to DCAS, 8.4.35 
141 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 12.4.051 
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hit. This idea was based upon a false application of 
probability theory by Captain Hill, which was corrected by 
Pattison. 142 Nevertheless, Verney told the DCAS that 
despite their different views on probability theory, Hill 
and Pattison had no dispute over the value of traversing 
guns. 143 
Arrangements were made to conduct experiments by fitting 
guns which could be traversed in the horizontal plane to 
an experimental aircraft, the "Hendy Heck". This 
aircraft, built by the Parnell Aircraft Company, 144 was 
used for a number of experiments on wing-mounted machine 
guns. 145,146 
Meanwhile, fighter requirement F. 10/35 (Hurricane and 
Spitfire), and its derivative specification F. 37/35 (the 
cannon fighter), said that it was "contemplated that some 
or all these (their] guns should be mounted to permit of a 
degree of elevation and traverse with some form of control 
from the pilot's seat". 147,148 This astounding requirement 
was later deleted from the cannon fighter specification, 149 
but experiments with moveable wing-mounted machine guns 
continued until the AOC-in-C Fighter Command (Dowding) 
decided in 1937 that the extra weight was not justified. 
Dowding, did, however, think that there might be some 
merit in guns which were moveable in the vertical plane - 
to permit no allowance shooting. 150 The DTD observed that 
this was impractical with wing-mounted guns, 151 but 
nevertheless no allowance shooting was re-examined by the 
Armaments branch. 
142 2/1575,58, Notes and Criticism of H. Q. Armament Group - A. F. C. /4 "Curve of Pursuit 
Attack System for Aircraft with Off-Set Guns Mounted on the Wings. " 
143 ibid., DTD to DCAS, 24.1.35 
144 Wixey, K. E., Parnell Aircraft since 1914,1990, page 214 
145 Keith, page 80 
146 2/1575, DTD to DSD, 29.7.37 
147 2/2821,13B, Armament section 
148 ibid., 438, Armament section 
149 ibid., letter to contractors, 4th April 1936 
150 2/1575, AOC-in-C to Air Ministry, Ist July 1937 
151 ibid., DTD to DSD, 29th July 1937 
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The elevation required to achieve no allowance shooting at 
the combat speeds expected in the late 1930s had greatly 
decreased from the 45 degrees of the biplane era. 152 and it 
was concluded that "For practical purposes the N. A. method 
at low angles of attack both in method of application and 
the results to be expected, blends into the stern chase 
long range method. 11153 
Undeterred by (or unaware of) this conclusion and the 
DTDIs advice on the impracticality of elevating wing- 
mounted guns, the first draft of specification F. 18/37 
(Typhoon and Tornado, discussed in chapter 9.2.1) stated 
that "The Air Staff are anxious that the guns should be 
adjustable in elevation, over the range required for no- 
allowance sighting, 'i. e. from 00 to 15' elevation, if this 
is possible. vo154 This request was dropped from the 
requirements before they were finalised for circulation to 
industry. 155 
6.4 SUMMARY 
The drive for increased firepower led to the specification 
in 1934-35 of single-seat fighters with eight machine guns 
or four 20mm cannon - far in advance of the armament 
specified by other air forces at the time. Nevertheless, 
the belief that bomber formations could defend themselves 
against attack by fixed gun fighters, however well armed, 
led to widespread support for multi-seat fighters on the 
assumption that only they offered hope of breaking up 
formations of bombers. But the end product of this line 
152 PRO: AIR 8/214, The Attack and Armouring of bombers, CAS to AOC-in-C, 2nd December 
1937 
153 2/1575 ibid., 27A, Notes by R. D. Arm. on Up-Set Guns and their Relation to "No 
Allowance" Methods, 19.10.37, para. 21 
154 PRO: AIR 2/2833, Tornado and Typhoon. Single Seater Fighter - specification F18/37. 
- Type Requirements, 4A, First Draft Air Staff Requirement for a High Speed 
Single Seat 
Fighter Landptane Specification F. 18/37, para. 3 
155 ibid., 20A, Appendix 11811 to Specification F. 18/37,26.1-38 
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of development - the Defiant - was to be confronted by 
bombers escorted by. single-seat fighters, and was 
outclassed by these as Dowding had predicted. 
Although there is little evidence of how multi-seat 
fighters would have fared in their intended role of 
attacking unescorted formation of bombers, there is some 
experience of the plan to attack from a bomber formation's 
blind spot. Guy Gibson described how effective this could 
be when the bombers could not turn away. During the 
Norwegian campaign his squadron of Hampdens was attacked 
by Me 110s, and he wrote that these, 
had one gun which can fire sideways. Their mode of 
attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens 
perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, 
and pick off the outside man with their one gun 
aiming with a no deflection shot at the pilot. The 
bomber boys could do nothing about it; they just had 
to sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke 
away they were immediately pounced on by three 
Messerschmitt 109s waiting in the background. 156 
Only four of the twelve Hampdens returned. 
156 Gibson, G., Enemy Coast Ahead, 1986 (first published 1946), page 64 
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BOMBERS TO ATTACK FRANCE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1930s, up to the emergence of Germany as a 
threat to Britain, the Air Staff continued to call for 
bombers with characteristics suitable for a war with 
France. It took the distance to Paris as the criterion 
for the range of the day bombers which were to form its 
main striking force. 
The development of these aircraft was much influenced by 
discussion at the Geneva Disarmament Conference of a 
limitation of the size of bombers, and for the same reason 
no replacement heavy night bomber was put in hand. When 
the Geneva conference broke up in 1934, a crash programme 
for a new night bomber was started, and for this too the 
requirements were initially based upon those of the 1920S. 
A new factor was introduced into bomber requirements in 
the early 1930s in response to Japanese aggression in the 
Far East, and was given more prominence after the 1935 
Abysinnian crisis. This was a requirement for a ferry 
range sufficient to reinforce the Middle and Far East. 
Then, with the recognition of Germany as the potential 
enemy in Europe, came demands for increased operational 
range, speed and armament. It was primarily these factors 
that led to much larger bombers than had previously been 
sought by the RAF, as will be shown in chapters 8 and 9. 
This chapter deals with the earlier period when France was 
the nominal enemy. It examines the thinking behind the 
initial development of all but one of the bombers with 
which the RAF entered the Second World War - the Battle, 
Hampden, Wellington and Whitley - the Blenheim is the 
exception. The operational requirements which led to 
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these aircraft emerged largely as part of the process of 
seeking replacements for aircraft in service. 
1934 saw the first moves away from separate day and night 
bomber classes towards the long desired dual-role bomber. 
The initiative for this came from Ludlow-Hewitt, 
paralleling his efforts to rationalise RAF fighter 
development. Following a meeting in March 1934 to 
consider the requirements for a new night bomber, Ludlow- 
Hewitt decided to give effect to the opinion of the 
meeting that the night bomber should be capable of work by 
day, and similarly that day bombers should be available 
for night work. He said that the performance of the 
aircraft being planned to replace the night and day 
bombers then in service should "justify the hope that this 
increase of flexibility in the use of our bombing 
squadrons may prove to be practicable". There was strong 
support from the AOC-in-C ADGB (Air Marshal Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham), who regarded the hard and fast division 
between day and night bombers as a temporary stop gap 
before it was possible to carry out Trenchard's decision 
of 1923 that the majority of bomber squadrons should be 
capable of operation by day and night. 1 
Ludlow-Hewitt proposed that in future night bombers should 
be renamed "heavy bombers", day bombers should be called 
either "single-engine medium bombers" or "multiple-engine 
medium bombers", and that replacements of the Hart type 
should be renamed "light bombers". 2 This at first led to 
little more than giving new names, and equipment, to 
requirements which had been drawn up for distinct day 
bombers and night bombers. It was not until 1936 that the 
long-desired dual role for bombers was specified from the 
beginning. 
1 PRO: AIR 2/729 , Heavy Bomber specification B3/34. 
Type Requirements, 13A, 18.6.34 
2 ibid., DCAS to CAs, 13.3.34 
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Section 7.2 discusses the operational requirements for day 
bombers. These first continued the dialogue on the 
relative merits of fast single-engined bombers which 
relied primarily upon evasion for their defence and 
slower twin-engined bombers with greater gun defence. 
Plans to develop the latter started first with the 
Sidestrand replacement project, B. 9/32. Their fulfilment 
was delayed by attempts to meet a weight limitation, but 
eventually the Handley Page Hampden and Vickers Wellington 
emerged from this requirement. 
When a replacement for the Hart high-performance (light) 
bomber was considered, the desire to compare this single- 
engined project with the Sidestrand replacement led to the 
specification of a bomb load twice that of the Hart. In 
consequence this requirement drifted into that for a 
single-engined medium bomber. The unhappy outcome was the 
Fairey Battle, with neither high performance nor adequate 
gun defence. The light bomber class was then put back on 
course with a true Hart replacement project, but designs 
to this requirement did not lead to an aircraft which 
entered service. The Air Staff came to the view that 
light bombers were unsuitable for a war with Germany. 
The limitation on bomber weight discussed at Geneva was 
likely to be most restrictive on the design of heavy night 
bombers, and in 1933 extreme measures were briefly 
considered to overcome this problem. When a new night 
bomber was sought urgently in 1934, attempts to involve 
the aircraft industry in drawing up the specification and 
hastening development led to many problems and much 
dissatisfaction with the product. These matters are 
discussed in section 7.3. They led on to plans for an 
"Americanised" heavy bomber, which can be seen as the 
transition in operational requirements from those of the 
1920s to those appropriate for war with Germany. 
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7.2 DAY BOMBERS 
In chapter 4 it has been shown that during the 1920s the 
RAF's concept of day bombers had become divided into two 
classes, high performance and medium performance. Through 
much of the 1930s the prime exponent of the high- 
performance day bomber class in service was the Hawker 
Hart and its derivatives. At the end of 1936 these 
equipped twenty-five squadrons. 3 By contrast, until 1935, 
the medium performance class of day bomber was represented 
by the one squadron of twin-engined Sidestrands which had 
been formed in 1929. This balance was to change 
dramatically when the bombers which followed from the 
events discussed in this section came into service in the 
late 1930s. 
The single- versus twin-engined day bomber issue came to 
the forefront in October 1930. The AMSR's department put 
forward a project for a "High Speed 1000 lb. Bomber", 
"Twin H[alfordl. or F[alcon]. engines, for Home Defence 
work. To carry twice bomb load of present types and great 
(speed] or defence. v14 Maund (FO1) advised the DCAS that 
if this was intended as a Hart replacement, the Air Staff 
neither needed nor had asked for such a project. If, on 
the other hand, the AMSR was seeking to perpetuate the 
Sidestrand class - despite what he said were, "its 
admitted disabilities of strategic immobility", Maund 
thought that the proposed aircraft was unduly large - 112 H 
engines to drop 1,000 lb. bombs is rather like giving a 
u5 battle cruiser 411 guns as primary armament! . 
It is evident from later correspondence that, perhaps in 
response to Maund's criticism of the size of his project, 
the AMSR (Dowding) suggested that the ambiguous "High 
Speed 1000 lb. Bomber" might be met by a single-engined 
aircraft powered by a new Rolls-Royce engine. This was 
3 Moyes, P. J. R., Bomber Squadrons of the RAF and their Aircraft, 1964, Appendix 7 
4 20/68, page 91, Air Estimates 1931 
5 ibid., page 101 of note by FOI, 6.10.30 
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the Griffon, which Dowding said was being developed from 
the company's Schneider Trophy racing engines. 6 
An unfortunate consequence of this interchange was that 
the genuine issue of evasion versus defence (or high or 
medium performance) for day bombers became obscured by 
arguments over the relative merits of single- or twin- 
engined bombers. 
The ADGB Command had been instructed to make comparative 
trials of the single-engined Hart and twin-engined 
Sidestrand, and, in Maund's words, had concluded that "the 
Hart is unquestionably the better form of day bomber". 7 
Thus in February 1931 the DCAS (Burnett) advised the CAS, 
Sir John Salmond, that a new twin-engined bomber should 
not be developed, at least for the time being. He argued 
that in view of tený-year rule the most urgent requirement 
was to have bombers which were suitable for reinforcing 
overseas commands. (This was at the time of the start of 
Japanese aggression in the Far East). Burnett said that a 
twin-engined aircraft was not suitable for reinforcing 
purposes, "because of shipping difficulties, and the time 
required to erect it", 8 i. e., after it had been dismantled 
for shipping - single-engined aircraft were much easier to 
transport by sea. 
However, Plans branch of the Air Staff saw that the ADGBIs 
preference for single-engined bombers was based upon 
comparison between the new Hart and the older Sidestrand. 
Whereas Boulton & Paul, manufacturers of the Sidestrand, 
claimed that an up-to-date version would be faster than 
the Hart. Plans concluded that a twin-engined day bomber 
would thus be better in every respect, even to the extent 
of being capable of day and night operations and of 
6 PRO: AIR 2/2745, Medium Bomber - Type Requirements specification P27/32, DCAS to CAS, 
21.4.32 
7 20/84, F01 to DCAS, 7.3.31, attached paper Comwnts by F. O. 1 on S. E. versus T. E. 
Bombers, 10.2.31 
8 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 21.2.31, 
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torpedo dropping. 9 They would have to wait until 1936 for 
these attributes to be written into Air Staff 
requirements. 
In March 1931, Maund reviewed all the papers on single- 
versus twin-engined bombers. In his comparison of the 
Hart with the Sidestrand he assumed that the Sidestrand 
could carry twice the bomb load (1,000 lbs) over the same 
range as the Hart'O -a matter on which there seems to 
have been some doubt. It is noted in chapter 4.2.2.1 that 
in 1928 the Hart and Sidestrand were credited with the 
same bomb load (500 lb) at the same range, and this was 
confirmed in 1933.11 Clearly to credit the Sidestrand 
with twice the bomb load of the Hart favoured the former. 
Even so, after taking account of total expenditure and 
manpower, and the likelihood of success in delivering the 
same bomb tonnage -a mode of analysis which came into 
great prominence in. later years - he concluded that there 
was overwhelming evidence in favour of the Hart. 
Nevertheless, like Plans, -Maund was conscious that 
comparisons were being made between the Hart of good 
recent design and the older Sidestrand, and was not 
prepared to rule out future twin-engined day bombers. He 
said that he would cast Hart replacement requirements 
deliberately to embrace both single- and twin-engined 
designs, and outlined a set operational requirements for a 
twin-engined type to compete with the Hart. These 
included provision for replaceable auxiliary fuel tanks to 
give strategic mobility through a ferry range of 1,250 
miles. 12 (This was to be increased in 1934 to 1,500 miles 
9 9/37, FoLio 19, Note by Ptans, 25.2.31 
10 20/84, F01 to DCAS, 7.3.31, TabLe I 
11 ibid., DCAS to DDOI, 20.4.33 
12 ibid., TabLe 11 of F01 to DCAS, 7.3.31 
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"to cover the distance to Gibraltar, 113 - which did not 
then have an RAF airf ield. 14,15) 
Faced with this somewhat confusing advice, the CAS decided 
to take the common sense course of first ordering a multi- 
engined replacement for the obsolete Sidestrand. But 
Burnett and Maund persisted in seeing this as a twin- 
engined Hart replacement - with unfortunate consequences. 
7.2.1 Sidestrand Replacement: B. 9/32 (Wellington and 
Hampden) 
In response to Salmond's instruction, Burnett submitted 
proposed "Multi-Engined Day Bomber. Operational 
Requirements" in July 193116,17 - these were much as Maund 
had suggested. They included a range of 600 miles at full 
throttle, a bomb load of 1 lb per hp, and provision to 
carry extra fuel in. lieu of half the normal bomb load -a 
step towards providing the means to mount continuous 
attacks on distant targets. The day bomber was to have a 
maximum speed of not less than 190 mph at 15,000 ft and a 
landing speed of 60 mph. Although Burnett emphasised the 
importance of defensive power, he proposed but three 
single gun stations, two of which were to be aft of the 
wings. All were to be protected from the slipstream. It 
was later decided that if an unrestricted field of fire 
aft was available - as from a tail turret - one aft gun 
station would suffice. 18 
Salmond accepted these requirements, but feared that if 
designers were given complete freedom over the dimensions 
13 PRO: AIR 2/2744, Multi-Engined Day Bomber Type Requirements - Specn. 8.9/32, OR to 
RDA3,15.8.34 
14 PRO: AIR 2/2718, Bomber squadrons Poticy Future of the Light Bomber, DCAS to CAS, 
18.1.36 
15 Fairbairn, T., Action Stations overseas, 1991, page 71 
16 2/2744, DCAS to CAS, 19.7.31 
17 ibid., 1A, 
18 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 7.932 
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of the aircraft, then "these machines may become so large 
that we cannot get them into any of our sheds; e. g., the 
bomber transport machine will not fit into any shed we 
have at home or abroad. " (Reference has been made to this 
point re C. 16/28 in chapter 4.4.3. ) He asked that this 
matter should be investigated and a limit on size laid 
down. 19 This was the first time such an issue had arisen, 
and although it did not have a significant impact on the 
aircraft which resulted from the operational requirement 
under discussion, many writers believe it had an important 
influence on the design of some larger bombers which 
appeared later, a matter which is discussed in chapter 8. 
The AMSR's department examined Burnett's operational 
requirement, and in September 1931 advised that it, "asks 
for rather more than we can expect to get". Dowding 
pointed out that the Air Staff were specifying a bomber 
with the same performance as the fighter F. 7/30, yet with 
a range of 600 miles at full speed carrying 1,000 lbs of 
bombs (with two 525 hp engineS20) . Little wonder that 
the 
RAF was concerned about its ability to defend London if it 
believed that even twin-engined day bombers could have the 
same performance as its fighters. 
Dowding told Burnett that the best combination appeared to 
be a maximum speed of 185 mph at 11,000 ft, and that even 
this would need a landing speed of 65 mph. He said that 
this estimate was based upon "the best existing 
constructional practice", but added that he knew of a 
Siddeley's design for a twin-engined aircraft with a 
retractable undercarriage. Dowding admitted that, "it is 
possible that other firms may have new ideas which would 
increase the performance beyond that which we consider to 
be attainable at the present time". 21 
# 
19 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 21.7.31 
20 ibid., 4A, Liptrot, 24.9.31 
21 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 29.9.31 
Chapter 7 Bombers to Attack France 228 
On seeing Dowding's views, Maund explained to Burnett 
that, whilst contractors tended to be optimistic, 
11D. T. D. Is experts estimate on current practice, and do not 
allow for future progress. With his responsibilities, 
A. M. S. R. no doubt prefers to make conservative estimates 
to US. 1122 Burnett was not happy with this policy, and 
suggested to Dowding that "we should legislate in our 
specifications for as much progress as possible, without 
damping the ardour of contractors". He too referred to a 
current design -a Boulton & Paul private venture - which 
he said matched his operational requirements, except for 
landing speed. 
Burnett insisted that the purpose of the new requirement 
was to test a twin-engined bomber, and as it would be a 
later design than the Hart, but with the same bomb load 
per horsepower, it was reasonable to expect a better 
performance. To accelerate action he said that he would 
accept a landing speed of "not more than 65 mph, 
preferably less". 23 
A new draft specification 
take account of the highe: 
comment on hangar size. 25 
scheme for defining range 
introduced early in 1932, 
The DTD explained that, 
(B. 9/32)24 was put in hand to 
r landing speed and of Salmond's 
It also took account of the new 
and speed which had been 
as discussed in chapter 3.4.5. 
the specified range ( ... ) is now 720 miles, and speed ( ... ) is 170 m. p. h., both at Normal R. P. M. 
These 
correspond to the 600 miles and 190 m. p. h. at Maximum 
R. P. M. originally called for by the Air Staff. 26 
The CAS was later to decree that the maximum speed should 
continue to be quoted at maximum rpm , i. e., full 
22 20/84, FOI to DCAS, 5.10.31 
23 2/2744, DCAS to AMSR; 14.10.31 
24 ibid., 17A 
25 ibid., AMSR to DTD, 16.10.31 
26 ibid., DTD to DCAS and AMSR, 22.8.32 
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throttle. 27 Note that in the quote above "Maximum" 
clearly means "full throttle", for that was associated 
with 190 mph in the first draft operational requirements. 
There is no indication that the change in range consequent 
upon the new definition was seen to have any operational 
significance. Indeed, in the requirements for a single- 
engined Hart replacement (to be discussed below), Burnett 
specified a range of 600 miles under the new definition, 
and made a point of telling the CAS that, "The range 
requirement ( ... ) will put Paris within range of our most 
distant Home Defence day bomber aerodromes. 1128 Since the 
Air Staff's declared aim was to compare the twin-engined 
B. 9/32 with a single-engined Hart replacement the extra 
120 miles which was obtained "accidentallv" for the former 
was unnecessary. It might have been exchanged for an 
increase in bomb load or maximum speed, a reduced landing 
speed, or for a smaller and cheaper aircraft. 
As discussed in chapter 3.4-5, as the 1930s progressed the 
cruising speed and range of bombers were progressively 
redefined to approach realistic operational practice. But 
in 1932-33 the failure to follow up the consequences of 
the change in definition of range was to have an adverse 
effect on the Hart replacement project. 
With regard to the question of a limitation on span, it is 
notable that, contrary to the Air Ministry's supposed 
predilection for biplanes, Liptrot was instructed to 
calculate the span required to meet B. 9/32 as for a 
monoplane. 29 (This was in October 1931 - the month in 
which fighter specification F. 7/30 was issued. ) 
It was found that the RAF's permanent hangars were large 
enough for the proposed bomber, and the size of 
Expeditionary Force hangars was investigated. A File Note 
27 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 7.9.32 
28 2/2745, DCAS to CAS, *21.4.32 
29 2/2744, DTD to RDA3,20.10.31 
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gives details of a transportable "Bessnoneau" hangar (of 
1914-18 war vintage30), which had a width of 63 feet and a 
length of nearly 80 feet. 31 It is not clear whether these 
dimensions led to the inclusion of a limit on span of 70 
feet in the specification, 32 or whether this came from 
Liptrot's calculations. 33 Whatever the reason, the Air 
Staff suggested that folding wings should be allowed to 
overcome the limitation on span, 34 and this option was 
included in the specification. 
A much more serious limitation on the design of aircraft 
to meet specification B. 9/32 arose from the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference. Under discussion was a proposal 
to limit the empty (or tare) weight of bombers to three 
metric tons. The Air Ministry feared that specification 
B. 9/32 could not be met at this weight, and Dowding 
suggested delaying its issue until the situation became 
clearer, for he wished to protect industry from producing 
a type for which there might be no market. 35 Salmond's 
reaction was that they must not let the disarmament talks 
delay technical progress, and he proposed to insert into 
the specification a tare weight limit of 6,500 lbs. He 
was prepared to accept a crew of three if it were possible 
to arrange for a single gun to have an unrestricted field 
of fire aft. 36 The DTD (Cave) then suggested that the 
weight limit should be reduced to 6,300 lbs so as to allow 
for the inevitable increase in weight during 
development. 37 Salmond agreed, and specification B. 9/32 
with this weight limit was issued on 17th September 
1932.38,39 
30 Barker, R., The Royal Ftyinq Corps in France - from Mons to the Somme, 1994, page 204 
31 2/2744,12A 
32 ibid., 13A 
33 ibid., 4A 
34 ibid., 14A 
35 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 23.8.32 
36 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 7.9.32 
37 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 13.9.32 
38 ibid., CAS, 17.9-32 
39 ibid., 31A, Specification No. 8.9/32. Twin-engined Day Bombing Aircraft, issued 17th 
September 1932 
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In December 1932 Liptrot reported that several of the 
firms which were interested in tendering to B. 9/32 were 
concerned about the weight limit. He estimated that to 
keep within 6,300 lbs the maximum speed would be no more 
than 175 mph. Alternatively, to keep 190 mph, the bomb 
load would have to be reduced to 500 lbs, and the range to 
560 miles. Liptrot advised that, "The only other way of 
getting the low tare weight is by falsifying figures, i. e. 
by considering what are really tare weight items as 
removable. " He suggested that the gun mountings and 
automatic controls might be left out. Even then it was 
likely that only biplane designs would meet the limit of 
6,300 lbs. 40 
On hearing of this, Maund (FO1) pointed out that Salmond's 
initial limit had been 6,670 lbS41, and that he had 
reduced this to 6,500 lbs to allow for development. Cave 
had then reduced it to 6,300 lbs for the same reason! 42 
Salmond had of course agreed to the second reduction, but 
by now the Ministry was becoming very concerned about the 
impact of the proposed weight limit, and the specification 
was corrected back to 6,500 lbs. 43 In addition, firms 
were told that they could leave out the automatic controls 
when calculating the tare weight. 44 
Later, when the Ministry had selected the monoplanes 
tendered by Vickers and Handley Page, these could not meet 
the weight limit. Vickers were told that they could also 
leave out the water in the engine cooling system. Handley 
Page, who planned to use air-cooled engines, were told 
that if they exceeded 6,500 lbs by no more than 100 lbs 
their tender would not be rejected. 45 These machinations 
40 ibid., 33A, RDA3 to DTD, 5.12.32 
41 3 metric tonnes actually equals 6,614 Lbs 
42 2/2744, Fol to DCAS, 13.12.32 
43 ibid., 40A, Corrigenda to Specification B. 9/32,20th December 1932 
44 ibid., 39A, RDA3 (for DTD) to contractors, 20th December 1932 
45 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 10.2.34 
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underline the problems faced by the Air Ministry during 
the disarmament talks. 
A new aspect of the weight limit problem was raised by 
Wing Commander Williams, (who succeeded Maund as head of 
Flying operations 1 in January 1933). He saw that the 
proposed limit, which so far had been considered only in 
respect of the new day bomber, would also have the effect 
of rendering the RAF's existing heavy night bombers 
illegal. This led him to suggest a remarkable version of 
the long-desired dual-role bomber. 46 
Williams first compared current Air Staff requirements for 
day bombers and night bombers, which he put as, 
bomb load range landing speed 
lbs miles mph 
Day bomber 
B. 9/32 normal 1,000 720 65 
or (i) Soo 920 65 
or (ii) 1,500 500 65 
Night Bomber 1,500 920 55 
Williams saw that to graft the night bomber requirements 
onto the day bomber would lead to an aircraft suitable for 
neither mode of operation. He proposed another solution, 
namely to build the day bomber with a fuselage suitable to 
take alternative wings to meet the night bomber 
requirement (primarily to meet the lower landing speed). 
He had been advised by the technical branches that this 
was a practical proposition, with a loss of speed of the 
day bomber of no more than 5 mph. 
Williams argued that in this way the RAF could get a new 
night bomber which met the feared restriction on weight 
within three years, as opposed to seven years if they 
started from scratch. He claimed that the tare weight 
232 
46 ibid., 42A, Sidestrand Replacement. Question of Alternative Wings, F01 to CAS, 
14.3.33 
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limit in the specification of 6,300 lbs left 314 lbs in 
hand for modifications (such as his) when compared with 
three metric tons. Clearly Williams had not caught up 
with the corrigendum to the specification which had raised 
the weight limit for B. 9/32 to 6,500 lbs. 
No action was taken on Williams' scheme, but when the 
question of the award of contracts for B. 9/32 came up in 
June 1933 he raised it again - "Quite apart from any 
question of disarmament". 
Williams suggested that there would be considerable 
advantages in having an aircraft which could be converted 
from day to night, and reiterated Trenchard's argument for 
a dual-role bomber (chapter 2.3.1). He said that, 
it would enable us to adjust the proportion of 
bombing effort with varying lengths of day and night 
in different countries and at different seasons of 
the year, or even with changing phases of 
operations. 47 
This remarkable proposal brought forth comments from other 
branches of the Air Staff. Those of Air Commodore R. E. C. 
Peirse, who had been DDOI (i. e., deputy head of the Air 
Staff) throughout the gestation of B. 9/32, are an example 
of the lack of consultation on the formulation of 
operational requirements - it will be remembered that F01 
reported directly to the DCAS. Peirse questioned the very 
basis of B. 9/32. He wrote that, "I think we are on the 
wrong tack in going for a multi-engined day bomber of the 
size of either the Vickers or the Handley Page", but said 
that if that was the policy then any loss of performance 
should not be accepted. 48 On the other hand Plans branch 
(Squadron Leader G. E. Gibbs) thought that on balance 
Williams, scheme was a good idea. 49 
47 ibid., 42A, F01 to CAS, 2.7.33 
48 ibid., 42A, DDOI to DCAS, 7.7.33 
49 ibid., 42A, Mans to DCAS, 6.7.33 
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The DCAS (Ludlow-Hewitt) gave the official Air Staff 
opinion to Ellington. He did not agree with Williams' 
scheme. He cited loss of performance for the day bomber, 
the danger of meeting neither role, and the expense of 
stocks of two sets of wings. 50 Ellington settled the 
matter by telling Dowding that alternative wings were not 
required. 51 
In 1934 the Disarmament Conference collapsed and Germany 
had became recognised as a potential enemy. Dowding asked 
if in view of the changed political situation the weight 
limit was to be retained, 52 and on 7th June 1934 Ellington 
agreed to remove it. 53 In fact consideration of a new 
night bomber, which would inevitably exceed the three 
metric ton limit, had begun earlier in 1934. It is 
discussed in section 7.3. 
The contractors designing to day bomber specification 
B. 9/32 asked if bigger engines could be fitted now that 
the weight limit had been removed. They hoped to raise 
the speed to at least 230 mph. 54 Dowding's comment to 
Ludlow-Hewitt on this issue summed up all that had gone 
before. He wrote "I have agreed to the proposals to fit 
more powerful engines [to B. 9/32]. You will realise the 
previous weight restriction (now removed) imposed a severe 
handicap on designers. 1155 
In February 1935 an important step was taken towards 
Ludlow-Hewitt's aim to have all aircraft capable of day 
and night operation. Although intended for a day bomber, 
specification B. 9/32 had required emergency night-flying 
equipment for take-off and landing at dawn or dusk. 56 It 
50 ibid., 42A, DCAS to CAS, 14.7.33 
51 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 15.7.031 
52 ibid., AMSR to CAS, 24.5.34 
53 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 7.6.34 
54 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 18.8.34 
55 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 21.8.34 
56 ibid., 31A 
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was established that this could be augmented to allow full 
night flying for a weight increase of but 10 lbs. 57 
The aircraft ordered to specification B. 9/32 became known 
as the Vickers Wellington and Handley Page Hampden. Their 
development had been much delayed by attempts to meet the 
weight limit and by redesign when the limit was lifted. 
The first flight of each did not take place until 1936. 
There can be little doubt that had their development not 
been retarded the specification would have led to bombers 
superior to any others conceived in the early 1930s. As 
it was, the Hampden was amongst the fastest bombers in the 
world when it came into service in 1938,58 and improved 
versions of the Wellington served usefully throughout the 
Second World War. On the other hand, had the basic 
designs been settled in 1932-33 as intended, they might 
have been wholly obsolete by 1939. Indeed, as early as 
November 1934 both the CAS and DCAS believed that the 
designs to B. 9/32 were then obsolete and that a new 
specification was needed. 59 Ludlow-Hewitt later admitted 
that this view was an overstatement, but nevertheless 
suggested that, "the medium bomber specifications having 
been made out before recent advances in speed were quite 
so apparent as they are now", early provision should be 
made for an up-to-date medium bomber. 60 In October 1935 a 
new medium bomber was included in the Experimental 
Aircraft Programme for 1936 - it was P. 13/36 - from which 
came the Halifax and the Manchester/Lancaster. 
7.2.2 Hart Replacements: P. 27/32 (Battle) and P. 4/34 
The Hawker Hart was the epitome of the so-called high 
performance day bomber class. Maund described it as "the 
57 ibid., RDA4 to OR, 13.2.35 
58 Thetford, page 313 
59 2/716, DCAS to AMSR, 26.11.34 
60 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 5.12.34 
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most promising machine the service has had since the 
war". 61 Although it. had a small bomb load and a radius of 
action barely sufficient to attack Paris, when it entered 
service it was as fast or faster than contemporary RAF 
fighters. However, as has been shown earlier in this 
chapter, when the question of a replacement arose, this 
became caught up in the debate on single- versus twin- 
engined bombers. Salmond's decision to first develop a 
twin-engined Sidestrand replacement with bomb load of 
1,000 lbs meant that if comparability was to be achieved 
the Hart replacement would need to match this. 
In Dowding's advice that such an aircraft might be based 
on the Rolls Royce Griffon engine, he seems to have taken 
to heart Burnett's plea that they should not dampen the 
ardour of contractors, for this engine was yet to be 
developed. Burnett-was encouraged to believe that the 
Griffon would allow an increase in both bomb load and 
speed as compared with the Hart. 62 His "Proposed 
operational Requirements" of April 1932 asked for a bomb 
load of 1,000 lbs, a range of 600 miles (at maximum 
permissible continuous rpm) and a top speed of 195 mph. 
An armament of one fixed and one rear machine-gun was 
specified. 63 Burnett's remark to the CAS on the range 
requirement has been discussed above. He also noted that 
the speed requirement was 15 mph above that of the 
original Hart (which he said was not met), and that this 
placed the proposed aircraft on a competitive basis with 
the Sidestrand replacement then under discussion. 64 
Dowding saw the similarity with the Sidestrand replacement 
project in a different light. His staff calculated that 
the new project would be twice the weight of the Hart and 
have a top speed of only 185 mph, 65 and Dowding saw this 
61 20/68, page 102, note by F01,6.10.30 
62 2/2745, DCAS to CAS, 21.4.32 
63 Wd., IA, undated, c. Aprit 1932 
64 Wd., DCAS to CAS, 21.4.32 
65 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 21.732 
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as simply duplicating the Sidestrand replacement. He 
suggested that the requirements should be reconsidered. 66 
Burnett's response was to remind him that, "The 
requirements were drawn expressly to be comparable with 
those of the Sidestrand replacement, so that we can assess 
the relative values of the two classes by contemporary 
types of single-engined and twin-engined aircraft. " 
Burnett wished to proceed with the specification. 67 It 
was put in hand in together with the development of the 
supercharged Griffon. 68 Specification No. P. 27/32 for a 
"Single-engined Day Bombing Aircraft" was issued in April 
1933.69 
It is clear that by pursuing the single- versus twin- 
engine issue the original intention to develop a new type 
in the high-performance day bomber class had become lost. 
This was recognised. by Ludlow-Hewitt when he had replaced 
Burnett as DCAS. In July 1933 he put to the CAS (now 
Ellington) and Dowding, that in regard to Burnett's Hart 
replacement requirement, 
This specification will produce an aircraft which 
will certainly not fulfil the need for a light high 
performance day bomber. It is questionable whether it 
will meet any particular requirement. 
Ludlow-Hewitt believed that a small high-performance day 
bomber was needed, and recommended producing a new 
specification which would be more like the Hart with a 
bomb load of 500 lbs and a range of 600 miles. 
To avoid the odium of cancelling the existing Hart 
replacement specification (P. 27/32) after it had gone to 
contractors, Ludlowý-Hewitt suggested increasing the range 
to 720 miles and then testing it against the concurrent 
66 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 23.7.32 
67 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 2.8.32 
68 ibid., DTD to ADRD, 10.8.32 
69 ibid., 19A 
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Sidestrand replacement, B. 9/32.70 It seems that with 
changes in Air Staff personnel it was overlooked that 720 
miles was called for in B. 9/32 only because of a change in 
the definition of range - the original operational 
requirement had asked for 600 miles. Nevertheless, 
despite his earlier doubts - and his continuity of 
appointment - Dowding agreed with Ludlow-Hewitt's 
proposal. His reason was that without the P. 27/32 there 
was little prospect of making use of the Griffon engine - 
an odd reason for developing a new aircraft. Dowding also 
agreed that a new small day bomber should be included in 
71 the following year's experimental programme. 
Thus P. 27/32, intended as a replacement for the Hart high- 
performance (or light) bomber, became a single-engined 
medium bomber. Moreover, not only was the operational 
range increased over that first intended, but the B. 9/32's 
ferry range requirement was added to the specification. 72 
Development of a single-engined medium bomber was perhaps 
a not unreasonable experiment at the time if an engine of 
the necessary power became available. It offered a fall- 
back position should the twin-engined designs to B. 9/32 
become unlawful. 73 But the Griffon engine did not 
materialise until many years later. In consequence the 
Fairey Battle to P. 27/32 was fitted with the less powerful 
Rolls Royce Merlin and was under-powered. 74 Indeed in 
January 1939 Ludlow-Hewitt, then AOC-in-C Bomber Command, 
asked permission to restrict its penetration of hostile 
air space because of its slow speed and weak armament75 - 
but by then a large number had been ordered in the cause 
of parity with the expanding German Air Force. 76 
70 ibid. DCAS to CAS (through AMSR), 21.7.33 
71 ibid., AMSR to CAS/DCAS, 31.7.33 
72 ibid., 28A, Corrigenda No. 1,24.10.33 
73 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 16.3.34 
74 Thetford, page 273 
75 PRO: AIR 2/2620, Fairey Battle Bomber Aircraft to Specn P. 27/32 Type Requirements, 
AOC-in-C to Air Ministry, 14th January 1939 
76 Postan, pages 11 and 489 
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7.2.2.1 A True Hart Replacement 
Ludlow-Hewitt's and Dowding's plan for a direct 
replacement for the-Hart was put to a meeting of the 
'Operational Requirements Committee' in March 1934. 
Surprisingly, after what had gone before, the draft Air 
Staff Requirement proposed that designers should be given 
a free hand to choose one or two engines. The aircraft 
was said to be primarily for a European war, to be capable 
of dive bombing, and to rely on speed for evasion of 
hostile fighters. A bomb load of 500 lbs was to be 
carried over a range of 600 miles at normal rpm. 77 
Before the meeting the DDOI (Plans) (Harris) advised that 
a range of 600 miles would not be adequate in six to seven 
years time. He suggested that 800 miles should be 
required. Harris was forthright on the proposed 
limitation on span, writing that "arbitrary limitations 
unconnected with operational efficiency tend only to 
produce freaks like the London taxi-cabs & H. M. S. 
Nelson. 1178 It was decided to proceed with a range of 600 
miles but the limit on span was dropped . 
When Ludlow-Hewitt reported the meeting's decisions on the 
new Hart replacement to Ellington, the CAS's reaction was 
to ask that the specification should indicate a preference 
for a twin-engined aircraft. 79 Ellington had in mind that 
a twin-engined aircraft could have a moveable front gun, 
and a better view and bomb aiming position than would be 
possible with a single-engined aircraft. 80 Inevitably, 
the technical branches advised that to meet the 
requirements a twin-engined aircraft would be considerably 
77 PRO: AIR 2/728, High Performance Day Bomber (500 tbs. bomb load) Type Requirements, 
IA 
78 ibid., PLans to F01,6.3.34 
79 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 16.3.34 
80 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 25.6.34 
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larger that a single-engined aircraft, and slower. 81,82 As 
regards Ellington's request for a moveable front gun, 
Ludlow-Hewitt explained that a fast day bomber would only 
use its front gun against an enemy two-seater fighter that 
took up position ahead of it, and that this was unlikely 
to be possible. 83 This was a surprising comment, since to 
exploit this form of fighter attack was the very reason 
that the RAF itself had re-started the development of two- 
seat fighters in 1930, as discussed in chapter 4.4.3. 
Ellington reluctantly accepted a single-engined aircraft, 
but said that he would see what came of the twin-engined 
fighters which were under development "as a result of our 
efforts last year. 1184 He was referring to the two multi- 
seat fighters, F. 5/33 and F. 22/33, which have been 
discussed in chapter 6. Both were twin-engined with 
moveable front guns and, as has been shown, both were to 
be discarded because of their low performance. 
"Specification No. P. 4/34. Light Day Bomber" was issued on 
the 12th November 1934,85 and it appears that no lesson 
had been learnt from the P. 27/32 saga. For when Ellington 
visited Faireys in January 1935, the company told him that 
the specification called for a bomb load of 1,000 lbs as 
an overload condition, and that to meet this they would 
have to increase the structure weight, which would reduce 
the performance. Ellington observed that, "In fact, the 
machine would come back again to the single-engined medium 
bomber. iiM Ludlow-Hewitt firmly advised that only a 500 
lb bomb load should be required. 87 
The bomb load and range of P. 4/34 thus finally reverted to 
that of the Hart concept of a light high-performance day 
81 20/84, RDA3 to AD/RDA and DTD, 11.5.34 
82 2/728, DTD to AMSR, 14.6.34 
83 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 22.6.34 
84 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 25.6.34 
85 ibid., Appendix 27A 
86 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 4.1.35 
87 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 8.1.35 
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bomber. But this concept was now in doubt, and there were 
no production orders for either the Fairey or Hawker 
designs to P. 4/34 as a light bomber. 88 
7.2.3 Demise of the LicTht Bomber 
Towards the end of 1935 Ellington began to doubt the 
usefulness of light bombers in a war with Germany. He 
called for a review of bomber policy which took account 
not only of tactical effectiveness, but also of production 
and financial aspects. 89 This was another step towards a 
policy of optimising the RAF's bomber force to obtain the 
maximum bomb lift for a given cost. 
In his response90 to Ellington's request, the DCAS (now 
Courtney) noted that in the past light bombers had been 
developed because they were cheap, easy to pack for 
overseas, and their small bomb load and range was offset 
by a very high performance. Courtney then criticised such 
two-seat bombers in a way which paralleled the case 
against single-seat fighters which has been discussed in 
chapter 6. He said. that the RAF had never solved the 
problem of the gunner/bomb aimer in two-seat bombers. The 
gunner could not use his gun and aim the bombs at same 
time, and the pilot could not fly the aircraft and operate 
the bomb sight. 
In fact it was known that the bomb aiming position in 
single-engined two-seaters was so cramped that after using 
it for any length of time the gunner was not fit to use 
his gun afterwards. 91 Considering that the RAF had 
operated two-seat bombers for over fifteen years, this, 
and Courtney's comments, underline the point made in 
88 The Hawker Hentey became a target tug and the Fairey evoLved into the Futmar navaL 
fighter. 
89 PRO: AIR 2/2718, Bomber Sciuadrons Poticy Future of the Light Bomber, CAS to DCAS, 
8.11.35 
90 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 18.1.36 
91 PRO: AIR 2/956, Bombing Committee - Minutes of Meetings, 2nd Meeting, 30th may 1934 
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chapter 2 that the defence of bombers had not been taken 
seriously. 
The Air Staff also at last recognised that whereas a 
formation of bombers each armed with one or two rear guns 
might have defended itself against attack from two-gun 
fighters, it would not be able to do so against eight-gun 
fighters. But to increase the light bomber's fire power 
would need a twin-engined aircraft92 - and hence go down 
the route towards a*medium bomber. 
This was indeed the route which the Air Staff wished to 
follow. Courtney cited the performance of the Bristol 
Blenheim (derived from a Bristol civil aircraft and not in 
response to an Air Staff Requirement) as an example of the 
impact of recent developments in aviation. The Blenheim 
had a performance which matched that specified in P. 3/34 
and with double the bomb load - an indication that a 
medium bomber could be as fast as a light bomber, and 
could have better defensive armament. This is contrary to 
Smith's claim in respect of the rejection of light 
bombers, that "Speed was therefore to be sacrificed for 
warload and defensive armament. 103 It will be seen in 
chapters 8 and 9 that in fact there was no diminution in 
the pressure for speed. 
Courtney proposed that a bomb load of 1,000 lbs coupled 
with a range of 1,000 miles should be the minimum to be 
considered. Despite the experience of P. 27/32, he saw 
this as being met by a single-engined bomber, with 2,000 
lbs and 2,000 miles from a twin, and a still higher load 
and range from four engines. He told the CAS that 
proposals on these lines would be in the 1936 Experimental 
Aircraft Programme. Their fate is discussed in chapter 8. 
92 2/2718,1A, The Defence of Light Somber Aircraft, OR2,15.1.36 
93 Smith, M., page 235 
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Harris stressed the importance of range, as he had 
unsuccessfully when bomber requirements P. 27/32 and P. 4/34 
were under discussion. He argued that in a German or 
Indo-Russian war the RAF would need to penetrate further 
than the enemy to reach comparably vulnerable targets. 
Harris countered the thought that the obverse of this 
argument was that an enemy would concentrate on fast light 
bombers, long feared by the RAF, by claiming that Germany 
had a high proportion of heavy bombers in recognition that 
if there was an international agreement on numbers of 
bombers, to have a large number of light bomber squadrons 
would be a disadvantage. 
Harris took up Ellington's reference to overall economics. 
He suggested that an analysis in terms of striking power 
and cost, which led to the conclusion that light bombers 
were inefficient, might also lead to the disappearance of 
medium bombers. He visualised that a "most economical" 
size of bomber might evolve - into which all categories 
would merge. 94 This line of thought was to be followed in 
the studies of an 'Ideal Bomber, which were started in 
1937, and are discussed in chapter 9. 
The CAS accepted the views of the Air Staff and agreed to 
the gradual elimination of the light bomber. 95 At no time 
in this review of bomber policy was there the suggestion 
of a change in bombing policy. 
7.3 HEAVY BOMBERS 
The preceding sections of this chapter have discussed the 
operational requirements for day bombers which were 
appropriate for war against France. This consideration 
set the required range, as it had done since 1923. During 
those years it had been customary to seek a longer range 
94 2/2718, Appendix 2A, Mans to DCAS, 16.1.36 
95 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 29.1.36 
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for heavy night bombers as discussed in chapter 4. In 
1934 Germany began to be seen as the realistic potential 
enemy, and by 1936 the requirements for medium and heavy 
bombers took this fully into account - by then both types 
were seen as capable of day and night operation. The 
series of heavy bomber requirements which are discussed in 
this section began early in 1934 and continued into 1935. 
They mark the transition between taking France as the 
potential enemy and seeking the performance required to 
attack Berlin and Eastern Germany from Britain. 
It has been seen that the threat of a three ton limitation 
on the size of bombers confused and delayed the RAF's 
development of medium bombers. Needless to say it had a 
greater impact on the development of heavy bombers. In 
April 1934 the CAS (Ellington) wrote to the Secretary of 
State for Air (Lord Londonderry) to give him comparative 
data on British and Foreign aircraft. He explained that 
in heavy bombers Britain was behind, because while there 
had been the possibility of restrictions on size during 
the Disarmament Conference (1932-34), it had been thought 
unwise to invest in types which exceeded the proposed 
restrictions. Ellington said that special steps were 
being taken to improve the position. 96 He put these 
special steps to the Secretary of the Air Ministry (Sir 
Christopher Bullock) in June 1934. Ellington wrote, 
I have, therefore, proposed to the A. M. S. R. that a 
selected firm should be given a free hand to produce 
the best they can design to a very general and short 
specification. At the same time, we want to order 
from the Americans the best of the big aircraft which 
we can obtain in order that we may learn what there 
is to be learnt from their experience. I hope you 
will be able to assist in this matter. 97 
96 PRO: AIR 8/174, RAF Expansion: Performance of British & Foreign Afrcraft: Posftion of 
German Air Re-armament. 20.11.34, document 621, CAS to SoS, 7.4.34 
97 2/729,17A, CAS to Secretary, 7.6.34 
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The Secretary gave his support to this proposal, although 
fearing that the Society of British Aircraft Constructors 
would object. 98 His fears were to be confirmed. 
7.3.1 Origins of the Whitle : B. 3/34 
A draft Air Staff Requirement for a heavy night bomber had 
first been drawn up early in 1934. This document is given 
in the contents list of the relevant Air Ministry file, 
but is missing from the copy held by the Public Record 
Office. Nevertheless, it is evident from minutes which 
comment on the draft that the range proposed was the pre- 
existing standard for night bombers (920 miles), and that 
a limit on span was included. Harris (Plans) suggested 
that the range should be increased to 1,200 miles - 2,000 
miles with overload, and again that the inclusion of a 
limitation on span in specifications was wrong. He 
commented that if this was due to the size of hangars, 
then "hangars are already proved an unessential luxury, 
except for repair purposes, & in wartime hangars will be 
the last place in which to keep aircraft. 1199 
A later draft of "Air Staff Requirement for a Night Bomber 
Heyford Replacement"100 was discussed by the 'Operational 
Requirements Committee' on 8th March 1934. (It was here 
that removal of specialisation of day or night bombers was 
discussed. ) Following the meeting the DCAS (Ludlow- 
Hewitt) explained the rationale of the new bomber to 
Ellington. 101 In the interests of increasing the 
flexibility of the air force it was to be suitable for 
carrying loads other than bombs, in particular to have 
accommodation for not less than ten troops. It was 
believed then that this would not detract from its 
performance as a heavy bomber. 
98 ibid., Secretary to CAS, 19.6.34 
99 ibid., Ptans to FOI, 6.3.1934 
100 ibid., 5A 
101 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 13.3.1934 
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Ludlow-Hewitt explained that the range had been increased 
to 1,250 miles at 190 mph (1,600 miles with auxiliary 
tanks), to give a radius of action of 500 (or 640) miles, 
which he said was adequate for a European war or a war in 
Afghanistan. The bomber was to depend upon self defence 
for its security and was to have gun turrets in the nose 
and tail plus upper and lower midships gun stations, all 
to be armed with a single machine gun. A limitation on 
span of 100 feet was included but was not thought to 
impose an undesirable limitation on design. Ludlow-Hewitt 
noted that oxygen would be required for the first time in 
a night bomber. 
Compared with the most recent previous heavy night bomber 
requirement, that issued in 1927 (B. 19/27, chapter 4.4.2), 
there was no change in bomb load, an increase in the 
number of guns from three to four (later rescinded), a 
modest increase in range and a substantial increase in 
speed. 
The CAS (Ellington) agreed to the requirements, but 
suggested that more than two engines were needed to get 
reliability. He said that although the Air Ministry had 
always specified that a twin-engined aircraft should fly 
with one engine switched off, "we never in practice have 
got such an aeroplane; the most that the types we have 
adopted can do once they have been in production some time 
is to prolong the glide and so increase the choice of a 
forced landing place. vO02 (In chapter 3.4.5 it is noted 
that the performance of aircraft in service seldom matched 
that attained by prototypes. ) 
This matter was investigated, 103 and it was concluded that 
if designers made full use of recent developments in 
aeronautical engineering - flaps, retractable 
102 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 16.3.34 
103 ibid., 9A 
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undercarriage, low drag cooling and variable pitch 
propellers, a twin could meet the requirements and 
maintain height at full load with one engine out. But it 
was now thought that the ability to carry ten troops would 
cost 10 mph - which might be offset if a tail turret was 
deleted from the requirements. 104 These issues were to be 
important when the specification was later discussed with 
aircraft designers. Meanwhile, Dowding (AMSR) 
unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Air Staff to drop 
the requirement for troop carrying, 105 and the ADGB Command 
was consulted on the need for a tail turret. 106 
The AOC-in-C ADGB (Brooke-Popham), responded that he was 
personally against tail turrets but would abide by the 
recommendation of Harris, 107 "whose opinions must carry a 
good deal of weightO. Harris was a strong advocate of 
tail turrets for night bombers. 108 Brooke-Popham later 
wrote to say that both his Western and Southern Area 
Commands favoured having a tail turret. 109 
When circulated early in July 1934 specification B. 3/34 
(later known as Specification No. 1), dealt with the troop 
carrying issue by saying that the aircraft should be 
"designed to be entirely suitable for operation as a 
bomber and, in emergency, as a bomber transport. " It 
called for a tail turret and a top speed of 225 mph. 110 
Ellington and Dowding pressed on with plans to hasten 
production by short-circuiting the normal competitive 
tendering procedure. They had intended to, "approach the 
three firms (Vickers, Handley Page, and Faireys) who alone 
have in recent years provided us with satisfactory heavy 
104 ibid., DTD to AMSR, 8.6.34 
105 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, 11.6.34 
106 ibid., DCAS to AMSR, 19.6.34 
107 ibid., 13A, AOC-in-C to DCAS, 18th June 1936 
108 2/688, DDOI to DCAS, 29.11.33 
109 2/729, AOC-in-C to DCAS, 25th June 1934 
110 ibid., 21A, Specification No. B. 3/34. Heavy Bomber Landplane, 3rd Juty 1934 
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bombers", 111,112 but ominously Armstrong Whitworth were 
later included at their own request. 113 Dowding proposed 
that the firms should be told that "In view of the very 
superior performance of the Heavy Bombers in the 
possession of certain other powers", the Air Ministry 
could not accept the delay inherent in normal 
procedures, 114 but these words were not in the invitation 
to the four firms to discuss the specification. The 
invitation simply said that, "Owing to importance of 
obtaining early delivery of improved aircraft of the type, 
Department cannot accept delay". To this end the firms 
were told that the Ministry would consider amendments to 
the specification which would facilitate early delivery. 
They were also told that after a specification had been 
agreed, each firm was invited to put in a tender within 
one month for the supply of one prototype to be built and 
tested in eighteen months. The Ministry would then 
immediately choose to proceed with one (or more) tender. 115 
After meeting the heads of the four firms on 1st August 
1934116, Dowding wrote urgently to Ellington to say that 
"he had emerged rather battered from the fray". At a pre- 
meeting the firms had complained that the Ministry 
apparently planned to award a contract without seeing any 
drawings, and that therefore the contract would go to the 
firm most prepared to risk losing money. He quoted Sir 
Richard Fairey as asking if they wanted a bid for 
sixpence1117 
Despite these objections to procedure, the main meeting 
discussed the specification in detail, and some major 
changes were proposed. The firms said that the specified 
performance was possible only if the aircraft could be 
Ill ibid., AMSR to CAS, 28.6.34 
112 ibid., CAS to AMSR, 2.7.34 
113 ibid., D. of C. to AMSR, 14.7.34 
114 ibid., AMSR to D. of C., 5.7.34 
115 ibid., 23A, 19th July 1934 
116 ibid., 30A, Notes of Conference held on Ist August 1934 
117 ibid., 29A, Dowding to CAS, 2nd August 1934 
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fully streamlined, and that as soon as defensive or 
operational excrescences were introduced the performance 
would be markedly reduced. Dowding told Ellington that he 
had therefore conceded that all hope of a bomber/transport 
must be abandoned, that only three gun stations should be 
specified, that arrangements for carrying 1,000 lb and 
1,500 lb bombs should be deleted, and that although a tail 
turret had not been wholly given up, it would cost 10 mph 
in speed. He had been advised that the top speed with a 
tail turret would be 205 mph. The aircraft could have a 
high performance without defence, but Dowding doubted that 
the Air Staff would accept that. 
Ellington replied to say that he left it to Dowding to 
settle contract arrangements, commenting that "designers 
who have frequently pressed for a free hand are now afraid 
of receiving it". 118 
Attempts to negotiate with the four firms new contractual 
arrangements which retained some element of competition 
failed. 119 The Air Ministry then decided to seek to place 
one order at a low price, bearing in mind that the chosen 
firm was likely to get a production contract. Dowding 
thought that Vickers or Armstrong Whitworth were likely to 
achieve the quickest delivery, but Ellington "was not 
prepared to complicate such an important experiment with 
the additional factor of geodetic construction, since, 
although showing great promise, we have had no practical 
experience of it yet. " This eliminated Vickers, and 
Dowding met Sir John Higgins of Armstrong Whitworth and 
agreed on a price of E64,000 for two machines - the other 
firms had asked for E60,000 for one. 120 A modified 
specificationl2l (later referred to as No. 2) was issued in 
August 1934. This took account of the firms, reactions to 
the original specification. 
118 ibid., Ellington to AMSR, 2nd August 1934 
119 ibid., Notes of meeting held by Director of Contracts, 3rd August 1934 
120 ibid., File Note by AMSR, 16.8.34 
121 ibid., 40A, Corrigendum No. 1 to Specification B. 3/34,7th August 1934 
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No sooner had these steps been taken than doubts arose 
about Armstrong Whitworth's capabilities, but Dowding 
rejected attempts to encourage Vickers to submit a private 
venture tender to B*. 3/34.122,123,124 
7.3.2 Americanisation: B. 1/35 
In October 1934 arrangements were being made to consider 
the Experimental Aircraft Programme for 1935, and Group 
Captain R. H. Peck (DDOI) raised the question of a new 
heavy night bomber. He feared that Armstrong's would 
produce an unsuccessful aircraft, and proposed that a new 
specification should be issued. 125 After some discussion 
it was decided to await the return of Air Commodore R. H. 
Verney (the new DTD) from his visit to American aircraft 
companies before deciding upon a new heavy bomber 
specif ication. 126,127 
Early in 1935, when Verney had returned from his visit to 
America, he put down his thoughts on the heavy bomber 
issue. He suggested that the RAF should aim for something 
not only superior to the current Martin bomber, but equal 
to or better than developments which were in hand at 
Martin and Boeing. Verney put forward a redraft of heavy 
bomber specification B. 3/34 to give an "Americanised" 
version. In this the maximum speed of 230 mph was little 
more than the Ministry's first hopes for B. 3/34, but the 
normal bomb load was increased from 1,500 lbs to 2,000 lbS 
and the range to 2,000 miles - substantially greater than 
the 1,250 miles of B. 3/34.128 It will be seen in chapter 8 
122 2/716, 
_13A, 
DTD to AMSR, 22.8.34 
123 ibid., AMSR to DCAS, ' 22.8.34 
124 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 28.8.34 
125 ibid., DDOI (for DCAS) to CAS, 12.10.043 
126 ibid., 1A, note to DCAS, 115.10.341, 
127 ibid., note by AMSR, 20.11.34 
128 PRO: AIR 2/2820, Warwick Heavy Bomber - spec 61/35 - Type ReqUirements, DTD to AMSR, 
12.1.35 
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that 2,000 miles was the range requirement thought to be 
needed for a war with Germany. 
Verney's ideas were incorporated in a paper written for a 
meeting of the 'operational Requirements Committee' held 
on 20th February 1935.129 This paper gave the history of 
B. 3/34, and referred to Verney's Americanised version as 
Specification No. 3. The maximum speed, range and bomb 
load of No. 3 were as proposed by Verney. Three gun 
stations (including a tail turret) were specified - each 
with a single Lewis gun. 130 Liptrot estimated that with 
two Rolls-Royce Merlins Verney's performance aims could 
not quite be met. 131 A design bomb load of 2,000 lbs and a 
range of 2,000 miles could be met at 150 mph , but at 
normal (maximum continuous) rpm to give a cruising speed 
of 195 mph a range of only 1,500 miles was possible. 
Following the meeting the operational requirements were 
revised to accord with Liptrot's estimates. They were 
circulated to industry in March 1935, now designated 
B. 1/35. The preamble recognised the significance of war 
with Germany and the consequent likelihood of deep 
penetration of hostile airspace. It said that, "During 
operations it is necessary to reduce the time over enemy 
territory to a minimum. Therefore the highest possible 
cruising speed is required. " In addition to the normal 
bomb load (2,000 lbs) and range (1,500 miles), firms were 
told that it was hoped to carry 1,000 lbs for 1,800 miles 
and 4,000 lbs for 900 miles". Internal bomb stowage for 
the maximum load was specified. 132 
A new feature was the specification of airfield 
performance in what the DCAS described as "looser 
terms". 133 It was required to be reasonable for average 
129 ibid., 5A, "Air Staff Requirement for a Heavy Bomber Landptane (Heyford and Hendon 
RepLacement)" 
130 ibid., 5b, Operationat Requirements of Nos. 2 and 3 
131 ibid., 68, RDA3 to DTD, 21.2.35 
132 ibid., 17C, Air Staff Requirements for a Heavy Bomber Landplane 
133 ibid., DCAS to AMRD, 27.2.35 
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aerodromes, with 500 yds to clear 50 feet in both landing 
and take-off given as guidance. Take-off distance was to 
become a major issue in the next generation of bomber 
specifications. 
The full specification B. 1/35 was issued on 8th May 
1935.134 In the section on "Gun Stations" this said that, 
"The ideal to be aimed for is that the gun stations should 
be dragless when the bomber relies solely on speed for 
evasion, but capable of powerful defensive fire when 
required. " This powerful defence was to be provided by 
single Lewis guns at the front and midships stations but 
now with two at the rear station. 135 
It will be remembered that when in June 1934 Ellington was 
considering a special procedure to hasten a heavy bomber 
replacement, he had consulted the Secretary of the Air 
Ministry and gained his support. Dowding had later used 
the absence of competition to obtain a much reduced price 
for two prototypes to B-3/34 from Armstrong Whitworth. 
Thus it can have been no surprise when, in March 1935, the 
Secretary wrote to Ellington and Dowding to express his 
great concern over the way in which dealings with that 
company were proceeding. It appeared to him that the 
B. 1/35 project would supersede B. 3/34 and that Armstrong 
would get few orders. 136 Dowding told Ellington that 
Bullock was right to be concerned, but advised that 
Armstrongs would get orders to equip three to four 
squadrons. 137 
Of course B. 1/35 had been initiated precisely to replace 
Armstrong's design to B. 3/34 (the original Air Staff 
Requirement document was entitled IIB3/34 Replacementoil38). 
The reason was that no sooner had a contract been awarded 
134 ibid., 24A, Specification No. B. 1/35. Heavy Bomber, 8th May 1935 
135 ibid., 24A, paragraph 11 
136 ibid., Secretary to CAS and AMRD, 16.3.35 
137 ibid., AMRD to CAS, 3.4.35 
138 ibid., 6A 
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to Armstrong than the Ministry lost confidence in their 
capabilities. In the event, B. 1/35 did not lead to a 
production order as a bomber, for it became absorbed into 
the next stage of bomber development as explained in 
chapter S. The Armstrong Whitworth Whitley was built in 
quantity, 139 and was the RAF's only heavy night bomber in 
service when war broke out in 1939. 
7.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter it has been shown that RAF bomber 
development in the early 1930s was initially dominated by 
arguments over the merits of single- and twin-engined day 
bombers. Sir John Salmond effectively overruled the Air 
Staff's preference for single-engined types, and from then 
on single-engined light bombers lost favour -a trend 
which was strengthened by the recognition of Germany 
rather than France as the enemy for planning purposes. 
A very important development in those years was the 
acceptance that advances in aeronautics had made redundant 
the distinction between the day and night classes of 
bomber. Thus at the end of the period covered in this 
chapter the heavy bomber requirement B. 1/35 marked not 
only the transition from France to Germany as the 
operational target, but also the end of the classification 
of the heavy bomber as primarily a night bomber. 
As with Air Staff requirements for fighters in the early 
1930s, bomber requirements sought to take full advantage 
of developments in aviation technology in other respects. 
They led to aircraft which in terms of bomb load and 
performance were at least as good as those developed 
elsewhere, but shared with the United states and the 
emerging German air forces the neglect of the bomber's 
defensive firepower. 
139 Thetford, page 30 
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In chapters 4 and 6 it is shown that in the years 1927 to 
1933 the Air Ministry planned or envisaged fighters armed 
with four, six, and eight machine guns. Eight guns, each 
with a high rate of fire, were firmly specified in 1934. 
Yet the bombers specified in that period called for no 
more than two to three single machine-gun stations, with 
only the final form of B. 1/35 specifying two guns in its 
tail turret. It is true that the RAF placed great 
reliance on the combined defensive power of a formation of 
bombers, but the individual bomber armament it specified 
was no more than that previously considered necessary for 
a formation to combat fighters armed with but two guns - 
and these with a relatively slow rate of fire. This 
policy was continued, even though, as discussed in chapter 
6.1, the Air Ministry was well aware that RAF bombers 
would be particularly vulnerable to multi-gun fighters. 
Indeed, in the context of the ideal "dragless" (i. e., 
remotely controlled) gun installations sought in 
specification B. 1/35, the Operational Requirements section 
admitted that bombers armed with only two/three guns 
firing aft were at a serious disadvantage against eight- 
gun f ighters. 140 
It will be seen that the in the next generation of bombers 
the Air Staff continued to allow the armament of its 
bombers to lag behind that of its fighters. 
140 PRO: AIR 20/9, Defence of Bombers, OR to DCAS and DSD, 10.1.35 
255 
8. BOMBERS TO ATTACK GERMANY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the previous chapter, the recognition of 
Germany as the potential enemy in Europe forced a re- 
appraisal of bomber requirements. In May 1935 the Interim 
Report of the Sub-Committee on Air Parity - which was in 
response to the fears aroused by the reported increase in 
the German Air Force - included a map which showed that a 
radius of action of-500 miles would be needed to attack 
Berlin and 700 miles to attack the Silesian industrial 
region. It noted that even the RAF's existing heavy 
(long-range) bombers could not attack Berlin with a full 
bomb load-' 
Raids on such distant targets would involve deep 
penetration of hostile airspace, and two ways of achieving 
this were considered - speed and armament. Speed would 
both reduce the length of time over which the bombers were 
exposed to attack and make interception more difficult. 
Increased armament would, it was thought, enable bombers 
to defend themselves against repeated attacks. Night 
attacks were a third option, but these would sacrifice 
bombing accuracy, and were planned only to maintain 
continuity of the offensive. 
The conflict between speed and armament dominated the 
discussion of the operational requirements for bombers up 
to the outbreak of war in 1939. It will be seen that 
although there was some advocacy of speed as the primary 
defence, the issue was more one of bomber weight, for it 
was argued that the heavier the bomber the more possible 
it was to have both speed and - what was believed to be - 
1 PRO: AIR 8/196, Royat Air Force Expansion - 1935, Sub-Committee on Air Parity' Interim 
Report, 8th May 1935, Appendix B and para. 32 
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adequate armament. Adequate meant not only many guns, but 
also an increased ammunition load, for as Air Vice Marshal 
W. R. Freeman (who replaced Dowding as AMRD in April 1936) 
explained, this "should be governed by the range of the 
aeroplane, because, as the range increased so did the 
length of time during which fighting might take place. o12 
Furthermore, as has been noted in the context of fighter 
development, the use of more powerful - and heavier - 
engines to obtain high speed inevitably led to aircraft of 
increased weight. How to get these heavy aircraft into 
the air became a major problem, with the solution first 
sought through schemes for assisted take-off. 
These issues were the core of the discussion of new medium 
and heavy bombers in 1936, and of the search for an 
"Ideal" (standard) bomber in 1937-39 which is discussed in 
chapter 9. It will be seen that it was such technical 
considerations which led to a great increase in the weight 
of RAF bombers. 
Some writers have interpreted these developments as 
indicative of a change in bombing policy. For example, 
Smith suggests that whereas in the Wellington and Hampden 
the Air Staff had found "its equipment-constant" (sic) 
type, in 1935-36, 
The Air Staff were in fact already working on the 
possibility of producing a much heavier bomber. In 
other words they were moving towards a final 
decision, without compromise, on fundamental 
strategic priorities. 3 
Similarly, the Air Historical Branch narrative on the pre- 
war evolution of Bomber Command claims that, via 
discussions on RAF Expansion Scheme F, the Cabinet, 
established as the accepted policy that from 
henceforward the home-based bomber force was to be 
2 PRO: AIR 9/77, Operational. Requirements Committee 1936-39, Minutes of 27th May 1936, 
Item 4 Armament 
3 Smith, M., page 237 
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regarded as an*offensive and potential war-winning 
weapon rather than merely to as an instrument for 
reducing the weight of enemy air attack by counter- 
offensive measures. This placed the emphasis in 
bomber development squarely upon hitting power - upon 
range, bombload, and fighting capacity. 4 
But as has been shown in chapter 2.2.1, it had never been 
RAF policy to concentrate its offensive upon the reduction 
of an enemy's scale of attack, as Air Staff Memoranda 11 
and 1I. A on the 'Correct Objective' made abundantly clear. 
Moreover bomber development had always been concerned with 
range, bomb load and fighting capacity, these attributes 
not being the prerogative of big bombers. 
In a similar vein, Postan claimed that, "Throughout the 
early years of expansion, the Air Staff showed every 
predilection in favour of the heavy long-distance 
bombers.,, 5 But the expansion was to meet the threat from 
Germany, and as major German targets were at a long 
distance, no predilection was required - common sense 
would suffice. Indeed, the AHB narrative noted that these 
requirements inevitably led to bombers of greater size. 6 
The straightforward technical requirements to get the 
range, and particularly the speed, seen as needed to 
attack targets in Germany inevitably led to much heavier 
bombers than had been needed to bomb Paris. That there 
was no big bomber policy as such is evident from a comment 
made when concern with the size of the new heavy bomber 
(B. 12/36) was voiced at the Operational Requirements 
Committee. The Air. Staff stated that, "in drafting the 
requirements they had visualised using the medium bomber 
as the backbone of the Striking Force supplemented by a 
certain number of these heavy bombers. 117 
4 41/39, page 132 
5 Postan, page 78 
6 41/39, page 132 
7 9/77, Minutes of 27th May, para. 7 
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It will be seen that the normal bomb load of the new 
medium bomber (P. 13/36) - the planned backbone of the 
striking force - was reduced to below that expected of the 
types it was to replace to obtain a much higher speed. 
The Ideal Bomber study also demonstrated the major 
influence of speed on weight. Neither in Air Staff 
thinking at the time nor in technical feasibility was 
there an alternative small bomber policy which they might 
have adopted for war with Germany. 
In the many RAF files which concern bomber operational 
requirements which have been examined in the course of the 
current research a change in bombing policy is never 
mentioned as their raison dletre. What is emphasised is 
the need for high speed and powerful armament to carry out 
the bombing policy which had been adopted in the early 
1920s. 
The following sections of this chapter deal first with the 
evolution of the bomber requirements B. 12/36 (Stirling) 
and P. 13/36 (Halifax and Manchester). Then section 8.3 
discusses the significance of a number common features. 
Section 8.4 reviews the outcome of the 1936 bomber 
specifications in relation to the aircraft which operated 
in the war. 
8.2 THE 1936 BOMBERS 
In the formulation of the 1936 bomber requirements Ludlow- 
Hewitt's aim to drop special day or night classes of 
bomber was put into effect. Both the new medium and heavy 
bombers were seen as capable of day and night operation, 
but their primary mode of operation was to be by day - 
Webster and Frankland say that 7516 of sorties were 
expected to be by day. 8 Indeed, the Minutes of the 14th 
8 Webster, Sir Chartes, and Franktand, N, The Strategic Air offensive against Germany, 
Vol 1,1961, page 100 
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meeting of the Bombing Committee, held in April 1937 
record that, "The Chairman opened the meeting by saying 
that the subject of. nicTht bombing was now, for the first 
time, before this Committee. 119 
That day operation was expected of the bombers planned in 
1936 is confirmed by the Air Staff's comments early in 
1939 on a proposal to fit an under turret to Pegasus 
engined Wellingtons, which would lead to reduced 
performance. The Director of Operational Requirements 
argued against the proposal. He suggested that, 
When more bomber aircraft are available it may be 
possible to relegate the Pegasus type to night 
operations, for which powerful defensive armament is 
not so essential as for day operations. 10 
But the Operations branch supported the fitting of an 
under turret, because it saw that the Pegasus Wellington, 
must form a considerable proportion of our day 
bombing attack until the Merlin Wellington, Stirling, 
Halifax and Manchester come into Service in 
quantity. 11 
In chapter 10 it is noted that as each of the types 
derived from the 1936 Air Staff Requirements came into 
service during the war, it was sent on daylight operations 
in the hope that the deficiencies of the previous 
generation of RAF bombers had been overcome. They had 
not, and the bombers derived from the 1936 specifications 
became the mainstay of the RAF's night bomber force. This 
has led to the common misconception that the 
specifications were originally for heavy night bombers. 
Thus Divine wrote, 
9 PRO: AIR 20/9830, Minutes of Bombing Committee Meetings. 1-24,14th meeting, para. 
italics added 
10 PRO: AIR 2/1964, Wellington Vickers Bomber to Specification 8.9/32. Type 
Regufrements, 55A, DOR to ACAS, 15.2.39 
11 ibid., DDOps(H) to ACAS, 20.2.39 
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In 1936 Air Ministry views - three years late as 
usual - swung towards heavy night bombers. Two 
specifications, P. 13/36 and B. 12/36, were circulated; 
one, for a four-engined big bomber; one, for a two- 
engined I small big bomber, . 
12 
Divine has the specifications in the wrong order; P. 13/36 
was to be twin-engined. Needless to say, Divine gives no 
clue as to who was specifying similar bombers three years 
earlier. 
Greer refers to, "the design of night bombers (Wellington, 
Stirling, and Lancaster) by the British for area attacks 
at night". 13 R. Freeman, in a reference to RAF policy in 
the inter-war years, says that, "the new four-engine heavy 
bombers in large scale production in 1942 were, from the 
outset, designed for night attack. ev14 
In fact, as explained above and evident from the following 
discussion of the 1936 bomber operational requirements 
(and those for an Ideal Bomber), the Air Staff were then 
planning primarily for bombing by day. This is why the 
armament and ammunition load were based upon the need to 
fight off repeated attacks by enemy fighters, and a high 
speed was needed to reduce exposure to such attacks. 
8.2.1 Common Features - Speed and Overload 
In chapter 7.2.1 it is noted that in 1934-35 the Air Staff 
were concerned that the medium bombers then under 
development to specifications B. 9/32 and P. 27/32 were 
obsolete, particularly in terms of speed. They wished to 
start on a new medium bomber in 1936,15 although the 
prototypes to the 1932 specifications had not floWn. 16 
12 Divine, page 189 
13 Greer, page 45 
14 Freeman, R., The U. S. Strategic Bomber, 1975, page 42 
15 2/1402,3A, ExperimentaL Aircraft Programme for 1936; Air Staff Requirements and 
Priority 
16 Thetford, pages 278 (BattLe), 313 (Hampden), 554 (WeLtington) 
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The Air Staff also wished to start the development of a 
new heavy bomber in 1936, although Armstrong Whitworth's 
design to B. 3/34 had also not flown, and, as explained in 
chapter 7.3.2, a replacement for it had been specified in 
1935 (B. 1/35). The Air Staff were seeking a larger 
alternative range and bomb load than B. 1/35,17 and appear 
to have been influenced by reports of a new American four- 
engined bomber (this seems to have been either the Boeing 
XB-15 or XB-17 - the prototype "Flying Fortress"18), and 
by thoughts from the ADGB Command on resurrecting the 
concept of a 'Giant' bomber - which Oxland said would now 
have to have a very high performance. 19 
In October 1935 new medium and heavy bombers were included 
in the proposed experimental aircraft programme for 
1936.20 First thoughts on the medium bomber2l were to call 
for a bomb load no greater than that then thought possible 
for the B. 9/32 Wellington, viz. 2,000 lbs. 22 It will be 
seen that this was to be reduced to 1, soo lbs, and then, 
to get a higher speed, to 1,000 lbs. The new heavy bomber 
was first planned to carry the same bomb load of 2,000 lbs 
as had been specified for B. 1/35. These bomb loads were 
under normal operating conditions, i. e., with a take-off 
to 50 feet of 500 yards. 
Under normal conditions the medium bomber was to have a 
range of 1,000 miles - not 1,500 miles as given in the AHB 
narrative. 23 It was the heavy bomber for which a normal 
range of 1,500 miles was specified. These ranges were to 
be achieved at a speed based upon "two-thirds maximum 
engine power", 24 rather than on the maximum permissible 
17 2/1402,15A, Appendix A, 
18 Freeman, page 22 
19 2/1402,7A, Notes on a PreLiminary Discussion on the Air Staff Requirements for the 
ExperimentaL Aircraft Programme for 1936,4th October 1935 
20 ibid., 7A 
21 ibid., 12A, Appendix "A", draft Air Estimates 1936 
22 PRO: AIR 9/82, The IdeaL Bomber, 12A, TabLe of performance of bombers, DOOR, 26.8.37 
23 41/39, page 136 
24 9/77, Minutes 27th May 1936, Item 2. Performance 
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rpm for continuous running that had been previous practice 
(chapter 3.4.5). Even so, such were the advances in aero- 
engines that it was hoped to get a considerable increase 
in cruising speeds. In addition, for both the new medium 
and heavy bombers a reinforcing range of 3,000 miles was 
sought. 
It is clear that the main element in the Air Staff's 
thinking was to seek an increase in speed over that of 
earlier bomber specifications. This need had been 
emphasised by Lord Weir in comments on the RAF's Expansion 
Programme. In regard to bomber development he had 
suggested that "the factor of speed be given the leading 
place". 25 However, large increases in range and bomb load 
also appeared possible when the requirements for both 
classes were enhanced to take account of operation in 
overload conditions. 
Two stages of overload operation were envisaged, first by 
extending the take-off from 500 yards to 700 yards, and 
second, by launching the bombers by catapult. Extended 
conventional take-off was expected to give a larger bomb 
load at a range of 2,000 miles for both classes. This 
would give the operational radius of action needed to 
attack Eastern Germany. Catapult take-off was expected to 
give an operational range of 3,000 miles with a further 
increase in bomb load, or - most significantly - up to 
eight-times the normal bomb load at shorter ranges. 
Some writers on the development of the aircraft operated 
by the RAF in the Second World War have noted the 
provision for catapult take-off in specifications B-12/36 
and P. 13/36. Barnes says that the Air Staff's "technical 
advisers" had "even predicted that some form of catapult 
launching (referred to as a 'frictionless take-off' 
device) would be essential on existing airfields". 
26 
25 6/43, The March 1937 Programme and the Strategical, and Tacticat Basis on which its 
MaterieL is founded, 17th JuLy 1935 
26 Barnes, Shorts, page 370 
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Andrews and Morgan refer to "a catapulting capability for 
short take-off". 27 Mason correctly notes that catapult 
launching was associated with heavy loads for the Short 
B. 12/36 28 and the Avr02 9 and Handley Page 30 designs to 
P. 13/36, but dismisses the concept with the comment that, 
"experiments (which) were to fascinate the RAE, if no one 
31 else, for years to come". It will be seen that this was 
far from the case. - 
The following sections of this chapter show how catapult 
take-off came to be introduced first for the heavy bomber 
B. 12/36. Requirements for the new medium bomber, P. 13/36, 
were then also written to exploit catapult take-off, and 
to include a facility to serve as a torpedo bomber. Both 
the catapult scheme and torpedo carrying were later 
abandoned, but by then they had exerted a major influence 
on the design of aircraft to the 1936 specifications. 
8.2.2 Heavv Bomber B. 12/36 (Stirling) 
In October 1935 the Air Staff's wish to start development 
of a new heavy bomber was discussed with the Directorate 
of Technical Development. 32 Captain Liptrot produced an 
estimate of what might be obtained from a bomber with four 
Merlin engines. With the same military load (i. e., mainly 
crew, bomb load and armament) and range as B. 1/35, he 
estimated that a maximum speed of 275 mph and a cruising 
speed of 230 mph were possible - both a considerable 
improvement on B. 1/35. However, the DTD (Verney), whose 
visit to America had generated the B. 1/35 specification, 
thought that, "the heavy bomber position was well met by 
the B. 1/35; he was very chary of supporting projects for 
very large aeroplanes". He said that making aircraft too 
27 Andrews and Morgan, Supermarine, page 320 
28 Mason, British Somber, page 314 
29 ibid., page 323 
30 ibid., page 330 
31 ibid., page 314 
32 2/1402, A 
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large for their purpose had been one of the faults of the 
past. Verney's alternative proposal is the real key to 
the origin of the RAF's future heavy bombers. 
He suggested that the future requirements of the Air 
Staff beyond the B. 1/35 might be met by incorporating 
them in the bomber which would have to be designed to 
meet the conditions of the Catapulting Scheme now 
under consideration; 
Verney claimed that, "The result would be a bomber just as 
powerful, capable of quite as much range, greater speed, 
and it would be smaller and cheaper to produce. " He noted 
that "the catapult bomber would be quite effective for use 
on ordinary aerodromes at a reduced load.,, 
The head of the Operational Requirements section (Oxland) 
asked for particulars of the Catapult Bomber, so that the 
Air Staff could consider this idea. 
Provision for a "Large Catapulting Type,, had been included 
in the Air Estimates for 1935.33 It was then described 
as, "A type for long range and high speed special 
operation, viz. a high cruising speed made possible by 
catapulting, refuelling in the air, or launching by other 
aircraft". Following Verney's proposal, this project 
(B. 4/36) was merged'with the new heavy bomber, and 
redesignated B. 12/36.34 One consequence was that 
development of a heavy bomber was moved ahead of that of 
the planned new medium bomber. 35 
The Air Staff reconsidered their requirements for a heavy 
bomber so as to take account of the catapulting scheme. 
They decided that, 
It should be an aircraft that can exploit the 
alternatives between long range and very heavy bomb 
33 2/716, DDOI to CAS, 12.10.34, Appendix 6B, Air Estimates 1935 
34 ibid., Note by DDOR, 16.9.37 
35 2/1402, DTD to AMRD,. 21.4.36 
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load which is made possible by catapult launching in 
an overloaded condition. 36 
In putting draft requirements to the DCAS (Courtney) in 
May 1936, Oxland (now Group Captain and Deputy Director 
Operational Requirements) said that, despite the weight of 
the onboard catapulting equipment, the new aircraft would 
in normal operation give some advance over the B. 1/35 
specification which it was to replace. It would have a 
cruising speed 35 mph higher and a doubling of defence - 
with two guns in a front turret, two amidships (under the 
fuselage) and four in the tail. With catapult take-off 
the new bomber would have a vastly increased striking 
power -a range of 3,000 miles with 8,000 lbs of bombs or 
of 2,000 miles with 14,000 lbs. 
Oxland said that it might be thought that a four-engined 
aircraft would be unduly large, but that a 100 feet limit 
had been placed on span, and RDA3 (Liptrot) agreed that 
the performance could be obtained within that limit. A 
four-engined type was proposed after a study of foreign 
developments and plans for such heavy bombers, and that, 
The speeds of all foreign heavy bombers, with the 
exception of the Italian S. 79, falls considerably 
below the speed we hope to attain. The French and 
U. S. S. R. are in the region of 140 m. p. h., the German 
and U. S. A. in the region of 200 m. p. h., and the 
Italian 250 m. p. h. 37 
(The S. 79 was a relatively short range three-engined 
aircraft. ) 
The Operational Requirements Committee met on 27th May 
1936 to discuss the new bomber, B. 12/36.38 The 
committee's discussion first centred round the size of the 
proposed aircraft. Verney explained that the size had 
been selected to take full advantage of catapult take-off. 
Although the new bomber it was expected to be no larger 
36 PRO: AIR 2/2629, HeaYy Bomber Landpiene (4 Engines) Specn. 8/12/36 Type Requ_irements. 
IA, Air Staff Requirements for a 4-engined heayy bomber tandplane, undated 
37 2629 ibid., DDOR to DCAS, 8.5.36 
38 9/77, Minutes of 27th May 1936 
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geometrically than the immediately preceding heavy bomber 
project, B. 1/35, with maximum overload it would be much 
heavier than any aircraft then operated by the RAF. The 
issue of weight was discussed in terms of technical and 
operational feasibility, not of bombing policy. The 
concern was whether a smaller twin-engined aircraft was 
preferable to the four-engined aircraft of the draft 
requirement. A force of twin-engined aircraft was seen as 
more reliable, because the unserviceability of an engine 
would reduce the striking force less - assuming that there 
would be a larger number of smaller bombers. On the other 
hand, a four-engined aircraft could carry greater 
defensive firepower. In view of the deep penetration 
flights that were expected, this was taken as the decisive 
argument. 
The representative of the ADGB (Air Commodore A. D. 
Cunningham) put the Command's view that it was better to 
go for a higher speed at the expense of defensive 
armament, 39 but this was not accepted. It will be seen 
that when the Command was represented by its AOC-in-C at 
the committee meeting on the new medium bomber, it was to 
be more successful in arguing the case for speed. 
Some interest was expressed in the operation of the 
proposed catapult system, but there was no questioning of 
where and when they would be built, or the state of 
development and likelihood of success. Verney's claim 
that, "this was a method of getting a large load without 
having to build a huge aeroplane", 40 was apparently 
accepted as an established fact. 
The committee's views on the composition of the bomb load 
had important consequences. It was accepted that the 
ability to carry 2,000 lb bombs was needed only for 
attacking ships - underlining that the heavy bomber was no 
39 ibid., para. 27 
40 ibid., para. 21 
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longer seen solely as a night bomber. Otherwise it was 
thought unnecessary to provide for bombs larger than 500 
lbs each for use against land targets. Space would 
therefore have to be found for the twenty-eight 500 lb 
bombs which would make up the maximum overload of 14,000 
lbs, and this would lead to bomb bays in the wings as well 
as in the fuselage - but with no individual bomb cell 
larger than that needed for the 2,000 lb bomb. 
When Oxland summarised the committee's conclusions he 
emphasised four points. one was the advantage that the 
larger size of bomber would give if the numbers of bombers 
were to be limited by International agreement. Second was 
the ability to carry seven 2,000 lb Armour Piercing bombs 
and so to support the Fleet and sea-borne trade. Third 
was the aircraft's suitability for home defence and to 
reinforce overseas. Fourth was the avoidance of 
production problems by obtaining a large loading capacity 
without having to build a huge aircraft. Oxland 
demonstrated the relative economy of the heavy bomber as 
compared with two medium bombers to give the same bomb 
lift -a meaningful comparison only if the range was the 
same, which was so only with overload take-off. 41 
In seeking the approval of the CAS to the requirements for 
a new heavy bomber, the DCAS (Courtney) also stressed the 
intention to exploit catapult launching, and the relative 
economy of the heavy bomber, but said there were reasons 
for also needing a medium bomber - "amongst which is the 
possibility in the future of a renewal of the idea of an 
International agreement for a limitation of all-up 
weight. 1142 Thus whilst Oxland argued that the case for 
needing a new heavy bomber was that aircraft numbers might 
be limited by international agreement, Courtney argued 
that the case for a new medium bomber was that aircraft 
weight might be so limited. Perhaps past experience of 
41 2/2629, DDOR to DCAS, 11.6.36 
42 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 12.6.36 
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disarmament discussions warned them that both fears were 
justified. 
Neither Oxland nor Courtney made any reference to a change 
in bombing policy, nor did the CAS (Ellington) when he 
approved Air Staff Requirement B. 12/36. He did, however, 
ask if any consideration had been given to replacing some 
of the 0.303in machine guns with 20mm cannon. 43 It Will 
be recalled from chapter 6.2.2 that Ellington had earlier 
encouraged the equipment of RAF fighters with cannon. 
Officers of the ADGB Command had also considered the 
possibility of heavier armament when they saw the first 
draft Air Staff Requirements for B. 12/36,44 but had not 
raised it at the Operational Requirements Committee 
meeting. 
The Air Staff's somewhat specious answer to Ellington's 
query is discussed in detail in section 8.3.4. It must 
bear a large measure of responsibility for the inadequate 
armament of RAF bombers in the Second World War. The DDOR 
(Oxland) advised that 20MM cannon armament for bombers was 
neither feasible nor necessary, and the DCAS (Courtney) 
added his own view that little was known about the 
application of larger calibre guns to aircraft. 45 (In 
fact the RAF had been experimenting with the large C. O. W. 
gun since 1917.46) Courtney did refer to the Air 
Ministry's cannon fighter prototypes, but suggested 
awaiting experience. with these before considering an 
application to bombers. 
Faced with this advice, Ellington had little option but to 
agree that cannon armament should not be tried in B. 12/36. 
Nevertheless, he did not want the issue postponed until 
43 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 12.6.36 
44 PRO: AIR 16/159, Four Enqfned Heavy Bomber Lanciptane Specification 812/36 Air Staff 
Requirements for, SASO to Air Ops., 21.5.36 
45 2/2629, DCAS to CAS, 24.6.36 
46 PRO: AIR 2/732, Mutti-Engine Bomber: Notes by Armament Experimentat Station, Report 
on Sfnaia Aeroptane, 18th ApriL 1918 
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the fighters were available - which he correctly expected 
to be several years. 47 
Arrangements were made to circulate the Air Staff 
Requirement for a heavy bomber to aircraft manufacturing 
firms. The DTD (Verney) asked that Armstrong Whitworth, 
Vickers, Handley Page and Boulton Paul should be told that 
they would be invited to tender, 48 but later agreed49 to a 
request from the Operational Requirements branch that 
Short Bros. should be included on the list of firms to be 
invited to tender. The branch had seen a design at Shorts 
which it said came close to the requirement. 50 
The full specification, "No. B. 12/36 Heavy Bomber", was 
issued in July 1936. It stated that the military load to 
be carried during acceptance trials need include only 
2,000 lbs of bombs, for this was the design case for a 
normal (500 yard) take-off. But the section of the 
specification on "Structural Strength" decreed that the 
aircraft must be designed for launching at "limiting 
weight" from a catapult which imposed an acceleration of 
two-and-a-half "g" at the end of a launch. 51 
Goulding and Moyes claim that at the Operational 
Requirements Committee the Goshawk engine was much 
favoured, 52 but in fact the Committee had simply been told 
that Liptrot's estimates of feasible performance had been 
based upon the use of four Goshawks. 53 The significance 
of this was that his original assessment of the potential 
of a four Merlin (then put at 850 hp54) bomber had been 
overtaken by hopes of developing a smaller aircraft for 
use with catapult take-off. Nevertheless, four engines 
47 2/2629, CAS to DCAS, 25.6.36 
48 ibid., DTD to DOC, 19.6.36 
49 ibid., DTD to C4C [Contracts Dept. 3,17.7.36 
50 ibid., ORI to RDA3,13.7.36 and E11A3, DOC to Short Bros., 18th July 1936 
51 ibid., 26A, Specification No. B. 12/36 Heavy Bomber, dated 15th July 1936, para. III 
52 Goulding and Noyes, page 41 
53 9/77, Minutes of 27th May 1936, para. 2 
54 PRO 6/50, Expansion Progress Meetings July- 1937, EPM 91(37), pare-2 
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were still desired and the Goshawk of 700 hp was the right 
size on which to base the project study. 
Prototypes to specification B. 12/36 were ordered from 
Supermarine and Short Bros.. Development of the 
Supermarine aircraft was delayed by work on the Spitfire, 
and by the loss of prototypes in an air raid in 1940. The 
Short Stirling went into production. Thus, as with the 
previous heavy bomber B. 3/34, a production order was given 
to a firm which was not on the DTDIs original list of 
those he wished to invite to tender - with a similar 
unsatisfactory result. 
8.2.3 Medium Bomber P. 13/36 (Halifax and Manchester) 
The new medium bomber was intended to form the "backbone 
of the Striking Force" as quoted above. It was hoped that 
it would also meet the requirements of the General 
Reconnaissance, General Purpose, and Torpedo Bomber 
classes. 
For some years the desire to reduce the number of types in 
RAF service centred on the possibility of bringing 
together some of these four classes. In 1930 Newall (then 
DCAS) had proposed that the General Purpose and Torpedo 
Bomber classes could be combined. 55 Also in 1930, Welsh, 
in a paper which reviewed aircraft in service and under 
construction, noted that it was intended that in future 
the medium bomber would double as a coast defence torpedo 
bomber. 56 This point was reinforced in 1931 by Plans 
branch, who, as discussed in chapter 7.2, saw that one 
advantage of a twin-engined day bomber was that it would 
be capable of torpedo carrying. 
55 20/68, DCAS to CAS and AMSR, 14.10.30 
56 9/37, Fotio 18, Types of Aircraft at Present in thq_Service and Types Under 
Construction, February 1930 
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A draft Air Staff Requirement P. 13/36 for a multi-role 
medium bomber was prepared for discussion by the 
Operational Requirements Committee. It followed that of 
the heavy bomber B. 12/36 in aiming to exploit overload 
operation with a long take-off and with the catapult 
scheme. It was hoped that a normal (500 yard take-off) 
bomb load of 1,500 lbs and range of 1,000 miles could be 
increased to 2,000 lbs and 2,000 miles with a 700 yard 
take-off, and to 3,600 lbs and 3,000 miles - or 8,000 lbs 
and 1,800 miles - with catapult take-off. Defensive 
armament was to be a four machine-gun tail turret and a 
two-gun front turret. 57 
The Operational Requirements Committee met on 22nd June 
1936 to consider P. 13/36.58 A Table had been prepared 
which gave two twin-engined examples. Case I had a 
cruising speed of 220 mph, and case II, a larger aircraft, 
250 mph. At the meeting Oxland explained that the Air 
Staff had called for a (ferry) range of 3,000 miles so as 
to get world-wide use, as with B. 12/36, and that they 
hoped to make use of catapulting. He asked the committee 
to consider if a cruising speed of 220 mph was adequate, 
or if a higher speed was sufficiently important to justify 
a larger aircraft, 59 - remarks which are hardly indicative 
of an organisation wedded to a big bomber policy. There 
was much discussion of this point, with the ADGB Command 
stressing the need for a speed higher than that offered 
even in case II. 
Now a key feature of the meetings on new aircraft 
requirements set up by Ludlow-Hewitt in 1933 was that they 
included the representatives of the operational Commands 
of the RAF. Thus the papers on P. 13/36 had been sent to 
the ADGB Command before the committee meeting, and the 
AOC-in-C (Air Marshal Sir John Steel) had sought the views 
57 9/77, Draft Air Staff Requirements for a twin engined Medium Somber tandplane 
Specification P. 13/36,10th June 1936 
58 ibid., Minutes of Meeting to consider P. 13/36,22nd June 1936 
59 ibid., minutes of 22nd June 1936, para. 5 
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of his officers. The response from his Headquarters staff 
was that speed was preferable to armament, 60,61,62 and this 
view was supported by No. 1 (Bomber) Group, who wanted a 
speed of 300 mph. 63 
Steel pursued this line at the Operational Requirements 
Committee. He suggested that it was the amalgamation of 
the requirements of four classes which had led to a loss 
of performance in the medium bomber role, and he was 
concerned about the weight of catapulting equipment. He 
also suggested that a bomb load of 1,000 lb would suffice, 
with the comment that, "If a greater load was required, 
more than one aeroplane could be used. 1164 This remark 
underlined the RAF's continuing belief in the accuracy and 
effectiveness of bombing, and perhaps the operational 
Command's scepticism in regard to overload operation. 
Oxland insisted that the Air Staff had first formulated 
requirements for a medium bomber, and had then considered 
if it could be used for other purposes. It was not these 
which caused a loss of speed. As regards the request for 
300 mph, Liptrot explained that a reduction in range and 
bomb load would be necessary to get this speed -a longer 
take-off would not be sufficient. 65 
No conclusion was reached on 22nd June, and a second 
meeting was arranged to consider new options aimed at a 
higher cruising speed. 66 For this meeting, held on 29th 
July 1936,67 three further examples were added to those 
considered earlier. 68 In these the normal bomb load had 
60 PRO: AIR 16/194, Twin Engined Medium Bomber Landotane. Specification P. 13/36. Air 
Staff Requirements for., Air Opsl to SASO, 12.6.36 
61 ibid., Navigation to Air Ops, 15.6.36 
62 ibid., Chief Signals-officer to Air Ops, 16.6.36 
63 ibid., Headquarters No. 1 (Bomber) Group to Headquarters, ADGB, 17.6.36 
64 9/77, Minutes of 22nd June 1936, pares. 10 and 29 
65 ibid., Minutes of 22nd June 1936, para. 52 
66 ibid., Minutes of 22nd June 1936, para. 51 
67 ibid., Minutes of a Meeting of the operational Requirements Committee ... on 29th 
July 1936, to give further consideration to ... P. 13/36 68 ibid., DDOR to AMRD et &1,8.7.36, Appendix A 
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been reduced from 1,500 lbs to 1,000 lbs, but a range of 
1,000 miles was retained. 
The DTD explained to the committee that he had first 
looked at the increase in speed which could be obtained 
from the original case II by a reduced normal load and an 
increase in normal take-off from 500 to 600 yards. He 
said that "The object was to produce a smaller aeroplane". 
This case III did not give 300 mph. New design studies IV 
and V showed the improvement in speed over case III made 
possible by increased power. The DTD said that for these 
it was not necessary to take advantage of a longer take- 
off, although the landing distance needed to be increased 
to 600 yards. This was to cater for the higher wing- 
loading that was needed to get a higher cruising speed. 
Case V was a four-engined example which had been included 
as at the request of the AMRD (Freeman), but it was not as 
good as the twin Rolls-Royce Vulture engined Case IV. 69 
(Note that the wing span of all these options was less 
than that of the B. 9/32 Wellington. ) 
Verney said that from a normal 500 yard take-off case IV 
was estimated to have a cruising speed of 278 mph and a 
top speed of 320 mph. The Table of performance 
comparisons showed that with a 700 yard take-off the range 
would be 2,000 miles with a bomb load of 3,400 lbs, at a 
slightly reduced speed. It was hoped that catapult take- 
off would give 2,080 miles with 8,000 lbs or 3,000 miles 
with 4,200 lbs, with a further small reduction in speed. 
A reinforcing range of 2,800 miles was attainable from a 
700 yard take-off. 
Verney told the committee that although the ministry did 
not intend to specify the type of engine, designers would 
be driven to use Vultures to get the required 
perf ormance. 70 Ther e is an interesting parallel in this 
69 Minutes of 29th July 1936, para. 2 
70 ibid., para. 23 
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respect between the P. 13/36 bomber and the Vulture engine 
and the F. 7/30 fighter and the Goshawk. In neither case 
was use of a particular engine specified, but only one was 
available to designers to give the required performance. 
In both cases the engine was a failure, and with it the 
aircraft. The Vulture-engined Manchester was transformed 
into the Lancaster with Merlin engines, and the 
Supermarine F. 7/30 sired the Spitfire, also with a Merlin 
engine. 
It was explained to the committee that the limiting factor 
in design for speed was the tankage required for a range 
of 3,000 miles plus the usual allowance of M hour at full 
power for take-off and reserves. Verney had suggested at 
the first meeting on P. 13/36 that if internal tankage was 
reduced to that for 2,000 miles it might be possible to 
get 300 mph, with the reinforcing range requirement of 
3,000 miles without bombs met by detachable tanks. 71 
After further consideration of this solution at the second 
meeting on P. 13/36, it was decided that it would be 
premature to reduce the requirement to below 3,000 miles 
before it was seen what designers could do. But the 
reserve fuel requirement was reduced to that for U hour at 
full power at sea level. 72 
To fulfil the role of torpedo bomber the bomb cell of 
P. 13/36 was to be convertible to take four torpedoes. 73 
However, Wing Commander W. S. Caster, representing Coastal 
Command on the Operational Requirements Committee, 
questioned the use of an aircraft of the proposed size as 
a torpedo bomber. Attacks on capital ships were expected 
to be costly, and Caster thought that the medium bomber 
would be too valuable to sacrifice in large numbers. It 
was decided to omit the specific requirement for torpedo 
carrying, but to say that, "designers should make 
71 ibid., Minutes of 22nd June 1936, para. 33 
72 ibid., Minutes of 29th July 1936, paras. 3,4 and 28 
73 ibid., Minutes of 22nd June 1936, para. 15 
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provision for carrying two torpedoes in a certain number 
of this class. 1174 
Following the second committee meeting the DCAS (Courtney) 
reported to the CAS and sought his approval to proceed 
with new requirements based upon case IV. He said that 
after comparisons had been made of speed, bomb load and 
all-up-weight, he had reluctantly accepted requirements 
which would give a bomb load of only 1,000 lbs at a range 
of 1,000 miles from "poor or smallish aerodromes", but 
that, "Under maximum load conditions (with accelerated 
take-off) Case IV gives us a better performance than Case 
III'. Courtney's remark illustrates the importance which 
the Air Staff attached to the catapult scheme. He 
explained that although the new medium bomber would have 
the same normal weight as the Vickers B. 1/35 heavy bomber 
(the Warwick), it would be smaller and faster. 75 
Ellington approved the requirements, and they were 
circulated to aircraft firms on 24th August 1936.76 
Contracts for prototypes were awarded to Avro and Handley 
Page. 
8.3 SPAN, TORPEDOES, TROOPS AND CANNON 
The earlier sections of this chapter have described the 
Air Staff's intentions in the development of the two 1936 
bomber specifications. These included reliance on 
assisted take-off to obtain very heavy operational loads, 
and the use of the medium bomber as a torpedo bomber. The 
literature largely overlooks the significance of these 
aims, but is critical of the limitation on span which was 
written into the requirements, and of a supposed troop 
carrying role. The eventual abandonment of assisted take- 
74 ibid., Minutes of 29th July 1936, para. 39 
75 PRO: AIR 2/2826, Medium Bomber tandptene Twin Engine Specn P13/36- Type Requirements, 
DCAS to CAS, 31.7.36 
76 ibid., 16A, Appendix 'IS" to Specification P. 13/36 
Chapter 8 Bombers to attack Germany 
276 
off schemes is discussed in the next chapter aspart of a 
discussion of the importance of airfield size for bomber 
development. This section discusses the significance of 
the span limit, the torpedo carrying requirement, and the 
actual requirement for personnel transport that was 
written into bomber requirements. It also examines the 
follow-up to Ellington's request that cannon armament 
should be considered for B. 12/36. 
8.3.1 Si)an Limitation 
It will be remembered (chapter 7.2.1) that the practice of 
placing a limit on the span of RAF bombers had originated 
with Sir John Salmond's concern in 1931 about getting the 
aircraft designed to B. 9/32 into "our sheds", and that it 
was only the size of Expeditionary Force hangars which was 
found to be relevant. In fact, when the Vickers 
Wellington was developed to B. 9/32 with a span of 86 feet, 
this increase over the specification limit of 70 feet was 
accepted by the Air Ministry so as to get an improved 
perf ormance. 77 
The idea that the reason for limiting the span of later 
bombers was the size of hangars persisted - even in the 
RAF. It has been shown in chapters 7.2.2.1 and 7.3.1 that 
Harris made scathing remarks about such a policy - if 
there was one. 
The AHB narrative on the evolution of Bomber Command said 
the wing span of B. 12/36 and P. 13/36 was kept down 
"largely from considerations of hangar space", and many 
writers insist the 100 feet limit was related to the size 
of RAF hangar door openings. Mason asserts that 100 feet 
was "stated to be the maximum door width of current RAF 
hangars", even though he claims that a thorough search 
reveals that the door opening of the most widely used 
77 Goutding and Moyes, page 22 
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hangar was 126 feet. 78 Ellam agrees that most RAF hangars 
had door openings of more than 100 feet, but that "some 
older 'sheds"' had only 100 feet. He says that for this 
reason a reduction in the span of the Fairey Hendon (to 
B. 19/27) from nearly 102 feet to 97 feet was considered, 
but not imposed. 79 In fact such a reduction in span was 
immediately rejected by Air Commodore R. P. Mills (DOSD) on 
the obvious grounds that the small clearance at each wing 
tip which would be achieved was "insufficient for taking 
big aircraft through a doorway". 80 His comment underlines 
the absurdity of claims that a 100 ft limit on span was 
placed with a view to getting a large aircraft into a 
hangar with a door opening of exactly the same size. It 
is also relevant that the then DCAS (Ludlow-Hewitt) 
commented that he had seen the Hendon put on a skate and 
pushed sideways into a hangar with a door opening of 85 
feet. He called for-more RAF experiments on this 
technique. 81 
In fact, when a limit of 100 feet was proposed for the new 
bombers in 1936, the reason then given was to stop them 
getting too large. As has been shown in chapter 4.4.3, 
this concern with size arose from the RAF's finding that 
the two large transports designed to specification C. 16/28 
were too unwieldy for ground handling. This concern was 
re-stated in the discussion of the B. 1/35 specification. 82 
For B. 12/36 and P. 13/36 it is clear hangar size was not an 
issue, for the opening paragraph of both requirements 
specified that, "Since it will be required to operate from 
bases anywhere in the world the aircraft must possess good 
facilities for maintenance in the open". 83,84 Specification 
78 Mason, British Bomber, page 313 
79 ELLam, C., The British Heavy Bomber Aeroplane, tecture to the Newcomen Society, Ilth 
December 1996, page 12 
80 PRO: AIR 2/850, "Hendon" Fairey Twin-Enqined Bomber Specn. 19/27 Type Requirements, 
DOSD to F01,13.2.33 
81 Wd., DCAS to DOSD, 10.11.33 and 5.12.33 
82 2/2820,5A, February 1935, para. 6 
83 2/2629,2A, para. 1 
84 2/2826,23B, para. 1 
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B. 12/36 required that engines must be replaceable with 
ease and rapidity, "in the field". 85 
The limit on span of 100 feet imposed in specification 
B. 12/36 is cited by Thetford, 86 Barnes, 87 Falconer, " and 
Goulding and MoyeS89 as the reason for the Short 
Stirling's poor performance. of particular concern was 
its relatively low ceiling. 
The geometrical parameter known as aspect ratio has a 
major influence on an aircraft's ceiling, and on its 
range. Aspect ratio is span squared divided by area, so 
as wing area is usually determined by landing weight and 
distance requirements, a limitation on span may prevent a 
designer obtaining an aspect ratio high enough for the 
required ceiling and range. 
It is said by Barnes that Short Bros. wished to have a 
span of 112 feet for the Stirling but that, 
"Unfortunately, before ordering any prototypes, the Air 
Ministry stipulated that the span must not exceed 100 ft, 
in order to conform to existing hangar dimensions". 90 No 
doubt the design referred to by Barnes was that seen by 
the Operational Requirements branch before the Air Staff 
Requirement was issued, but if it was based upon a preview 
of the requirement, that included the 100 ft limit from 
its first draft. It was repeated in the final form which 
was sent to Short Bros. some months before prototypes were 
ordered. 91 
Short Bros. designed a wing with a span of 99 feet, aspect 
ratio 6.71. However, in his accepted design to the same 
specification, B. 12/36, Mitchell of Supermarine's did not 
85 2/2629,26A, para. 33 
86 Thetford, page 488 
87 Barnes, Shorts, page 371 
88 FaLconer. J., Stirling at War, 1991, page 8 
89 Goutding and Moyes, page 43 
90 Barnes, Shorts, page 371 
91 2/2629, MAI, DoC to Short Bros., 9th Juty 1936 
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think it necessary to fully exploit the limit set by the 
Ministry, for the span of that firm's Types 316-318 was 
initially but 93 feet, aspect ratio 6.97. This was later 
increased to 97 feet, aspect ratio 6.93.92 Clearly 
Mitchell shared with Liptrot the view that it was not 
necessary to exploit the maximum span allowed to meet the 
specification, even though span squared is the critical 
parameter. Even the famed Lancaster had a wing span of 
only 102 feet. 93 
The major failing of the Stirling was a large increase in 
structure weight during design94,95 - so much so that in 
1940, when the question of additional fuel capacity for 
the Stirling was under consideration, it was said that 
this, "had no operational advantage since even with no 
bombs the weight of the aircraft plus normal military 
equipment exceeded the anticipated practicable operational 
all up weight". 96 If this was so the limit on span 
imposed in the specification was of little consequence. 
8.3.2 Torpedo Carrying 
A feature of the 1936 bomber specifications which had 
unlooked for repercussions was the requirement that the 
medium bomber P. 13/36 should be capable of modification to 
carry torpedoes. 
When tenders to specification P. 13/36 had been received, 
it was found that provision to carry two 18 in. torpedoes 
(which were 18 feet long), without altering the main 
structure of the aircraft, or losing performance, was 
causing design difficulties. This led the DDOR (Oxland) 
to review the discussion on this issue which had taken 
92 Andrews and Morgan, Supermarine, page 323 
93 Thetford, page 68 
94 2/2629, DDOR to DTD, 23.11.37 
95 2/2899, AD/RDL to DGRD, 16.1.39, and 1A, 11.1.39 
96 ibid., 13A, DOR to DD/RDA, 8.8.40 
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place at the two Operational Requirements Committee 
meetings on P. 13/36.97 He told the DCAS (Peirse) that the 
Coastal Command representative had given his C-in-C's view 
that the aircraft was too large and expensive for a 
torpedo bomber. Even so, the then DCAS (Courtney) had 
argued that whilst there was the possibility of a 
limitation on the numbers of first-line aircraft, it was 
desirable that every unit should be as effective in war as 
possible. As has been seen, a muted form of the torpedo 
carrying requirement was therefore included in the 
requirements. 
Oxland recommended that as a dedicated torpedo bomber was 
now under development (B. 10/36 - Bristol Beaufort), the 
torpedo requirement should be deleted from P. 13/36. 
Alternatively, he said, provision could be made for a 
limited number of the aircraft to have larger bomb doors 
etc.. 
The Operations and Plans branches of the Air Staff did not 
agree that the torpedo requirement should be scraped. 
They advised Peirse that the Admiralty had yet to be 
persuaded that, "the IB' bomb is in every way a more 
efficient weapon with which to attack ships", and that a 
torpedo bomber version of P. 13/36 should be developed 
until the Admiralty was convinced otherwise. 98 (The "B" 
bomb was designed to be dropped in the path of a ship, 
sink, and then rise to strike the bottom of the ship as it 
passed over. 99,100) 
This discussion was made redundant when the Operational 
Requirements branch announced that it had new information 
on the size of torpedoes, which meant the Avro P. 13/36 
could carry only one internally, and that in any case 
existing torpedoes could not be released at 150 mph from 
97 2/2826,37A, P. 13/36 - Torpedo Requirements, DDOR to DCAs, 22.4.37 
98 ibid., DDOps (DDPL&ns concurring) to DCAS, 26.4.37 
99 MacBean, pages 252-255 
100 10/1430, Chapter V, para. 89 
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200 feet. 101 If this was relevant, the DCAS (Peirse) must 
have wondered how the idea of torpedo carrying for P. 13/36 
had arisen in the first place. It appears that the 
Operational Requirements branch had given no more thought 
to the operational problems of torpedo dropping than they 
were found to have given to catapult launching (chapter 
9). Peirse decided that torpedo carrying would no longer 
be required of the P. 13/36 bombers, 102 but by then designs 
were well advanced. 
8.3.3 Troov Carrying 
A common misconception regarding Air Ministry bomber 
requirements is that the Ministry always sought to combine 
bomber and troop transport requirements. This goes back 
to the early 1920s with the Vickers Virginia bomber and 
Victoria transport - which had the same wings. 103 Indeed, 
M. Smith appears to believe that it was the Victoria which 
was the bomber version. 104 Similarly, Mason maintains that 
the transport aircraft specification C. 16/28 was, 
"primarily a bomber requirement in every respect but 
name". 105 But as shown in chapter 4.4.3, it was the 
aircraft industry which suggested that aircraft built to 
this specification might also serve as night bombers. 
Mason further claims that this, 
dual-role capability requirement was to be demanded 
in numerous heavy bomber Specifications during the 
coming decade, and thereby dominated the design of 
almost every RAF heavy bomber of the Second World 
War, 106 
He claims that the B. 12/36 Stirling was, "to be able to 
carry 24 fully-armed troops". 107 Yet when Mason describes 
10,2/2826, OR1 to DCAS, 3.5.37 
102 ibid., DCAS to DDOR, 26.5.37 
103 Thetford, page 544 
104 Smith, M., pages 32 and 230 
105 Mason, British Bomber, page 228 
106 ibid., page 228 
107 ibid., page 314 
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the P. 13/36 Halifax, he says that, "The fuselage was also 
much deeper than that of the Stirling, the secondary 
troop-carrying requirement probably dictating this. 11108 
Andrews and Morgan also claim accommodation for twenty- 
four armed troops was specified for B. 12/36, in this case 
with reference to Supermarine's design. 109 Yet when Bomber 
Command officers inspected the mock-up - far from finding 
accommodation for fully armed troops - they were concerned 
as to whether there was adequate room for the crew. They 
reported that headroom throughout the fuselage was 
restricted, and that even the captain and navigator did 
not have room to stand. 110 
As discussed in chapter 7.3, the requirement that a heavy 
bomber should be designed so as to carry troops was indeed 
included in the first draft specification for the B. 3/34 
(Whitley). The Air-Staff had been led to believe that 
this additional role could be obtained without a reduction 
in its performance as a bomber. It was dropped from the 
specification after discussions with industry, and after 
the DTD had admitted it would result in a loss of 10 mph 
in speed. 
Specifications B. 12/36 and P. 13/36 did indeed ask that, 
Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a 
light removable form of seating for the maximum 
number of personnel that can be accommodated within 
the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for 
reinforcing overseas Commands. 111,112 
Note that seating was to be fitted in the fuselage, not 
that the fuselage was to be designed to take seating. 
Clearly this provision referred to the need to transport 
RAF ground crew to RAF Overseas Commands -a concomitant 
of the introduction of a reinforcement range into bomber 
108 ibid., page 330 
109 Andrews and Morgan, Supermarine, page 319 
110 2/2629,388, Notes on Inspection by Bomber Command staff of the Mock-up of the 
Supermarine 8.12/36,5.10.37, para. 7 
Ill ibid., 23A, para. 9(xii) 
112 2/2826,238, para. 9(xii) 
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requirements. However, in 1939 Air Staff policy was that 
for the P. 13/36 designs (Halifax and Manchester) this 
facility might be used to carry troops, albeit "'to 
special order only' to. 113 In a lecture to the Higher 
Commanders' Course the point was made that these bombers, 
"will have all the necessary cabin space, lift capacity 
and range to fulfil the bomber transport primary role and 
its secondary functions as well", but it was noted that, 
"by reason of the multiplicity of internal installations 
in the fuselage the troops may not enjoy the same degree 
of comfort available in present types. 11.114 clearly a 
troop carrying requirement did not dominate - or even 
influence - the design of RAF bombers. 
8.3.4 fannon Armament for Bombera 
It is noted in section 8.2 that in 1936 Ellington asked 
for 20mm cannon armament to be considered for the B. 12/36, 
and that the Air Staff advised that this was neither 
possible nor necessary. Their reasoning was unsound, and 
the policy was soon reversed, but it was then too late to 
modify any of the designs to the 1936 bomber 
specifications, although attempts were made. 
In chapter 6.2.2 it has been shown that when the cannon 
fighter (F. 37/35) was devised, the replacement of eight 
0.303in. machine guns by half that number of 20mm. cannon 
was regarded as a major increase in armament. Yet in 
response to Ellington's request for consideration of 
cannon armament for bombers, Oxland considered only the 
replacement of machine guns by the same number of 20mm 
cannon. From this premise he argued that for a tail 
turret, the extra weight of cannon so far aft of the 
centre of gravity was unacceptable - hardly an 
insurmountable obstacle for aircraft which were yet to be 
113 20/96, FOI to DDOps, 24.2.39 
114 PRO: AIR 69/17, The Role of Bomber-Transport Aircraft, 3rd May 1939 
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designed. He added that recoil loads would give grave 
problems except for firing almost directly astern. For a 
two-gun midships turret, Oxland claimed that whilst the 
weight would be half that of the tail turret, the weight 
of the ammunition needed for an aircraft which would spend 
long periods over hostile territory would be unacceptable. 
It will be seen in chapter 9 that this self-contradictory 
argument was replaced in 1938 by the acceptance that it 
was worth replacing half the bomb load with ammunition if 
that made it more likely that the remainder would get 
through. For the nose turret, Oxland said that cannon 
would obstruct the bomb aimer, and would also be too heavy 
if beam fire was wanted. He then claimed that these 
difficulties could be avoided because a bomber did not 
need the extra range of a big gun. 
This argument had been used in the operation Requirements 
branch's review of fighter and bomber armament mentioned 
in chapter 6.2.115 It was based upon the theory that when 
attacked from astern the effective range of a bomber's 
firing was considerably shortened as compared with that of 
the attacking fighter. This theory was irrelevant to 
defence against beam or frontal attacks, and therefore to 
midships and nose turrets. Nevertheless, Oxland claimed 
that it largely disposed of one of the two supposed 
advantages of 20mm guns. As regards the other advantage 
of cannon - an explosive shell - he said that the stage 
had not been reached "where this can be utilised 
effectively without severe disadvantages. 1016 There had 
been no mention of such difficulties when he and Sorley 
had advocated cannon armament for RAF fighters in 1935 - 
it was then claimed that one hit from a 20mm shell would 
be decisive. 117 
Little more than a year after Oxland had argued against 
20mm cannon armament for the B. 12/36 he was advising Plans 
115 5/1137, A. F. C. /15, 
116 2/2629,10A, DDOR to DCAS, 19.6.36 
117 5/1137, A. F. C. /15, para. 13 
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branch that bombers of the immediate future would need to 
be armed with 20mm guns (and later with 37-40mm guns). 118 
This was confirmed in a review of bomber armament in June 
1938.119 Plans were made to fit 20mm cannon to Mark II 
versions of the Stirling, Halifax and Manchester, 120,121 but 
by then the centre of gravity issue was decisive because 
it had not been designed for in 1936. Experiments with a 
20mm cannon midships turret for the Stirling and Halifax 
found that it was difficult to balance the aircraft even 
with the tail turret omitted entirely. The DD/RDA (W. S. 
Farren) explained to the Air Fighting Committee in 1940 
that nevertheless this was the only way of having 20mm 
guns on existing bombers. He said that to have cannon in 
a tail turret, "they would have to start again from the 
beginning,,. 122 
8.4 THE CIRCLE COMPLETED 
The outcome of the 1936 bomber specifications was 
remarkable. On the one hand, the prospect of catapult 
take-off led to a requirement for a relatively small heavy 
bomber to carry a very large bomb load or have a longer 
range than had been sought in earlier specifications. on 
the other hand, the desire for a multi-role high-speed 
medium bomber with a maximum range of 3,000 miles led to a 
relatively large aircraft of this type. Misleading 
interpretations of the Air Staff's intentions in 1936 most 
likely arise from a retrospective view of the development 
of the aircraft which were designed to meet these 
requirements. It transpired that the aircraft designed to 
the medium bomber specification (P. 13/36) embodied the 
potential for development into more successful heavy 
bombers (Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster) than that 
118 9/82,8A, note from-DDOR, 26.8.37 
119 9/77, The Gun Armament for Bombers, 2.6.38, para. 33 
120 PRO: AIR 2/3341, Question of Vutnerabitity of Fi hters Against Existing Bombers, 
DDOR to DSD, 20.7.38 
121 PRO: AIR 20/6, Priorities of Items of Armament-E-qu-ijp_ment, ACAS to DCAS, 21.12.38 
122 5/1126,21st Meeting, 5th Aprit 1940, para. 61 
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designed to the heavy bomber specification, B. 12/36 
(Stirling). That this was possible can be traced to three 
technical features of the medium bomber specification - 
gross overloading with catapult take-off, fuel tankage for 
a range of 3,000 miles, and provision for the internal 
stowage of torpedoes. 
Designs to specification P. 13/36 needed to be stressed for 
catapulting at maximum overload, and to have internal 
stowage for the overload bomb and fuel load. In addition, 
provision had to be made for an unobstructed bomb bay if 
some of the aircraft were to serve as torpedo bombers. 
These additions to the normal requirements gave scope for 
the future development of the aircraft which followed from 
the specification after both torpedo carrying and catapult 
take-off had been abandoned. There was space for much 
larger bombs than were envisaged in 1936, and the 
potential for operation with large bomb loads using a 
longer conventional take-off run. 
The first step towards the transformation of the intended 
medium to a heavy bomber came from Handley Page. Soon 
after commencing design to P. 13/36 the company concluded 
that the aircraft would be very similar to their on-going 
design to B. 1/35 - the "Americanised" B. 3/34 heavy bomber 
specification. They asked the Air Ministry if they could 
stop work on their contract for B. 1/35 and absorb it into 
their P. 13/36 design. 123 This was agreed. 124 
Both the Handley Page and Avro P. 13/36 bombers were 
initially designed to be powered by two vulture engines as 
anticipated by Verney. But the Handley Page design was 
soon changed to four Merlins, 125 and, as will be seen 
in 
chapter 9, was thought to meet the P. 13/36 maximum 
overload requirement without assisted take-off, albeit 
123 PRO: AIR 2/1903, Proposats to Re-Design the HandLey Pase B1/35 as a P-13/36, 
HandLey Page to AMSO and AMRD, 22nd September 1936 
124 Wd., DTD to Director of Contracts, c. December 1936 
125 2/2826,45A, CAS to AMRD, DCAS, DoO, 24.7.37 
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with a long conventional take-off. Avro continued with 
the Vulture engine, but this proved a failure, and the 
P. 13/36 Manchester was modified to the Lancaster, also 
with four Merlins. 126 Thus the Air Ministry's misplaced 
faith in the catapult scheme finished back where Liptrot's 
first estimates for a new heavy bomber had started - with 
bombers powered by four Merlins - albeit derived from 
requirements for a medium bomber. 
126 PRO: AVIA 15/590. Manchester with merlin XX EMLUMSI 
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9. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 1937-39 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The RAF's home defence role - the subject of this thesis 
required bombers to attack an enemy's military and 
industrial infrastructure, and fighters to defend the 
United Kingdom against air attack. Throughout the Second 
World War these roles were largely fulfilled by aircraft 
derived from operational requirements which had been 
defined before the end of 1936. This is partly explained 
by the need of both the Air Ministry and the aircraft 
industry for a breathing space. Group Captain R. H. M. S. 
Saundby (who replaced Oxland as DDOR in January 1938) 
argued to the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (AVM W. S. 
Douglas) in 1938 that, 
As a result of the introduction of the fast monoplane 
with relatively high wing loading in 1935, we have 
been obliged, during the last two years, in order to 
keep the Air Force up to date, to put out new 
requirements for every type of aircraft in service 
( ... ). This, of course, has resulted in an abnormal 
number of new specifications, and we have at present 
no less than seventeen types of aeroplane building 
which have not yet been tested, and in all but a few 
instances, not yet been flown. 
Then after listing the types under development, he said 
that, 
It is clear that we cannot continue to issue 
specifications at the rate to which we have recently 
become accustomed. We must have a brief pause in 
order to try out the aircraft now building. ' 
It will be noticed below that many of the Air Staff 
Requirements which were planned in the late 1930s were 
delayed and redesignated. 
1 20/68, page 23, DDOR to ACAS, 23.9.38 
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As regards the significance of the tremendous advances 
that had been made in aviation in the 1930s, some thought 
that these favoured bombers, and others that they favoured 
fighters. It was, of course, expected that the 
development of RDF Iradar) had improved the prospect of 
intercepting air attacks, but in "The Role of the RAF in 
National Defence" of July 1938, the Air Staff said that 
this must to some extent be conjectural, whereas "the 
advantages conferred on the bomber by its astonishing 
developments in speed are beyond dispute. 112 
On the other hand, at the same time Saundby, when writing 
upon the "Question of Vulnerability of fighters against 
existing bombers" , argued that, 
What has really altered the balance against the 
bomber is that the weight and performance of fighters 
is now such that the carrying of the small amount of 
armour necessary to protect the pilot and tanks can 
be arranged without difficulty. 
Ludlow-Hewitt, as AOC-in-C Bomber Command, held similar 
views. He feared that his bombers would be helpless 
against fighters which had sufficient armour to make then 
invulnerable to machine-gun fire when attacking bombers 
from astern. Both Saundby and Ludlow-Hewitt saw that the 
solution was to armour a bomber, and so "make itself even 
more immune from fire than can the fighter113,4 - but this 
was all in the context of armour against machine guns. 
The Air Staff argued that it was to meet such a 
development that they had specified the cannon fighter 
(F. 37/35 - chapter 6.2.2), and sought a cannon armed 
turret fighter. 5 It was known that other nations were 
also planning cannon-armed fighters, and, as discussed in 
2 PRO: AIR 8/244, Papers for Lord Chatfield, The Role of the RAF in National Defence, 
Air Staff, 5th July 1938 
3 2/3341, DDOR to DSD, 20.7.38 
4 Wd., 2A, AOC-in-C to Air Ministry, 25th June 1936 
5 8/214, DCAS to Dowding, 2nd December 1936 
Chapter 9 Operational Requirements 1937-39 290 
chapter 8.3.4, this led to plans to arm RAF bombers with 
similar weapons. 
Technical developments in engines made feasible the 
development of high altitude bombers and fighters, as Peck 
had noted in his review of aircraft requirements 
undertaken in 1935 (chapter 3.3.2). Contrary to Postan's 
assertion that studies of "the high altitude aeroplane" 
were instigated by industry in 1939,6 the Air Ministry 
undertook project studies and initiated experimental work 
at least two years earlier. 
An Air Staff Requirement (B. 25/37) for a four-engined 
bomber with a pressure cabin was drawn up in collaboration 
with the RAE in 1937,7 the CAS gave instructions for high 
altitude studies to proceed in April 1938,8 and plans to 
try a pressure cabin in a Wellington were also decided 
later that year. 9 In the war the need for high altitude 
aircraft was met by fitting pressure cabins to the 
Mosquito and Spitfire. 
The most significant events in the late 1930s from the 
point of view of an analysis of operational requirements 
were the study of the economics of a bomber striking force 
- which resulted in the specification of an "Ideal 
Bomber", and parallel efforts to gain support for a "speed 
bomber". These are discussed in sections 9.3 and 9.4, but 
first the next section discusses plans for new fighters in 
the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. 
6 Postan, page 81 
7 PRO: AIR 2/2082, Consideration of Design of Experimental Heavy Bomber included as a 
Devetopment Type in the 1937 Estimates. Specn. 825/3 , DTD to RDA3,18.6.37 and 3A, 
"Appendix "B" to Specification B. 25/37 
8 20/84, CAS to AMRD, 4.4.38 
9 PRO: AIR 2/3415, Devetopment of Aircraft for Operating at High ALtitudes, 2A, Notes of 
meeting ... on August 31st, 1938 
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9.2 FIGHTER DEVELOPMENT 
In chapters 5 and 6 it has been shown that by the summer 
of 1935 Air Staff Requirements had been issued which led 
to the Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant - the three first- 
line home defence fighters with which the RAF entered the 
war in 1939. In the years immediately preceding the 
outbreak of war, attempts were made to improve upon the 
1935 single-seat fighter requirement (F. 10/35) in terms of 
speed and firepower, and further efforts were made to 
develop a multi-seat turret fighter. None of these 
schemes was to supplant development of the Spitfire as the 
premier day interceptor f ighter. 10 Their evolution throws 
no new light on the Air Staff's concept of air warfare, 
apart from continuing confusion over the best layout for a 
turret fighter. 
9.2.1 Hurricane and Svitfire Replacement: F. 18/37 
In June 1937 the Air Staff opened discussions on a single- 
seat fighter to replace the Hurricane and Spitfire. They 
sought the views of the Research and Development 
(Aircraft) branch on possible performance levels of a 
fighter armed with twelve machine guns. 11 
Liptrot advised that a Napier Sabre engine of 1,920 hp 
could be expected to give a maximum speed of 405 mph, but 
he queried the Air Staff's proposed fuel allowances and 
landing distance. On fuel, Liptrot chided the Operational 
Requirements branch for using the old definition of 2/3rds 
power for endurance, whereas they should have calculated 
it "at maximum economic cruising power". (This change is 
noted in chapter 3.4.5. ) He suggested that the fuel 
allowance for climb could be reduced as the fighter would 
reach its operating height in under five minutes, 
but on 
10 Postan, pages 126-127 
11 2/2833, ORI(a) to RDA3,3.6.37 
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the other hand, "would like to suggest" that the endurance 
of RAF fighters had got too low, with the result that they 
could not pursue bombers. He proposed an increase from 
one to two hours, although this would reduce the top speed 
to 400 mph. 12 
In regard to landing distance, Liptrot explained that if 
this could be increased to 775 yards, the top speed would 
rise to 415 mph at 15,000 feet and 428 mph at 19,000 
feet. 13 He said that there was no need to mention take- 
off and climb in the requirements, as the use of very 
powerful engines and constant speed propellers ensured 
that these would be very good - wing loading would be 
determined by other considerations (e. g. landing 
distance). 
A draft Air Staff Requirement14 was drawn up for 
discussion by the Operational Requirements Committee on 
29th November 1937. The Operational Requirements branch 
had taken heed of Liptrot's advice on fuel for take-off 
and climb, and also called for permanent tankage for 30t 
more fuel than needed to meet the normal endurance 
requirement. Dowding (C-in-C Fighter Command) said that 
this was not needed for home defence, but it was kept for 
possible overseas needs. 15 Air Staff policy on this issue 
was re-emphasised in 1938 when increasing the range of the 
RAF's fighters was considered. Saundby then explained 
that, "We have kept down the tactical range of our 
fighters to the minimum required for home defence in order 
to obtain maximum performance and fire power. ivI6 
Discussion at the committee meeting centred on two issues 
- twelve or eight guns, and top speed versus landing 
12 ibid., RDA3 to DDOR, 26.7.37 
13 ibid., RDA3 to DDOR, 3.8.37 
14 ibid., 8A 
15 ibid., Minutes of the operational Requirements Committee meeting held on 29th 
November 1937, para. 57 
16 PRO: AIR 2/3037, Investigation into the Possibility of Increasing the Range 2f 
Fighter Aircraft, DDOR to DDOps, 16.5.38 
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distance. Dowding expressed a preference for eight guns 
with more ammunition rather than twelve guns. But after 
consideration of the higher chance of a lethal hit from 
twelve guns, and the problem of stowage for more 
ammunition for eight, twelve guns were agreed, subject to 
an investigation of alternatives. 17 In this discussion a 
comment by DDOps underlined the RAF's expectation that it 
would be faced with defence against unescorted formations 
of bombers. He pointed out that, 
during the last war the single-seater pilot was 
nearly always exposed to attack by other single- 
seaters and would therefore be more liable to become 
excited than the home defence pilot who could attack 
possibly from a range at which the enemy could not 
hurt him. [pencil manuscript note, 'Will the Germans 
have fighter escorts? 1]18 
The answer to the final query was presumably that they 
would not, for when referring to the latest fighters in 
production in May 1939, Saundby (then DOR) declared that, 
Generally speaking they are all intended for Home 
Defence i. e. the destruction of enemy bomber aircraft 
in circumstances in which they are unlikely to meet 
enemy fighter aircraft. 19 
At the Operational Requirements Committee discussion of 
F. 18/37 Liptrot made his point that a landing distance of 
greater than 600 yards would be advantageous, but Dowding 
insisted that this would be dangerous for night flying 
from some fighter aerodromes. It was said that in any 
case 600 yards was the maximum permissible at some 
aerodromes. The reaction of the AMRD (Freeman) to these 
arguments was that, 
11aerodromes should be made larger. The size of 
aerodromes was a limiting factor in the development 
of better aircraft. We were handicapping ourselves 
in a way that no other nation would allow itself to 
be handicapped. lo20 
17 2/2833, Operationat Requirements Committee Minutes, 29th November 1937, paras. 10-36 
18 9/77, Operationat Requirements Committee Minutes, 29th November 1937, para. 22 
19 20/167, DOR to ACAS, 9.5.39 
20 2/2833, Minutes, 29th November 1937, paras. 64-67 
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This problem also arose with respect to the Hurricane and 
Spitfire, for Fighter Command was concerned with their 
take-off with fixed pitch propellers. In July 1938 it was 
decided that 1,000 yard aerodromes would be adequate for 
these aircraft, but that their suitability for future 
fighter types with a variable pitch propeller - where 
landing would be the predominant problem - would have to 
be reconsidered. 21 It will be seen later that the 
performance of RAF bombers was also closely coupled with 
the size of airfields. 
Freeman also queried the small difference between the 
performance called for in the new requirements and that 
then estimated for the Westland F. 37/35 (the cannon 
fighter). He suggested that the new specification was not 
worth issuing unless the speed was raised to 420 mph * 
22 
In fact there was the possibility of getting a higher 
speed if a twin-engined fighter was accepted, but this was 
rejected by Dowding because there would inevitably be 
fewer larger fighters. 23 He thought that the Spitfire and 
Hurricane would be a match for the German aircraft coming 
into service. 24 
It was concluded that F. 18/37 should proceed, but if it 
showed little advance over the Westland cannon fighter it 
could be abandoned. 
Following the meeting the DCAS (Peirse) sought approval 
from the CAS to F. 18/37 as a replacement for the Hurricane 
and Spitfire. He noted that although development of fixed 
and turret cannon fighters was proceeding concurrently, 
until these were proven they could not relax efforts to 
improve upon conventional (machine-gun armed) types. 
21 PRO: AIR 2/3351, Size of Fighter Aerodromes in relation to Take-off and Landinq Ru 
of Modern Fighter Aircraft, 1A, meeting on 11th Juty 
1938 
22 2/2833, Minutes, 29th November 1937, para. 109 
23 ibid., Minutes, para. 37 
24 ibid., Minutes, para. 44 
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Peirse said, "the F. 18/37 Specification is designed to 
ensure this. s125 
Specification F. 18/37 led to the Hawker Tornado/Typhoon, 
which were later to be armed with four 20mm cannon. 
Postan says that it, "was not quite the aircraft 
originally expected". As a fighter it was inferior to 
contemporary German aircraft- and to later marks of the 
Spitfire. It was, however, successful as a ground attack 
aircraft26 -a role that had been considered briefly by 
the Operational Requirements Committee in 1937.27 
A new fixed-gun home defence fighter (F. 6/39) was 
considered in 1939, but soon abandoned. 28 The only other 
pre-war fixed-gun fighter development was the Beaufighter. 
This was not in response to a new Air Staff Requirement, 
but was offered by Bristol as a cannon fighter which could 
be quickly developed by a redesign of the Beaufort torpedo 
bomber. 29 In 1-940, when there was found to be a need for 
a long-range fighter to protect shipping, the Beaufighter 
was accepted for that role. 30 
9.2.2 Turret FicThters 
In chapters 4 and 6 it is shown that there was a school of 
thought in the RAF which doubted the ability of fixed-gun 
fighters to break up enemy bomber formations. This had 
led to attempts to develop a type of fighter which could 
bring the firepower of a formation of fighters to bear 
simultaneously, and from many directions. The surviving 
result of these efforts was the Defiant, with a four 
25 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 20.12.37 
26 Postan, page 127 
27 2/2833, Minutes, 29th November 1937, paras. 7-8 
28 PRO: AIR 2/3576, Fixed Gun Fighter Aircraft to Specification F6/39. Type 
requirements, 26A, Extract from Notes of Conference, 4th October 
1939 
L 29 PRO: AIR 2/3075, Beaufighter F. 17139. Type Requ re_ments, DDOR to DDGP, 22.11.38 
30 PRO: AIR 9/97 (no title), The Role and Requirements of a Long-Range Fighter, notes by 
Ptans2,13.3.40 
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machine-gun turret. Attempts to produce a cannon-armed 
turret fighter were pursued from 1936 to 1939, and these 
included resurrection of the front-turret and two-turret 
fighter types which have been discussed in chapter 6.3. 
In May 1936, after plans had been made to replace the 
eight machine gun armament of F. 10/35 by four 20mm cannon, 
the Operational Requirements branch suggested that the 
logical development was to replace the four machine guns 
of F. 9/35 (Defiant) by a four 20mm cannon turret. This 
was the same dubious logic which had eliminated 
consideration of cannon armament for the 1936 bombers - 
surely replacing eight machine guns by four cannon implied 
replacing four by two. Moreover, it was now said that the 
ability to fire straight ahead was needed, and that this 
ruled out a single-engined aircraft, and possibly called 
for a nose turret. 31 
Thus the argument which had been used by Courtney in 1935 
to justify cancellation of the 11CAS11 fighter type 
(F. 22/33) and its replacement by the Defiant was turned on 
its head. Indeed, when the Operational Requirements 
Committee discussed the new turret fighter, 32 it was 
offered two options, 33 one of which was a reincarnation of 
the 1, cAs, l type -a three seater with two twin-cannon 
turrets, one in the nose and the other amidships. This 
had been seen as the preferred layout. 34 The other option 
was a straightforward extension of the Defiant concept 
with a midships turret, but with four 20mm cannon and two 
engines so that it could fire straight ahead. 35 The 
committee decided to proceed with the two-seat single 
midships turret option. Unlike the Defiant, it was to 
have had one fixed forward-firing machine gun to answer 
Dowding's request for some means of engaging a single low- 
31 PRO: AIR 2/1798, Two Seater Fighter Landplane Specn. F11/37. Type Reguirements, OR3 
to DDOR, 20.5.36 
32 9/77 Minutes of Operationat Requirements committee, 4th March 1937 
33 ibid., DDOR to AND et al, 12.2.37, Draft Air Staff Requirements F. 18/36, "All and "B" 
34 8/214,7A, OR III to DCAS, 16.12.36 
35 2/1798, OR3 to DDOR, 20.3.36 
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flying aircraft. 36 Why the forward firing turret did not 
meet this need was not discussed. 
Dowding and Freeman questioned the feasibility of getting 
four 20mm cannon into a turret, and were told that a high- 
wing monoplane was envisaged with the turret merged into 
the top surface of the wing. It will be seen in section 
9.3.3 that this arrangement was then taken up for the 
armament of the "Ideal Bomber". 
After the committee meeting the designation of the new 
turret fighter was changed from F-18/36 to F. 11/37,37 and 
an Air Staff Requirement with that number was issued in 
May 1937.38 
In 1938 the question arose as to the best proportion in 
Fighter Command of two-seat fighters to single-seat 
fighters, and this led to an Air Staff review of "Air 
Defence Fighter Tactics". It concluded that at the speeds 
then attainable by bombers a fixed-gun single-seat fighter 
could attack only from astern. In consequence it would be 
difficult to obtain surprise, the enemy would need only 
rear defence, and only one or two fighters could attack 
simultaneously. The review repeated the now familiar 
argument that, "The moveable gun fighter, by flying on a 
parallel course to the bomber, can attack it from any 
direction and so overcome all these disadvantages. " It 
also argued that for "Air superiority fighting", where the 
aim was the destruction of opposing fighters and army 
cooperation aircraft, a moveable gun fighter could act 
defensively as well as offensively, and thus penetrate 
enemy territory and withdraw at will, whereas a single- 
seat fighter could not. 39 
36 9/77, Minutes, 4th March 1937, paras. 21-26 
37 2/1798,21A, DOI to C-in-C Fighter Command, 16th ApriL 1937 
38 ibid., 26A, Specification No. F. 11/37 Twin-Engined Two-Seater Fighter, Appendix "B" 
39 PRO: AIR 2/2964, The Emptoyment of 2-Seater and Sfnqte-Seater Fighters in a Home 
Defence War - Air Staff Note, IA, 17.6.38 
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Perhaps it was this re-affirmation of confidence in turret 
fighters which led to yet another cannon-turret fighter 
proposal, for little progress had been made with the 
turret required for F. 11/37. 
Early in 1939 a new turret fighter requirement (F. 2/38) 
was drawn up. The Air Staff now resurrected the need to 
fire at considerable angles of depression, and at first 
proposed to return to the Novel Fighter concept of a nose 
turret - with four 20mm cannon - albeit with limited arcs 
of fire. 40 However, this thought was overtaken by the 
suggestion that, "The upper turret of the B. 1/39 may be 
suitable for this aircraft. 114l This implied a midships 
turret. 
B. 1/39 was the Ideal Bomber. Its armament was based upon 
the type of turret which had been envisaged for F. 18/36 
(F. 11/37). Thus a turret development which initially 
arose from a fighter requirement, and was then to be 
specified for a bomber, was now proposed for a fighter. 
In fact it was found impossible to meet either need. 
Project studies showed that the new turret fighter would 
be no better than that started in 1936 - now F. 11/37.42 
After re-designation to F. 26/39, the F. 2/38 project was 
abandoned. 43 None of these post-1935 requirements led to 
a completed turret fighter. 
9.3 THE IDEAL BOMBER 
It has been shown in chapters 2,3 and 4 that the RAF had 
long sought a standard bomber which could serve for both 
day and night operations. This need was effectively met 
40 PRO: AIR 2/3544, Turret Fighter Aircraft to Specification F26/39 Type Requirements, 
1A, DOOR to DArmD, 3.1.39 
41 ibid., 2A, Air Staff Requirement for a Turret Fighter. Specification F. 2/38 
42 ibid., RDT1 to ORI(a), 9.5.39 
43 ibid., 8A, 4.10.39 
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in 1934 when Ludlow-Hewitt successfully argued that it was 
by then possible for all bombers to operate by day and by 
night. The day bomber specification B. 9/32 was amended to 
include full night flying equipment in 1935, and when the 
1936 heavy and medium bombers were under discussion no 
time of day limitation on their operation was raised. ' 
The 
Air Staff then pursued a different approach to the concept 
of a standard bomber, where the aim was to obtain the 
maximum striking power from a given sum of money. The 
emergence of this concept has been noted in chapter 7 in 
connection with the Hart versus Sidestrand replacement 
issue, and in the discussions which led to abandonment of 
the light bomber class. 
It was in July 1937 that the idea of a standard, all 
purpose, bomber began to crystalise within the Air Staff. 
The recently appointed DDPlans (Group Captain J. C. 
Slessor) put forward some general thoughts on the 
equipment of the RAF. He suggested two types of bomber - 
medium and heavy - both to have an operational range 
sufficient for war with Germany, and a reinforcing range 
to reach Egypt non-stop. These were no more than the 
principles which had lain behind the 1936 bomber 
specifications, B. 12/36 and P. 13/36. But when the DCAS 
(Peirse) saw Slessor's note he said that it did not answer 
his request for "an appreciation of the economical type of 
bomber aircraft for the Metropolitan Air Force. " 
Peirse said that it should not be assumed that a large 
aircraft was the obvious solution, for these might require 
special aerodromes of which only a few could be built. If 
so, the bomber force would be tied to these and present an 
easy target to an enemy, whereas a larger number of 
smaller aircraft could be dispersed over many normal 
airfields. He also feared that large bombers might be 
limited to night operations, and unable to undertake 
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precision bombing. 44 These remarks by Peirse contradict 
claims that the RAF adopted a big bomber policy in 1936. 
Peirse's concern with the inaccuracy of night bombing was 
confirmed by exercises in 1938 in which of forty-seven 
night raids only one was near enough to the target to be 
plotted - and that had an error of over a mile. Bomber 
Command attributed this, and poor results from earlier 
exercises, "to the extreme difficulty of finding and 
attacking an unilluminated target at night with high speed 
aircraft. 1145 It needed two years of wartime operations 
for the implications of this conclusion to be accepted. 46 
Air Vice Marshal Freeman (AMRD) saw the DCAS's comment on 
the possible need for special aerodromes, and strangely 
made no mention of the catapult scheme fostered by his 
department, and which was fundamental to the 1936 bombers. 
Instead he offered a new solution to the take-off of 
heavily-loaded bombers. He suggested that a few airfields 
in the Eastern counties should be equipped with hard 
runways, and that these should be used for "bombing-up". 
Bombers would fly to them from their normal (grass) 
airfields with full fuel but no bombs, load bombs at the 
special airfields, and then continue to their targets. 47 
This scheme was later to be rejected on the rather obvious 
grounds that it would introduce a vulnerable bottle-neck 
into bomber operations. 48 
Both Peirse and Freeman had raised a problem that was to 
dominate bomber development in the years immediately 
before the war, and which merits separate consideration. 
44 9/82,2A, DCAS to DDPLans, 30.7.37 
45 5/1132, item 33, Air Staff Note on Bombing PoLlcy, para. 22,2.2.38 
46 Webster and Frankland, Vot 1, page 178; has a discussion of the Butt report on the 
accuracy of RAF night bombing 
47 9/82,3A, AMRD to DCAS, 4.8.37 
48 ibid., 15A, Minutes of a meeting to discuss heavy bombers and aerodrome surfaces, 5th 
October 1937, para. 7 
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9.3.1 Aerodrome Polic 
The issue of the weight of aircraft which could operate 
from normal bomber airfields was fundamental to the bomber 
studies which Peirse and Slessor had set in train, and to 
the future of the bombers of the 1936 programme. 
There seems to have been, at times, an amazing lack of 
continuity of policy on this subject. In 1936 the CAS 
(Ellington) had agreed the specification of a new heavy 
bomber (B. 12/36) which was estimated to weigh over 30,000 
lbs in normal operation, and nearly 50,000 lbs with 
maximum overload and catapult take-off. 49 Yet at a 
Secretary of State's Progress Meeting on 20th July 1937, 
when the possible need for concrete runways was discussed, 
he advised that it would be "strategically unsound" to 
place reliance on them, and that in consequence the all- 
up-weight of RAF aircraft should be limited to 30,000 lbs 
for take-off on grass. 50 
Against this background, Slessor responded to the DCAS's 
request for a study of the most economical size of bomber. 
He drafted a new paper, dated September 1937, entitled 
"Considerations Affecting the Design of Ideal Bomber 
Aircraft for Metropolitan Air Force". In this he examined 
the best way of achieving the maximum bomb lift for an 
expenditure of E20 million. This paper, and its re- 
drafts, became known in the Air Ministry as the "Ideal 
Bomber" paper, and are referred to as such hereafter. 
Slessor explained that although his terms of reference 
were "limited to consideration of the most economical size 
of bomber aircraft for the Metropolitan Air Force", he 
thought it necessary to take a long view. He said that 
although Germany was then seen as the enemy, in ten years 
time it might be Russia, or Japan, or Italy. Therefore 
49 9/77, Minutes of the Operational, Requirements Committee, 27th May 1936, para. 2 
50 PRO: AIR 6/30,90th Secretary of State's Progress Meeting, 20th Juty 1937, page 4 
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the RAF must be prepared to get its bombers to anywhere in 
the world from the United Kingdom - "and that means 
adequate reinforcement range. " Moreover, they must be 
able to operate from locally available aerodromes -a 
consideration which he said, "may limit the size and 
weight to which we can economically go.,, 
Slessor then examined four examples, which he compared on 
the basis that, "the true criterion of cost of a bomber 
force should be the cost per ton delivered at the 
target. ". The detail of these examples was overtaken in 
the final version of the paper; suffice to say here that 
he concluded that a bomber with a maximum bomb load of 
10,000 lbs was the most economical. However, Slessor 
feared that a bomber of this size might need hard runways, 
and that Freeman's "bombing-up" scheme might have to be 
considered. 51 
These fears were justified. Slessor was advised that his 
proposed bomber would be similar to the B. 12/36 which had 
been ordered in the previous year. It would need a take- 
off on grass of 1,400 yards, or of 900 yards on concrete. 
The B. 12/36 bomber was, of course, planned to be 
catapulted when highly overloaded - its normal bomb load 
was 2,000 lbs from a take-off on grass of 500 yards, and 
the maximum conventional take-off then considered feasible 
was 700 yards. Slessor was also advised that bombers 
needed to be armed with 20mm cannon (as noted in chapter 
8), and that to get a high speed the bomber must be as 
small and clean as possible. 52 
Following this advice, Slessor sent his draft paper to 
other branches of the Air Staff with the comment that it 
had, "a possibly dangerous bias towards the big aeroplane, 
51 9/82,9B, Considerations Affecting the Design of the ideal Bomber Aircraft for the 
Metropolitan Air Force, DDPLans to DDOps, 2.9.37 
52 ibid., 8A, from DDOR, 26.8.37 
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and that its disadvaneages may not have been fairly 
brought out. iM 
The tentative conclusion that the RAF's standard bomber 
should be relatively large re-opened the question of what 
was the heaviest weight acceptable to normal airfields. 
In September 1937 Slessor explained to the DCAS that, 
In the course of the appreciation now in the course 
of preparation on the subject of the Ideal Bomber, 
there is one point which is of such fundamental 
importance, and on which there appears to be so much 
difference of opinion, that I think it should be 
cleared up at once before we go any further. The 
point is that of the heaviest weight on the wheel 
that can be accepted for normal aerodromes, i. e., 
without concrete or tarmac tracks or runways 
He suggested that a survey should be made of how other 
countries dealt with this problem, and a meeting called to 
consider RAF poliCy. 54 The Air Staff appear to have been 
unaware of a meeting on the same subject held in the 
previous June by the Director of Organisation (AVM W. L. 
Welsh). This concluded that runways were required at 
aerodromes with poor surfaces, and that fighter aerodromes 
should be "tracked" to ensure all-weather operation. 
(Tracking was the use of wire netting over grass. 55) It 
also noted that Imperial Airways operated the Ensign (a 
four-engined airliner) at 45,000 lbs from grass 
airf ields. 56 
A survey of the practice of foreign air forces showed that 
Germany had no hard runways, although it operated aircraft 
up to 44,000 lbs. 57 The American5s and Russian59 air forces 
were found to have some concrete runways. At the meeting 
53 ibid., 9A, DDPLans to DDOR and DDOps, 2.9.37 
54 ibid., 11A, DDPLans to DCAS 25.9.37 
55 Ryan, R., "From Grass to Concrete", Aerospace Historian, Vot 21 (1974), No. 4 
56PRO: AIR 2/2067, Design of Aerodromes - Future Recluirements - Poticy (Runwayll, Notes 
of meeting on Aerodromes - Future Requirements in Design, 16th June 1937 
57 9/82,11C, A13c to DDI, 30-9.37 
58 82 ibid., 11E, A12d to DDI, 4.10.37 
59 82 ibid., 11D, Al2b to DDI, 1.10.37 
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initiated by Slessor, Colonel J. F. Turner (Director of 
Works) explained that these countries had little choice 
because their continental climate militated against good 
grass. 60 Turner also advised that it was rapid taxying 
and sudden braked turns that damaged grass surfaces more 
than take-off and landing. (Higham claims that it was not 
until 1943 that this problem was discovered. 61) 
Experiments on taxying and braking could be made by 
overloading an existing aircraft, and these were put in 
hand to determine the tyre pressure that was acceptable on 
grass airfields. 62 The tests were made in 1938, and 
showed that there need be no limit to the weight of 
aircraft using grass aerodromes if tyre pressures were 
below 40 lbs/sq. in. It was noted that, "All R. A. F. 
aerodromes are being made to withstand these tyre 
pressures. iiM 
This result was not available at the discussion of 
aerodrome surfaces in October 1937, and it was then 
decided that, because of the great expense which a 
complete system of hard runways would entail, it was 
undesirable to commit the RAF to it for bomber aerodromes. 
Policy would be to use grass airfields, with take-off at 
intermediate loads and landing at light loads. 64 
The question then arose as to how to take-off under 
overload conditions. Turner mentioned two rail-launching 
systems; one was an unassisted rail-track scheme proposed 
by the RAE, and the other (presumably) the catapult 
scheme. He also drew attention to a power-assisted rail- 
track system patented by Captain F. T. Courtney (a private 
60 82 ibid., 15A, para. 5. 
61 Higham, R., "Airfields, technology and the realities of war", Kansas State 
University, pamphlet held by Royal Aeronautical Society, November 1990 
62 9/82,15A, para. 3 
63 ibid., 20A, The Suitability of Grass Aerodromes for the Operations of Heavy Bombers, 
Air Staff, 29.10.38 
64 ibid., 15A, para. 6 
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inventor). It was agreed that investigation of these 
systems should continue. 65 
Some type of assisted take-off scheme was essential if the 
maximum requirements for range and bomb load sought for 
the 1936 bombers, let alone those considered for the Ideal 
Bomber, were to be achieved. In January 1938 Slessor 
became concerned with the lack of information on such 
schemes. He wrote to the DCAS (Peirse) to express concern 
that he had heard of no progress on either the catapult 
project or the "Courtney rail launching scheme". He said, 
The advantages which our air striking force, once it 
is equipped with B. 12/36 and P. 13/36 aircraft, will 
derive from assisted launching devices are literally 
enormous. I can think of no field in which we can do 
more to increase our striking strength and thus make 
up for such difficulties as slow production of 
aircraft and restriction of our first line strength. 
Slessor gave figures which compared the performance of 
these aircraft with a 700 yard take-off with that obtained 
from assisted take-off, and said that "You will see that 
the assisted take-off increases the bomb load threefold 
for the same range-1166 
Peirse shared Slessor's concern, and asked the Research 
and Development Department for a progress report on 
assisted take-off schemes. He pointed out that unless 
assisted-take-off was possible for the Manchester (the 
Avro design to P. 13/36) and for the B. 12/36, the striking 
force would be considerably restricted. 67 
The AMRD (Freeman) replied that one catapult was being 
constructed and should be completed in 1940. It would be 
capable of launching a 60,000 lbs aircraft at 110 mph 
every three minutes, and would cost E106,000. He said 
that there was another assisted take-off scheme, known as 
65 Wd., 15A, para. 7 
66 PRO: AIR 20/14, Assisted Take-offs, DDPLans to DCAS, 5.1.38 
67 ! bid., DCAS to AMRD, 11.1.38 
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the Directional Control Take-off System. With this the 
bomber was secured to a truck and accelerated under its 
own power along a railway track. Freeman said that this 
scheme was an improvement over that proposed by Captain 
Courtney, and might be ready in 1939.68 
Slessor's comment on the railway scheme was that he 
believed that only theoretical work had been done on it, 
and that in any case the US Navy had looked at something 
similar and turned it down because of the great length of 
track required as no extra power was provided. 69 
It appears that although the Air Staff had been persuaded 
by the Directorate of Technical Development to pin great 
hopes on assisted take-off, and had specified aircraft to 
take advantage of it, no urgency had been placed on its 
development, and little thought had been given to its 
operational use. When this sorry story came to the notice 
of the DDOR (Saundby), his comments were those which 
should surely have been made in 1936. He said that whilst 
one catapult per aerodrome might suffice (but only if 
formation flying was not required), it would increase the 
cost of an aerodrome by 25%. Saundby had no doubt that 
bomber aerodromes could be increased greatly in size for 
less than the cost of a catapult. He thought that the 
railway scheme might be cheaper than a catapult, but he 
shared Slessor's doubts about its effectiveness. Saundby 
advised the DCAS (Peirse) that, 
The cheapest and safest solution of the problem of 
taking-off heavily loaded bombers appears to me to 
lie in increasing the size of natural aerodromes. By 
doing so, we shall at the same time contribute 
towards the solution of the fog landing problem, and 
give ourselves more room to disperse our aircraft on 
the ground. 70 
68 ibid., AMRD to DCAS, 18.1.38 
69 ibid., DDPtans to DCAS, 26.1.38 
70 ibid., DDOR to DCAS, 28.1.38 
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Peirse's reaction was, "The more I see of this the more 
convinced I am that our bombers must be capable of getting 
off grass aerodromes, under overload conditions, under 
their own power. 1171 
Where did this leave the bombers which had been specified 
to exploit catapult take-off? 
Peirse believed that the B. 12/36 designs (Supermarine and 
Short Bros. ), and the Handley Page P. 13/36, could all 
take-off with overload in 600-700 yards, but that, "The 
Avro 13/36 has been designed for assisted take off & for 
this reason I am against producing this type in quantity - 
Can you confirm? " Fortunately for the future development 
of the Avro Lancaster, when Saundby reviewed the position 
he found that Peirse was wrong in his belief that the Avro 
P. 13/36 was the odd one out - none of the current bomber 
designs could meet their planned maximum overload with a 
take-off of 700 yards. 
Saundby found that the catapult requirement for the 
Handley Page P. 13/36 had been cancelled, "because the firm 
stated, and R. D. A. 3 [Liptrot] confirmed, that this 
aircraft with four Merlins would take-off in less than 700 
yards at maximum loading. This is now stated to be 730 
yards. " He continued, "Neither of the two 12/36 designs 
can take-off at maximum load unassisted within 700 yds". 
It was estimated that they could attain a range of 2,000 
miles with a bomb load of 4,000 lbs with a take-off of 
less than 700 yards72 - this was the original requirement 
with a 700 yard take-off. 
The issue of take-off at high weights was effectively 
settled by the development of larger airfields -a step 
noted in chapter 5.3.2. with respect to the cannon fighter 
of 1935, and in D. J. Smith's Britain's Military Airfields 
71 ibid., DCAS to DDOR and PLans, 4.2.38 
72 ibid., DDOR to DCAS and ACAS, 25.2.38 
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1939-45.73 In December 1938 the Secretary of State for 
Air was advised that if variable-pitch airscrews and flaps 
were used, the "Aircraft which were originally expected to 
need assisted take-off in overload conditions will now 
take-off within the 1,000 yd. s. limit. 1174 
As four years earlier the then DTD (Cave) had assumed the 
use of these devices when assessing the performance of the 
B. 3/34 heavy bomber (chapter 7.3.1), it is surprising that 
so much emphasis had been given to assisted take-off 
schemes in the intervening years. The answer probably 
lies in the RAF Expansion Schemes between 1934 and 1938, 
for these implied the need for many new airfields, and 
they would be built to the new standards. 
A 1,000 yard take-off was used in the next stage of the 
Ideal Bomber project. Nevertheless, research on assisted 
take-off schemes continued. 75 These included variations 
on the railway launching scheme - with extra power from 
rockets, or from a large flywheel, or from dropping a 
large weight down a well. But when these schemes were 
reviewed in 1940, Bomber Command declared that concrete 
runways were essential - both for landing as well as for 
take-off. The then DDOR (Group Captain H. V. Rowley) 
concluded that assisted take-off was no longer an urgent 
problem! 76 
During the war new airfields for heavy bombers were built 
with hard runways of up to 2,000 yards in length. 77 As 
noted in chapter 8, the aircraft derived from the 1936 
bomber requirements were then able to benefit from their 
inbuilt capacity to take the very high loads which had 
originally been specified to exploit catapult take-off. 
73 Smith, D. J., Britain's Mititary AirfieLds 1939-45,1989, page 12 
74 PRO: AVIA 10/17, (no titte), DDRD to SoS, 14th December 1938 
75 PRO: AIR 20/385, Methods of Assisted Take Off of Aircraft, OR1 to DDOR, 18.10.38 
76 PRO: AIR 20/387, Assisted Take-Off of Aircraft,, A219, DDOR to DOR, 29.10.40 
77 Hatpenny, B. B., Action Stations, 1981 and 1991, page 10 
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9.3.2 options for a Standard Bomber 
The need to bring the theoretical consideration of a 
standard bomber to a conclusion was hastened following a 
meeting of the operational Requirements Committee on 24th 
November 1937 to discuss a new medium bomber project, 
B. 17/37.78 This requirement was deferred pending 
discussion of the Ideal Bomber. 79 It reappeared in most 
respects as a bomber/reconnaisance aircraft project 
(18/38) which was initiated by the Directorate of 
Technical Development. 80 This was for "a bomber of 
composite construction capable of being manufactured by 
trades, other than the highly specialised trade in the 
aeroplane industry". It was believed that in this way, 
"we can make an attractive emergency aeroplane with a good 
performance". 81 But. when the Armstrong Whitworth 
Albemarle (which did not serve as a bomber) was produced 
to this specification in 1941 it was disowned by the Air 
Staff, who said that it did not meet any Air Staff 
requirement, nor was there any clear definition of its 
operational employment. 82 
Wing Commander A. Collier of the Plans branch of the Air 
Staff had attended the Operational Requirements Committee 
meeting on B. 17/37. In his opinion, "The further the 
discussion of the B. 17/37 continued, the more it became 
apparent that little good could come out of it". He urged 
completion of the Ideal Bomber paper as the basis for a 
discussion of bomber poliCy. 83 The Air Staff took heed of 
Collier's advice, and a new version of the Ideal Bomber 
78 9/77, Minutes of meeting on B. 17/37,24th November 1937 
79 ibid., para. 67 
80 PRO: AIR 2/3229, Type Requirements for Bomber Reconnaissance A/C. For Rapid 
Construction, 158, Appendix B to Specification No. 18/38 
81 ibid., DDTD to AMRD, 24.3.38 
82 PRO: AIR 2/3352, 'Atbemarte' Bomber Aircraft Armstrong Whitworth Specification 
8/18/38. Type Requfrements, 25A, DOR to ACAS(T), 20.8.41 
83 9/82, PLans to DDPLans, 24.11.37 
Chapter 9 Operational Requirements 1937-39 310 
paper was produced for consideration by the Bombing 
Committee. 
It is of interest that up to this stage investigation of a 
standard bomber had been led by Plans branch of the Air 
Staff, and that bomber policy was seen as the province of 
the Bombing Committee, not of the Operational Requirements 
Committee. It will be seen that when the project was 
taken over by the Operational Requirements branch after 
recommendations from the Bombing Committee, there was a 
change in approach. 
Despite the shadow cast over big bombers by the 
discussions on airfield policy, very large bombers were 
included amongst the five options, A-E, which were offered 
in the new paper. 84 (Liptrot saw these as "his family of 
bombers,, 85). With a normal take-off (now increased from 
the 500 yards used in the 1936 bomber studies to 700 
yards), the options considered ranged from a normal bomb 
load of 1,000 lbs with an all-up-weight of 18,000 lbs, to 
a bomb load of 18,000 lbs with an all-up-weight of 160,000 
lbs. 86 In all cases an operational still air range of 
2,000 miles (to give a radius of action of 750 miles) was 
specified, with a reinforcing range at most economical 
speed of 2,750 miles (this determined the required fuel 
tank capacity87). In each case an overload take-off of 
1,000 yards was also examined, and this allowed bomb loads 
of a nominal 4,000 lbs for case A, up to 44,000 lbs for 
case 
The basis of the paper was as before - the total bomb lift 
which could be obtained for E20 million. This determined 
the number of aircraft of each type which could be built 
and hence the total bomb lift which each type could 
84 ibid., 19A, Considerations Affecting the Design of the IdeaL Bomber Aircraft for the 
Royal. Air Force, Air Staff, March 1938 
85 PRO: AVIA 10/15, Ideal. Bomber (Freeman's papers), RDA3 to AMRD, 20.4.38 
86 9/82,19A, Appendix A 
87 ibid., 19A, Appendix C 
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deliver. Total bomb lift was compared at both normal and 
overload take-off. With a normal take-off there was a 
steady increase in bomb lift with increase in aircraft 
size, i. e., a smaller number of larger aircraft was more 
than offset by their higher bomb load. But at maximum 
overload the Table showed only a modest advantage from 
increasing size above case B, 88 which was an aircraft of 
35,000 lbs all-up-weight in normal operation. In fact, on 
the data given, the smallest example (case A) was actually 
slightly better than case B in terms of bomb-lift for E20 
million. But the paper did not show this, because case A 
was rejected on the grounds that an acceptable cruising 
speed could be achieved only by restricting the size of 
its fuselage. In consequence it could not stow its 
otherwise attainable maximum bomb load of 4,000 lbs. 
It was argued that high speed was desirable to make 
interception more difficult, to reduce the time over enemy 
territory, and to hinder anti-aircraft fire. The five 
bombers considered were estimated to have maximum cruising 
speeds with a normal take-off of 265 mph for case A up to 
280 mph for case D. These would be reduced by about 5 mph 
at maximum overload. As compared with the 1936 bomber 
specifications, these speeds were considerably higher than 
that sought for the heavy bomber, B. 12/36, but little 
different from the final choice for P. 13/36. It will be 
seen that as discussion of the Ideal Bomber progressed, it 
was speed which became the dominant consideration, the 
political justification of large bombers, and ultimately 
the death of the Ideal Bomber project. 
Nevertheless, both in the paper and later, it was not 
accepted that speed alone could provide adequate defence. 
Whilst it was accepted that an unarmed fast bomber might 
evade fighters in poor weather and darkness, it was 
thought that they could not be expected to penetrate a 
88 This resutt arose because the assumed ratio between maximum and normat 
bomb Load 
reduced with increasing size of aircraft. 
Chapter 9 Operational Requirements 1937-39 312 
modern defensive system in daylight. It followed that the 
Ideal Bomber would need heavy armament, and possibly 
armour. 
This was a key conclusion, for the paper cited experience 
of the Spanish Civil War, 89 and from RAF experiments, 
which showed that high performance bombers could be 
attacked only from astern. This emphasised the need for a 
tail turret - another reason for the rejection of the 
smallest option - because the larger the bomber the less 
detrimental to performance would be a tail turret. 
Similarly, it was said that only a relatively large 
aircraft could mount an under turret to defend against 
attacks from below by turret fighters. 90 
The paper noted that fighters armed with guns firing 
explosive shells were being developed, (a number of cannon 
armed fighters were displayed at the Paris Exhibition 
193891), and that if a bomber was to carry similar weapons 
it would need to be at least as big as case B. At that 
size it would also be feasible to carry armour, at least 
against 0.303 in. ammunition. on the other hand, aircraft 
as large as cases D and E would present a large target, 
but give no significant benefit in fire power or speed 
over B or C. Furthermore, it was believed that ramming 
might be a worthwhile (cost effective) defence against 
bombers larger then type B. (For some years the RAF had 
itself considered ramming as a possible defence against 
bombers. 92) 
In regard to "requirements on the ground", the paper noted 
that whilst it was obvious that fewer aircraft would need 
less overall maintenance effort, the probable need for 
hard runways arose with very large aircraft. It was 
89 PRO: AIR 2/3233, Use of Armour Mating for - Foreign Aircraft,, 18, report from the 
RoLLs-Royce Paris agent, 
" 16.12.37 
90 9/82,19A, paras. 28-30 
91 Ctinton, A. C., "The Trend of Devetopment in Aircraft, some impressions of the Paris 
Exhibition 193811, JRUSI Vot 84 (1939), page 144 
92 20/68, OR2 to DOOR, 29.10.38 
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suggested that all cases up to C (normal all-up-weight 
56,000 lb) could use a normal (grass) airfield. 
The paper concluded that case B was much to be preferred 
to A, and that case C did not give a substantial 
improvement over B. Cases D and E were rejected as too 
large. An aircraft. of about the size of case B was 
recommended. 93 
Postan refers to contributions to the Air Staff's Ideal 
Bomber study from industry, and particularly from Barnes 
Wallis of Vickers, 94 but the timing is wrong. It was 
after the Ideal Bomber paper had been written (it was sent 
to Freeman on 27th January 193895) that the DCAS (Peirse) 
suggested that Freeman might show it to some firms to get 
their views. 96 Freeman replied (unofficially) that he 
agreed that it was unreasonable to go further with 
consulting the best designers, and that in view of 
production commitments there was time to do so. But he 
added that, "In saying this I realize we must also take 
into account that design staffs are now awaiting work-u97 
All but Vickers agreed with Liptrot's estimates. 98,99 
Vickers comments were followed by a paper by Wallis dated 
November 1938100 - some months after the Ideal Bomber issue 
had been discussed by both the Bombing and Operational 
Requirements Committees. 
Postan may have confused Freeman's approach to firms on 
that Ideal Bomber project with a proposal from Wallis for 
a six-engined bomber in 1936. This advocated a layout 
93 9/82,19A, para. 78 
94 Postan, page 79 
95 AVIA 10/15, DDOR to AMRD, 27.1.38 
96 ibid., DDOR to AMRD, 2.2.38 
97 PRO: AIR 2/3239, Considerations Affecting the Design of Ideat Bomber Aircraft for 
RAF, 11A, Freeman to Peirse, 8.2.38 
98 AVIA 10/15, RDA3 to AMRD, 20.4.38 
99 ibid., RDA3 to PS to AMRD, 10.5.38 
100 PRO: AIR 20/364, Bomber Aircraft: The determination of the Most Economicat Size 
Vickers Armstrong Ltd. 
Chapter 9 Operational Requirements 1937-39 314 
where a low structure weight was obtained by distributing 
all engine, fuel and bomb loads across the wing span. The 
Air Staff were aware that this was not a new idea, and 
that it could be achieved only with a large aircraft. 101 
(It would also have a restricted size of bomb cell, 
although the significance of this was not then 
appreciated. ) Assessment of Vickers, proposal was 
suspended in 1937 until the Ideal Bomber appreciation was 
completed. 102 
9.3.3 Bombinq and Operational Recruirements Committee 
Discussions 
The Ideal Bomber paper was the only item on the Agenda of 
the Bombing Committee at its meeting on 4th May 1938.103 
The Chairman (Peirse, DCAS) explained that the committee 
was to decide the operational requirements, with a view to 
the production of a specification, of what had been termed 
the "Ideal Bomber". He said that, 
By that was meant the ordinary standard bomber for 
the Royal Air Force; and the Committee's opinion was 
required on the extent to which it would be possible 
to standardise, for mass production for the Bomber 
Force at home and abroad, one type of bomber 
aircraft. 
The basic assumptions of the Air Staff's paper were 
accepted. An important recommendation which arose from 
the committee meeting was that the new bomber must be 
designed around its turrets - no doubt a reaction to the 
consequences of the failure to provide for 20mm cannon 
armament in the 1936 bomber specifications. 
101 PRO: AIR 2/2673, Proposal by Vickers Ltd. for a Special, Six-engined Heavy Bomber, 
IA, RDA3 to AMRD, 21.7.36 
102 ! bid., DDOR to ACAS, 26.9.38 
103 PRO: AIR 2/2958, Somber tandplane to Spec. No. B1/39. Type Reguirements., 1A, 
Minutes of the 17th meeting of the Bombing Committee, May 4th 1938 
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The committee considered whether or not formation flying 
would be necessary. Contrary to previous RAF doctrine, 
which had stressed the defensive power of bombers in 
formation - both of its own and of an enemy's, the Ideal 
Bomber was to be so well armed as to be able to defend 
itself. It would then be able to avoid anti-aircraft fire 
by manoeuvring. Saundby (DDOR) admitted that this point 
had been over-emphasised, and he agreed with ACM Sir Edgar 
Ludlow-Hewitt (AOC-in-C, Bomber Command), that there might 
be occasions when formation flying would be desirable. 104 
These points clearly referred to operation in daylight, 
but it was agreed that provision should also be made for 
night bombing. 105 
In his summing up of the Bombing Committee's discussion, 
Peirse said that they had outlined the minimum 
requirements of a standard bomber which would fulfil the 
main functions of Bomber Command. The aircraft to meet 
these requirements might be between cases A and B, but "if 
adequate defence were to be provided for, Type 'B' might 
be too small. 1006 
Type B as put before the Bombing Committee was specified 
to have a normal bomb load of 2,500 lbs, coupled with an 
operational range of 2,000 miles at 270 mph. With a take- 
off of 1,000 yards the overload bomb capacity was 8,000 
lbs. 107 Apart from an armament of 20mm cannon, this 
specification was little different from that of the medium 
bomber P. 13/36 (with the same 700 yard take-off), a 
comparison which CollierIO8 had noticed when he had been 
given a preview of the Ideal Bomber paper by Slessor. 109 
Following the meeting of the Bombing Committee, the 
Operational Requirements branch of the Air Staff wrote to 
104 ibid., paras. Q. 7 
105 ibid., paras. Q. 6 
106 ibid., para. III 
107 9/82,19A, Appendix A 
108 2/3239,3A, CoMer to DDPLans, 22.1.38 
109 ibid., manuscript note between 3A and 4A 
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Liptrot to say that they were drawing up operational 
requirements based upon the decisions by the committee, 
and asked for performance estimates for the range of cases 
in the Ideal Bomber paper. They stressed the need for 
high speed, and for formidable armament - with front, 
upper, lower and tail turrets, each with two 20mm 
cannon. 110 This request was soon overtaken by a decision 
to move away from the analysis of the Ideal Bomber as 
discussed by the Bombing Committee - whose decisions were 
supposedly being implemented. 
Liptrot was told to limit his investigation to maximum 
bomb loads of 8,000 lbs and 12,000 lbs respectively. The 
reinforcing range was increased to 3,500 miles, and was to 
be at a higher speed than previously specified. The 
12,000 lbs case, which became the Air Staff Requirement, 
was to have two four-cannon turrets, one above and one 
below the aircraft's centre of gravity. The operational 
range of 2,000 miles with maximum bomb load was required 
from a take-off of 900 yds rather than the 1,000 yds 
previously assumed. Self-sealing or armoured fuel tanks 
were specified. 111 
The new armament arrangement arose from general study of 
bomber armament following a request from Ludlow-Hewitt. 
It was argued that for aerodynamic reasons a bomber could 
not have turrets with more that one cannon at the front, 
two in the tail, and none underneath. An under turret was 
regarded as essential for defence against turret fighters, 
which - in Air Staff theory - could attack bombers from 
any direction, as explained in chapter 6 and earlier in 
this chapter. It was said that, "We know little of 
foreign developments regarding turreted fighters but we 
110 2/2958, OR1(a) to RDA3,14.7.38 
111 Wd., OR1(a) to RDA3,25.7.38 
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must give potential enemies credit for initiative equal to 
our own. iO12 
The proposed central turrets were said to give the 
additional advantage of allowing the bomber to carry and 
expend a very large amount of ammunition without affecting 
its stability. Then, as the DDOR later explained to a 
sub-committee set up to consider armament for the Ideal 
Bomber, 
If, in clear weather, the B. 19/38 should be required 
to operate in formation it will be possible to 
dispose a proportion of aeroplanes in certain places 
in the formation which will carry a light bomb load 
or even no bomb load at all, but will carry the 
equivalent weight of ammunition and so will be used 
primarily for the defence of the formation. 
This "escort bomber" tactic has been discussed in chapter 
2.3.2. Unfortunately, Saundby was also obliged to tell 
the sub-committee that, 
while we had the authority of the Bombing Committee 
to 'build the B. 19/38 around its turrets, we had no 
turrets available at the present time to form the 
foundation of our requirements and consequently it 
was necessary to develop the turrets concurrently 
with the aeroplane. 113 
The requirements prescribed for the Ideal Bomber were 
taken further following a meeting of the Operational 
Requirements branch, with the DCAS and ACAS in July 
1938.114,115 on seeing the new Air Staff Requirement, Wing 
Commander L. F. Pendred (F02) commented that although this 
was to be based on the recommendations of the Bombing 
Committee, "It seems, however, that in most respects it is 
an improvement on these recommendations. " He observed 
that the cruising speed of 300 mph which was now called 
112 PRO: AIR 14/380, Notes of Air Staff Requirements for a Bomber Landptane - Sen 
619/38, The Gun Arrangements for Bombers, ShoLto DougLas to LudLow-Hewitt, 9th August 
1938 
113 2/2958,14A, minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-Committee Formed to consider 
the Armament Requirements of the 8.19/38,22nd August 1938 
114 ibid., minute by WiggLesworth, 6.8.38 
115 ibid., 5A, Air Staff Requirements for a Bomber LandpLane. Specification No. 0.19/38, 
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for implied a top speed of about 350 mph - which was 
faster than the latest "Messer Schmit" (sic) fighter. 116 
It will be seen that this was the last straw which broke 
the back of the Ideal Bomber project, but at the time it 
was thought that the bombers being designed to the 1936 
specifications would have a maximum speed of nearly 330 
mph. 117,118 
The revised Air Staff Requirement (B. 19/38)119 was 
discussed by the Operational Requirements Committee on the 
11th August 1938. Many of those present had also attended 
the Bombing Committee's discussion of the Ideal Bomber. 
Nevertheless, the replacement of that committee's 
recommendation to pursue a bomber of about the size of 
case B by requirements which implied an aircraft much 
larger than case C was not queried. The draft 
requirements were largely accepted. 120 
There was some discussion of range. Ludlow-Hewitt 
suggested that only a small proportion of raids would be 
required to penetrate long distances, "as the risk 
involved in flying over so many miles of defended country 
would make it an uneconomical proposition. " Such doubts 
have been noted in chapters 4.2.2.3 and 6.1, but were not 
discussed further at the committee meeting. It was said 
that 2,000 miles was needed to attack Berlin, and that in 
any case fuel tankage was determined by the range required 
for reinforcing purposes. Furthermore, now that Austria 
had become a province of Germany, and as Vienna was an 
important strategic target, it was suggested that an 
operational range of more than 2,000 miles might be 
necessary. 121 
116 PRO: AIR 20/35, Considerations Affecting the Design of the Ideat Somber Aircraft for 
the R. A. F. March - Aug I, Note on Specification No. 8.19/38, F02 to DDOPS(H), August 
1938 
117 2/2082, Tabte attached to 5A, RDA3 to DTD, 12.11.37 
118 PRO: AIR 20/180, The Undefended Bomber. PotiEy, Tabte from OR1(A), 8.2.38 
119 2/2958, BA 
120 ibid., 108, Minutes of the Operational, Requirements Committee, Ilth August 1938 
121 ibid., 108, Minutes, paras. 15-17 
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Freeman (now Air Member for Development and Production) 
pointed out that the decision to design the aircraft 
around its turrets, "would lead to difficulties as the 
turrets had not yet been designed. it 122 He said that 
designers would immediately ask for details of the 
turrets, and proposed that issue of the specification 
should be delayed until a turret design was available. 
This was not accepted - the turret problem was solved 0) 
by omitting the "Armament" section from the requirements 
and setting up a sub-committee to investigate the 
matter. 123 
9.3.4 The Demise of the Ideal Bomber 
Following the operational Requirements Committee meeting, 
the ACAS (Douglas) sent the amended Ideal Bomber 
Requirement (B. 19/38)124 to the Department of Development 
and Production for technical evaluation, with the comment, 
I am, of course, just as anxious as you are that this 
aeroplane should be the smallest and cheapest that 
can fulfil the role of a standard bomber for the 
future, and should be very glad if you would let me 
know what items in these requirements could 
reasonably be omitted or modified. 125 
It was soon evident that by enlarging upon the relatively 
modest recommendations of both their own Ideal Bomber 
paper and of the Bombing Committee, the Air Staff had gone 
beyond what was feasible in the then state of development 
of aviation technology. 
The Director-General Research and Development (AVM A. W. 
Tedder) pointed out that the B. 12/36 bomber, "taken all 
round comes somewhere near the optimum position accorded 
122 ibid., 108, Minutes, para. 7 
123 ibid., 108, Minutes, paras. 36 and 38 
124 ibid., 10A, 
125 ibid., ACAS to AMDP and DGRD, 13.8.38 
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to the various features of an ideal bomber" - and it was 
smaller than case C. But the proposed B. 19/38 would be 
larger than case C, primarily because of the extra speed 
that was sought. It would have a span of 120 feet and a 
take-off weight of 80,000 lbs when overloaded. 
Tedder explained that the Ideal Bomber analysis had 
considered a hypothetical family of aircraft which had 
been kept artificially comparable. In particular it had 
been assumed that suitable engines were available to match 
the different sizes of bomber which were considered. In 
reality there was no suitable engine to provide the 
performance now specified for B. 19/38. In consequence 
bigger engines than were strictly needed would have to be 
used - giving more fuel, more weight, and hence a larger 
aircraft. But even-so he was doubtful that the most 
powerful available engines (the Rolls Royce Vulture of 
2,000 hp) would give the requested 300 mph cruising speed. 
He said that, 
The extra speed required is the dominant reason for 
the increase in size, cost, and reduction in numbers 
likely to be available for a given cost. 
In Tedder's view not enough was known to draw up a 
specification for a successor to the B. 12/36 designs - 
which had not yet flown. He was also very sceptical about 
the operation of such a large aircraft from all but a few 
RAF aerodromes. 126 
Following Tedder's comments on the technical feasibility 
of the Air Staff Requirement for an Ideal Bomber, the AMDP 
(Freeman) told the CAS that when the hypothetical 
investigation had been translated into the practical, "the 
very arguments which made us select the Ideal Bomber would 
make us throw out the 19/38.11 Freeman said that the Air 
Staff wanted a fast bomber which was armed with cannon and 
armoured, but in reality the more the defensive power was 
126 ibid., DGRD to AMDP, 7.9.38 
Chapter 9 Operational Requirements 1937-39 321 
increased the slower would be the bomber. 127 Both he and 
Tedder suggested that rather than proceeding with a 
specification for B". 19/38 they should ask industry what 
could be done to improve on the B. 12/36 bomber. 
The ACAS (Douglas) and DCAS (Peirse) were opposed to this 
idea. 128,129 Peirse took the view that the Air Ministry 
should not pass on to industry a problem which it could 
not solve itself. He told the CAS (Newall) that, "the 
evils of going over the optimum size are probably greater 
than the drawbacks of not reaching it", and he stated what 
he saw as the essential requirements. These were, (a) 
improved speed, (b) improved defence, (c) armour 
protection, and (d) adequate range (which was now put at 
2,500 miles). He continued that, 
Without the above, we shall not get the bombs to 
their destination. Therefore (a) to (d) must, to my 
mind, take precedence of (sic) bomb load. In fact, I 
would willingly give up 5000 lb. of bomb load to 
increase the chances of the remaining 7000 lb. 
reaching their objective, wherever that objective 
might be in Germany. 
These views, which the CAS (Newall) agreed, 130 underline 
that the RAF's move towards large bombers in the 1930s was 
dominated by the operational demands - and their technical 
consequences - of bombing Germany, and not by a supposed 
change in bombing policy or predilection for large 
bombers. It is pertinent that the maximum bomb load of 
7,000 lbs now deemed acceptable was less than that 
specified in 1936 for the medium bomber P. 13/36, and half 
that of the heavy bomber B. 12/36. 
A curious episode then intervened in the Air Ministry's 
consideration of the Ideal Bomber. The question of the 
127 ibid., AMDP to CAS, 9.9.38 
128 ibid., ACAS to CAS, 15.9.38 
129 ibid., DCAS to CAS, 18.10.38 
130 ibid., CAS to DCAS, 28.9.38 
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optimum size of bomber arose during Cabinet consideration 
of the expansion programme of the RAF in November 1938. 
In his brief for the Cabinet meeting, the CAS advised the 
Secretary of State for Air that the Ideal Bomber paper, 
"represents the present Air Staff doctrine on this matter 
[of bomber size]". However, he then moved away from that 
paper's analysis of the most economic size of bomber, and 
put the emphasis on speed. He wrote that "High speed is 
the best form of defence against fighter attack", and 
that, "In the present stage of design technique and engine 
efficiency it is a fact that the fastest bomber is one of 
weight between 35,000 and 50,000 lbs. 11 In regard to 
range, Newall said that, "Broadly speaking the larger the 
Bomber the greater the range. l1131 There is much truth in 
that statement, but it was irrelevant to the Ideal Bomber 
study, for this had prescribed the same range for all the 
sizes of aircraft which were considered. 
In fact by November 1938 the Air Staff's specification of 
an Ideal Bomber had gone far beyond the optimum weights 
quoted by Newall, mainly because they were seeking even 
higher speeds. This was of little consequence to the 
discussion in Cabinet, because it was concerned with the 
current RAF Expansion Scheme, and thus with expenditure on 
the bombers initiated in 1936 - and not on the Ideal 
Bomber. 
In the Cabinet discussion132 the Secretary of State for Air 
argued the case for large bombers as the best way of 
getting level with Germany, for large bombers gave more 
bomb lift for a given sum of money. The Foreign Secretary 
countered that if armament limitation should be discussed 
it would probably begin by banning very large bombers, and 
the Prime Minister was unhappy about concentrating on 
heavy bombers. He likened the position to that of the 
_ýL8 
131 PRO: AIR 8/247, Brief for SoS for Ministerial. Di-scussion-C. P. 218 3? 1, Point 1 
132 PRO: CA8 23/96,19th Oct-21st Dec 1938, pages 150-172 
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development by Britain of the Dreadnought battleship, 
which although said to make other navies, battleships 
redundant, actually raised the cost of all battleships. 
He expressed the fear that concentration on Manchesters 
and Halifaxes might-result in Germany building a "super- 
Halifax". 
The irony of this debate was that the Manchester and 
Halifax were being built to an Air Staff requirement for a 
medium bomber, and moreover - contrary to Newall's brief - 
this called for them to be much faster than their heavier 
contemporary, the B. 12/36. 
The Cabinet told the Air Ministry to re-consider the 
policy of concentrating on very large bombers, and the Air 
Staff drew up a paper for Sir Horace Wilson, the Prime 
Minister's adviser. Not surprisingly, the preparation of 
this paper was seen as "a matter of considerable 
delicacy". 133 In fact the Air Staff avoided the speed 
versus weight dilemma posed by the 1936 bomber 
requirements by comparing a force of 1936 heavy bombers 
(B. 12/36 Stirlings) with one of Wellingtons -a medium 
bomber of 1932 vintage. They argued that, 
Large bombers, since they are faster, better 
defended, able to operate singly and make full use of 
cloud flying and avoiding action, are less vulnerable 
to fighter attack. It seems certain that the fitting 
of cannon' gun turr7ets will be essential in future 
types of bombers and this is not practicable in the 
smaller class. is134 
The paper stressed the danger of regarding bomb lift as 
the only criterion when determining the size of the bomber 
force. 135 It expressed the fear that if an enemy with 
small bombers had established the infrastructure for a 
large number of aircraft, and then changed to large 
133 PRO: AIR 8/257, The Ideat Somber, PS to 2nd PUS to PS to CAS, 15.12.38 
134 9/82,22A, Air Staff Note on Size of Bomber Aircraft, F. H. Sandford to Sir Horace 
witson, 23rd December 1938, Summary of Conctusions, para. 29(a) 
135 ibid., 22A, para. 32 
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bombers, it would take many years for the RAF to respond. 
The Air Staff deduced that the United Kingdom's 
infrastructure must be ready to support as great a force 
as that of enemy. 136 
Clearly great delicacy had been employed in coming to 
these 'having it both ways, conclusions, which made a 
nonsense of Newall's statement that the Ideal Bomber paper 
gave Air Staff doctrine on the size of bomber aircraft. 
Not only was that paper based fundamentally upon the 
concept of bomb lift, but part of the case for a small 
number of large bombers was the reduction in 
infrastructure which would follow. 
It has been seen above that the DGRD (Tedder) and AMDP 
(Freeman) had both criticised the Air Staff for seeking 
too high a speed for the Ideal Bomber. But following the 
Cabinet discussion Tedder put to the CAS, with Freeman's 
acquiescence, his thoughts as to why the RAF was forced to 
large bombers. He first reiterated the point that the 
longer a bomber is over enemy territory the longer will it 
be exposed to attack, and that "Therefore the prime 
requirement of the bomber is speed". 
Tedder then explained that speed depended upon drag and 
engine power, and as little improvement in drag seemed 
likely, increased performance needed more power. He 
wrote, 
Any increase in horsepower by fitting bigger engines, 
increases the weight of the power units, the fuel 
required for a given range and the weight of the 
tanks, and also increases the structure weight of the 
aircraft. 
Consequently, even if speed alone were the demand, 
the faster aircraft would inevitably be bigger. 
136 ibid., 22A, para. 26 
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He added that factors such as more range, more navigation 
equipment, and more armour to counter heavier fighter 
armament, all pointed the same way. 137 
Nevertheless, the Air Staff responded to Tedder's earlier 
criticism of the Ideal Bomber and drew up new requirements 
with the cruising speed reduced to 280 mph and the maximum 
bomb load reduced to 9,000 lbs. The landing weight, with 
no bombs and a reduced fuel load, was to be limited to 
50,000 lbs. But these concessions were offset by an 
increase in the operational range with maximum load from 
2,000 miles to 2,500 miles, and retention of a maximum 
take-off of 900 yards and a reinforcing range of 3,500 
miles at operational cruising power - all more onerous 
that in the Ideal Bomber studies. 138 
In sending these to Freeman, Douglas drew attention to a 
comment from the Secretary of State for Air that the 
Ministry was often criticised for delays in production, 
and that the apparent gestation period of a new design was 
often artificially lengthened by the specification bearing 
a date considerably earlier than when contracts were 
issued to firms. As contracts for B. 19/38 could not now 
go out before the 1939 financial year, the SoS requested 
that it should have a 1939 number. 139 The designation 
B. 19/38 was changed to B. 1/39. 
The new requirements were sent to aircraft firms in 
January 1939,140 and nine tenders were received. These 
convinced the AMDP's Department that in the current state 
of knowledge of aerodynamics and of turret design even the 
reduced specification could not be met. 141 Freeman 
proposed that discussions with the two firms (Bristol and 
Handley Page) who had made the most promising proposals 
137 8/257, DGRD (through AMDP) to CAS, 22.11.38 
138 2/2958,28A, Appendix "B" to Air Staff Requirements for a Somber Landptane No. 
B. 1/39 
139 ibid., ACAS to AMDP, ' 13.12.38 
140 ibid., DTD to ADC(A), 5.1.39 
141 ibid., DGRD to AMDP, 13.7.39 
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should be continued to see what compromises were possible, 
and with a view to ordering development prototypes. 142 
This minute produced an interesting reaction from Saundby 
(now Director of Operational Requirements). He told the 
CAS that although the Bombing Committee had recommended 
that the Air Staff should prepare draft requirements for 
the Ideal Bomber, his branch had not intended to issue 
them until there was some experience of the Stirling, 
Halifax and Manchester. However, they had been strongly 
urged by the AMDP to complete and issue requirements, as 
work was needed to occupy designs staffs in industry. 
Saundby claimed that the Stirling, Halifax and Manchester 
would meet their requirements for some time as regards 
range, bomb load, and, probably, speed. Their weak point 
was reliance on machine guns for defence. This would be 
remedied in the Mark II of each type, with upper and lower 
amidships turrets carrying 20 mm guns. Saundby said that, 
"I agree with A. M. D. P. that, if these Mark II designs are 
successful, they will meet our requirements until the 
B. 1/39, developed in a systematic way, comes along-vo143 
It has been noted above that when Freeman realised that 
the Air Staff were calling for turrets which did not 
exist, he had proposed delaying the project - despite his 
concern with the need for work for design staffs. It was 
the Air Staff who undermined the Ideal Bomber project by 
specifying a performance beyond the limits of the 
feasible. Whilst recognising the importance of speed, the 
Air Staff tried to keep all other desirable 
characteristics of a bomber as well. As Freeman had 
graphically put it to the CAS (Newall), "We are, or so it 
seems to me, trying to produce the air equivalent of 
destroyers with heavy armour and 1511 guns: the result is 
not likely to be satisfactory.,, 144 
142 ibid., AMDP to CAS, 13.7.39 
143 ibid., DOR to CAS, 19.7.39 
144 ibid., AMDP to CAS, 9.9.38 
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The advocates of a speed bomber also sought the best of 
both worlds, and failed, as is shown in the next section. 
Furthermore, the Air Staff's expectation that the bombers 
then under development could be retrospectively fitted 
with 20mm cannon turrets was doomed to failure, as has 
been discussed in chapter 8.3.4. 
9.4 SPEED BOMBERS 
The concept of a bomber which would rely entirely upon its 
speed to avoid hostile fighters interested some senior 
officers in the RAF for many years. In chapter 4.2.2.1 it 
noted that in 1928 Chamier suggested that such an aircraft 
might be the only feasible form of attack in daylight. In 
the 1930s advances in aviation appeared to make the idea 
of a fast unarmed bomber a realistic proposition. 
The McRobertson Mildenhall to Melbourne Race of 1934 was 
won by the purpose-built de Havilland DH 88 Comet. 145 The 
Comet was a long-range twin-engined monoplane which was 
considerably faster than the fastest fighter then in RAF 
service. But the Air Staff did not see this as presaging 
the introduction of fast unarmed bombers. They believed 
that the success of, the Comet was due to a fortuitous 
coming together of a number of recent design developments, 
and that a fighter produced under the same conditions as 
the Comet would have been over 40 mph faster. They 
deduced that the lesson to be learnt was that they must 
have sufficient staff to watch design trends so that the 
RAF could not be overtaken. 146 Nevertheless, there were 
other factors which kept the idea of a speed bomber alive. 
In 1935 Air Ministry Intelligence received reports that a 
Heinkel civil aircraft had been converted to a fast 
145 Ogitvy, D., DH 88 (Comet), 1984 
146 6/43, EPM 19(35)), The Possibitity of Dispensing with the Armament in the Light 
Bomber Ctass, Air Staff Note, 22nd June 1935 
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unarmed bomber (probably the future He 111). 147 The 
Ministry may also have known that in 1936 Junkers were 
investigating the design of a very fast but unarmed bomber 
- which became the Ju 88.148 
Also in 1935, the Royal Aircraft Establishment 
investigated the possibility of a high-speed day bomber 
with two Merlin engines and armed with three machine guns 
in streamlined mountings. It suggested that with a speed 
of 330 mph it would be difficult to attack by fighters. 149 
This proposal was included as development type in the 
draft 1936 Experimental Aircraft Programme, as was a "High 
Performance AeroPlanell which could be produced in war by 
firms used to working in wood. 150 These ideas were not 
then taken up - there was great pressure to reduce the 
number of new types under development. 151 A following RAE 
paper152 on a high-speed bomber to meet the B. 1/35 
requirements was circulated to the aircraft industry, 153 
and may have led to a number of proposals for fast 
bombers, some armed, some not, which emanated from 
industry in the late 1930S. 154 
Whilst none of these were seen as a sufficient advance on 
the performance then expected of the Avro P. 13/36 
design, 155 they led Oxland (with the DCAS's approval156) to 
clarify Air Staff policy on the interplay between speed 
and armament. He wrote that, 
Our own views as to the relative importance of speed 
and armament may be summarised by saying that we 
think 80% of the defence of the bomber lies in its 
speed and the remaining 20t lies in its armament. 
But that 20t is essential for a day bomber. 
147 ibid., EPM 9/35, German Poticy on Supercharging and Armed Bombers 
148 GriehL, M., Junkers Ju 88. Star of the Luftwaffe, 1990, page 8 
149 2/2082,6A, Chief Superintendent RAE to DTD, 4th Aprit 1935 
150 2/1402,8A, Air Staff Types Required 
151 ibid., AMRD to DCAS, 18.10.35 
152 2/2082,8A, 1.5.35 
153 ibid., IIA, 28.5.35 
154 20/180, proposaLs from MandLey Page, Short Bros., GLoster and Napier are mentioned. 
155 ibid., OR1 to DDOR, 22.2.38, and Tabte from OR1(a) 
156 ibid., DDOR to DCAS, 30.3.37 
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He accepted that, "for night work, when all defensive 
armament is comparatively useless to the bomber, we may be 
justified in sacrificing armament for speed. " But he saw 
that to develop such a type would mean reverting to the 
policy of specialist day and night bombers. 157 Freeman 
agreed with these views. 158 
The most prominent input to consideration of a speed 
bomber came from Bomber Command. As discussed in chapter 
8.2, the senior staff of the ADGB (and of Bomber Command 
from July of that year) pressed for higher speed in the 
1936 bomber requirements, particularly for P. 13/36. They 
expressed a willingness to forego some or all defensive 
armament to obtain higher speeds. Ludlow-Hewitt, 
appointed AOC-in-C of Bomber Command in September 1937, 
took up this concept when the Operational Requirements 
Committee met to discuss the B. 17/37 medium bomber 
project. He asked for consideration of a higher speed, if 
need be at the expense of reducing range, 159 and saw a 
place for a very high-speed unarmed bomber. 160 
Liptrot's comment on the proposal to reduce the range of 
B. 17/37 underlines the point which has been emphasised in 
this thesis that speed was the prime driving force which 
led the RAF to larger bombers. He said that a reduction 
in range would have little effect on speed, and that, "The 
factor most responsible for the low speed was the desire 
of the Air Staff to keep the aeroPlane as small as 
possible.,, 161 
The Ideal Bomber paper recommended that an unarmed high- 
speed bomber should not be developed. 162 But before the 
paper was discussed by the Bombing Committee in May 1938, 
157 ibid., Oxtand to AMRD, March 1937 
158 ibid., Freeman to DDOR, 23.3.37 
159 9/77, Minutes of Operationat Requirements committee, 24th November 1937, para. 20 
160 ibid., para. 57 
161 ibid., para. 22 
162 9/82,19A, para. 23 
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Ludlow-Hewitt put in a further plea for a bomber which 
would depend primarily on speed to evade enemy fighters. 
He argued that in war, in addition to heavy destructive 
attacks, there would be a need for frequent harassing 
attacks. For these a fast light bomber would be required, 
and he sent Freeman (then AMRD) his specification for a 
such an aircraft. It was not for an unarmed bomber, which 
Ludlow-Hewitt said was a misnomer, but for a "speed 
bomber" - one which, "must depend mainly upon its speed to 
evade enemy defence. iPI63 
Ludlow-Hewitt's definition was not incompatible with 
Oxland's statement of Air Staff policy as quoted above, 
but their response to his specification was that a speed 
bomber was operationally inefficient as a bomb carrier, 
would need 20mm guns, and could quickly become obsolete as 
fighter speeds increased. Policy would be to make 
harassing attacks with single heavily-armed standard 
bombers. 164 The Ideal Bomber paper claimed that in this 
way a number of targets could be attacked by one aircraft 
in one sortie (quoted in chapter 2.2.2). 
Following Bombing Committee's discussion of the Ideal 
Bomber, Ludlow-Hewitt put his advocacy of a fast bomber on 
a formal basis by writing directly to the Under Secretary 
of State, Air Ministry, and repeated the specification 
which he had sent to Freeman. This did not specify a 
speed, and included some armour and considerable armament 
- two fixed forward guns, and two pairs of rear guns in 
flush mountings. The bomb load was to be 1,000 lbs and 
the range 1,500 miles. He added that such an aircraft 
would also be useful for photographic reconnaissance. 165 
on learning that the CAS was not persuaded to order a 
speed bomber, Ludlow-Hewitt repeated his fear that Bomber 
163 PRO: AIR 14/251, Bomber Command Requirements in New Type Afrcraft - High Sr>eed 
Bomber, 2A, AOC-in-C to AMDP, 23 ApriL 1938 
164 20/84, The Speed Bomber, undated, c. May/June 1938 
165 14/251, LudLow-Hewitt to USoS, 19th JuLy 1938 
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Command's conventional bombers were inadequately armed, 
and advanced another use for his speed bomber. He said 
that Germany, Italy and Japan were escorting their bombers 
with fighters, (presumably in Spain and China), but that 
should the RAF find this to be necessary they had no 
escort fighter. He suggested that a large high-speed 
aircraft might also serve that need. 166 
Undeterred by the constant refusal to develop a speed 
bomber, Ludlow-Hewitt again raised the matter at an 
official level in August 1939. He then wrote to say that 
the speed bomber need not be thought of as a light bomber. 
He suggested that there was a need for an aircraft of some 
30,000 lbs, with a speed 40-70 mph faster than the 
Stirling or the B. 1/39 (Ideal Bomber). 
In view of the history of the interest in a fast bomber 
outlined above, and the Air Staff's clear policy of 
daylight bombing which runs throughout this thesis, 
Postan's description of the origin of the de Havilland 
Mosquito is astounding. He said that the firm, "had to 
think out for themselves the whole tactical and strategic 
purpose of the aircraft", and that, 
While the Air Ministry were still wholly devoted to 
the doctrine of night bombing by heavy bombers, Sir 
Geoffrey de Havilland conceived the idea of day 
bombing by fast unarmed aircraft. 
and that, "In the circumstances of 1939-40 this was an 
entirely new and independent set of ideas". 167 
The facts are that on 20th September 1939 Captain Geoffrey 
de Havilland referred to a recent conversation with 
Freeman, and wrote that he believed that his firm could 
produce a bomber of such outstanding performance that 
little defensive equipment would be needed. 168 (Goulding 
166 ibid., 6A, Ludlow-Hewitt to CAS, 3rd December 1938 
167 Postan, page 85, italics added 
, 1A, 168 PRO: AVIA 15/4, High Speed Bomber Proposed by de Havittands mosquito BlLýO 
Geoffrey de HaviLLand to Freeman, 20th September 1939 
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and Moyes make the point that Freeman would have known of 
the RAE fast bomber study and that he was close to de 
Havil land. 169) 
The DGRD (Tedder) told de Havilland that the Ministry had 
been considering such a form of aircraft, and had asked 
other firms to do layouts. He said that they sought a 
bomb load of 2,000 lbs and a range of 2,000 miles, and 
that, 
The desirability of entire absence of defensive 
armament is not generally accepted. Its acceptance 
would depend very much on the additional speed that 
it would permit, as demonstrated in tests on the 
prototype. 170 
Following a meeting between the Ministry's technical staff 
and de Havilland, 171. the company looked at the design of an 
aircraft with two Griffon engines and a four-gun rear 
turret. 172 on 20th November 1939 Tedder told the firm that 
the Ministry were intending to order two prototypes to 
that design. 173 
This plan was made redundant at a meeting held two days 
later. Freeman then told the de Havilland that if it 
would guarantee to produce a twin Merlin unarmed aircraft 
in nine months, followed by a Griffon engined version nine 
months later, and then a Sabre engined version, he would 
recommend such a programme to the Air Council as a 
gamble. 174 The Air Ministry then immediately discussed 
with the company an operational requirement to support the 
development of a high-speed light reconnaissance aircraft 
on these lines. It'was to be capable of easy conversion 
to a fighter, or to a bomber with a bomb load of 1,000 lbs 
169 GouLding and Moyes, page 92 
170 AVIA 15/4,5A, Tedder to de HaviLLand, 3rd October 1939 
171 ibid., 9A, meeting arranged for 14.10.39 
172 ibid., de HaviLtands to Grinsted, 8th November 1939 
173 ibid., 25A, Tedder to de HaviLtand, 20th November 1939 
174 ibid., 37A, Minutes of a meeting on 22nd November 1939 to discuss a new de HaviLLand 
somber aircraft 
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and fuel for 2,000 miles from a 900 yd take-off. 175 This 
project was to become the Mosquito. 
It was after the events described above that the Air 
Ministry called a meeting to consider the proposals for a 
high-speed bomber put forward by Ludlow- Hewitt. 176 It was 
explained that all analyses of such ideas from Bomber 
Command had concluded that they were a bad compromise - in 
trying to get high speed and modern armament neither could 
be attained. The crux of the matter, as put by the AMDP 
(Freeman), was the balance between speed and armament. He 
asked if the Command would be prepared to dispense with 
armament if a bomber could be produced which was faster 
than fighters. 
This was not acceptable to Ludlow-Hewitt, although he 
thought that it might be useful for reconnaissance. He 
seemed to miss Freeman's point entirely with the comment 
that, as the object was to make harassing attacks on 
places previously heavily attacked, the bomber could 
expect to be intercepted, and would therefore need some 
defence before it reached cloud cover. Needless to say, 
Freeman was disappointed with this reply, for he had hoped 
that it would be agreed that if a bomber was faster than 
opposing fighters the question of interception would not 
arise. 
The contribution of the ACAS (Douglas) to the discussion 
epitomised the RAF's belief in the viability of daylight 
operation of heavily-armed bombers. He suggested that to 
rely too much on speed was to make the same mistake as the 
Germans, whereas the Stirling and Manchester, "could very 
well be used singly or in small formations to follow up 
the main attack". 177 
175 ibid., 378 
176 14/251,128, High Speed Bomber; Minutes of Conference on 12th December 1939 
177 ibid., 128, para. 6 
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Despite these unhelpful contributions, Freeman obtained 
agreement to pursue two lines of development - the first 
of which he had already promised to de Havilland. Scheme I 
was for an unarmed bomber with a bomb load of 1,000 lbs 
and range of 1,500 miles. Scheme II was a longer-term 
project for a large high-speed bomber based upon the 
Manchester. 
For Scheme I it was recognised that a new model would be 
needed each year to take advantage of engine development 
so as to maintain a speed advantage over contemporary 
fighters - as Freeman had demanded of de Havilland. A 
good view rearward was also deemed essential, because an 
unarmed bomber would cruise below its maximum speed and 
its crew would need to see an attacking fighter in time to 
accelerate away. 178 
The Deputy Director-General Production advised that if the 
new aircraft was to*be produced quickly, it would disrupt 
current aircraft production arrangements unless it was of 
wooden construction. He said that this emphasised the 
advantage of using a firm like de Havilland. 179 Their 
proposal was before the meeting and it was decided to 
proceed with it. 180 
9.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the RAF's views on the 
desirable characteristics of its home defence aircraft in 
the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. It 
has been shown that as developments in aeronautics gave 
the potential for improved flight performance, aerodrome 
size became a dominant factor in the setting of 
operational requirements. Otherwise, no new thoughts 
emerged for either fighters or bombers. 
178 ibid., 15A, Bomber Command to Air Ministry, January 1940 
179 ibid., 12B, para. 21 
180 ibid., 128, para. 23 
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The Air Staff continued to pursue the idea that a high- 
performance turret fighter was needed to successfully 
attack formations of bombers - more so if the bombers were 
armoured against attack from astern. The Ideal Bomber 
investigation was based upon the long-held belief that 
bombers could defend themselves in daylight when on deep 
penetration attacks into hostile airspace, and emphasised 
that the speed required to reduce exposure to fighter 
attack inevitably led to large bombers. In the next and 
final chapter it will be seen that both lines of 
development were soon found to be unsoundly based when 
tested in war. It was the much derided - but never quite 
forgotten - unarmed fast bomber which was the most 
successful outcome of the immediate pre-war (or correctly 
pre-phoney war) period. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter first reviews an issue which has run 
throughout this thesis - the inaccuracy of much of the 
literature on Air Ministry policy and actions relating to 
aircraft development. It then compares the experience of 
operations in the first year of the Second World War with 
the doctrine of air warfare which was adopted by the RAF 
between the wars. It was this doctrine which underlay the 
operational requirements which emerged from the management 
and consultation processes outlined in chapter 3. These 
are reviewed in section 10.3. The bomber and fighter 
requirements which were set in the 1930s are then assessed 
in relation to the operational situations which were 
encountered in war - which in most instances were very 
different from those expected. 
Finally, some thoughts are given on how Air Staff 
requirements might have developed had it not believed in 
the power of self-defending day bomber formations. It is 
suggested that there would have been little change. 
10.1 MYTHS AND LEGENDS REFUTED 
This thesis is concerned with the aircraft performance 
characteristics which the RAF saw as required to enable it 
to carry out its home defence role. In the course of the 
research it has been found that published views on these, 
and on the origin of the aircraft with which the RAF 
entered and fought the war, are in many instances unsound, 
particularly in their citing of the intentions of the Air 
Ministry. Correct accounts, taken from the Air Ministry 
files of the period, have been given as they have arisen 
in earlier chapters. No further comment is required, 
except to suggest that writers on air policy should be 
wary of supporting their opinions by reference to 
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secondary sources which purport to give details of 
aircraft specifications, and the policy behind them, but 
which in fact do not - the "legendary" role of Sorley is a 
salutary example. 
Common charges against the Air Ministry are that it was 
out-of-date in its requirements for aircraft and their 
armament as compared with other countries; that it was 
primarily concerned with aircraft for Air Control, 
suspicious of monoplanes, slow to respond to technical 
development, and sought big (night) bombers to implement a 
new bombing policy. The reader is led to believe that 
military aircraft produced in other countries were more 
advanced than those sought by the Air Staff, and that the 
British aircraft which proved successful were mostly the 
product of initiatives (and funding) from industry. It 
has been shown that these claims are largely without 
foundation. 
of course the Air Ministry did not design aircraft. The 
success in translating operational requirements into 
outstanding machines was the achievement of British 
aircraft designers - but as noted at the beginning of this 
thesis, and confirmed throughout, they were guided and 
funded by the Air Ministry. Even the so-called "purest 
case'll of private venture designs - the Mosquito - has 
been shown to stem from a long line of thinking by RAF 
officers, regarding both a speed bomber and an aircraft 
made of wood. 
Many critical opinions stem from a failure to notice 
factors which were highly relevant to RAF thinking at the 
time. These include the importance of the day and night 
operational capability demanded of the RAF's standard 
fighter, and of all fighters after 1935; the belief that 
bomber formations could not be broken up by single-seat 
fighters, and the consequent effort put into attempts to 
I Postan, page 84 
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develop a satisfactory multi-seat turret fighter; and the 
crucial decisions made in 1934-35 to drastically reduce 
the fuel load of fighters, which had a major influence on 
the practicality of the eight-gun fighters. 
Little notice is taken of the profound impact on bomber 
development of disarmament discussions in the early 1930s 
- which as has been shown were still of some concern in 
1936 and 1938. The RAF's assessment of the operational 
requirements for bombing Germany in daylight, and their 
technical consequences, are misunderstood, and interpreted 
in retrospect as a change in bombing policy. It is little 
appreciated that the operational requirements for war with 
Germany were seen to demand not only long range, but also 
high speed to reduce exposure to fighter attack in 
daylight. This requirement was a major factor in the 
evolution of big bombers, despite the desire to keep them 
as small as possible. 
The crucial importance of assisted take-off in meeting the 
1936 bomber requirements for long range and large bomb 
loads is unnoticed or brushed aside, and its replacement 
by airfield development is ignored. Yet it was this which 
enabled the catapult take-off performance called for in 
1936 to be exploited in war. 
The current research has shown that much of the criticism 
in the literature of the Air Ministry is unjustified. In 
terms of the aircraft it sought the Air Ministry was 
thoughtful and forward looking. When put to the test of 
war, the fighting performance which the Ministry demanded 
for its home defence fighters and bombers was at least as 
good as those sought or achieved elsewhere, and in some 
respects superior. 
That this was so with respect to Germany is evident from 
combat experience in the first year of the war. Fighter 
Command did win the Battle of Britain, although 
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outnumbered by contemporary German fighters. German 
bombers were no more successful in defending themselves in 
daylight than were RAF bombers. When both were forced to 
bombing by night, and heavy bomb loads were needed, those 
written into Air Staff Requirements in 1936 were far 
greater than any achieved by German aircraft at any time 
during the war. 
As regards comparison with America, when consideration was 
given to the purchase of American aircraft in the 
desperate days of May 1940, the Cabinet was told that, 
"the aircraft types now in service with the United States 
Army were obsolete, and unsuitable for European 
conditions. 112 Earlier in 1940, it was found that, 
At the present time no long range American bombers 
have an armament which in our view is in any way 
adequate. In particular none has power-operated 
turrets, which we consider to be indispensable. 3 
The first American fighter units which operated from 
Britain were equipped with Spitfires, 4 and when these were 
replaced by an early model of the P-47 (Thunderbolt), it 
could "barely hold its own against the Luftwaffe". 5 
The French military aircraft which were in service in 
1939-40 were generally out-classed by those of Germany. 6,7 
In terms of performance and armament, only the few 
available Dewoitine'D. 520 fighters were comparable with 
the Me 109 or with the Hurricane and Spitfire. Some 
French bombers were armed with a 20mm cannon, but their 
performance suffered from the policy of seeking a multi- 
purpose bombardement-combat-reconnaissance type. 8 
2 PRO: CAB 65/7, War Cabinet 124(40) 16th May 1940, page 149, section 12 
3 PRO: AIR 8/293, Aircraft Potential in U. S. A. Pleven and Greenly Investigation, ACAS 
to PUS, 15.1.40 
4 Macfarland, page 82 
5 ibid., page 89 
6 Griffin, D. E., "The Battle of France 194011, Aerospace Historian, VOL 21 (1974), No. 3 
7 Kirkland, F. R., "French Air Strength in May 194011, Air Power History, VOL 40 (1993), 
No. 1 
8 Vennesson, P., "Institution and Air power: The Making of the French Air Force", JSS, 
VOL 18 (1995), No. 1 
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10.2 DOCTRINE versus REALITY 
With regard to the strategic assessment which the RAF had 
put forward in the inter-war years the story is simply 
told. The German Air Force did not attempt an immediate 
knock-out blow, nor did the RAF embark upon an immediate 
counter-offensive against German military installations 
and industry. When air attacks on London were made, they 
were on a scale far greater than the 100 tons per day for 
a few days which had been thought to be sufficient to 
produce devastation. In September, October and November 
1940 a daily average of over 200 tons was dropped on 
London, and a lower level of attack continued through to 
the spring of 1941.9 But when faced with a resolute, 
well-organised and radar-aided defence, bombing accuracy 
was much less than had been predicted. Bombing caused 
neither the level of destruction and casualties that had 
been calculated nor the collapse of civilian morale. The 
words of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in 1921 proved 
correct. His comment on claims that a future war would be 
decided by devastating air attacks was that it was not, 
profitable to pursue the abstract discussion of such 
conjectural phenomena, for it must be very many years 
before the aerial power of our potential enemies can 
attain the gigantic proportions suggested, by which 
time it may be that science will have designed a 
correspondingly effective antidote, while it is to be 
hoped that this country may then be peopled by a less 
war weary and more robust generation. 10 
It was in the absence of any known antidote to bombing 
that the RAF had adopted a doctrine of air warfare which 
depended upon the supremacy of the bomber, and throughout 
the inter-war period it held to that assessment. Changes 
in the international situation did not alter its belief 
that the only effective way of mitigating air attacks on 
London was to threaten and, if needs be, to implement, a 
9 Wood and Dempster, Appendix 23, and Overy, page 36 
10 PRO: AIR 8/6, The Air Force in retation to the Army and Navy, note by CIGS, 26.9.21 
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counter offensive. Nor did it believe that advances in 
science and engineering undermined the validity of the 
means by which that doctrine was to be given effect - 
accurate daylight bombing by self-defending bombers. 
This theory, shared at the time by other air forces, was 
soon disproved. Webster and Frankland comment that, 
More was learnt about the potentialities and 
limitations of the day bomber formation in a few 
months of war experience than had been gained from 
the previous twenty years of theorising on the basis 
of fragmentary and often obsolete evidence derived from the First World War, the Sino-Japanese War and 
the Spanish Civil War. 11 
The failure of day bombing theory had its counterpart in 
the unanticipated success of RAF fighters against daylight 
raids on Britain, even when German bombers were escorted. 
Faced with these facts, both British and German air forces 
turned to bombing by night, and this exposed other 
deficiencies in pre-war assessments. 
10.3 THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The introduction in 1933-34 of a formal procedure for the 
initiation of new aircraft types has been described in 
chapter 3.3.2. The system then established concentrated 
power into the hands of the Air Staff. But the 
establishment of a branch whose sole responsibility was 
for operational requirements did not lead to a careful 
appraisal of the aircraft characteristics which were 
needed to implement RAF home defence strategy. There were 
no studies of the kind carried out in earlier years by 
T. C. R. Higgins, Welsh and Chamier. The review of 
operational duties undertaken - with some reluctance - in 
1935, went little further than to consider the allocation 
of different types of aircraft to home and overseas 
11 Webster and Franktand, Vot 1, page 190 
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stations, and the prospects for reducing the number of 
classes of aircraft. Even the Air Staff's Ideal Bomber 
appreciation was based primarily upon the economics of a 
bomber force - its novel contribution to operational 
analysis was to assume that the combined defensive power 
of a formation of bombers was no longer needed, for which 
no evidence was cited. 
The Operational Requirements branch became increasingly 
involved in detail, and, as has been shown, did not think 
through some important operational aspects of the aircraft 
it prescribed. Omissions which have been discussed are 
the interaction between fighter and bomber armament, the 
problems of night fighting and bombing, and the wider 
implications of assisted take-off schemes. It also 
pursued the amalgamation of the medium and torpedo bomber 
classes without examining the practicality of torpedo 
dropping, although in this instance with fortuitous 
beneficial consequences. 
Perhaps the most notable of these omissions was the Air 
Staff's failure to relate their own forward-looking 
approach to fighter armament to its implications for the 
defence of bombers. Yet this was an issue of great 
relevance to the RAF's own doctrine of air warfare - the 
power of bombers to defend themselves. 
From 1927 to 1932 there were operational requirements (and 
experiments) which increased fixed-gun fighter armament 
from the two machine guns of 1918 to four (F. 20/27 and 
F. 7/30) or six (F. 10/27 and F. 16/33). Even so, the 
armament specified for bombers in those years was no more 
than three single-gun stations for B. 19/27 and B. 9/32. 
This level of bomber defence was continued in 1934 and 
1935 (B. 3/34 and B. 1/35), even though contemporary 
requirements for fighters by then called for eight guns - 
and it was expected that other nations would follow this 
trend. 
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Although the final form of B. 1/35 called for a two-gun 
tail turret, and the 1936 bomber requirements both 
included a four machine-gun tail turret, by that time the 
Air Staff had launched the cannon fighter (F. 37/35) - with 
four 20mm cannon - and in 1937 saw the alternative as a 
twelve machine-gun fighter (F. 18/37). 
Despite this failure over many years to bring bomber 
armament into line with that of contemporary fixed-gun 
fighters, the Air Staff's confidence in the defensive 
power of bombers against such fighters led to their near 
obsession with fighters with moveable guns. In the early 
1930s development of a high performance single-seater was 
postponed in favour of such developments, and up to 1939 
great hopes were placed upon such types. This obsession 
had its impact on bomber requirements through the 
insistence on the need for under turrets for defence 
against (non-existent) hostile turret fighters. 
The lack of interaction between the operational 
requirements for fighters and bombers perhaps followed 
from a weakness in Ludlow-Hewitt's scheme for an 
operational Requirements Committee. This made provision 
for a representative only of the "appropriate Command at 
home, if applicable". Thus the opportunity for an 
exchange of views between fighter and bomber officers was 
not taken. 
On some other issues the inclusion of the operational 
Commands in discussions of operational requirements was 
clearly beneficial.. Examples are the Commands' views on 
the endurance of fighters, and their pressure for higher 
speeds for bombers. Perhaps the most surprising omission 
was the failure of ADGB/Bomber Command officers to 
question seriously the practicality of launching the 
bomber striking force by catapult. 
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That the Air Staff did not follow through some 
implications of their operational requirements may be 
traced to the fact that responsibility for them was first 
taken on by the Flying Operations 1 section of the Air 
Staff. This section had initially been established 
specifically to consider the strategy and tactics of home 
defence, but Portal led it into concentration on 
operational requirements. When in 1934, as discussed in 
chapter 3.2.2, it was recognised that this had become its 
major role, Williams and Sorley were transferred to the 
new Operational Requirements section. The study of home 
defence strategy was separated, and diminished to the 
extent that it was given to the officer who was also 
responsible for RAF policy with respect to civil unrest. 12 
Thus any link which there had been between operational 
requirements and home defence operational considerations 
was further weakened. 
Another criticism of the Air Ministry's management of 
operational requirements is the lack of continuity of 
thought on a number of major issues. This seems to have 
been a consequence of the relatively short-term 
appointment of RAF officers to the Air Staff. How else 
can one account for the all too frequent resurrection of 
previously rejected ideas, the inversion of arguments, and 
contradictory decisions? Examples are the gyrations of 
policy in regard to multi-seat fighters, discussed in 
chapters 4,6 and 9, and those on airfield policy, 
described in chapter 9. 
The Air Ministry was not unaware that lack of continuity 
posed a problem. On such a vital matter as air defence 
intelligence communications - the core of Fighter 
Command's operational control - the Ministry decided that 
the chairmanship of the Technical Committee should go to 
the Assistant Engineer-in-Chief of the Post Office - "as 
12 2/673, page 15 
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R. A. F. personnel are liable to change rapidly". 13 They 
were also aware of the consequences of a rapid turnover of 
policy staff in other Service departments, exemplified by 
a note from Dowding to Buchanan following discussions with 
the Admiralty. He wrote that, "when you have taken action 
I should like this file to go back to D. C. A. S to confirm 
this Policv officiallv with the Admiralty. Otherwise I 
fear that the next incumbent of DNADIS14 post will have 
his own ideas & want to scrap all previous poliCy.,, 15 
That in some instances this is exactly what happened 
within the Air Ministry apparently went largely unnoticed 
and uncorrected. 
Continuity was less of a problem in the technical branches 
of the Air Ministry, no doubt because there was a large 
component of permanent civilian staff. Respected figures 
such as Buchanan and Liptrot were in post throughout the 
1930s - Liptrot from the early 1920s. Perhaps even more 
important in ensuring continuity of approach was that 
Dowding was the AMSR, then AMRD, through the vital years 
September 1930 to May 1936. 
10.4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN ACTION 
The aircraft which were operated by the RAF in the first 
eighteen months of war were those derived from operational 
requirements which had been set many years before. These 
had been chosen to implement the pattern of air warfare 
expected by the RAF. Later in the war the strategic 
situation, and the pattern of air warfare, had changed 
completely from that envisaged before the war. British 
aircraft development responded to these circumstances 
largely through the modification and improvement of the 
13 PRO: AIR 2/1672, Air Defence Inteltigence Reporting System Formation of Co-ordfnatio 
Cormnittee, FOI to DCAS, 7.12.35 
14 Director of Navat Air Division 
15 PRO: AIR 2/607, Design Branch Specification No. 0.27134 Fighter Dive Bomber, Dowding 
to [Buchanan3,15.12.34 
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aircraft types which had been defined before the war16 - 
mostly before 1937 - and based upon concepts established 
in the 1920s. 
Throughout the inter-war years the operational 
characteristics which the RAF sought to implement its 
doctrine changed little in principle, although greatly in 
quantity. The development of increasingly powerful 
engines was used to get higher speeds from heavier 
aircraft which then had the potential to carry greater 
military loads. For both bombers and fighters this 
potential could be exploited fully only by building larger 
airfields. 
Obviously an important input was the emergence of Germany 
as the most likely enemy able to strike Britain through 
air power. To attack Berlin the counter-offensive bomber 
force would need a much greater operational range than had 
hitherto been sought when Paris was the prime target, and 
this was seen to need both high speed and powerful 
defensive armament.. Speed and armament are not good 
bedfellows in bomber design, and much effort was spent on 
searching for an acceptable compromise. But belief in the 
viability of self-defending bombers did not waver, nor did 
its counterpart - doubts about the ability of RAF single- 
seat fighters to defend London. War was to demonstrate 
that both these beliefs were unfounded. 
10.4.1 Bombers 
By the end of 1939 the RAF's belief that daylight bombing 
by self-defending formations was sustainable was 
undermined, even though no penetration of Germany had been 
attempted. In the words of Air Marshal Sir Phillip 
Joubert, Bomber Command operations against the German 
16 Postan, page 159 
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fleet, "had cost us dear". 17 Armed reconnaissance 
missions by formations of Hampdens and Wellingtons derived 
from specification B. 9/32 suffered severe losses. The 
operations themselves are well-trodden ground. They, and 
the consequent move to night bombing, are fully described 
in Webster and Frankland. 18 
It was believed that the B. 9/32 bombers, lack of beam 
defence was their weakness against fighter attack. Thus 
in May 1940, when the Air Fighting Committee met to 
consider "The defensive armament of heavy bombers", and to 
decide policy which the ACAS (Douglas) said might last 
until the end of the war, 19 it was decided to fit mid- 
upper turrets to the bombers of the 1936 programme. This 
was in spite of Dowding's re-assertion of the pre-war view 
that at modern bomber speeds (over 200 mph) beam attacks 
would not be feasible. But he noted that some of the 
bombers had been flying at what he called 1914-18 war 
speeds - 11140 m. p. h., (e. g. the Wellington)" - and that 
then beam attacks were feasible. 20 This was a further 
instance of the difference between operational practice 
and performance as seen within the Air Ministry, for in 
September 1939 the operational cruising speed of the 
Wellington had been put at 212 mph. 21 
Despite the inability of the bombers derived from B. 9/32 
to defend themselves, the Air Staff hoped that the faster, 
better armed and armoured bombers from the 1936 programme 
could operate in daylight. Webster and Frankland note 
that, 
The belief still lingered that heavy bombers might 
yet be cast into self-defending formations capable of 
17 PRO: AIR 20/225, Operations against the German Fleet Dee 1939 - Feb. '40, Joubert to 
DCAS, 29.12.39 
18 Webster and Franktand, VoL 1, Chapter IV 
19 5/1126, Minutes of 21st meeting of the Air Fighting Committee, 5th Aprit 1940, para. 1 
20 ibid., para. 7 
21 PRO: AIR 20/235, Part 11 Attacks on German Fteet 6th Sept '39 - 26th May '43, A. 
Durston EDNOI to DDOps, 8.9.39, para. 5 
Chapter 10 Conclusions 348 
carrying the war to the interior of Germany in 
daylight. 22 
This belief was supported by tactical trials of the 
P. 13/36 bombers, which concluded that they could be 
operated in daylight if there was some cloud cover. Indeed 
it was expected that the Halifax would be particularly 
able to defend itself - even flying alone - when fitted 
with a mid-upper turret. 23,24 
Soon after each type derived from the 1936 specifications 
came into service it was sent upon daylight raids, 
although not to the interior of Germany. In July 1941 
small formations of Stirlings and Halifaxes attacked the 
French Atlantic ports. But after an attack by fourteen 
Halifaxes on La Pallice had suffered heavy casualties, 25 
Bomber Command concluded that, "unsupported daylight 
attacks by heavies when faced with equal or slightly 
superior numbers of fighters are not a practical 
proposition". 26 Nevertheless, some further daylight 
attacks were mounted, notably with Lancasters (which can 
be directly traced back to P. 13/36). Losses were high and 
the results were disappointing. 27 
The RAF was forced to night attacks as the means of 
conducting a bombing offensive against Germany throughout 
most of the war. It lost not only the supposed precision 
of day bombing, but also the prospect of a continuous day 
and night offensive. 
Bombing by day had been envisaged as the main operational 
role in all but one of the bomber operational requirements 
specified in the 1930s. Nevertheless, there was always in 
22 Webster and Frankland, page 239 
23 PRO: AIR 2/1651, Air Fighting Cttee (papers), 193A, Tacticat Triats of Hatifax 
Aircraft, 3.6.41 
24 ibid., 173A, Tacticat Triats - Manchester Aircraft, 1.4.41 
25 Rivaz, R. C., Tait Gunner, 1943 and 1996; chapters VI and VII give a graphic account 
of this raid by a participant 
26 Somber Command Air Staff Note, 28.7.41, cited by Webster and Frankland, page 241 
27 Webster and FrankLand, chapter VII, section 4, Daytight bombing in 1942 
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the background the thought that if day bombing was not 
sustainable a night offensive might be forced upon the 
RAF. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s the reason for 
the search for a dual-role bomber was so that it could be 
used by day or by night as the strength of opposition 
dictated. That bombing by night might be forced upon the 
RAF was envisaged by the DCAS (Burnett) in 1932. He wrote 
that, 
If (and it is a possibility we must be prepared for) 
the enemy's defence by day proved unexpectedly 
strong, we should have to depend largely on night 
bombing for most of our material effeCt28 
Similarly, in his review of aircraft classes in 1935, Peck 
feared that medium bombers might have to be used at 
night. 29 
A night-flying operational capability was included in all 
medium and heavy bomber specifications issued after 1934 
and, in 1935, the Hampden and Wellington - built to day 
bomber specification B. 9/32 - were planned to be equipped 
for full night operation. Thus when the degree of 
opposition did force the RAP to an offensive based upon 
night bombing, it was not ill-equipped in aircraft for 
that role - that it was untrained is another matter. 
Moreover the facility for very large bomb loads built into 
the 1936 bomber requirements provided some recompense for 
the inaccuracy of night bombing. 
An important, indeed at times overriding, trend in RAF 
bomber requirements in the 1930s was the emphasis on 
speed. This was seen as essential to limit the exposure 
to fighter attack in daylight raids, and was a major 
factor in the increase in the weight of RAF bombers. For 
P. 13/36 (Halifax and Manchester) in particular there was 
strong pressure for a cruising speed of 300 mph, although 
when issued 275 mph was specified (equivalent to a top 
28 9/69, FoLio 76, DCAS to CAS, 18.6.32 
29 2/2715,68 
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speed of over 300 mph). In fact, as noted in chapter 
9.3.3, during design development speeds even higher than 
these were attributed to the P. 13/36 designs, and even to 
the heavy bomber B. 12/36 designs - maximum speeds of 
nearly 330 mph were estimated for both types. But when 
these bombers came into service in 1941, and production 
aircraft were evaluated, their top speed was lower than 
the cruising speed specified in 1936. Trials gave for the 
Halifax (without mid-upper turret) a top speed of 270 mph 
and a cruising speed of 210 mph, 30 and for the Manchester 
(with mid-upper turret) a top speed of 262 mph and a 
cruising speed of 225 mph. 31 These results further 
illustrate the change in performance that could arise 
between the Air Staff's requirements, design estimates, 
and production. This problem has been discussed in 
chapter 3.4.5 - where similar disappointing figures for 
the B. 12/36 Stirling are noted. 
However, it is doubtful if attainment of the speed 
estimates of the late 1930s would have allowed deep 
penetration raids in daylight. Later in the war even 
short-range attacks by fast medium bombers were usually 
escorted by fighters. Only the Mosquito Mark IV (the 
first light bomber version) was fast enough to make 
occasional deep penetration raids in daylight, and it is 
credited with a maximum speed of 380 mph and a cruising 
speed of 340 mph. 32 
As regards the defence of bombers, it has been shown that 
this was given surprisingly little attention, despite its 
vital importance to the concept of self-defending 
formations. The RAF not only failed to translate its own 
advances in fighter armament into complementary 
improvements in bomber defence, but in personnel terms, 
whilst much credence was given to the idea that a fighter 
pilot could not fly his aircraft and accurately aim his 
30 2/1651,193A, para. 6 
31 ibid., 173A, para. 19,1.4.41 
32 Thetford, page 215 
Chapter 10 Conclusions 351 
guns, it was taken for granted that a fitter could aim the 
guns of a bomber - and without the need to test his 
eyesight. 33 
When, in 1938, it was at last accepted that "Bomber 
armament must naturally be correlated to that of 
fighters", 34 it was too late. Designs to the 1936 bomber 
specifications were well advanced by the time that it was 
accepted that cannon armament was essential for bombers, 
and no way of satisfactorily modifying the developed 
aircraft was found. Regrettable as this was thought to 
be, it must be doubtful that cannon armament would have 
provided adequate defence in daylight. (The USAAF's 
unescorted daylight attacks on Germany in 1943, with large 
formations of bombers armed with many O. Sin guns, suffered 
unsustainable losses. 35) In the event, when the 1936 
bombers were operated at night, their armament was of less 
consequence, for if the crew could not see an attacking 
fighter it mattered little what guns they carried. 
The last pure night bomber requirement - B. 3/34 (Whitley) 
- was used early in the war for leaflet dropping sorties, 
and from May 1940 for night attacks on military and 
industrial targets. Losses due to enemy action were very 
JOW36 -a warning before German night attacks on Britain 
of the ineffectiveness of night defence before the 
introduction of radar aids to interception. 
Air Ministry Intelligence deduced another lesson from 
these early Bomber Command night attacks. It suggested in 
September 1940 that Germany had adopted indiscriminate 
bombing at night - in the hope of undermining morale - 
33 2/956, Minutes of the second meeting of the Bombing Committee, 30th May 1935 
34 14/380, The Gun Arrangements for Bombers, 9.8.38, section headed "FIGHTER ARMAMENT" 
35 Daniets, G. (editor), A Guide to the Reports of the United States Strategic Sombinq 
Surve , 1981, page xviii 36 2/1651, AFC 98, Notes on Interception of British Bombers by Enemy Aircraft at Night, 
Air Tactics Branch, 12.7.40 
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because they knew that little effective military damage 
was done in RAF night raids. 37 
10.4.2 Fiqhters 
Fighter Command operations before the summer of 1940 
confirmed the expected superiority of multi-gun single- 
seat fighters over single bombers. They brought forth an 
interesting reflection on pre-war concerns about the 
limited ammunition capacity and endurance of RAF fighters. 
Dowding's advice to pilots who attacked too fast was that, 
"The motto should be - 'Keep cool, there is no hurry. You 
have an hour's petrol and only 18 seconds (sic) fire 
capacity. , iiM 
The Hurricane and Spitfire were not called upon to operate 
in their planned home defence role against formations of 
bombers until the commencement of the Battle of Britain in 
July 1940. In terms of the operational requirements 
(F. 10/35) from which these aircraft derived, this crucial 
battle was quite unlike that which had been expected in 
two ways. 
First, as with German fighters attacking RAF bomber 
formations, but contrary to pre-war expectation, single- 
seat fighters were found to be very effective against 
unescorted formations of bombers. Second, the German Air 
Force adopted fighter escort for its bombers - feasible 
from bases in France in a way that it would not have been 
from Germany. Fighter Command was therefore faced with 
fighter versus fighter combat. This had not been 
envisaged when fighter policy in the 1930s put the 
emphasis on speed at the expense of manoeuvrability. 
Indeed there were some doubts as to whether dogfights were 
37 PRO: AIR 9/443, Notes of Meeting hetd on 23rd October 1940 to Discuss Bombing Potic 
DD13 to Dol, 24.9.40 
38 PRO: AIR 16/299, Lessons tearned from Air Combats, IA, 25.10.39, para. 4 
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physiologically feasible. The RAF Manual of Air Tactics 
stated that, 
Manoeuvre at high speeds in air fighting is not now 
practicable, because the effect of gravity on the 
human body during rapid changes of direction at high 
speed causes a temporary loss of consciousness, 
deflection shooting becomes difficult and accuracy is hard to obtain. 39 
This statement was issued before fast monoplane fighters 
had come into service. When it was found that dogfights 
between such fighters were possible, the issue of 
manoeuvrability versus speed was summed up by Dowding at 
an Air Fighting Committee discussion in February 1940. He 
said that if two fighters were determined to stay and 
fight, it would eventually resolve into a circling match, 
and the one with the smallest turning circle and best 
control would win. But if the other fighter had 
sacrificed manceuvrability to get a higher performance, 
and did not choose to fight, it need not. 40 
Despite the unanticipated tactical situation, the 
Hurricane and Spitfire, coupled with a radar-based fighter 
control system, whilst not able to prevent the daylight 
bombing of London, did make it militarily ineffective and 
unsustainable. on the other hand, the considerable 
resources devoted to attempts to devise a form of fighter 
thought to be more suitable to attack formations of 
bombers proved not only to have been unnecessary, but - as 
feared by Dowding when this idea was gaining momentum 
through the Novel Fighter competition - led to fighters 
like the Defiant which were vulnerable to enemy single- 
seat fighter escorts. 
On finding that day attacks by its purpose-designed day 
bombers were too expensive, the main German bomber force 
followed the RAF in concentrating on night attacks. 
39 10/1430, chapter VIII, para. 4 
40 5/1126, Minutes of 19th meeting of AFC, 12th February 1940, para. 51 
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Attacks in daylight were continued along the lines 
proposed by Chamier" (discussed in chapter 4.2.2.1), with 
fighters carrying bombs. These "changeling bombers" were, 
as anticipated by Chamier, fast enough to make 
interception difficult, and able to defend themselves if 
intercepted. 
The RAF's plan for defence against night attacks had 
always been to employ its single-seat fighters, to the 
extent that the Air Staff were prepared to sacrifice their 
performance as day fighters to obtain safe night flying - 
sometimes in vain, as with the Bulldog. Night defence by 
single-seat fighters had appeared to be reasonably 
successful in air exercises. But exercises against 
bombers which flew along known routes, and with their 
navigation lights on, were no test of the ability of a 
fighter pilot to see and attack a bomber at night in 
wartime. As with German defences against RAF night 
bombing, there was found to be no effective defence until 
the introduction of Airborne Interception radar and Ground 
Controlled Interception. Nevertheless, the belief that 
single-seat fighters could be effective at night persisted 
amongst the Air Staff, and contrary to Dowding's wishes, 
more squadrons were employed in that role - to little 
effect. 41 (Later in the war, German single-seat fighters 
achieved some success at night against RAF bombers when 
their attacks were concentrated in time and space, could 
be illuminated by radar guided searchlights, and 
silhouetted against the flares and fires of the target 
area - the so-called Wilde Sau tactics. 
42) 
Airborne Interception radar was under development in 1938 
(then known as R. D. F. 2). It was clear that a two-seat 
fighter would be needed for night fighting because a pilot 
could not fly the aircraft and operate the radar. 
43 
Fortuitously, the Bristol Beaufighter was coming into 
41 CoWer, B., The Defence of the United Kirind , 1957, pages 
254-255 
42 HinchLiffe, page 131 
43 2/2964,18A, Note of a Meeting ... on 16th November 1938, page 
2 
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service. The origin of this aircraft as a quickly 
available cannon fighter has been noted in chapter 9.2.1. 
Its capacious fuselage could take radar equipment and an 
operator, and it became the first successful night 
fighter. 
Yet apart from night fighting, and despite its doubts 
about the effectiveness of single-seat fighters, the Air 
Staff chose the right priorities for this class in other 
respects. From the early 1930s it moved towards placing 
speed and armament above other performance 
characteristics, and accepted a relatively low endurance 
to get a high maximum speed. This policy led to the 
development of fighters which were a match for their main 
opponent in 1940, the Me(Bf) 109. Indeed, comparative 
trials with a captured Me 109 concluded that the Spitfire 
was better in every respect. 44 (Spick says that German 
trials with a captured Spitfire came to the opposite 
conclusion. He suggests that, "in practice there was 
little to choose between the two types". 45) 
In its plans for the armament of fighters the Air Staff 
was far ahead of those of any other air force. The 
literature reports that in 1934, when eight wing-mounted 
0.303in machine guns were specified for F-5/34, the German 
Me 109 was designed to carry two 7.9mm (0.311in. ) machine 
guns, later increased to four. 46,47 Design of the Focke- 
Wulf Fw 190 started in 1937-38 and was thus contemporary 
with F. 18/37. It was initially armed with four rifle- 
calibre machine gunS48,49 whereas Air Staff Requirement 
F. 18/37 called for twelve. 
44 2/1651,87A, AFC 99, Comparative Triats between a captured Messerschmitt 109 and 
British Fighters 
45 Spick, M., The Ace Factor, 1988, page 82 
46 Cooper, M.. The German Air Force 1933-45. an Anatomy of Faiture, 1981, page 52 
47 DresseL. J., and GreihL, M., (trans. M. J. SheiLds), Fighters of the Luftwaffe, 1993, 
page 36 
48 Green, W. & Swanborough, G., Focke-wutf Fw 190,1976, page 33 
49 Smith J. R., & Kay, A., German Aircraft of the Second Wortd War, 1972, page 175 
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The armament of American fighters also lagged behind that 
adopted for RAF fighters. In 1934 the Curtiss P-36 was 
designed with but two 0.300in machine guns - later 
increased to four. The Curtiss P-40 (Tomahawk when 
operated by the RAF), first flew in 1938 armed with two 
O. Sin machine guns, 50 with two 0.300in added later. 51 
operational requirements for the better armed American 
fighters of the Second World War were no doubt drawn up 
some time before these aircraft entered service in 1942 - 
Brodie says the requirements which led to the P-38 
(Lightning) were issued in February 1937.52 But by 1942 
most RAF fighters in service were armed with either two 
20mm cannon plus machine guns or four cannon. 
The Air Staff had first called for an armament of four 
20mm cannon in 1935. The Westland Whirlwind to 
specification F. 37/35 was much delayed in development, and 
arrangements were made to arm the Spitfire and Hurricane 
with 20mm. cannon. Cannon-armed Spitfires made a brief 
appearance in the Battle of Britain, by which time German 
fighters were armed with cannon, but of a type much 
inferior to the Hispano gun which was coming into use by 
the RAF. Indeed, Wallace says that the 20mm Oerlikon as 
used by the German Air Force had less penetration than the 
RAF's 0.303in machine guns. He adds that theory (both RAF 
and German) had been that an explosive charge would 
suffice, but this was proved wrong, particularly when 
aircraft were armoured against machine gun ammunition. 53 
Indeed, after a year of experience of air fighting, it was 
found that, 
one of the principal lessons of the war is that the 
airframe can stand a very large number of strikes 
from all types of ammunition up to and including 20 
m. m. without failure. 54 
50 Bradtey, M. E., *'The XP-4011, Aerospace Historian, Vot 25 (1978), No. 3 
51 Swanborough & Bowers, pages 221 and 231 
52 Brodie, W. M., The Lockheed P-38 LiAhtning, 1991, page 16 
53 Wattace, page 181 "German Guns" 
54 20/84, ACASM to D of Ptans, 12.10.40, Vutnerabitity of Aircraft 
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This finding confirmed the Air Staff's view in 1935 that 
the single engine-mounted cannon then being developed in 
France (and also in Germany for the Me 109B55) would not 
give a sufficient density of fire. 
10.5 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A NIGHT BOMBING POLICY 
In chapter 4.2.2.3 the RAF's implied doubts about the 
feasibility of long-range bombing operations in daylight 
are discussed, and in chapter 6.1 the Dowding's and 
Pierse's fear that deep penetration bombing raids would be 
vulnerable to attack by multi-gun fighters is noted. This 
section briefly discusses the impact on operational 
requirements if these concerns had led the Air Staff to 
base its planning on the assumption that long-range 
unescorted bombing by day would be too costly. 
It is assumed that no change in strategic policy would 
have arisen, since,. as noted in chapter 2.2.1, the Air 
Staff saw its counter-offensive strategy as appropriate 
for, "war between two nations who have no land frontiers 
in common". Thus as there were no plans to send a British 
army force to the continent of Europe until the late 
1930S, 56 the alternative policy of planning the home 
defence air force primarily to support ground operations 
would not have arisen. Moreover, the relative 
vulnerability of London was high, so that an enemy might 
be able to sustain daylight attacks when the RAF could 
not, and, if he was forced to night attacks, it was feared 
that these would also be devastating despite the expected 
loss of accuracy. 57 Thus a deterrent counter- offensive 
strategy would still have been seen as appropriate for 
home defence. 
55 Janes Fighting Aircraft of World War 11, Studio Editions, 1989, page 176 
56 Bond, B., British Military Policy betw; en the Two World Wars. 1980 
57 41/14, Appendix 6, Annexure A, Estimate of Effect of Air Attack on Docks 
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There were known to be two options to implement a counter- 
offensive if it was believed that day bombing by 
unescorted formations of bombers was not a feasible 
operation of war. These were night bombing or fighter 
escort for day bombers. 
For an offensive based upon night bombers one might 
suppose that the first requirement to be relaxed would be 
defensive armament, for it was recognised that this would 
be of little use in darkness. It had been Air Staff 
policy to arm night bombers to the same standard as day 
bombers only because they might have to undertake part of 
their missions in daylight in the summer months, and might 
be used by day when an enemy's defences had been weakened. 
If day operation had been thought to be not feasible these 
considerations would not apply. Even so, in the thinking 
of the 1930s it is unlikely that armament would have been 
dispensed with entirely. A tail turret would have been 
thought necessary for crew morale, and as a threat to an 
attacking fighter should it have sighted the bomber. (one 
of the oddities of Bomber Command's night offensive is 
that it operated fully armed and crewed day bombers at 
night, although there was a firmly held opinion - by 
Arthur Harris in particular - that only a tail turret 
could be useful at night. 58) 
Otherwise, the trend of bomber development would sensibly 
have moved towards large bomb loads to counteract the 
expected relative inaccuracy of night bombing as compared 
with day. Cruising speed would need to be no more than 
sufficient to complete deep penetrations of German 
airspace in darkness throughout most of the year. 
In many respects the original requirement for the medium 
bomber, P. 13/36, came close to this specification when 
overloaded take-off. is taken into account, but with the 
important difference that a high cruising speed was 
58 5/1126, Minutes of 21st meeting of AFC, 5th April 1940, paras. 39 arid 43 
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demanded to limit exposure to fighter attacks during day 
raids. In fact, as noted above, by the time the aircraft 
designed to this requirement were ready for operations 
their cruising speed was little more than 200 mph - more 
suitable for their enforced role of night bomber than for 
that of high-speed day bomber aimed for in 1936. Very 
high speeds for night bombers became important only after 
the introduction of'radar aids to interception, as 
evidenced by the relative invulnerability of the Mosquito. 
Acceptance that daylight bombing was unsustainable would 
have affected not only bomber operational requirements, 
for Air Staff fighter requirements were also guided by 
belief in the efficacy of daylight bombing. Faith in 
self-defending formations of bombers was extended to 
potential enemies more so in view of the vulnerable 
position of London and this led to many attempts to find 
a type of fighter to overcome the supposed failings of 
fixed-gun fighters. Furthermore, the belief that 
devastating day attacks on London could not be prevented 
led to the view that night attacks would be of secondary 
importance, and that therefore the development of a 
dedicated night fighter was not justified. Instead, all 
fighters were required to have a day and night fighting 
capability. 
Had night bombing been seen as the main threat, then the 
Air Staff could be expected to have put more emphasis on 
the development of a night fighter, and this would have 
been along the lines considered in the mid-1920s and early 
1930s -a twin-engined aircraft with a very good view for 
the crew. (Such a project was included in the draft Air 
Estimates for 1931.59) It must be remembered that, 
although it was found in war that the interception of 
night bombers by fighters of any sort was negligible 
before the advent of airborne radar, this was not part of 
the Air Staff's reasoning between the wars. 
59 20/68, page 91 and page 101, Item 4. Twin Engined Night Fighter 
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Whatever efforts might have been made to improve defence 
against night attacks, a strong day defence would also 
have been required to force an enemy to concentrate on 
night attacks. There is no reason to think that the 
aircraft seen as required for this purpose would have been 
any different than those which were specified, 
particularly as it was believed that these already 
included a secondary night fighting capability. 
Fighter escort for bombers in daylight was the alternative 
policy the RAF could have considered had it assumed that 
attacks by unescorted day bombers were untenable. 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Air Staff argued that 
fighter escort was tacticallv unsound, diverted resources 
from bombers, and in any case was not technically 
feasible. Although later in the war found to be unsound 
in its tactical appreciation, the Air Staff was correct in 
its assumption that an escort fighter designed in the mid- 
1930s, with the range needed for war with Germany, could 
not have a performance comparable with that of the short- 
range fighters which the defence would employ. This was 
demonstrated by the fate of the German Me 110 long-range 
fighter - as good a-design as the state-of-the-art of the 
1930s allowed6O - when confronted by the RAF's single-seat 
fighters. 
The later success of the North American P-51B Mustang as 
an escort fighter is not a fair comparison. Designed to a 
British specification in 1940, it benefited from improved 
knowledge of aerodynamics, the development of drop tanks, 
and above all advances in engine development. Indeed, it 
can be added to the 'modified' F. 7/30 and the P. 13/36 
designs as an instance where the replacement of the 
original engine by the Merlin transformed its performance 
from the mediocre to amongst the best. 
60 Price, Fighter Aircraft, pages 14-15 
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If an effective long-range fighter was not a practical 
possibility then the Air Staff's doctrinal arguments 
against escort fighters, right or wrong, were irrelevant. 
Reference has been made on a number of occasions to the 
RAF's interest in the concept that the defensive power of 
a formation of bombers might be increased by including 
some bombers with increased armament in place of bomb 
load. This form of escort was not Put into practice by 
the RAF, but as noted in chapter 2.3.2, when tried by the 
USAAF it was found to be ineffective. 
10.5 SUMMARY 
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that in 
the inter-war years the Air Ministry fostered the 
development of advanced aircraft through its operational 
requirements. Contrary to many published views, the Air 
Ministry encouraged the development of monoplane fighters, 
recognised from the late 1920s the need for multi-machine 
gun fighter-armament, and, as early as 1935, its 
replacement by 20mm cannon. The Ministry saw the need for 
fast long-range bombers for war with Germany, seized the 
apparent opportunity to call for very large bomb loads, 
and sought power-operated multi-gun turrets at a time when 
German and American designs had none. 
Certainly there were problems of coordination and 
management, but these are to be found in any large 
organisation - particularly during periods of rapid 
technical change and expansion. 
In the first eighteen months of war with Germany the RAF's 
fundamental assumption which had guided its operational 
requirements was found to be wrong - the relative 
effectiveness of fighters and bombers in daylight was the 
opposite to that expected. Daylight bombing by self- 
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defending formations of bombers was soon found to be 
untenable in the face of fighter opposition. The 
corollary of this experience was that RAF single-seat 
fighters were equally effective against German bomber 
formations. Breaking up formations of enemy bombers did 
not require multi-seat turret fighters, indeed they were 
themselves exposed when the bombers were escorted by 
single-seat fighters. 
Another lesson learnt from the first year of operations 
was that despite the insistence throughout the 1920s and 
1930s that the RAF's standard fighter should have a night 
flying capability, they were able to provide little 
defence against night attacks. 
All was not lost. other air forces made the same 
misjudgements, and overall the operational requirements 
set by the RAF in the 1930s led to bombers and fighters 
which were at least as effective as those of other 
nations. Moreover, most were adaptable to the not wholly 
unforeseen pattern of air warfare which emerged. The long 
sought "dual-purpose" bombers were effective in the night 
bombing role which was forced upon them, and the multi-gun 
single-seat home defence fighters were effective when 
unexpectedly confronted with enemy fighters - as Dowding 
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